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Abstract	The	 ‘Role	 Model	 Effect’	 (RME)	 broadly	 postulates	 that	 women’s	 presence	 in	male-dominated	 positions	 of	 political	 power	 encourages	 other	 women	 to	participate	 in	 politics.	 In	 this	 study	 I	 contribute	 to	 the	 RME	 scholarship	 by	expanding	the	analytical	scope	prevalent	in	the	literature,	as	I	examine	the	extent	to	which	values,	 characteristics	and	behaviours	 that	 female	university	students	associate	with	the	term	‘female	political	elite’	serve	as	normative	resources	when	they	 make	 important	 life	 decisions.	 Hence,	 this	 study	 analyses	 how	 the	 RME	functions	 by	 emphasising	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 female	 students	 at	 the	University	of	Johannesburg	in	South	Africa.		Based	on	 focus	group	discussions	and	semi-structured	 interviews	conducted	 in	2016-2017,	I	find	that	most	students	do	not	directly	consider	women	in	politics	as	role	models.	However,	students	create	a	connection	between	themselves	and	an	ideal	female	political	elite	through	leadership.	They	construct	a	set	of	norms	that	 they	 expect	 of	 female	 political	 elites	 as	 leaders	 and	 as	 ideal	 versions	 of	themselves:	 someone	 educated,	 hard-working,	 active,	 caring,	 steadfast,	 and	independent.	 Many	 women	 in	 politics	 do	 not	 meet	 these	 ideal	 norms.	Nevertheless,	they	contribute	to	the	construction	of	the	ideal	type	together	with	a	variety	of	women	and	men	who	serve	as	role	models	and	anti-heroes	 for	 the	students.	 These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 it	 would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 women’s	empowerment	 and	 political	 representation	 scholars	 and	 activists,	 especially	within	 the	 western	 context,	 to	 consider	 more	 fully	 people’s	 agency	 and	 the	construction	of	 the	normative	 ideal.	 Consequently,	 this	 shift	 in	 focus	highlights	the	 importance	 of	 access	 to	 relevant	 information	 about	 a	 variety	 of	 women	across	 public	 and	 private	 spheres	 and	 people’s	 ability	 to	 critically	 analyse	 this	information.	 Moreover,	 it	 calls	 for	 future	 explorations	 of	 context-relevant	empowering	ideals	and	constructs.		 	
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1 Women	 in	 Politics	 as	 Role	 Models:	 Gender,	 Power	 and	
Representation		
Introduction	Who	would	you	like	to	be	when	you	grow	up?	This	 is	one	of	the	questions	that	comes	 to	 mind	 when	 we	 think	 about	 role	 models.	 A	 role	 model	 (RM)	 is	 your	mind’s	vision	of	 someone	who	has	 those	special	qualities	you	have	a	 reason	 to	value,	 when	 the	 question	 gets	 asked;	 someone	 whose	 career	 or	 whose	 life	represents	the	ideals	that	you	think	are	possible	for	you.	When	Pearl,	one	of	my	key	informants,	was	growing	up	in	an	Indian/Asian	township	in	the	province	of	KwaZulu-Natal	(KZN)	in	South	Africa,	she	was	confident	that	it	would	be	possible	for	her	to	leave	her	township	and	become	successful.	Pearl	was	an	Indian	South	African,	and	when	we	met	in	May	2017,	she	was	working	as	a	youth	activist	and	co-directing	a	non-governmental	organisation	(NGO).	She	was	a	recent	graduate	from	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 universities	 in	 South	Africa	 and	 had	 a	 student-activist	past,	being	a	member	of	a	political	organisation	on	campus.	She	believed	it	was	her	home	environment	 that	had	enabled	her	 to	 think	of	herself	 as	 exceptional.	Surrounded	by	books	and	television,	and	going	to	a	white	church,	where	she	saw	people	“who	had	made	it	in	life,”	she	was	in	an	environment	unlike	many	of	her	township	peers.	With	high	cadence	and	passion	in	her	speech,	she	said:		 And	 that’s	 the	 thing.	 You	 shouldn’t	 have	 to	 be	 exceptional	 to	 do	well...	And	I	think	that’s	one	of	the	only	reasons	why	I	managed	to	get	 out	 [of	 the	 township],	 because	 I	 always	 thought	 that	 I	 was	exceptional.	 And	 so	 I	was	 like:	 ‘well,	obviously	 I’m	 gonna	 get	 out,	coz	 I’m	 great’.	 ….	 And	 that’s	 what	 it	 takes.	 You	 have	 to	 be	exceptional.		Pearl’s	 statement	 goes	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 expected	 impact	 of	 role	models.	 As	individuals	who	are	seen	to	be	exceptional	and	stand	out	 from	the	crowd,	 they	inspire	 others	 with	 their	 behaviours	 and	 characteristics.	 It	 is	 their	 qualities,	demonstrated	 in	 their	 journeys	 towards	 a	 desirable	 status,	 goal	 or	 outcomes,	whatever	they	may	be,	that	make	them	into	role	models	for	others	with	similar	desires	and	positions	in	life.	The	extent	to	which	women	in	politics	serve	as	role	models	to	young	South	African	women	at	the	University	of	Johannesburg	(UJ)	is	
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the	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis,	 which	 questions	 if	 norms	 that	 students	 associate	with	these	women	serve	as	an	empowering	resource	in	their	decision-making.			According	to	some	feminist	scholarship	on	gender	and	politics,	there	is	evidence	which	suggests	that	women	in	politics	are	role	models	to	other	women	based	on	their	shared	experiences	within	patriarchal1	societies	(Evans,	2016a;	Krook	and	Schwindt-Bayer,	2013;	Morgan	and	Buice,	2013;	Wolbrecht	and	Campbell,	2007).	Their	 successful	 entry	 into	 male-dominated	 offices	 and	 positions	 of	 power	challenges	established	gender	norms,	which	cast	leadership	as	a	male	trait,	and	which	have	naturalised	politics	as	men’s	domain,	while	relegating	women	to	the	privacy	of	the	home.	Women’s	presence	in	these	political	positions	represents	a	different	 social	 order	 and	 helps	 other	women	 to	 envision	 a	 reality	 that	 differs	from	what	socialisation	taught	them	to	be	possible	for	‘someone	like	them’.	The	‘role	 model	 effect’	 (RME),	 then,	 denotes	 the	 observation	 that	 women	 become	encouraged	to	engage	in	politics	in	various	ways	and	to	challenge	the	patriarchal	social	order	when	they	see	other	women	in	politics.			Over	 the	 last	 few	 decades,	 women	 have	 become	 a	 considerable	 presence	 in	formal	politics	and	in	the	public	sphere	more	broadly	 in	many	countries.	South	Africa,	 for	 instance,	has	had	 some	of	 the	world’s	highest	percentages	of	 female	parliamentarians	and	cabinet	members	(Inter-Parliamentary	Union,	2017,	2015,	2014).	 The	 increased	 numerical	 representation	 of	 women	 in	 politics	 since	 the	1990s	in	South	Africa	would	suggest	that	women	have	become	better	entrenched	amongst	most	 political	 echelons.	 This	 in	 turn	 demonstrates	 the	 rise	 of	 gender	norms,	 which	 do	 not	 associate	 political	 leadership	 and	 power	 with	 men	 only.	Women’s	formal	inclusion	in	the	democratic	political	institutions	in	the	country	arises	 from	 a	 long	 history	 of	 women’s	 engagement	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	 the	racist,	patriarchal	political	system	of	apartheid	and	its	colonial	predecessors,	as	well	 as	 from	 the	 experiences	 of	women’s	 pre-colonial	 political	 power	 in	many	parts	of	the	Southern	African	region.			
																																																								1	Patriarchy	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 structures	 and	 systems	 privileging	 masculinities	 and	undermining	the	feminine	(Enloe,	2004).	
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In	late	2016,	Dr	Nkosazana	Dlamini-Zuma	(NDZ),	a	veteran	of	the	anti-apartheid	struggle,	a	 former	cabinet	minister	and	Chairwoman	of	 the	African	Union	(AU),	became	the	front-runner	for	the	position	of	the	president	of	South	Africa’s	ruling	party,	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC).	Her	victory	would	have	symbolically	solidified	 the	 changes	 of	 gender	norms	 in	 the	 realm	of	 political	 representation	and	 many	 hoped	 that	 having	 a	 Black	 African	 woman	 president	 would	 also	expand	the	aspirational	horizons	of	young	women	and	girls	in	the	country.	In	the	end,	 NDZ	 lost	 the	 presidential	 race	 in	 December	 2017	 by	 a	 relatively	 small	margin,	which	sparked	a	series	of	analyses	as	to	why	she	was	not	elected.2	These	debates	 highlighted	 the	 complexity	 of	 her	 candidature	 and	brought	 to	 the	 fore	the	 various	 axes	 of	 power	 shaping	 South	 African	 society.	 It	 highlighted	 once	again	that	women’s	presence	 in	South	African	politics	 is	accompanied	by	sexist	rhetoric,	 misogynistic	 violence,	 and	 everyday	 practices	 of	 marginalization	 and	exclusion,	suggesting	women’s	continued	outsider	status	in	the	public	sphere.	It	also	 showed	 the	 deeply	 felt	 and	 lived	 concerns,	 frustrations,	 and	disenchantments	 with	 the	 politics	 of	 corruption	 and	 patronage	 of	 the	 ruling	classes,	 the	 powerful,	 the	 elite,	 whose	 wealth	 and	 privilege	 stand	 in	 stark	contrast	to	the	poverty	of	 the	majority	(Alejo	Vázquez	Pimentel,	Macías	Aymar,	and	 Lawson,	 2018).	 Women	 in	 South	 African	 politics	 thus	 experience	 and	represent	 a	 complex	 and	 contradictory	 set	 of	 norms,	which	 begs	 the	 question,	whether	 they	 are	 deemed	 as	 empowering	 role	models	 to	 other	women	 in	 the	country	 or	 their	 exceptionalism	 as	 elites	 creates	 a	 sense	 of	 difference	 that	prevents	them	from	contributing	to	the	empowerment	of	other	women.			The	example	of	NDZ’s	bid	 for	 the	presidency	has	 clearly	 shown	 that	women	 in	politics	 need	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 much	 more	 than	 bearers	 of	 a	 particular																																																									2	NDZ’s	 loss	 was	 analysed	 through	 a	 gendered	 lens	 not	 least	 because	 her	 candidature	 was	supported	by	the	ANC	Women’s	League	(WL),	which	drove	the	debate	about	the	 importance	of	the	 first	 female	 president.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 her	 commitment	 to	 gender	 parity	 and	 her	 track	record	on	promoting	women’s	empowerment	had	been	scrutinised	during	the	campaign,	as	was	her	 link	 to	her	 former	husband,	 the	 sitting	president	 Jacob	Zuma.	Her	opponents	depicted	her	potential	presidency	as	a	continuation	of	his	politics	of	corruption,	as	I	discuss	more	in	Chapter	Five,	and	her	 loss	was	partially	 caused	by	 the	switch	of	allegiance	of	a	voting	block	headed	by	David	 Mabuza,	 who	 moved	 away	 from	 the	 Jacob	 Zuma	 faction.	 Lastly,	 NDZ’s	 loss	 was	accompanied	 by	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	 number	 of	 women	 in	 the	 top	 six	 ANC	 positions.	 These	developments	 were	 jointly	 marked	 as	 a	 decline	 of	 gender	 equality	 within	 the	 ANC	 and	demonstrate	 the	 systems	 of	 power	 that	 surround	 women	 in	 South	 African	 politics	 (Morojole,	2018;	Bendile,	2017;	Gerber,	2017).	
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(gender)	 identity	 or	 proponents	 of	 a	 set	 of	 political	 beliefs	 and	 objectives.	However,	much	 of	 the	 early,	 foundational	 scholarship	 on	 the	 RME	 from	North	American	 and	 European	 academics	 has	 insufficiently	 recognised	 these	complexities	 of	women’s	 lived	 experiences.	Hence,	 one	 of	 its	weaknesses	 is	 an	insufficient	 analysis	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 power	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 the	mechanism	 through	 which	 women	 as	 role	 models	 may	 help	 empower	 other	women	 in	 a	 given	 society	 (Celis	 and	 Lovenduski,	 2018).	My	 research	 seeks	 to	build	on	 this	critical	 scholarship	of	 the	RME,	by	shifting	 the	analytical	 focus	on	women’s	lives	and	experiences	and	combining	them	with	an	examination	of	their	views	 and	 perceptions	 of	 women	 in	 positions	 of	 political	 power.	 Hence,	 this	research	 interweaves	 the	 stories	 of	 women	 in	 politics	 with	 stories	 and	experiences	of	 female	citizens:	South	African	university	students,	 their	 families,	friends	 and	 other	women	 in	 their	 lives	 and	 in	 the	 public	 domain.	 It	 shows	 all	these	women	as	both	subjects	and	objects	of	power	and	focuses	on	the	messiness	of	 power,	 identity,	 and	 representation	 across	 the	 public	 and	 private	 spheres.	Thus,	it	strives	to	improve	our	understanding	of	the	RME	mechanism	within	the	broader	decolonial	feminist-inspired	objective	of	empowering	the	oppressed	and	achieving	social	justice.			Based	on	the	insights	from	UJ	students,	I	argue	that	many	women	in	politics	fail	to	 be	 seen	 as	 empowering	 role	 models	 to	 young	 women.	 Their	 counter-stereotypical	presence	 in	politics	 is	not	sufficient	 to	meet	 the	expectations	 that	young	women	construct	of	an	 ideal	woman	 in	politics,	or	what	 I	 refer	 to	 in	 the	thesis	 as	 a	 ‘female	 political	 elite’	 (FPE).	 Together	with	 other	women	 and	men,	who	are	 role	models	and	anti-heroes	 for	young	women,	women	 in	politics	are,	however,	 important	 contributing	 elements	 in	 the	 construction	 process	 of	 the	norms	that	students	attach	to	the	FPE	ideal,	which	I	find	to	be	the	ideal	version	of	the	 student	 herself.	 It	 is	 this	 ideal	 and	 the	 meaning	 that	 the	 students	 want	women	 in	politics	 to	 symbolise	 that	 serves	as	an	empowering	 resource	 for	 the	students	 instead	 of	 the	 individual	 women	 in	 politics.	 Consequently,	 I	 propose	that	 the	 agency	 of	 students	 in	 the	 processes	 of	 construction	 of	 social	 norms	deserve	a	more	prominent	role	in	future	feminist	research	and	activism,	as	it	has	largely	 been	 neglected	 in	 the	 theorizing	 and	 researching	 of	 the	 empowering	
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potential	of	women	 in	politics	as	 role	models.	 In	addition	 to	 these	 implications	for	 the	 RME	 theorising,	 research	 and	 activism,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 RME	 in	 this	thesis	 serves	 as	 a	 lens	 through	which	 to	understand	how	women	at	university	understand,	critique,	and	engage	with	politics	in	South	Africa.	Thus,	this	research	also	contributes	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	South	African	social	order.		
	The	remainder	of	 this	 introductory	chapter	provides	 the	details	of	 the	 theories	and	 debates	 on	 women’s	 political	 representation	 and	 the	 RME	 in	 particular,	explaining	the	aforementioned	weaknesses	in	the	literature.	After	presenting	and	justifying	 the	 research	 question	 and	 sub-questions,	 the	 chapter	 concludes	 by	outlining	the	thesis’	structure.		
Features	of	Women	and	Political	Representation	Scholarship	Research	on	women	in	politics	as	potential	role	models	has	conventionally	been	situated	 within	 the	 literature	 on	 symbolic	 representation.	 The	 conceptual	premises	 of	 this	 scholarship	 stem	 from	 the	work	 of	Hanna	 Pitkin	 (1972),	who	articulates	symbolic	representation	as	one	of	four	types	of	representation.	Pitkin	understands	 representation	 as	 a	 process	 by	 which	 an	 agent	 stands	 for	 a	principal.	 While	 formal	 representation	 denotes	 the	 rules	 and	 procedures	regulating	 the	 delegation	 of	 the	 authority	 to	 act,	 descriptive	 representation	means	 ‘standing	 for’	 someone	 through	a	 connection,	 a	 resemblance	or	 likeness	(1972,	 61);	 substantive	 representation	 means	 ‘acting	 for’	 others	 or	 making	represented	people	“present	in	the	action	rather	than	in	the	characteristics	of	the	actor”	 (1972,	144).	 Symbolic	 representation	 then	denotes	making	 the	principal	present	through	symbols,	be	it	objects	or	people	in	a	way	that	a	flag	symbolises	the	 nation	 (1972,	 92).	 Hence,	 symbolic	 representation	 differs	 from	 the	descriptive	 form	 because	 it	 evokes	 certain	 meanings	 for	 the	 person	 who	perceives	 it	 and	 thus	 symbols	 do	 not	 necessarily	 have	 to	 have	 any	 descriptive	resemblance	to	what	or	whom	they	represent.	Pitkin	prioritises	active	forms	of	representation	 over	 symbolic,	 because	 of	 the	 emphasis	 on	 accountable	relationship,	which	is	particularly	important	for	democratic	citizenship,	which	is	the	context	in	which	she	works	(Childs	and	Lovenduski,	2013).			
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Feminist	 and	 gender	 scholars,	 amongst	 others,	 have	 substantially	 expanded	Pitkin’s	 theorization	 of	 representation	 since	 the	 1970s;	 however,	 it	 is	 still	important	 to	 recognise	 that	 RME	 scholarship	 originates	 from	 Pitkin’s	 work,	because	her	undervaluing	of	symbolic	representation	has	 led	to	a	reluctance	to	engage	 with	 it	 in	 subsequent	 scholarship,	 pushing	 it	 to	 the	 margins	 of	 the	discipline.	As	 Jane	Mansbridge,	another	representation	scholar	summarises,	 “In	political	 contexts	 the	word	 ‘symbol’	 often	 bears	 the	 unspoken	modifier	 ‘mere’.	Moreover,	 symbols	are	often	perceived	as	being	 ‘only’	 in	people’s	heads	 rather	than	‘real’”	(1999,	652).	Thus,	while	mainstream	political	science	scholarship	had	been	dismissive	of	symbolic	representation,	as	it	is	about	evoking	beliefs,	norms	and	more	 generally	 about	 creating	 social	meaning,	 its	 importance	 for	 feminist	scholars	had	become	increasingly	recognised.				In	 the	 early	 feminist	 scholarship	 carried	 out	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 North	American	and	European	academia,	the	role	model	function	of	women	in	politics	was	understood	as	a	mechanism	by	which	women’s	presence	in	political	offices	symbolised	that	women	are	capable	and	fit	to	rule	(Mansbridge,	1999,	650).	As	such,	 the	 RME	 is	 understood	 to	 counteract	 socialisation	 processes	which	 instil	gender	norms	keeping	women	out	of	decision-making	and	the	public	sphere	 to	various	degrees,	and	perpetuating	leadership	and	political	acumen	as	masculine	traits.	 Gender	 norms	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 widely	 held	 sets	 of	 expectations	within	a	particular	spatial	and	temporal	context,	of	how	men	and	women	should	behave	 in	 order	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 intelligible	 and	 be	 accepted	 by	 their	communities.	Gender	norms	which	are	 set	 in	binaries	of	male/female	and	 thus	are	 tied	 to	 biological	 sex,	 took	 on	 their	 current	 configuration	 as	 a	 result	 of	capitalist	 forms	 of	 economic	 production	 and	 spread	 through	 colonialism	 and	imperialism	 from	 Europe	 to	 other	 regions,	 including	 South	 Africa.	 Through	colonialism	 and	 the	 accompanying	 missionary	 activities,	 gender	 norms	 were	imposed,	and	either	replaced	or	transformed	local	sets	of	norms,	which	in	many	instances	did	not	feature	differentiated	expectations	for	men	and	women	in	sex-based	 binary	 forms	 (Mendoza,	 2016;	 Lugones,	 2008;	 Oyèwùmí,	 2002).	 These	gender	 norms,	 which	 result	 in	 disproportionally	 lower	 presence	 of	 women	 in	leadership	positions,	are	manifested	 in	various	ways.	For	example,	 they	 lead	to	
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women’s	 lack	of	 self-confidence	or	 their	perception	 that	 in	 comparison	 to	men	with	equal	credentials	they	are	less	qualified	for	office	(Fox	and	Lawless,	2011).	Hence,	 when	 considering	 political	 office,	 women	 fight	 internalised	 norms	 and	expectations	that	they	belong	to	the	privacy	of	the	home	as	mothers	and	carers	rather	 than	 to	 the	public	 sphere	 (Gouws	and	Hassim,	2014;	Bauer	and	Britton,	2006;	Sadie,	2005).			Against	 this	 backdrop,	 the	 RM	 theory	 postulates	 that	 by	 virtue	 of	 a	 shared	gendered	 experience,	 female	 politicians	 become	 role	 models	 and	 help	 other	women	overcome	 this	 “internalized	 sexism”	 (Broockman,	2014,	3).	They	 foster	an	“emancipative	belief”	that	“emphasizes	the	equal	empowerment	of	all	people	to	 freely	 actualize	 their	 potentials,	 irrespective	 of	 group	 differences,	 including	those	of	sex”	(Alexander	and	Welzel,	2011,	369).	Consequently,	with	the	rise	 in	the	 numbers	 of	 female	 politicians,	 positive	 changes	 emerge	 to	 the	 supply	 of	female	candidates	as	well	as	the	demand	for	female	decision	makers	and	leaders	from	 both	 men	 and	 women	 alike.	 Studies	 suggest	 that	 if	 women	 are	 seen	 as	competent	 problem	 solvers,	 they	 can	 come	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 leaders	 over	 time	(Evans,	2016a;	Beaman	et	al.,	2012),	but	the	impact	behind	the	novelty	of	their	presence	can	also	diminish	after	several	electoral	cycles	as	they	become	part	of	the	establishment	(Gilardi,	2015).	In	situations	of	social	discontent,	for	example,	support	 for	women’s	political	engagement	 increases	 if	women	are	perceived	as	alternatives	or	outsiders	to	the	establishment	(Morgan	and	Buice,	2013).			Gender	norms	which	negatively	affect	women’s	ability	to	enter	and	successfully	perform	in	the	public	sphere	are	embedded	in	institutional	culture	and	practices	within	 political	 organisations.	 Thus,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 aforementioned	internalised	 norms,	 there	 are	 also	 external	 norms	 and	 expectations	 that	 push	women	out	of	 the	public	 sphere	and	politics	 in	particular	 (Piscopo,	2018).	The	well-documented	 experiences	 of	 African	 female	 parliamentarians	 (Gouws	 and	Hassim,	2014;	Burnet,	2011;	Devlin	and	Elgie,	2008;	Tripp,	2001;	Tamale,	2000)	reveal	 these	 practices	 that	 are	 both	 formal	 and	 informal.	 One	 example	 is	 the	propensity	 of	 political	 parties	 to	 avoid	 or	 undermine	 the	 implementation	 of	practices	that	would	promote	women	in	the	institutional	hierarchy.	This	can	be	
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seen	 in	 fielding	female	candidates	 in	spots	where	they	are	unelectable	(Tadros,	2015).	 Consequently,	 a	 proportional	 representation	 (PR)	 electoral	 system	with	closed	party	lists,	which	is	also	used	in	South	Africa,	is	positively	associated	with	women’s	successful	entry	into	office,	especially	when	accompanied	with	official,	national	 quota	 systems	 and	 sanctions,	 because	 they	 address	 these	 institutional	party	 practices	 (Murray,	 2018;	 Krook	 and	 Norris,	 2014;	 Tinker,	 2004).	Additionally,	leftist	parties	also	seem	to	provide	more	opportunities	for	women,	at	 least	 as	 far	 as	 numerical	 representation	 is	 concerned,	 although	 the	opportunities	 to	 exercise	 substantive,	 political	 power	 remains	 questionable	(Krook	and	Schwindt-Bayer,	2013;	Bauer,	2012,	2011;	Bauer	and	Britton,	2006;	Lindberg,	2004).			Internal	 operational	 party	 rules	 and	 practices	 also	 impede	 women’s	 political	performance	 and	 ability	 to	 move	 up	 the	 party	 ladder.	 These	 obstacles	 are	especially	 cumbersome	 for	 women	 who	 choose	 to	 or	 have	 to	 combine	 their	political	 careers	 with	 other	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	 such	 as	 providing	 the	unpaid	 care	 for	 their	 households	 and	 families.	 Ranging	 from	meeting	 times	 at	late	 hours	 of	 the	 night	 to	 insufficient	 physical	 infrastructure,	 parties	 fail	 to	change	 their	modus	operandi,	which	has	been	set	up	 to	suit	 the	privileged,	but	does	not	accommodate	most	female	politicians.	In	this	regard,	parties	mirror	and	co-construct	practices	 in	other	political	 institutions	and	create	a	 context	which	communicates	 that	women	 do	 not	 belong	 in	 the	 public	 realm	 (Kittilson,	 2013;	Tiessen,	2008;	Ross,	2002).			The	 formally	 exclusionary	 environment	 is	 exacerbated	 by	 informal	 practices	perpetuated	 by	 the	 so-called	 ‘Old-Boys	 Club’	 mentality.	 Male	 politicians	 have	been	shown	 in	various	degrees	 to	question	women’s	presence	within	 the	party	structures,	 their	ability	 to	 lead	and	perform	on	an	 ‘equal’	 footing	as	 they	see	 it,	and	some	even	actively	undermine	women’s	political	careers	and	performance.	Experiences	 of	 sexual	 harassment,	 amongst	 other	 forms	 of	 physical	 and	psychological	 violence	 are	 probably	 the	 most	 notorious	 manifestations	 of	 this	sexism	and	misogyny,	which,	however,	are	often	hidden	in	public	debates.	Hence,	formal	and	informal	factors	converge	to	create	and	maintain	patriarchal	political	
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institutions,	such	as	political	parties	and	parliaments,	resulting	 in	 the	dearth	of	women	 in	 leadership	 positions	 (Ahikire,	Musiimenta	 and	Ashaba	Mwiin,	 2015;	Tripp,	2006;	Sadie,	2005).			The	successes	of	women	such	as	Helen	Zille,	Premier	of	the	Western	Cape	(WC)	Province	 and	 the	 former	 leader	 for	 eight	 years	 of	 the	 South	 Africa’s	 main	opposition	party,	the	Democratic	Alliance	(DA),	demonstrate	women’s	ability	to	rise	 within	 party	 structures;	 yet,	 their	 achievements	 do	 not	 negate	 the	overarching	 patriarchal	 nature	 of	 the	 system.	On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 frequently	show	that	women	have	 to	work	extraordinarily	hard	 to	 ‘prove’	 themselves	and	overcome	the	gender-based	barriers,	suggesting	that	they	perform	much	better	than	 the	majority	of	 the	men	against	whom	they	compete	 (Besley	et	al.,	2017).	Moreover,	 some	 of	 these	 women’s	 careers	 demonstrate	 that	 their	 success	 is	dependent	 on	 their	 adoption	 of	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	 that	 either	resonate	with	 the	masculine	nature	of	politics,	 or	 at	 least	do	not	 challenge	 the	core	 underpinnings	 of	 the	 patriarchal	 structures.	 In	 some	 instances,	 female	politicians	achieve	this	by	acting	in	line	with	the	dominant	forms	of	masculinity	in	 the	 given	 political	 context.	 Others	 perform	 iterations	 of	 femininity	 that	 are	acceptable	to	the	patriarchal	gaze	perpetuated	by	both	men	and	women	(Gqola,	2015;	Laher	2014).	I	return	to	some	of	these	issues	in	Chapters	Three	and	Eight,	as	 I	explore	them	in	South	Africa	specifically,	using	the	case	study	of	 the	ruling	ANC.		The	 RME	 theories	 are	 thus	 founded	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 FPEs	 symbolise	 a	challenge	 to	prevalent	gender	norms	and	hence	RME	can	be	re-articulated	as	a	process	whereby	 norms	 that	 FPEs	 represent	 serve	 as	 normative	 resources	 for	the	empowerment	of	others.	Naila	Kabeer	defines	empowerment	as	 “processes	of	 change	 through	which	 those	who	have	been	denied	 the	 capacity	 to	 exercise	choice	gain	this	capacity”	(2012,	217).	In	Kabeer’s	conceptualisation,	power	is	an	“ability	 to	make	 choices”,	which	 suggests	 the	existence	and	one’s	 awareness	of	meaningful	alternatives.	The	choices	that	Kabeer	engages	with	are	in	matters	of	“strategic	 importance”,	 such	 as	 whether	 to	 get	 married	 or	 get	 employed,	 as	decisions	 of	 everyday	 nature,	 such	 as	 what	 to	 cook	 for	 dinner,	 might	 not	
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necessarily	 challenge	 gender	 norms	 and	 power	 hierarchies	 (Kabeer,	 1999,	 2).	One’s	 ability	 to	 exercise	 power	 (agency)	 is	 influenced	 by	 various	 inputs,	including	social	norms,	which	can	either	inhibit	or	enable	one’s	agency	(Kabeer,	1999,	 3).	 However,	 presence	 of	 and	 access	 to	 resources	 does	 not	 necessarily	mean	 control	 over	 them	 and	 therefore,	 resources	 do	 not	 automatically	 lead	 to	improved	 agency	 (Malhotra	 and	 Schuler,	 2005;	 Mason,	 2005;	 Kabeer,	 1999).	Thus,	empowerment	cannot	be	done	for	disempowered	women	and	men,	but	it	is	a	process	of	change	that	they	undergo.			Enhancing	 one’s	 ‘power	 within’	 –	 an	 ability	 to	 overcome	 internalised	 gender	norms	 which	 inhibit	 one’s	 agency	 –	 is	 the	 key	 idea	 behind	 both	 women’s	empowerment	 and	 the	 RM	 theories.	 Empowerment	 scholars	 such	 as	 Cornwall	(2014),	Kabeer	(2012),	Eyben	and	Napier-Moore	(2009)	and	Wilson	(2009)	also	highlight	however,	 the	 importance	of	stimulating	a	collective	 ‘power-with’.	 It	 is	through	women’s	coming	together	in	solidarity	and	discussion	that	the	impetus	to	 demand	 societal	 transformation	 arises,	 because	 it	 creates	 critical	 distance	from	one’s	internalised	subjectivities.	Collective	action	is	thus	crucial	to	achieve	structural	 and	 systematic	 change	 and	 to	 resist	 power,	 domination	 and	exploitation	 (McGee,	 2016).	 As	 Srilatha	 Batliwala	 (2007)	 points	 out,	 based	 on	this	 conceptualisation,	 empowerment	 in	 the	 20th	 century	 was	 primarily	 a	political	 feminist	 project	 of	 personal	 and	 social	 transformation.	 Through	 the	mainstreaming	 and	 large	 uptake	 of	 empowerment	 discourses,	 however,	empowerment	 has	 been	 depoliticised	 and	 lost	 its	 focus	 on	 power	 and	 radical	social	 transformation	 in	 favour	 of	 individualised	 economic	 change	 (Cornwall,	2014;	 Batliwala,	 2007).	 Hence,	 individualistic	 or	 ‘liberating’	 empowerment,	unlike	 collective,	 works	 alongside	 the	 neoliberal	 economic	 paradigm	 that	dominates	 development	 policy	 and	practice,	 and	which	 renders	 empowerment	into	an	instrument	for	incorporating	women	as	entrepreneurs	into	the	local	and	global	 economy	 (Cornwall	 and	 Edwards,	 2014).	 While	 Batliwala	 (2007)	questions	 whether	 empowerment	 should	 be	 abandoned	 for	 a	 new	 concept	 in	light	of	its	current	political	impotence	to	challenge	power	structures,	the	theories	and	empirical	scholarship	rather	than	policy	and	state	practice	are	useful	for	the	
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study	of	FPEs	as	role	models	and	the	norms	attached	to	them	as	empowerment	resources.			Despite	empowerment’s	usefulness	for	the	RM	scholarship,	most	political	science	scholars	who	work	on	the	RME	and	who	are	situated	within	North	American	and	European	academia,	have	not	been	engaging	with	power	and	empowerment	in	a	meaningful	manner,	being	focused	primarily	on	the	issue	of	representation	and	participation	 within	 the	 liberal	 democratic	 theorising,	 which	 I	 explore	 in	 the	following	 section.	 Alexander	 (2012),	 Alexander	 and	 Welzel	 (2011)	 and	Zetterberg	(2009),	for	example,	evoke	empowerment,	but	they	do	not	extend	the	theoretical	debates	and	do	not	analyse	power	of	the	norm	that	lies	at	the	core	of	the	RME	mechanism.	The	notable	exceptions	are	the	edited	volume	by	Alexander,	Bolzendahl	and	Jalalzai	(2018),	who	identify	these	disciplinary	silos	and	seek	to	use	 the	 empowerment	 literature	 from	 development	 studies	 to	 explore	 and	theorise	 the	 concept	 of	 women’s	 political	 empowerment	 on	 a	 global	 scale.	Second,	 is	the	work	by	Lombardo	and	Meier	(2014,	172),	who	demonstrate	the	usefulness	 of	 symbolic	 representation	 for	 the	understanding	 of	 power	 through	informal,	 unspoken	 cultural	 norms;	 however,	 they	 do	 not	 examine	 if	 and	 how	individual	women	as	role	models	can	help	empower	other	women.	In	contrast	to	the	aforementioned	scholars,	many	gender	and	development	scholars	engaging	with	political	empowerment	have	focused	on	the	issue	of	power	in	a	much	more	targeted	 manner.	 Mariz	 Tadros	 (2015,	 68)	 for	 example	 cautions	 about	 the	propensity	 to	 equate	 women’s	 political	 representation	 with	 empowerment,	highlighting	the	eliteness	and	various	forms	of	privilege	that	facilitate	entry	into	politics	for	women	and	men,	leaving	out	voices	of	those	whose	are	marginalised	by	their	age	or	ethnicity	amongst	other	identities	and	structures	of	power.			In	 the	 following	 section	 I	 elaborate	 on	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 the	 RM	 scholarship	regarding	the	focus	on	specific	forms	of	political	representation	and	participation	which	emerges	out	of	the	critical	scholarship	of	many	African	feminists.			 	
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Representation	and	Participation	Nexus	Due	to	the	intellectual	and	disciplinary	origins	of	the	RM	scholarship	in	political	sciences	 in	 the	 global	North,	 scholars	 have	 focused	 on	 analysing	 the	 impact	 of	women’s	 representation	 as	 a	 means	 to	 encourage	 women’s	 political	 efficacy,	interest	 and	 participation	 against	 the	 standards	 of	 liberal	 democracies.	 This	scholarship	 claims	 that	 gender	 norms	 associated	 with	 politics,	 which	 can	 be	understood	as	 “processes,	philosophies,	behaviors,	and	systems	of	organization	that	relate	to	state	governance”	(Hill	Collins	and	Chepp,	2013,	73)	contribute	to	women’s	 unequal	 participation,	 despite	 equal	 citizenship	 rights	 (Siim,	 2013;	Cornwall,	 Robins	 and	 Von	 Lieres,	 2011;	 Lister,	 2003;	 Phillips,	 1991;	 Connell,	1990;	 Fraser	 1990).	 Participation,	 or	 in	 other	 words	 access	 and	 inclusion	 in	formal	 politics,	 have	 consequently	 become	 the	main	 response	 of	many	 gender	equality	programmes	and	policies.	Tied	 to	 the	aforementioned	 ‘principal-agent’	based	 theorizations	 of	 representation,	 female	 elected	 office	 holders	 dominated	the	 RM	 scholarship	 until	 the	 early	 2000s.	Most	 studies	 have	 been	 focusing	 on	national	 or	 provincial/state	 level	members	 of	 parliaments	 (MPs),	 but	 over	 the	last	decade	women	in	the	executive	have	been	increasingly	included	in	the	pool	of	 ‘women	 in	politics’	 that	 are	 analysed	 (Jalalzai	 and	dos	 Santos,	 2015;	 Jalalzai	and	Alexander,	2014).			This	focus,	which	I	refer	to	as	the	‘political	representation-participation	nexus’,	is	however,	not	suitable	to	grasp	a	broader	understanding	of	politics	in	the	context	of	the	global	South,	nor	is	it	suitable	in	a	context	of	crisis	of	parliamentarianism	and	 liberal	 democracy	 (Tadros	 2015),	 where	 spaces	 for	 formal	 political	representation	 and	 participation	 become	 the	 domains	 of	 the	 elites	 and	 the	privileged,	both	women	and	men.	As	institutional	and	formal	political	processes	do	 not	 provide	 sufficient	 voice	 and	 opportunities	 for	 the	marginalised	women	and	 men,	 especially	 between	 infrequent	 moments	 of	 electoral	 participation,	disillusioned	 and	 discontented	 groups	 look	 for	 alternatives	 that	 are	 closer	 to	their	everyday	realities	(Dawson,	2014b;	Cornwall,	Robins	and	von	Lieres,	2011;	Marien,	Hooghe	and	Quintelier,	2010).	Women’s	movements	and	civil	society	in	particular	 have	 offered	 an	 accessible,	 direct	 alternative	 to	 formal	 politics,	 and	
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when	 they	 were	 autonomous,	 they	 led	 to	 many	 important	 constitutional	 and	legislative	 changes	 towards	 gender	 equality	 on	 the	 continent	 (Bridger	 2018;	Hughes	and	Tripp,	2015;	Bauer	and	Burnet,	2013;	Weldon,	2011;	Waylen,	2008).	In	many	countries,	 the	 line	between	 the	 state	and	civil	 society	as	 two	separate	sites	 of	 representation	 is	 blurred,	 as	 many	 women	 move	 between	 positions	within	 the	 state	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations	 (CSOs),	 where	 they	 build	leadership	 skills	 and	 platforms	 to	 enter	 formal	 politics	 (Cornwall,	 Robins	 and	Von	Lieres,	2011;	Hassim,	2006b;	Burns,	Schlozman	and	Verba,	2001).			For	many	South	African	women	for	example,	burial	societies,	prayer	circles	and	savings	 groups,	 the	 so-called	 stokvels,	 offered	 important	 spaces	 for	 socializing	and	political	conscientisation	during	apartheid	when	other	forms	of	participation	and	 engagement	 were	 not	 available	 (Shange,	 2017;	 Willoughby-Herard,	 2014;	Stevenson,	 2011).	 The	 history	 of	 anti-colonial	 liberation	 struggles	 across	 the	continent	shows	that	women	also	engaged	in	violent,	armed	struggles	as	a	means	of	their	political	participation.	Moreover,	ethnic	kingdoms	and	chiefdoms,	which	are	not	part	of	the	Eurocentric	RM	scholarship	repertoire,	are	under-researched	as	 sites	 of	 political	 representation	 for	 African	 women,	 often	 under	 the	 false	colonial	homogenising	understanding	of	African	societies	being	patriarchal	and	misogynist,	and	hence	automatically	unable	to	provide	women	access	to	political	power	(M’Cormack-Hale,	2015;	Cornwall,	Robins	and	Von	Lieres,	2011;	Comaroff	and	 Comaroff,	 2003).	 Achille	 Mbembe	 highlights	 the	 particular	 importance	 of	these	 unconventional	 engagements	 in	 post-colonial	 contexts,	 where	 the	domination	is	complemented	with	conviviality	and	thus	“the	analyst	must	watch	out	for	the	myriad	ways	in	which	ordinary	people	guide,	deceive	and	actually	toy	with	power	instead	of	confronting	it	directly”	(1992,	25).			Many	 African	 feminists	 highlight	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 so-called	 naked	 protests	whereby,	 through	 exposing	 their	 breasts	 or	 buttocks	 in	 public,	 African	women	shame	 other	 members	 of	 their	 communities,	 especially	 men,	 and	 expose	 the	violence	against	their	bodies,	while	highlighting	their	life-giving	power	(Andrade,	2002).	 Feminist	 activists	 continue	 to	 build	 on	 this	 tradition,	 with	 primary	examples	including	women	who	were	members	of	the	Fallist	student	protests	in	
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South	 Africa,	 who	 staged	 several	 naked	 or	 nude	 protests,	 be	 it	 in	 response	 to	police	and	security	brutality	or	against	rape	and	other	forms	of	violence	against	their	 bodies	 (Ndlovu,	 2017;	 Gouws,	 2016a;	Miller	 2016).	 The	 centrality	 of	 the	body	 in	African	 feminisms	 (Bennett,	2011;	Nnaemeka,	2004)	arises	against	 the	colonial	 racist	 hyper-sexualisation,	 control	 and	 abuse	 of	 African	 women,	 most	iconically	manifested	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 Sara	Baartman	who	 “was	 taken	 from	South	 Africa	 to	 Europe	 to	 be	 paraded	 as	 a	 freak	 on	 account	 of	 her	 protruding	buttocks	and	elongated	 labia”	 (Vincent	2016,	7).	Similarly,	Pumla	Gqola	 (2015)	highlights	the	metaphor	of	the	colonial	rape	of	land	on	the	continent	being	tied	to	the	rape	of	women’s	bodies,	which	consequently	transforms	the	sites	and	forms	of	women’s	participation	 in	politics	 in	a	post-colonial,	patriarchal	racist	society	and	the	centrality	of	women’s	bodies	in	these	efforts.			Non-formal	means	 of	 participation	 are	 also	 of	 importance	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	globally	 for	 the	 youth	 as	 new	 technologies	 and	 social	 media	 become	 more	prominent	 (Coffé	 and	 Campbell,	 2017;	 Lewis,	 Tigist	 and	 van	 Vuuren,	 2013;	Honwana,	 2012;	 Dalton,	 2008;	 Diouf,	 2003)	 and	 for	 African	 feminists	 in	particular	 (Nyambura	 2018;	 Bennett,	 2011).	 Scholars	 have	 also	 shown,	 for	example,	 how	 music	 and	 youth	 culture	 have	 had	 a	 considerable	 political	influence,	which	 is	 often	 disregarded	 in	 the	 consideration	 of	 political	 activism.	The	South	African	genre	of	Kwaito,	which	evolved	in	particular	in	the	1990s	as	a	cultural	expression	of	the	Black	African	youth,	played	a	significant	role	in	helping	to	 shape	 the	 idea	 of	 South	 African	 belonging	 and	 identity	 and	 had	 profound	political	 implications,	despite	being	seen	as	apolitical	(Steingo,	2017;	Honwana,	2012).	The	Gender	 and	Cultural	 Citizenship	Working	Group	 captures	 this	need	as:	 looking	 for	 politics	 and	 issues	 of	 power	 and	 inequality	 in	 arenas	normally	considered	to	be	outside	of	the	domain	of	citizenship,	for	example,	 issues	 of	 spirituality,	 emotion,	 family	 and	 kinship,	sexuality	and	intimate	relations,	and	domestic	and	sexual	violence	(2009,	7).		Hence,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 of	 widening	 the	 definition	 of	 politics	 to	 the	extent	that	it	becomes	devoid	of	meaning	and	practically	useless	(Hooghe,	2014),	the	 term	 needs	 to	 be	 open	 to	 new	 insights	 and	 to	 be	 made	 contextually	
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appropriate.	 Oinas,	 Onodera	 and	 Suurpää	 (2017)	 use	 the	 term	 ‘political	engagement’	as	a	means	to	challenge	the	narrow	approach	of	traditional	political	participation	vocabulary	in	their	work	on	politics,	and	to	expand	the	horizons	of	the	 possible	 interpretations	 of	 forms	 and	 styles	 of	 politics,	 which	 I	 use	throughout	the	thesis.		The	 aforementioned	 recognition	 of	 the	 role	 of	 movements	 in	 representing	‘women’s	 interests’,	 if	 indeed	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 such	 collective	interests,	is	tied	up	with	scholarship	on	women’s	substantive	representation	and	the	 constructivist	 turn,	 which	 challenges	 the	 assumption	 of	 the	 democratic	theory	 that	 representation	 is	purely	a	bottom-up	process	 starting	with	citizens	(Celis	 and	 Mügge,	 2017;	 Warren,	 2017).	 Various	 studies	 demonstrate	 the	opposite	 directionality	 of	 representation,	 with	 politicians	 and	 political	institutions	 affecting	 their	 constituents’	 views,	 opinions,	 and	 behaviour	(Broockman	 and	 Butler,	 2017;	 Bullock,	 2011;	 McDonagh,	 2009).	 Morgan	 and	Buice	 (2013),	 for	example,	 find	 that	men	and	 individuals	 connected	 to	political	parties	are	more	likely	to	take	cues	from	political	elites	and	shift	their	views	on	women	 in	 politics	 according	 to	 these	 cues.	 Hence,	 representatives	 not	 only	respond	to	the	citizens,	but	also	shape	them	and	construct	a	certain	image	of	who	they	are.			The	reversed	directionality	between	the	representative	agents	and	principals	has	been	theorised	by	Michael	Saward	(2006)	through	the	notion	of	 ‘representative	claim	making’.	He	argues	that	“representation	is	not	a	mere	fact	that	‘just	is,’	so	representations	 (depictions,	 portrayals,	 encapsulations)	 of	 self	 and	 others	 in	politics	 do	 not	 just	 happen.	 People	 construct	 them,	 put	 them	 forward,	 make	claims	 for	 them	 –	 make	 them	 [original	 emphasis]”	 (2006,	 301).	 Emanuela	Lombardo	and	Petra	Meier	(2017,	2014)	expand	Saward’s	theory	by	focusing	on	the	construction	of	gender	in	politics	and	do	so	particularly	by	utilizing	discourse	analysis.	 They	 demonstrate	 that	 by	 representing	women	 and	men	 in	 gendered	ways,	representatives	(not	only	elected	office	holders)	construct	gender	norms,	which	in	turn	serve	to	perpetuate	social	identity,	political	legitimacy	and	control.	Thus,	 they	 show	 that	 symbols	 do	 not	 only	 ‘stand	 for’	 the	 principal	 as	 Pitkin	
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(1972)	 postulates.	 The	 authors	 further	 highlight	 that	 evocations	 of	 gender	become	 subject	 to	 interpretation	 by	 individual	 citizens,	 meaning	 that	 the	citizens’	 positioning	 affects	 their	 interpretations	 of	 their	 symbolic	representations.	 Similarly,	 Shirin	 Rai	 (2017,	 2015)	 shows	 that	 rituals	 and	ceremonies	 in	 political	 institutions	 can	 be	 approached	 and	 analysed	 as	performances	 towards	 citizens	 and	 other	 audiences.	 These	 performances	 are	judged	on	their	authenticity	amongst	other	elements	and	are	subsequently	met	with	 various	 responses	 from	 the	 audience,	 ranging	 from	 their	 acceptance	 to	rejection	and	resistance.			The	examination	of	 the	RME	within	 the	representation-participation	nexus	and	the	weaknesses	 that	 arise	 from	 it	 against	 the	post-colonial	African	 context,	 are	partially	 facilitated	 by	 the	 disciplinary	 preference	 of	 political	 scientists	 to	 use	quantitative	 methods,	 which	 by	 default	 require	 a	 simplification	 of	 complex	gender	 socializing	 processes	 (Childs	 and	 Lovenduski,	 2013,	 491;	 Franceschet,	Krook	and	Piscopo,	2012,	234).	It	should,	therefore,	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	the	RME	literature	has	produced	inconclusive	results,	depending	on	the	research	design.	 Correlations	 between	 women’s	 political	 representation	 and	 various	forms	of	political	participation	have	been	established	and	are	further	supported	by	 anecdotal,	 qualitative	 evidence,	which	 suggests	 that	 FPEs	 are	 symbols,	 role	models	and	a	resource	for	some	women.	This	justifies	the	need	for	a	qualitative	study	 that	 would	 address	 the	 methodological	 and	 theoretical	 weaknesses	 and	provide	new	insights	into	the	RME	mechanism.	
Research	Question	and	Sub-Questions	Building	on	 the	above	outlined	 literature	and	 theorising	of	 the	RME,	 this	 study	asks:	 To	 what	 extent	 do	 female	 university	 students	 in	 present	 day	 South	 Africa	
consider	 values,	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	 represented	 by	 female	 political	
elites,	when	they	make	decisions	they	deem	important	to	their	lives?	In	 particular,	the	research	strives	to	understand:		 1) What	are	the	key	decisions	that	the	students	have	made	so	far?		a. How	were	these	decisions	made?		
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b. Who	were	the	key	individuals	involved?		c. How	is	the	South	African	context,	including	gender	norms,	shaping	these	decisions?	2) Who	are	female	political	elites	according	to	the	students?		a. How	do	the	students	understand	eliteness?3	b. How	 do	 their	 perceptions	 of	 eliteness	 change	 with	 the	compounded	understanding	of	politics	and	gender	norms?	3) What	 are	 the	 values,	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	 that	 they	 expect	 of	female	political	elites?	a. 	Are	 these	 expectations	 met	 by	 the	 particular	 individuals	 they	consider	to	be	female	political	elites?			The	 formulation	 of	 the	 research	 question	 and	 sub-questions	 addresses	 the	limitation	 of	 the	 binary	 focus	 on	 the	 representation-participation	nexus	within	an	equally	limited	notion	of	what	is	considered	‘political	action’	as	tied	to	liberal	democracies.	Firstly,	by	using	the	term	‘female	political	elite’	rather	than	a	pre-selected,	particular	group	of	women	in	politics,	the	research	allows	participants	to	 interpret	 the	 notions	 of	 ‘politics’	 and	 to	 select	 the	women	who	 they	 see	 as	relevant.	 Secondly,	 the	 research	question	extends	 the	 scope	of	 analysis	beyond	political	 participation	 by	 examining	 decision-making	 processes	 of	 research	participants,	based	on	the	aforementioned	women’s	empowerment	literature	on	decision-making	as	an	indication	of	agency.	Formulating	the	research	question	in	this	 manner	 avoids	 presumptions	 about	 the	 spheres	 of	 life	 in	 which	 the	 RME	induced	 ‘emancipative	 belief’	 as	 Alexander	 and	 Welzel	 (2011)	 put	 it,	 can	 be	experienced	 and	 perceived.	 Thirdly,	 the	 question	 embraces	 the	 intersecting	nature	 of	 gender	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 power	 and	 inequality	 by	 focusing	 on	undefined,	undetermined	values,	characteristics	and	behaviours	associated	with																																																									3	I	use	the	term	eliteness	throughout	the	thesis	separately	from	elitism,	which	Merriam-Webster	dictionary	 defines	 as	 “leadership	 or	 rule	 by	 an	 elite”;	 “the	 selectivity	 of	 the	 elite;	 especially	snobbery”	 or	 “consciousness	 of	 being	 or	 belonging	 to	 an	 elite”	 (Elitism,	 2018).	 Eliteness	 in	distinction	 is	 meant	 to	 designate	 the	 norms	 attached	 to	 individuals	 or	 institutions	 who	 are	understood	 to	be	elite,	or	 in	other	words,	 to	 capture	what	 it	means	 to	be	elite	and	 to	perform	being	 elite,	 which	 might	 not	 automatically	 involve	 selectivity.	 Some	 literature,	 for	 example	Thurlow	 and	 Jaworski	 (2017a,	 2017b),	 use	 the	 terms	 eliteness	 and	 elitism	 interchangeably.	However,	in	order	to	highlight	that	elitism	as	snobbery	may	or	may	not	be	part	of	being	elite,	and	that	 there	 is	 a	 broader	 scope	 of	 understanding	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 elite,	 I	 use	 the	 terms	distinctively.		
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the	 term	 FPE.	 Consequently,	 my	 study	 seeks	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	 better	understanding	of	the	RME	mechanisms	and	of	the	impact	of	women	in	politics	as	complex	 individuals,	 situated	 within	 intersecting	 systems	 of	 power	 and	 hence	amongst	 broader	 set	 of	 actors	 who	 shape	 people’s	 lives	 realities.	 Ultimately,	 I	strive	to	distil	 if	and	how	the	delivery	of	the	emancipative	potential	of	the	RME	may	 be	 achieved	 and	 thus	 how	 it	 fits	 within	 a	 broader	 spectrum	 of	 feminist	strategies	to	promote	social	justice	and	tackle	gender	inequality.		South	 Africa	 offers	 a	 very	 productive	 context	 for	 the	 explorations	 of	 the	 RME	mechanism	due	to	 the	aforementioned	paradoxes	and	controversies,	which	put	female	 politicians	 in	 a	 complex	 position	 as	 both	 power	 holders	 and	 the	disempowered,	 be	 it	 vis-à-vis	 their	 male	 peers	 or	 fellow	 citizens.	 As	 I	 have	mentioned	earlier,	women	continued	to	maintain	substantial	presence	 in	South	African	national	and	provincial	politics	in	2016	–	2017,	despite	a	declining	trend	in	 numerical	 representation	 since	 the	 first	 post-apartheid	 government	 which	came	 into	 power	 following	 the	 first	multi-racial,	 democratic	 elections	 in	 1994.	Since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 women	 have	 also	 held	 some	 of	 the	 highest	 positions	within	the	South	African	Police	Service	(SAPS),	South	African	Defence	Force,	the	judiciary	 and	 the	 diplomatic	 corps.	 According	 to	 the	 Elections	 Commission	(2014,	50),	in	2013	only	a	third	of	South	Africans	believed	that	men	were	better	leaders	 than	 women,	 and	 46%	 believed	 that	 their	 interests	 would	 be	 better	represented	if	there	were	more	women	in	politics.	Both	of	these	public	opinion	polls	marked	a	rising,	pro-women	trend	since	2010,	suggesting	that	patriarchal	gender	 norms	 keeping	 women	 outside	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 may	 be	 changing.	Support	 for	women	 in	 top	 leadership	 positions	 is,	 however,	 not	 an	 automatic,	progressively	 strengthening	 phenomenon.	 As	 practices	 connected	 to	 gender	norms	are	subject	 to	change,	many	aforementioned	 feminist	authors	warn	 that	regressions	and	loss	of	gained	grounds	are	not	uncommon.	Thus,	challenges	and	acceptances	of	gender	norms	in	their	intersections	with	other	systems	of	power	need	to	be	seen	within	the	long-term	political	and	socio-economic	trajectories	in	South	 Africa,	 which	 include	 the	 growing	 divide	 between	 the	 wealthy	 and	 the	poor	(Alejo	Vázquez	Pimentel,	Macías	Aymar,	and	Lawson,	2018).		
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The	focus	of	this	study	on	young	female	university	students	is	based	on	several	key	factors	relating	to	their	age	as	well	as	their	position	within	higher	education	(HE).	 Firstly,	 young	 people	 are	 often	 target	 beneficiaries	 of	 role	 model-based	programmes,	 policies,	 and	 other	 interventions,	 due	 to	 the	 ongoing	 process	 of	socialisation	 and	 identification/identity	 formation	 (Wolbrecht	 and	 Campbell,	2017;	 Beaman	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 These	 interventions	 use	 role	 models	 to	 induce	change	and	impact	the	youth’s	views,	beliefs	and/or	behaviour	(MacCallum	and	Beltman,	2002).	While	 socialisation	 and	 identification	processes	do	not	 stop	 in	later	ages	and	therefore	role	models	remain	of	importance	for	adults	(Brown	and	Treviño,	 2014),	 the	 role	 model	 and	 socialisation-based	 interventions	 tend	 to	focus	on	younger-generations	and	age	cohorts.	As	young	university	students	are	at	 the	 stage	 of	 their	 life	 when	 they	 are	 making	 important	 decisions	 which	influence	 their	 life	 trajectories,	 for	 example	 about	 their	 education,	 career,	marriage,	or	parenthood	(Bosch,	2013;	Malila	et	al.,	2013),	using	the	theorisation	of	 empowerment	 becomes	 particularly	 helpful	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 potential	impact	of	FPEs.	Hence,	focusing	on	this	cohort	enables	the	research	to	feed	into	and	engage	with	youth-based	policies	and	programmes.			Secondly,	as	I	will	demonstrate	throughout	the	thesis,	young	women’s	voices	in	the	patriarchal	and	gerontocratic	social	context	such	as	South	Africa	have	been	invisible	 and	 neglected	 due	 to	 the	 power	 structures	 that	 render	 them	unimportant.	Hence,	young	women,	especially	 those	marginalised	by	 their	 race	and	 economic	 status,	 have	 both	 some	 of	 the	 greatest	 need	 for	 empowering	resources	 as	 well	 as	 for	 inclusion	 in	 research,	 advocacy	 and	 policy	 (Bridger,	2018;	Nyambura,	 2018).	 Lastly,	 universities	 in	 South	Africa	 and	on	 the	African	continent	 more	 broadly,	 are	 conceptualised	 as	 spaces	 where	 the	 critical	consciousness	 of	 the	 country’s	 future	 citizenry	 and	 leadership	 are	 to	 be	developed	 (Walker	 and	 Loots,	 2016;	 Luescher-Mamashela,	 2011).	 Due	 to	 the	connection	between	HE	and	employment,	 the	relatively	small	proportion	of	the	population	with	access	to	HE,4	and	the	historical	tendencies	of	political	leaders	to																																																									4	According	 to	Stats	SA	 (2017a),	 less	 than	1.35	million	people	who	were	20	years	and	older	 in	South	Africa	have	a	university	degree.	From	the	population	of	nearly	52	million,	this	means	that	degree	holders	represent	less	than	3%	of	South	Africans.	Moreover,	only	12%	of	the	population	overall	held	some	kind	of	post-secondary	education	qualifications.	
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arise	 from	 university-educated	 populations,	 as	 I	 describe	 in	 more	 detail	 in	Chapter	Six,	students	are	often	considered	to	be	the	elite	and/or	the	future	elite	of	 their	 countries.	 They	 are	 vested	with	 leadership	potential	 as	 future	political	echelons	and	thus	discursively	share	ties	with	the	FPEs.	Consequently,	research	on	 students’	 perceptions	 of	 FPEs	 represents	 important	 insights	 into	 the	 future	trajectories	of	the	South	African	democracy.		
Structure	of	the	Thesis		The	remainder	of	 the	thesis	 is	structured	 into	seven	chapters.	 In	Chapters	Two	through	 Four,	 I	 provide	methodological,	 conceptual	 and	 socio-political	 context	for	the	study.	Chapter	Two	outlines	the	methodology,	starting	with	the	research	site	 and	 data	 collection	 methods,	 followed	 by	 the	 ethical	 considerations,	epistemological	 positionality	 inspired	 by	 decolonial,	 intersectional	 feminisms	and	 concludes	 by	 recognizing	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 study.	 Chapter	 Three	outlines	 the	 foundational	 context	of	 South	African	politics,	HE	and	 social	order	more	 broadly,	 highlighting	 the	 abuse	 of	 power	 and	 distrust	 as	 constitutive	elements	 shaping	 the	 students’	 understanding	 of	 women	 in	 politics.	 Chapter	
Four	 describes	 the	 conceptual	 framework,	which	 is	 based	 on	 research	 on	 role	models	 in	 education	 and	 professional	 development,	 elite	 studies,	 and	intersectionality	and	outlines	how	the	thesis	joins	difference,	identity,	and	power	to	analyse	the	RME	of	female	political	elites.			Chapters	 Five	 through	 Eight	 analyse	 normative	 power	 that	 shapes	 the	perceptions	of	FPEs	and	offer	the	empirical	evidence	for	the	thesis’	argument	by	addressing	 the	 three	 research	 sub-questions.	Chapter	Five	 looks	 at	women	 in	politics	as	career	and	life	journey	role	models.	It	argues	that	the	students	do	not	perceive	most	women	in	politics	in	this	way,	because	of	the	tenuous	link	between	education	and	careers,	and	because	of	the	 lack	of	 information	that	the	students	would	 desire	 to	 have	 about	 these	 women.	 Hence,	 most	 students	 had	 not	consciously	 and	 deliberately	 used	 women	 in	 politics	 in	 their	 decision-making	processes	as	a	resource.	Chapter	Six	examines	the	students’	views	of	eliteness	as	both	 superior	 status	 and	 prestige,	 and	 as	 a	 powerful	 group	 of	 self-interested	individuals.	These	views,	reflected	in	the	discourses	on	HE,	result	in	the	students’	
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contradictory	 and	 conflicted	 relationship	 with	 the	 term.	 The	 interpretation	 of	eliteness	 as	 middle	 classness	 and	 understanding	 elites	 as	 leaders,	 however,	arises	as	the	link	that	enabled	the	students	to	connect	to	an	ideal	of	an	FPE	and	to	articulate	FPE	as	a	symbol	of	their	ideal	self.			Chapters	 Seven	 and	 Eight	 describe	 the	 values,	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	that	 are	 vested	 in	 an	 FPE	 and	 show	 students’	 agency	 in	 the	 process	 of	constructing	norms	about	women	 in	politics.	The	norms	attached	 to	FPEs,	 and	consequently	 the	 two	 chapters	 as	 well,	 are	 shaped	 by	 two	 sets	 of	 discourses,	which	seek	to	discipline	the	students	into	maintaining	the	power	status	quo	and	curb	 their	 aspirations	 for	 change.	 Chapter	 Seven	 focuses	 on	 the	 discourse	 of	‘being	 deserving,’	 which	 the	 students	 translate	 into	 the	 expectation	 that	 FPEs	should	achieve	their	positions	and	continue	to	deserve	them	by	being	educated,	aware,	 hard-working	 and	 active.	 Chapter	 Eight	 is	 framed	 by	 the	 discourse	 of	‘remembering	where	you	come	from’.	It	operates	on	the	threat	of	exclusion	from	an	 imagined	 community	 of	 belonging	 and	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 expectation	 that	FPEs	 care	 for	 their	 community	 and	 people,	 and	 that	 they	 remain	 steadfast	against	patriarchal	power,	greed	and	selfishness	in	order	to	deliver	change.	The	students	both	challenge	and	conform	to	the	power	of	these	discourses	and	norms	in	various	ways,	highlighting	the	possibility	of	overcoming	difference	in	order	to	change	the	patriarchal,	racist	and	economically	exclusionary	social	order.		
Chapter	Nine	is	the	conclusion.	In	addition	to	summarizing	the	main	argument,	it	also	elaborates	 the	contributions	of	 this	 research	and	 its	 implications	 for	 the	RME	theorising,	feminist	practice	and	research.	The	subsequent	Appendix	offers	a	summary	of	profiles	of	students	who	are	mentioned	multiple	times	in	the	thesis	for	 readers’	 ease	 of	 reference,	which	 is	 then	 followed	 by	 the	 group	 discussion	and	interview	guidelines	used	to	data	collection.			 	
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2 Methodology:	Practicing	Intersectional	Feminist	Research	
Introduction	In	 order	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 existing	 RME	 scholarship	 and	 to	centralise	the	power	of	norms	in	the	RME	theorising,	the	study	was	designed	to	be	 qualitative	 and	 thus	 it	 generated	 data	 through	 focus	 group	 discussions	 and	interviews	 with	 UJ	 female	 students.	 The	 focus	 on	 the	 manifestations	 and	perceptions	 of	 power	 and	 norms	made	 the	 ‘content’	 and	 the	 ‘process’	 of	 data	collection	 inseparable.	 In	 other	words,	 because	 of	 the	power	 that	 is	 inherently	present	 in	 the	 research	 encounter,	 my	 interactions	 with	 the	 students,	 their	experiences	of	being	part	of	the	research,	and	their	perceptions	of	me	co-created	the	mosaic	 that	 led	me	 to	 articulate	my	argument	 and	 to	produce	 this	body	of	knowledge.	 Consequently,	 practicing	 intersectional,	 decolonial	 feminist	approaches	 to	 knowledge	 production	 arises	 as	 the	most	 suitable	 and	 relevant	methodology	 for	 this	 research,	which	 is	 situated	within	 the	 South	 African	 and	British	academia.			In	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 chapter	 I	 firstly	 describe	 the	 research	 site,	 the	 data	collection	 methods	 and	 my	 participants.	 Subsequently,	 I	 share	 how	 I	 try	 to	approach	 power	 and	 identities	 from	 the	 decolonial,	 intersectional	 feminist	methodological	 positionalities,	 and	how	 I	 address	 other	 ethical	 issues.	 Lastly,	 I	explain	 how	 these	 considerations	 and	 methods	 shape	 the	 way	 the	 thesis	 is	written	 and	 acknowledge	 some	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 vis-à-vis	 the	 aspiration	 of	this	research	to	be	decolonial,	intersectional	and	feminist.	
Research	Site		The	 University	 of	 Johannesburg	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 university,	 which	 in	 the	South	 African	 context	 means	 that	 it	 offers	 degree	 programmes	 in	 both	traditionally	 technical/vocational	 fields	 and	 research	 degrees	 (Bunting	 and	Cloete,	 2010)	 to	 nearly	 50,000	 students	 (University	 of	 Johannesburg,	 2018).	Created	 in	 2005	 as	 a	merger	 of	 three	 institutions,	 namely	 the	 Rand	 Afrikaans	University	 (RAU),	 Vista	 University	 and	 the	 Technikon	Witwatersrand	 (Beukes,	2010),	UJ	is	one	of	several	public	HE	institutions	which	were	formed	in	the	early	
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2000s	 by	 joining	 together	 smaller	 institutions	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 transform	 the	racially	segregated	South	African	academia.	UJ’s	main	campus	in	Auckland	Park,	Kingsway	(APK)	is	the	former	seat	of	RAU	and	it	served	as	my	main	research	site	and	 operational	 hub	 because	 the	 Department	 of	 Sociology,	 which	 granted	 me	institutional	 affiliation,	 is	 based	 here.	 The	 Department	 also	 facilitated	my	 visa	letters,	ethics	approvals	and	other	necessary	paperwork	 for	me	to	conduct	 this	study	 at	 UJ,	 and	 its	 staff,	 especially	 Professor	 Kammila	 Naidoo,	 were	 very	welcoming	and	generous	with	their	support	and	guidance	throughout	my	time	in	Johannesburg.	 The	 hospitality	 of	 the	 Department	 included	 their	 providing	 me	with	desk	space,	as	well	as	access	to	internet,	printing,	and	other	infrastructure.	Most	 crucially,	 however,	 it	 provided	 me	 entry	 points	 into	 the	 student	 body,	through	introductions	to	academics	in	other	departments,	access	to	lectures	and	tutorials	 and	overall	 advice	 on	how	 things	work	 at	UJ,	 both	 from	 the	 staff	 and	student	 perspectives.	 On	 a	 more	 practical	 note,	 being	 granted	 a	 status	 of	 a	visiting	researcher,	 I	became	a	constant	presence	 in	 the	Department,	but	 I	was	neither	a	full	staff	member	nor	a	full	student.			The	 diversity	 of	 the	 student	 body,	 broadly	 reflective	 of	 the	 South	 African	demographic	 make-up,	 relative	 affordability	 and	 the	 location	 in	 Gauteng	province	were	the	three	key	reasons	for	my	selection	of	UJ	as	the	research	site.	Every	 institution	 of	 HE	 is	 unique,	 with	 a	 specific	 organisational	 culture	 and	profile.	Being	a	historically	white	university	(HWU)	or	an	underprivileged	Black	African	 institution,	 sets	 up	 a	 particular	 experience	 for	 an	 individual	 student,	which	I	demonstrate	for	example	in	Chapter	Six	with	a	discussion	of	the	students’	views	 of	 UJ	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 so-called	 ‘elite’	 University	 of	Witwatersrand	(Wits).	Similarly,	being	located	in	a	rural	or	an	urban	setting,	or	in	a	municipality	and	a	province	run	by	the	ANC	or	the	DA,	are	also	factors	that	affect	the	research	in	a	particular	university	setting.	Hence,	the	focus	on	one	institution	against	the	backdrop	of	this	uniqueness	limits	the	research	with	regards	to	its	ability	to	offer	generalisations	 about	 South	 African	 female	 university	 students	 or	 youth	more	broadly.	 However,	 providing	 such	 broad	 insights	 is	 not	 the	 objective	 of	 the	thesis;	 rather,	 it	 is	 to	 offer	 insights	 into	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 power	 and	empowerment	 against	 the	 context	 of	 political	 representation	 and	 role	 model	
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debates.	As	I	argue	throughout	the	thesis,	while	the	students	are	impacted	by	the	University	setting,	 their	experiences,	views,	and	self-perceptions	do	not	stop	or	begin	at	the	gates	of	their	universities.	They	are	shaped	by	the	wider	discourses	and	other	lived	realities	of	the	students	who	interact	with	local	and	global	issues	and	bring	them	into	their	university	experience.	Thus,	getting	to	know	the	local	context	 of	 a	 particular	 university	was	 crucial	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 power,	which	made	it	necessary	for	me	to	become	embedded	within	one	institution	rather	than	attempting	to	do	a	large	scale	study	with	a	statistically	representative	sample	or	a	comparative	study	(Lewis	and	Russell,	2011).			Being	focused	on	UJ	allowed	me	sufficient	time	to	build	rapport	with	the	students	and	to	appreciate	more	 fully	 the	 institutional	context	 in	which	they	 functioned.	Consequently,	 participant	 observation	 (PO)	 was	 one	 of	 the	 data	 collection	methods.	 Anthropologist	 Russell	 Bernard	 defines	 participant	 observation	 as	“experiencing	the	 lives	of	 the	people	you	are	studying’	and	 ‘immersing	yourself	in	 a	 culture	 and	 learning	 to	 remove	 yourself….	 so	 you	 can	 intellectualize	what	you’ve	seen	and	heard”	(2006,	324).	This	understanding	of	PO	as	‘experiencing’	the	 lives	 of	 the	 ‘people’	 is	 in	 contradiction	 with	 the	 decolonial	 intersectional	approach	 of	 this	 research	 and	 thus	 it	 deserves	 to	 be	 clarified	 that	 while	 my	observations	were	an	attempt	to	understand	the	student	experiences,	they	were	not	and	could	not	have	been	direct	 shared	 lived	experiences,	not	 least	because	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	unified	lived	experience	of	a	female	or	a	male	student	at	UJ.		The	 University	 of	 Johannesburg,	 like	most	 HE	 institutions	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	around	 the	 world,	 is	 embroiled	 in	 neoliberal	 approaches	 to	 education.	 The	corporate	 style	 management	 and	 global	 competition	 of	 HE	 institutions	 have	caused	obsessions	with	 international	rankings	and	comparisons	amongst	South	African	universities	(Muller,	2017;	Mbembe,	2016;	Sall	and	Oanda,	2015).	While	Wits	and	the	University	of	Cape	Town	(UCT)	boast	their	leading	positions	on	the	continent,	 UJ’s	 media	 campaigns	 frequently	 highlighted	 the	 University’s	achievements	 in	 climbing	 up	 the	 ladder	 within	 the	 category	 of	 ‘young’	institutions,	 which	 have	 been	 established	 only	 within	 the	 last	 25	 years	
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(University	 of	 Johannesburg,	 2017a)	 or	within	 the	BRICS	 (Brazil,	 Russia,	 India,	China	 and	 South	 Africa)	 grouping	 (University	 of	 Johannesburg,	 2016b).	 For	example,	 during	 his	 engagement	 session	 with	 students	 in	 February	 2017,	 the	Vice-Chancellor	 (VC)	 Prof	 Ihron	 Rensburg	 praised	 UJ	 achievements	 in	 these	rankings.			Transformation	 is	 a	 crucial	 criterion	 for	 the	 evaluation	 of	 HE	 institutions	 in	South	 Africa.	 At	 the	 aforementioned	 engagement	 event,	 the	 VC	 praised	 UJ’s	transformation.	Going	beyond	the	racial	make-up,	he	highlighted	the	rise	of	the	student	population	from	the	so-called	‘Q1-3’	schools5	from	8%	to	30%.	In	2013,	UJ	 was	 ranked	 2nd	 in	 the	 country’s	 university	 Equity	 Index,	 which	 measured	demographic	and	gender	equity	changes	in	student	enrolment	(Govinder,	Zondo	and	 Makgoba,	 2013)	 and	 as	 the	 University	 argued,	 its	 student	 population	reflected	 the	 demographic	 make-up	 of	 the	 country,	 with	 86%	 of	 the	 students	coming	 from	 a	 “previously	 marginalized	 background”	 (University	 of	Johannesburg,	 2018).	 The	 Equity	 Index	 is	 arguably	 a	 weak	 measure	 of	 the	transformation	 process	 as	 it,	 for	 example,	 does	 not	 account	 for	 academic	considerations	such	as	quality	of	 research	outputs	 (Booi,	Vincent	and	Liccardo,	2017;	Morris,	2014)	and	hence	it	was	not	a	widely	embraced	and	used	ranking.	In	 later	 chapters	 I	 delve	 into	 the	 debates	 of	 academic	 transformation	 of	HE	 in	South	 Africa	 in	 more	 detail;	 however,	 from	 a	 merely	 physically-symbolic	perspective,	 as	much	 as	UJ	 sought	 to	move	 away	 from	 its	 historical	 legacy,	 for	example	 by	 re-naming	 residence	 halls	 (res-es)	 in	 2015	 from	 their	 RAU-era	Afrikaans	 names	 to	 the	 student-preferred	 alternatives,	 the	 old	 Afrikaner	foundations	 of	 APK	 remained	 obvious.	 The	 Afrikaans-English	 dual	 signs,	 the	occasional	plaques	remembering	the	RAU	historical	milestones,	or	even	the	more	mundane	cue	on	your	ATM	bank	slip	specifying	‘RAU’	as	your	location,	reminded	the	 students,	 staff	 and	 other	 APK	 visitors	 of	 its	 Afrikaner	 past;	 hinting	 at	incomplete	and	on-going	institutional	transformation.	
																																																								5	In	South	Africa,	schools	are	split	into	quintiles	(Q1-5)	according	to	their	poverty	scores	in	order	to	 assist	 with	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources	 towards	 under-resourced	 school	 (Badat	 and	 Sayed,	2014).	 The	 quintile	 statistics	 referenced	 by	 the	 VC	 seek	 to	 suggest	 that	 students	 from	poorer,	under-resourced	 schools	 are	 getting	 access	 into	 university	 spaces,	 which	 had	 previously	 been	limited	to	students	from	wealthier	schools	and	family	backgrounds.		
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	As	a	public	university,	UJ’s	funding	structure,	as	it	was	explained	to	the	students	by	a	UJ	staff	member	at	the	aforementioned	VC	engagement	event,	comprised	of	three	streams:	student	 fees	 for	 tuition	and	accommodation,	state	subsidies	and	external	 income,	 for	 example	 for	 outside	 or	 online	 courses.	 Due	 to	 the	insufficient	state	subsidies	vis-à-vis	the	rising	student	numbers,	universities	had	been	 increasing	 student	 fees.	 In	 2015,	 however,	 the	 government	 decided	 to	freeze	 the	 fees6	and	 in	 early	 2017,	 VCs	 from	multiple	 universities	 argued	 that	should	the	decision	to	freeze	fees	be	repeated	for	2017	academic	year,	it	would	have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 university	 daily	 operations.	 While	 for	 some	universities	it	meant	a	real	threat	of	bankruptcy,	for	others,	such	as	UJ,	it	meant	adopting	 stringent	 cost-cutting	 measures.	 Engaging	 the	 staff,	 VC	 Rensburg	highlighted	 that	 while	 in	 2016	 the	 university	managed	 to	 cut	 down	 operation	costs	to	cover	the	missing	income,	for	2017	it	had	no	room	to	do	so	without	staff	redundancies.			The	 student	 political	 engagements	with	 the	 university	management,	 as	well	 as	with	 ‘outside’	 political	 world,	 can	 be	 situated	 primarily	 in	 the	 offices	 of	 the	Student	Representative	Council	(SRC),	not	far	from	the	Student	Centre	(SS).	The	SRC	location	seemed	highly	symbolic,	because	it	is	a	stone’s	throw	away	from	the	school’s	 auditorium,	 which	 was	 set	 on	 fire	 in	 May	 2016.	 The	 burning	 of	 the	auditorium	 brought	 some	 students	 into	 a	 direct	 conflict	 with	 the	 university	management,	as	several	SRC	members	and	other	politically	active	students,	 the	so-called	UJ17,	were	 accused	by	 the	University	management	 to	be	 the	 culprits,	which	 led	 to	 their	 suspension,	 followed	 by	 court	 action.	 The	 arson	 and	 its	investigation	were	engulfed	in	many	rumours	and	conspiracy	theories	featuring	the	University	management,	especially	VC	Rensburg,	whose	term	in	office	ended																																																									6	President	Zuma	agreed	to	freeze	student	fees	for	the	2016	academic	year	in	response	to	the	so-called	Fallist	student	protests	in	2015,	which	culminated	in	a	march	towards	the	Union	buildings	in	Pretoria	(seat	of	the	Presidency)	(Booysen,	2016).	While	to	some	students	it	was	a	victory,	as	the	president	responded	to	the	power	of	student	organizing,	to	others	it	was	far	away	from	the	demand	 of	 free	 education	 for	 all,	 which	 some	 of	 the	 Fallists	 advocate,	 and	 thus,	 it	 was	 not	 a	systematic	 solution	 to	 their	demands.	Subsequently,	 further	organizing	 took	place	 in	2016	and	the	government	funding	policy	for	2017	consisted	of	a	recommended	fee	increase	capped	at	8%,	which	would	be	funded	by	the	government	for	majority	of	the	working	class	and	poor	students.	I	discuss	the	implications	of	this	policy	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	Six.		
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in	 2017	 and	 who	 was	 succeeded	 by	 Prof	 Tshilidzi	 Marwala.	 Some	 students	believed	 that	 the	 charge	 against	 the	 17	 students	 was	 orchestrated	 to	 silence	‘problematic’	 student	 activists.	 For	 example,	 some	 of	 my	 respondents	 treated	with	 suspicion	 the	 fact	 that	 security	 guards	 were	 seen	 walking	 around	 the	auditorium	area,	yet	 they	claimed	to	not	have	seen	anything;	 they	also	 found	it	peculiar	that	there	was	alleged	camera	footage,	which	existed	for	this	particular	case,	 while	 for	many	 other	 investigations	 of	 incidents	 on	 campus	 the	 cameras	were	said	to	not	have	been	working.			The	 area	 adjacent	 to	 the	 SRC	 offices	 was	 frequently	 used	 for	 student	 political	agitations	by	student	political	bodies,	which	are	closely	if	not	directly	tied	to	the	main	political	parties	in	South	Africa.	For	example,	the	APK	SRC	was	elected	by	the	student	body	in	March	2017,	with	the	Economic	Freedom	Fighters’	Student	Command	(EFF	SC)	and	DASO	(DA	Student	Organisation)	boycotting	the	election.	Having	 faced	SASCO	(ANC	aligned	South	African	Students	Congress	and	backed	by	 the	 ANC	 Youth	 League	 (YL)	 and	 Young	 Communist	 League)	 the	 student	opposition	 parties	 complained	 about	 the	 electoral	 systems	 regulating	 the	leadership	 of	 the	 SRC	 and	 considered	 SRC	 structures	 to	 be	 pawns	 of	 the	management	 (Mndebele,	 2017;	 Mndebele	 and	 Ndongo,	 2017).	 Student	 politics	can	thus	be	seen	as	a	mezzo	level	between	the	students	and	the	world	of	formal	country	 politics.	 It	 serves	 as	 an	 important	 connector	 between	 the	 students’	perceptions	of	FPEs,	as	I	demonstrate	throughout	the	thesis.			SRC	offices	are	also	adjacent	to	the	‘day-houses’,	which	are	student	associations	that	offer	small	hang-out	spaces	for	students,	who	are	daily	commuters	to	APK,	but	who	wish	to	be	part	of	a	student	community	similar	to	the	one	offered	by	res-es.	 UJ	 had	 shortages	 of	 on-campus	 accommodation	 for	 its	 students,	 many	 of	whom	 wished	 to	 stay	 on	 campus.	 Therefore,	 many	 stayed	 in	 off-campus,	university	 accredited	 accommodation,	 private	 housing	 and	 student	 communes	(shared	 flats)	or	with	 relatives	 and	 families.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	Library	 and	 the	Arts	Centre,	where	I	held	several	of	my	interviews,	 the	 last	 location	relevant	to	this	research	was	the	so-called	‘F7’	area–	a	mere	half	a	dozen	metal	picnic	tables	under	shaded	trees	right	across	from	the	SRC	offices.	This	area	could	probably	be	
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best	 described	 as	 infamous,	 because	 it	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 hang-out	 place	 of	 students	with	 F7	 academic	 status,	 meaning	 failing.	 To	 some,	 the	 F7	 label	 represents	students,	whose	place	at	UJ	and	within	HE	more	broadly	is	questionable	because	of	 a	 prevalent	 view	 that	 students	 should	 deserve	 their	 HE	 by	 working	 hard,	which	 as	 I	 argue	 in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 represents	 a	 discourse	 disciplining	 young	South	Africans.			In	 addition	 to	 APK,	 UJ	 has	 three	 other	 campuses,	 all	 of	 which	 have	 their	 own	distinct	characteristics,	be	it	by	their	locations,	the	programmes	of	study	taught	there,	 or	 by	 their	 own	 institutional,	 pre-merger	 histories.	 For	 example,	 the	Soweto	Campus	(SWC)	is	modern,	fresh	and	attractive,	fully	‘Africanised’	both	by	the	names	of	its	buildings	after	people	like	Hector	Pieterson	or	Robert	Sobukwe	and	by	its	student	body.	Having	visited	the	campus	on	several	occasions	for	class	observations	 and	 to	 conduct	 a	 few	 interviews,	 it	 struck	 many	 of	 my	 research	participants	 that	 I	 was	 one	 of	 a	 handful	 white	 people	 around.	 Taking	 the	university-funded	 inter-campus	 buses	 to	 travel	 to	 SWC	 from	 APK,	 I	 was	frequently	the	only	white	person,	which	was	a	reminder	of	the	incomplete	nature	of	the	transformation	process	at	UJ	and	the	country	more	broadly.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 Doornfontein	 Campus	 (DFC)	 located	 in	 the	 central	 business	 district	(CBD)	of	Johannesburg,	has	higher	levels	of	white	students	enrolling	in	classes	in	health	and	sports-related	disciplines	 taught	here.	This	 racial	distinction	of	DFC	became	apparent	when	I	was	advised	by	the	students	and	staff	in	the	Sociology	Department	to	observe	classes	run	at	this	campus,	specifically	in	order	to	recruit	white	students	for	my	research.		
Focus	Group	Discussions	and	Semi-Structured	Interviews	I	 adopted	 a	 two-stage	 research	 design	 consisting	 of	 focus	 group	 discussions	(FGDs)	and	followed	by	semi-structured	interviews	(SSIs),	whose	structure	and	general	list	of	questions	can	be	found	in	the	Appendix.	FGDs	are	designed	to	elicit	views	and	perceptions,	while	offering	social	interaction	amongst	participants	as	a	 specific	 source	 of	 data	 (Kitzinger,	 1994).	 I	 chose	 FGDs	 because	 they	 are	frequently	 used	 in	 studies	with	 university	 students	 and	 youth,	 for	 example	 by	Wasserman	and	Garman	(2014),	Bhana	and	Anderson	(2013),	and	Bosch	(2013),	
	38	
as	 well	 as	 by	 feminist	 researchers	 in	 order	 to	 rebalance	 research	 power	hierarchies	between	the	researcher	and	the	participants	(Whitaker	and	Savage,	2015;	 Moloney,	 2011).	 Building	 on	 a	 similar	 principle	 of	 power	 of	 the	 group,	many	 development	 programmes	 with	 women’s	 empowerment	 objectives	establish	 women’s	 groups	 and	 bring	 women	 together	 to	 facilitate	 the	identification	 or	 realisation	 of	 shared	 experience	 and	 positions	 within	 wider	societal	structure,	thus	allowing	for	potential	empowering	effect	stemming	from	the	collective	(Pini,	2002;	Wilkinson,	1998).	Additionally,	many	African	feminists	highlight	that	women	on	the	continent	tend	to	be	more	focused	on	the	collective	and	the	social	(Akin-Aina,	2011;	Tamale,	2008;	Nnaemeka,	2004).			Consequently,	due	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	research	 topics	and	 the	research	power	dynamics,	 I	 convened	 the	 FGDs	 as	 the	 first	 research	 stage,	 and	 I	 did	 so	 in	 an	informal	manner	and	in	a	supportive	environment	to	build	trust	and	rapport,	to	ease	any	discomfort	and	power	imbalance,	and	to	obtain	valuable	information	on	the	participants’	perceptions.	The	FGDs	were	also	used	to	assist	me	with	testing	the	 assumptions	 underpinning	 the	 research	 and	 to	 narrow	down	which	 of	 the	students’	identifications	or	experiences	would	appear	to	be	of	most	relevance	in	affecting	their	views	and	perceptions	of	FPEs	as	role	models.		Over	 the	 course	 of	 two	 months	 (September	 and	 October	 2016),	 I	 held	 seven	FGDs,	five	of	which	were	women-only	groups,	one	was	men-only,	and	one	was	a	mixed,	 self-organised	group	of	 campus	 activists.	The	 focus	of	 the	 research	was	not	on	the	differentiated	impact	of	FPEs	on	women	and	men,	as	is	often	the	case	in	the	literature.7	The	perceptions	of	male	students	were	outside	of	the	scope	of	the	study	and	hence	there	were	no	individual	interviews	with	male	students.	The	FGD	with	male	participants	was	conducted	as	a	litmus	test	to	gauge	whether	any	discourses,	norms	or	 issues	were	missing	and	whether	the	narratives	raised	by	the	women	students	were	largely	corresponding	with	the	issues	being	raised	by	the	men.																																																											7	See	for	example	Barnes	and	Burchard	(2012)	or	Beaman	et	al.	(2009)	who	focus	on	explaining	the	 gender	 gap	 in	political	 representation-participation	nexus	 and	hence	 are	 interested	on	 the	differentiated	impact	on	women	and	men.		
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I	 recruited	 the	 participants	 in	 the	 single	 sex	 groups	 by	 attending	 lectures	 and	tutorials,	 in	which	willing	academics	offered	me	some	time	to	 introduce	myself	and	 my	 research.	 Several	 departments	 agreed	 to	 send	 out	 an	 email	 to	 their	students	 with	 the	 information	 about	 my	 research,	 which	 was	 contained	 on	 a	flyer.	 In	 addition	 to	my	 smiling	 face	 and	 contact	 details,	 the	 flyer	 included	 the	following	 text:	 “Are	you	a	South	African	student?	Are	you	 first	or	 second	year?	Are	you	under	35	years	old?	Join	my	research	and	tell	me	what	you	think	about	South	African	female	political	elites!”	39	of	my	female	participants	signed	up	for	the	 research	 immediately	 after	 a	 lecture	 or	 tutorial,	 where	 I	 introduced	 my	research	and	10	 students	 emailed	me	directly	 in	 response	 to	 the	 flyer,	 in-class	presentation	 or	 online	 announcement.	 27	 women	 then	 joined	 the	 research	having	been	approached	and	recommended	by	another	participant.	Most	of	my	exchanges	with	 participants	 prior	 to	 the	 FGD	 or	 SSIs	were	 thus	 via	 email	 and	WhatsApp,	which	was	a	popular	form	of	communication.	The	FGDs	varied	in	the	number	 of	 participants,	 ranging	 from	 5	 –	 12	 students	 and	 in	 total	 47	 female	students	participated	in	women’s	only	groups.			I	 captured	 some	 of	 the	 students’	 identifications,	 demographic	 information	 and	details	of	their	studies	and	activities	in	short	biographical	forms.	Students	filled	these	forms	out	after	having	signed	their	consent	forms	and	prior	to	commencing	the	FGDs.	I	had	pre-established	the	focus	of	the	research	to	be	on	South	African	female	 university	 students	 under	 the	 age	 of	 35,	 because	 the	 South	 African	government	 considers	 youth	 to	 be	 15-34-year	 olds	 (The	 Presidency	 of	 South	Africa,	2015).	However,	the	majority	of	my	participants	were	18-22	years	old	as	they	were	first	and	second	year	students,	which	was	a	criterion	because	my	data	collection	was	taking	place	over	 two	academic	years	and	students	 in	 their	 final	year	would	potentially	not	be	available	in	2017	after	having	graduated.			In	 addition	 to	 their	 age,	 the	 form	 captured	 information	 on	 racial/ethnic	identification,	 markers	 of	 class	 (source	 of	 funding	 for	 studies),	 religion,	motherhood,	civic	engagement	(membership	in	organisations	or	extra-curricular	activities)	and	residency	(coming	from	urban	or	rural	setting),	as	 literature	has	shown	 these	 characteristics	 to	 impact	 women’s	 political	 behaviour.	 Students	
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were	 free	 not	 to	 answer	 any	 of	 the	 questions	 they	 did	 not	 want	 to,	 and	 the	questions	were	formulated	to	allow	self-identification,	in	terms	preferred	by	the	students,	 rather	 than	being	 limited	 to	pre-determined	 categories.	The	 students	who	did	not	participate	in	FGDs,	but	whom	I	only	interviewed,	did	not	fill	out	this	form.	 However,	 I	 captured	 most	 of	 the	 information	 about	 the	 students’	background	during	the	course	of	the	interview.		I	 expected	 the	 students’	 being	 South	 African	 to	 be	 the	 least	 problematic	characteristic	to	establish	during	the	participant	recruitment.	However,	it	turned	out	to	be	as	contestable	a	determination	as	self-identifying	with	a	particular	class	or	race.	Students,	who	have	lived	their	whole	lives	in	the	country,	but	lacked	the	government	papers	to	be	legitimised	as	citizens	or	even	residents	in	the	eyes	of	the	 state,	 felt	 that	 South	 Africa	 was	 their	 home,	 even	 if	 ‘home-home’8	was	somewhere	else.	They	knew	more	about	South	Africa	than	the	countries	where	they	or	their	parents	emigrated	from,	be	it	in	Southern	Africa	or	Eastern	Europe.	Hence,	non-citizen	students	who	lived	in	South	Africa	were	also	included	in	the	research.	 Together	with	 the	 other,	 aforementioned	 categories	 of	 identification,	the	question	of	who	 can	 ‘pass	 for’	 South	African	 in	 their	 lived-experiences	 and	who	 believed	 and	 was	 believed	 to	 be	 South	 African	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 state-adjudication,	highlighted	the	need	for	an	approach	which	was	not	rigid	in	using	identity	categories.		Combing	 through	my	 preliminary	 data	 in	 November	 2016,	 no	matter	 how	 the	students’	identification	categories	and	experiences	got	mixed	and	matched	in	my	analysis,	 no	 clear	 patterns	 and	 links	 to	 explaining	 views	 of	 FPEs	were	 arising.	Consequently,	I	asked	all	the	students	who	had	participated	in	FGDs	to	meet	for	an	 individual	 interview,	 if	 they	 were	 willing	 to	 continue	 to	 participate	 in	 my																																																									8	Many	 students	would	use	 this	phrase	 to	 show	 that	 the	 location	where	 their	parents’	 families	originated	from	and	where	the	students’	extended	familial	networks	resided	was	not	in	the	place	where	they	lived	at	the	time	of	the	research.	Similarly,	they	would	sometimes	clarify	where	they	are	‘from-from’,	to	specify	not	their	current	residence,	but	where	they	and	their	families	are	from.	While	for	some	students	it	meant	a	different	country,	such	as	Zimbabwe,	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	or	Angola,	for	other	students	it	meant	a	different	province	of	South	Africa,	which	reflects	the	racial	segregation	policies	of	the	apartheid	regime,	which	controlled	the	populations	through	administrative	 territories,	 which	 for	 the	 Black	 African	 populations	 were	 called	 Bantustans	 or	homelands.		
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research.	 Thirty-nine	 of	 these	 students	 then	 participated	 in	 the	 SSIs.	 I	interviewed	additional	37	UJ	 students	across	various	stages	of	 their	 studies,	 as	well	as	 three	non	UJ	students	and	five	non-student	key	 informants,	resulting	 in	the	 total	 of	 86	 formal	 one-on-one	 interviews.	 The	 additional	 students	 were	individuals	who	 had	 expressed	 interest	 in	 the	 group	 discussions,	 but	 they	 had	not	 managed	 to	 attend;	 or	 they	 were	 targeted	 referrals	 from	 my	 existing	participants,	 whom	 I	 asked	 for	 assistance	 with	 identifying	 additional	participants.	The	interviews,	which	took	place	in	the	period	of	November	2016	–	May	2017,	lasted	on	average	90	–	100	minutes.	The	length	of	the	interview	was	adjusted	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 student.	 Several	 students	 met	 with	 me	 multiple	times	 and	 the	 interviews	were	 thus	 split,	 in	 order	 to	 accommodate	 their	 other	commitments	 or	 limitations.	 Some	 key	 informants,	 such	 as	 a	 youth	 culture	journalist	or	an	education	activist	were	interviewed	via	Skype	due	to	difficulties	with	scheduling	in	person	meetings.		Many	 students	 who	 participated	 in	 both	 stages	 of	 my	 research	 made	 direct	references	to	the	FGDs	during	their	interviews.	For	example,	when	I	asked	Kiara,	who	came	to	mind	when	she	heard	the	term	FPE,	she	responded,	“Like	we	said,	Thuli	 Madonsela	 and	 Nkosazana	 Dlamini-Zuma	 [my	 emphasis].”	 Referring	 to	women	 in	 politics	 that	 were	 discussed	 during	 her	 FGD,	 Kiara	 made	 a	 direct	connection	to	her	previous	engagement	in	the	research.	She	further	shared	with	me	that	she	sometimes	messaged	the	other	participants	and	exchanged	greetings	with	 them	when	 they	 ran	 into	 each	 other	 on	 campus.	 Other	 interviewees	 only	subconsciously	used	the	same	words	to	describe	FPEs	and	did	not	refer	overtly	to	 the	 FGDs.	 For	 instance,	 Sage	 Marley	 used	 the	 word	 ‘powerhouse’	 as	 a	characteristic	 of	 an	 ideal	 FPE	 –	 a	 word	 that	 was	 not	 common	 in	 the	 public	discourse	 in	 South	 Africa,	 nor	 was	 it	 a	 word	 that	 was	 used	 in	 other	 groups	besides	hers,	where	it	was	introduced	by	another	student	to	describe	the	former	Public	 Protector,	 Thuli	 Madonsela.9	Hence,	 FGDs	 served	 as	 a	 shared	 reference	point	during	the	interviews.																																																										9	The	office	of	the	public	protector	is	one	of	South	Africa’s	‘chapter	9	institutions’,	meaning	that	it	was	 established	 by	 the	 constitution’s	 chapter	 9,	 together	 with	 the	 Commission	 for	 Gender	Equality,	the	South	African	Human	Rights	Commission	and	others,	to	strengthen	and	protect	the	country’s	 democracy.	 The	 public	 protector’s	 office	 investigates	 issues	 of	 alleged	 improper	
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Ethical	Considerations	The	FGDs	as	well	as	the	majority	of	the	SSIs	took	place	at	APK,	while	a	handful	of	interviews	were	conducted	at	other	UJ	campuses	and	off-campus	cafes.	The	key	criterion	 for	 each	 location	 and	 time	was	 to	 least	 inconvenience	 the	 students.	 I	covered	the	travel	expenses	 for	several	students,	 if	 they	travelled	to	campus	or	another	location	solely	for	the	purposes	of	the	interview,	while	many	refused	my	offer	to	cover	these	costs.	All	of	the	interview	locations	were	public	and	informal	in	 their	 ambiance,	 because	 they	 facilitated	 open,	 casual	 conversation	 and	 put	students	at	ease.	Meeting	in	a	closed,	private	spaces	such	as	an	office,	which	is	a	frequent	 interview	 practice	 in	 university	 research,	 used	 for	 example	 by	 Singh	(2016),	 would	 have	 ensured	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 confidentiality.	 However,	 this	would	 not	 have	 guaranteed	 more	 openness,	 and	 could	 have	 potentially	intimidated	 the	 students	 as	well.	Moreover,	 on	 a	 practical	 level,	 it	would	 have	been	 difficult	 to	 organise	 private	 interview	 spaces	 at	 APK	 because	 of	bureaucratic	procedures	and	spatial	constraints.	Additionally,	due	to	the	nature	of	the	research	there	was	no	particular	need	to	take	extraordinary	measures	to	protect	 participants’	 identity	 and	 therefore	 meeting	 in	 open	 spaces	 did	 not	present	problems	with	regard	to	research	ethics.			Students	were	not	compensated	for	their	participation,	but	most	accepted	a	tea,	coffee	 or	 another	 drink	 as	 a	 token	 of	 gratitude	 for	 their	 time	 during	 the	interviews,	while	all	of	the	FGDs	were	supplied	with	cold	drinks	and	snacks	as	a	small	incitement	to	volunteer.	All	of	the	FGDs	and	SSIs	were	recorded,	with	none	of	the	participants	expressing	concerns	about	being	recorded,	nor	did	any	of	the	students	 feel	 uncomfortable	 with	 providing	 written	 consent	 for	 their																																																																																																																																																																conduct	of	state	affairs	brought	to	its	attention	by	the	citizens,	including	political	parties,	and	has	the	power	to	set	remedial	action	that	is	legally	binding.	Prior	to	Thuli	Madonsela’s	tenure,	which	ended	in	November	2016,	the	institution	was	not	as	well-known,	but	through	her	highly	visible	cases,	 the	 office	 became	 known	 as	 the	 beacon	 of	 the	 country’s	 democracy,	 together	 with	 the	courts	 (Gumede,	 2015).	 Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 office,	 it	 is	 very	 much	 individualised	 and	personified,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 involves	 the	 collective	 work	 of	 dozens	 of	 staff	 members,	including	 in	 regional	 branches.	 Madonsela	 investigated	 several	 cases	 of	 corruption	 which	resonated	 with	 my	 respondents.	 These	 included	 primarily	 her	 reports	 on	 President	 Zuma’s	misuse	of	public	funds	to	upgrade	his	personal	homestead	in	his	home	village	in	Nkandla	in	KZN,	which	 was	 published	 in	 2014,	 but	 faced	 legal	 challenges	 until	 2016;	 and	 her	 report	 on	 State	Capture,	 published	 in	 November	 2016,	 which	 started	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 corruption	 in	 public	procurement	and	the	collusion	between	politicians,	state	owned	enterprises	(SOEs)	and	private	businesses.	
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participation.	 The	 consent	 forms	 were	 provided	 electronically	 to	 the	 students	prior	to	our	meeting,	be	it	for	the	FGD	or	SSI,	if	at	all	possible.	The	research	was	conducted	 in	 English,	 so	 no	 translation	 or	 the	 use	 of	 research	 assistants	 was	necessary.	 As	 it	 is	 the	 language	 of	 instruction	 at	 UJ,	 the	 students	 did	 not	 have	difficulties	with	 communicating	 in	 English.	 Detailed,	 annotated	 notes	 from	 the	recordings	were	 used	 as	 the	 bases	 for	 the	 subsequent	 analysis.	 As	 part	 of	 the	consent-gaining	process,	students	were	advised	that	all	data	would	be	securely	stored	 in	 electronic	 form	 and	 password	 protected.	 No	 special	 encryption	software	was	used	due	to	the	low	level	of	security	threat.			The	 students’	 and	 other	 participants’	 names	 used	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 are	either	their	real	names	or	pseudonyms.	The	students	decided	themselves	which	of	the	two	options	they	preferred,	after	having	been	advised	about	confidentially	and	other	 readers’	ability	 to	 recognise	 them	should	 they	pick	 their	 real	names.	However,	 I	 generalise	 some	 details	 about	 the	 students	 to	 enhance	 their	protection,	 for	 example,	 listing	 the	province	 and	 the	urban/rural	 setting	of	 the	place	where	 they	 are	 from,	 rather	 than	 naming	 the	 specific	 locality.	 In	 several	instances	 (see	 for	 example	 pages	 174,	 218	 and	 220)	 I	 refrain	 from	 using	 the	students’	real	names	despite	their	permission	to	do	so.	It	is	an	extra	measure	of	precaution	against	potential	negative	backlash	against	 their	views,	which	some	readers	may	find	hurtful	or	controversial.	All	other	specific	wishes	made	by	the	students,	for	example	withholding	their	children’s	or	parents’	names,	were	fully	respected.			As	 the	 conversations	 focused	 on	 students’	 lives	 and	 perceptions	 of	 power,	 the	students	 drew	 on	 their	 personal	 experiences	 amongst	 other	 sources	 of	information,	 and	 for	many	 it	 included	 psychologically	 and	 emotionally	 painful	memories.	The	students	had	been	warned	prior	to	our	research	engagement	that	my	questions	might	provoke	such	feelings	and	I	had	encouraged	them	to	answer	only	as	they	felt	comfortable	and	to	reveal	only	as	much	detail	as	they	deemed	fit.	Several	 students	 shared	 very	 painful	 memories,	 including	 of	 racial	 abuse	 in	school,	experiences	of	poverty,	discrimination,	injustice	and	humiliation,	as	well	as	gender-based	violence	(GBV).	In	such	instances,	the	students	were	supported	
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to	talk	about	the	issue	at	hand	to	the	extent	that	they	found	most	appropriate	for	them.		
Participants’	Background	Students	who	participated	 in	my	research	came	 from	various	backgrounds	and	were	able	 to	self-identify	along	various	characteristics,	 including	race.	 In	South	Africa	 there	 are	 four	main	 racial	 classifications	 of	 Black	 African,	 Indian/Asian,	Coloured	and	white,	which	have	been	maintained	by	the	democratic	government	after	the	end	of	apartheid.	Over	the	decades	of	the	apartheid	regime,	established	by	 the	National	Party	 (NP)	 in	1948,	 the	 terminologies	 and	 the	adjudications	of	the	 classifications	 have	 changed;	 for	 example,	 classification	 term	Black	African	arose	from	terms	like	native	or	Bantu	(Seekings,	2008b)	and	their	delimitations	became	 increasingly	 more	 stringent	 (Posel,	 2001).	 Despite	 the	 constitutional	commitment	 to	 non-racialism	 and	 de-racialization	 of	 much	 of	 the	 state	legislature	in	the	1990s,	the	continuation	of	the	racial	categories	is	linked	to	the	political	 objectives	 of	 socio-economic	 redress	 and	 to	 the	 operationalization	 of	some	 affirmative	 action	 policies	 (Seekings,	 2008b).	 For	 example,	 Statistics	 SA,	the	official	government	statistical	agency,	provided	the	following	six	options	for	racial	 identification,	 labelled	 as	 ‘population	 groups’:	 Black	 African,	 Coloured,	Indian/Asian,	white,	other,	and	‘prefer	not	to	identify’	(Stats	SA,	2016a).	The	four	categories	 thus	 naturally	 continue	 to	 be	 used	 in	 research	 and	 policy	 and	most	importantly,	 they	 are	 part	 of	 the	 social	 fabric	 and	 consciousness	 of	 South	Africans.	Thus,	they	are	evoked	and	used	in	the	thesis,	but	are	seen	as	contested	rather	 than	 set	 categories	 and	 are	 understood	 as	 being	 re-defined	 and	questioned,	which	underscores	 the	 importance	 of	 research	participants’	 ability	to	self-identify	using	their	own	terms.		In	 addition	 to	 the	 fluidity	 and	 complexity	 of	 demarcating	 the	 four	 racial	categories,	 there	 are	 often	 further	 conflations	 and	 substitutions	 of	 categories	based	on	ethnicity	and	colour.	Vincent	and	Howell	 (2014)	point	out	 that	South	Africans	across	different	racial	groups	tend	to	hide	the	issue	of	race	discursively	by	substituting	race	for	culture,	ethnicity	or	class.	Consequently,	 the	analysis	of	difference	within	 racial	 groups	 and	 the	 constitution	 of	 identities	 along	 various	
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discursive	markers	becomes	conflated.	For	example,	students	often	spoke	about	ethnic,	tribal,	group	or	cultural	stereotypes	and	animosities,	as	linked	to	the	Zulu,	Xhosa,	Tsonga	or	Pedi	peoples,	 to	name	a	 few;	as	well	as	about	 the	differences	between	 the	 English	 whites	 and	 Afrikaners,	 or	 Chinese	 and	 Indian	 Asians.	Similarly,	 students	described	and	used	stereotypes	associated	with	skin	shades	or	tones	amongst	Black	Africans	in	South	Africa	and	from	around	the	continent,	and	 also	 described	 the	 skin	 colour	 differences	 amongst	whites,	me	 included.	 I	analyse	in	more	detail	these	differences	in	Chapter	Eight,	as	they	pertain	to	the	notion	 of	 belonging	 and	 community,	 because	 they	 affect	 the	 students’	 lived	realities	and	are	consequently	projected	into	their	perceptions	and	expectations	of	 FPEs.	Moreover,	 they	 also	 impact	 students’	 ability	 and	 desire	 to	 be	 seen	 as	exceptional/or	exceptions	to	these	communities	of	belonging.					The	research	participants	also	came	from	various	economic	situations,	which	are	analysed	 primarily	 in	 Chapter	 Five,	 but	 are	 interwoven	 throughout	 the	 thesis.	Most	 frequently	 their	 economic	 status	 is	 revealed	 in	 their	 descriptions	 of	 the	education	 and	 employment	 of	 their	 parents	 and	 guardians,	 their	 housing	 and	access	 to	 services,	 such	 as	 electricity,	 water	 and	 sanitation,	 mode	 of	transportation	and	commute	to	university,	as	well	as	their	ability	to	afford	food	and	 tuition	 fees.	 However,	 their	 identification	 with	 a	 particular	 class	 label	 or	their	 own	understanding	 of	 their	 lived	 experiences	 do	not	 always	match	 these	markers,	 which	 I	 problematise	 in	 the	 said	 chapter.	 Residency	 (rural	 vs.	 urban	living,	and	township10	vs.	non-township	setting)	 is	also	a	 frequently	used	proxy	of	 economic	 status,	 but	 must	 also	 be	 problematised,	 especially	 as	 many	townships	 such	 as	 Johannesburg’s	 Soweto,	 are	 sites	 of	 dynamic	 change	 and	unequal	development.	Therefore,	although	I	specify	whether	the	students	came	from	a	 township	or	not,	 it	cannot	be	automatically	assumed	as	an	 indication	of	poverty.	The	majority	of	the	students	came	from	the	province	of	Gauteng,	where																																																									10	Townships	 in	 South	 Africa	 refer	 to	 racially	 segregated	 residential	 areas	 close	 to	 or	 within	urban	 centres,	which	 started	 emerging	 in	 the	 19th	 century,	 but	 became	heavily	 regulated	with	urban	 areas	 legislature	 in	 the	 1920s.	 Townships	 were	 mostly	 meant	 to	 supply	 cheap,	predominantly	 Black	 African	 labour	 to	 support	 the	 white	 economy,	 while	 restricting	 and	surveying	 the	movement	 and	 rights	 of	 the	 Black	 population.	 Townships	were	marked	 by	 high	levels	of	poverty	due	to	the	under/non-investment	from	the	state,	and	the	lack	of	infrastructure	and	services	continues	to	plague	many	townships	to	date	(Kihato,	2014).	
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UJ	 is	 located,	 while	 others	 came	 from	 the	 Eastern	 Cape,	 the	 Free	 State,	 KZN,	Limpopo,	 Mpumalanga,	 North	 West	 and	 the	 Western	 Cape.	 There	 were	 no	students	 from	 the	Northern	 province.	 The	 students	 also	 came	 from	 both	 rural	and	urban	settings.			Lastly,	 the	 students	 also	 came	 from	 diverse	 religious	 and	 faith-based	positionalities.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 students	 identified	 as	 Christians	 of	 various	denominations,	 ranging	 from	 Roman	 Catholics,	 Lutherans,	 Pentecostals,	 Seven	Day	 Adventists	 to	 members	 of	 the	 Zion	 Christian	 Church.	 Some	 were	 actively	involved	as	youth	 leaders,	readers	or	musicians,	others	were	avid	congregation	members	and	church	goers,	yet	others	considered	their	 faith	 in	God	 important,	even	if	they	did	not	go	to	church	while	at	varsity.	There	was	also	a	considerable	group	of	students,	who	were	brought	up	 in	a	church-going	household,	but	 they	saw	 it	more	of	 a	 ritual	practice	 that	was	a	 requirement	 from	 their	elders,	 than	something	 that	 they	 themselves	desired	 to	do.	Several	 students	 in	my	research	also	 identified	 as	 Muslim,	 Hindu	 or	 followers	 of	 traditional	 African	 religions.	Their	 faith	 and	 religions	 also	 played	 a	 varying	 degree	 of	 importance.	 To	 some	Muslims,	for	example,	their	faith	was	important	and	affected	their	political	views,	such	 as	 their	 rejection	 of	 the	 DA	 over	 its	 position	 on	 the	 Palestine	 and	 Israel	conflict.	 To	 others,	 their	 religion	 was	 important	 in	 their	 personal	 lives,	 and	impacted	 decisions	 such	 as	 whom	 and	 when	 to	 marry,	 or	 which	 religious	holidays	 to	 observe	 and	 which	 traditions	 to	 follow	 with	 regards	 to	 eating	 or	physical	 appearance.	 For	 many	 of	 these	 students,	 there	 was	 a	 complex,	unresolved	relationship	between	 their	culture	and	 their	 religion	–	 for	example,	many	differentiated	between	their	Muslim/Hindu	faiths	and	what	they	perceived	as	 traditional	 Indian	 culture,	 creating	 a	 conflation	 of	 values	 that	 they	 had	 to	navigate	and	reconcile.			The	importance	of	religion	in	my	research	emerged	even	before	I	personally	met	any	of	the	students	in	2016.	They	communicated	and	performed	their	religiosity	in	their	WhatsApp	statuses	and	on	social	media.	As	I	recruited	participants	and	added	 them	 into	 my	 WhatsApp	 contact	 lists,	 their	 statuses	 showed	 messages	asking	for	God’s	blessings	and	strength.	Twitter	feeds	from	UJ	students	and	other	
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young	 South	 African	 opinionistas	 often	 evoked	 Bible	 verses	 or	 prayers,	 while	many	emails	or	messages	were	ended	with	signatures	wishing	God’s	blessings.	A	similar	range	of	attitudes	towards	religion	and	religiosity	was	found	by	Brittian,	Lewin	and	Norris	(2013)	in	their	study	amongst	18-year-old	Black	Africans	from	urban	areas	of	Johannesburg.	In	their	study	they	found	that	religion	offers	young	people	a	moral	compass,	a	sense	of	belonging,	and	a	social	support	mechanism.	Moreover,	 they	 found	 that	 it	 offers	 a	 cross-generational	 connection	 and	 allows	them	to	know	where	they	come	from.		
Situated	Knowledge:	Importance	of	Decolonisation	and	#FeesMustFall	During	 my	 data	 collection,	 the	 South	 African	 academic	 spaces	 were	 heavily	impacted	 by	 student	 activism,	 collectively	 known	 as	 Fallism.	 Popular	representations	of	Fallism	depict	 it	as	a	student	 led	movement11	and	a	wave	of	social	 and	 political	 activism	 revolving	 partially	 around	 the	 question	 of	decolonisation	 of	 HE	 and	 partially	 around	 other	 iterations	 of	 social	 justice	struggles.	 Fallism’s	 origins	 are	 said	 to	 be	 in	 the	 #RhodesMustFall	 (RMF)	campaign	at	UCT	in	2015,	and	the	push	to	have	the	statue	of	Cecil	 John	Rhodes	removed	from	a	prominent	space	on	campus.	The	removal	was	a	manifestation	of	 wider	 debates	 at	 UCT	 about	 institutional	 racism	 and	 structural	 violence	experienced	 by	 Black	 students,	 which	 evolved	 into	 broader	 debates	 of	decolonisation,	 financial	 exclusion,	 and	 violence	 against	 women	 and	 queer	bodies. 12 	RMF	 developed	 into	 broader	 Fallism	 through	 various	 hashtag																																																									11	The	 conceptualisation	 of	 Fallism	 as	 a	 ‘movement’	 or	 a	 unified	 form	 of	 organising	 has	 been	contested.	In	2016-2017	there	was	a	debate	within	Fallist	circles	about	whether	the	‘movement’	should	 formalise	 and	 centralise	 and	 thus	 function	 through	 elected	 representatives	 and	 form	structures	on	a	national	 level	 in	order	 to	enhance	 its	 impact.	These	debates	became	especially	important	 in	 the	 first	half	of	2017,	because	 there	had	been	no	 joint,	nation-wide	mass	 student	action	 and	 only	 sporadic,	 localised	 and	 campus-based	 protest	 actions	 (Langa,	 2017;	 ROAPE,	2017).	In	addition	to	the	geographical	isolation	of	campuses,	political	and	ideological	differences	amongst	 Fallists	 were	 also	 causing	 fractions	 and	 impotence,	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 better	understood	as	series	of	activisms.	While	some	accused	political	parties	of	interference	and	trying	to	usurp	and	splinter	the	movement,	others	pointed	to	the	genuine	differences	on	issues	such	as	whether	HE	should	be	free	for	all	students,	including	those	who	can	afford	to	pay,	or	only	to	those	within	certain	economic	brackets	(Duncan,	2016;	Pithouse,	2016).	The	role	of	social	media	and	joint	 online	 activism	 through	 hashtags	 adds	 another	 layer	 of	 complexity	 in	 internet-age	mobilising	and	social	movement	conceptualising	(Luescher,	Loader	and	Mugume,	2017).	12	The	leading	role	of	Black	Radical	Intersectional	Feminists	(BRIF)	in	instigating,	theorising	and	pursuing	Fallist	 struggles	 has	 led	 to	 reflecting	 on	 feminist	 identity	 and	politics	 in	 South	Africa	(Khan,	 2017;	Ndlovu,	 2017;	 Gouws,	 2016b;	Miller,	 2016).	 As	Hassim	 (2006b)	 highlights,	 there	had	 not	 been	 a	 unified	 women’s	 movement	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	 heterogeneity	 amongst	women’s	 rights/	 feminist	 activists	 continues.	 Many	 Fallists	 claimed	 a	 feminist	 identity,	
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campaigns,	 including	 #PatriarchyMustFall	 and	 #FeesMustFall	 (FMF)	 which	spread	 across	 the	 country	 and	 had	 their	 localised,	 campus-specific	 iterations	such	as	#OpenStellenbosch.	However,	activism	around	the	experiences	of	Black	African	 students	 at	 formerly	white	 institutions	 and	 financial	 exclusion	 in	HE	 is	much	 longer	 than	 the	 events	 sparked	 at	 UCT	 (Luescher	 and	 Klemenčič,	 2016;	Luescher,	Loader	and	Mugume,	2017;	Badat	and	Sayed,	2014).	Similarly,	the	calls	for	 the	 decolonisation	 of	 universities	 have	 a	 rich	 history	 in	 South	 Africa	(Mamdani,	 1998;	 Ntsebeza,	 2014),	 across	 the	 continent,	 and	 in	 other	 post-colonial	 settings.	However,	 in	 the	 popular	 representations	 and	debates	 around	Fallism,	 these	 historical	 trajectories	were	 under-reported,	 as	were	 the	 student	activities	at	institutions	which	were	not	historically	white.			Fallism	re-politicised	the	well-researched	problems	of	structural	and	systematic	barriers	 to	 students’	 completion	 of	 HE	 degrees,	 such	 as	 the	 poor	 quality	 of	secondary	 education	 and	 inadequate	 English	 language	 competencies,	 which	make	 some	 students	 ill-equipped	 to	 handle	 varsity	 requirements.	 These	problems	 are	 combined	 with	 other	 factors,	 such	 as	 financial	 difficulties	 or	alienating,	 white/Eurocentric	 institutional	 set	 up	 of	 most	 universities.	 Many	Black	African	students	and	academics	alike	underscore	that	in	order	to	perform	well	 within	 the	 university	 setting	 they	 have	 to	 act	 white	 and	 exhibit	 signs	 of	whiteness	 in	 order	 to	 be	 acceptable,	 be	 it	 in	 their	 speech,	 attire	 or	 otherwise	(Booi,	 Vincent	 and	 Liccardo,	 2017).	 The	 pressure	 to	 perform	 against	 white	standards	often	takes	a	negative	emotional	and	psychological	 toll	because	their	lives	become	a	balancing	act	of	wearing	different	masks	or	moving	 in	between	two	worlds,	which	 explains	why	 the	 ideologies	 of	 Steve	Biko	 and	 Franz	 Fanon	have	had	such	resonance	with	many	people	in	HE	(Omar,	2016).	The	experiences	of	 feeling	 like	 one	 has	 to	 wear	 different	 masks,	 complements	 the	 students’	expectations	 and	 desire	 for	 authenticity	 in	 their	 leaders	 and	 in	 the	 value	 that																																																																																																																																																																highlighting	 however,	 their	 radical	 positioning	 in	 comparison	 to	 South	 African	womanists/feminists,	who	worked	within	 the	patriarchal	structures.	Hence,	many	BRIF	Fallists	criticised	feminists/women	who	did	not	challenge	the	structures.	Consequently	some	adopted	a	radical	 use	 of	 violence	 and	 connected	 to	women	 like	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela	 or	 the	 Black	Panthers	in	the	USA,	who	were	perceived	to	be	radical	and	revolutionary.	The	BRIF	activists	also	criticised	binary	approach	to	gender	and	sexuality,	which	can	be	seen	in	their	widespread	use	of	womxn	in	their	writing	as	well	as	inclusion	of	trans	and	non-binary	bodies	(Miller	2016;	Mupotsa	2017).		
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they	 assign	 to	 personal	 experience	 in	 the	 context	 of	 social	 distrust,	 which	 I	discuss	in	Chapter	Four.		Overt	incidents	of	systematic	racism	which	show	the	remnants	of	white	privilege	in	 HE	 are	 numerous	 and	 easy	 to	 identify.	 At	 UJ,	 for	 example,	 the	 ability	 of	Afrikaner	 students	 to	 study	 Accounting	 in	 Afrikaans,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 receive	additional	tutoring,	which	gave	them	an	undeserved	advantage,	was	used	as	an	illustration	by	some	students.	Although	most	Black	students	in	my	research	did	not	 feel	 or	 think	 they	 experienced	 overt	 forms	 of	 racial	 discrimination	 in	 a	classroom	setting,	which	made	UJ	a	comparatively	speaking	a	special	institution,	stories	 like	 that	 of	 the	 Accounting	 Department	 served	 as	 a	 reminder	 that	undeserved	 privileged	 continued	 even	 at	 an	 institution	 with	 a	 predominantly	Black	 African	 student	 population.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 also	 underscores	 that	many	 students,	who	 come	 from	Afrikaans	 speaking	 high	 schools,	 also	 struggle	with	 language	 competencies.	 However,	 as	many	 Fallists	 highlight,	 unlike	 other	students,	Afrikaans	speakers	are	able	to	pursue	varsity	degrees	in	their	mother	tongue	 at	 one	 of	 the	 country’s	 numerous	 institutions	 with	 dual	 English	 and	Afrikaans	 language	 of	 instruction,	 which	 speakers	 of	 Bantu	 African	 languages	cannot.			The	toxic	cocktail	of	structural	and	epistemic	violence	in	HE	is	finalised	with	the	political	and	social	pressures	to	increase	Black	African	student	enrolment.	This	is	pursued	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 post-apartheid	 transformation	 of	 South	Africa	 towards	 a	 more	 just	 society,	 and	 an	 economically	 stronger	 country.	Retaining	 the	 increasing	number	of	 students	 then	arises	 as	 a	key	 challenge	 for	universities	because	the	aforementioned	structural	issues	lead	to	high	drop-out	rates,	 especially	 of	 students	who	 come	 from	 poor	 backgrounds	 or	who	 do	 not	have	 suitable	 conditions	 to	 study	 (Ndebele	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 The	 drop-out	 rates	between	 first	 and	 second	 year	 at	 UJ	 in	 2014	were	 20%	 (Van	 Zyl	 and	Motsabi,	2016)	and	many	academics	who	I	spoke	to	mentioned	that	retention	was	a	big	concern	of	the	university’s	management.	Increasing	the	‘through-put’	of	students,	therefore,	featured	heavily	on	their	minds	and	#FeesMustFall	only	intensified	the	sense	 of	 urgency	 and	 pressure	 to	 deal	 with	 institutional	 barriers	 to	 Black	
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students’	 success.	At	 the	same	 time,	 some	academics	argue	 that	many	students	with	insufficient	skills	should	not	be	accepted	into	university	just	for	the	sake	of	demonstrating	 government’s	 commitment	 to	 transformation	 through	massification	 of	HE,	meaning	 a	 process	 of	 expanding	 the	 number	 of	 university	student	 through	 de-racializing	 education	 access.	 Nonetheless,	 due	 to	 these	systematic	 features	 of	 the	 education	 system,	 universities	 often	 reproduce	 the	socio-economic	 inequalities	 that	 they	 are	 meant	 to	 address,	 with	 many	underprivileged	 students	not	being	 able	 to	 successfully	 complete	 their	degrees	(Hodes,	2017;	Mbembe,	2016;	Van	Zyl,	2016;	Van	Zyl	and	Motsabi,	2016;	Badat	and	Sayed,	2014;	Higham,	2012).		Many	 British	 institutions,	 including	my	 own	 institution	 SOAS,	 became	 actively	involved	 in	 similar	 discussions	 around	 the	 same	 time,	 with	 initiatives	 such	 as	‘Why	is	my	curriculum	white’	also	advocating	for	the	necessity	of	decolonisation	of	 academia	 (Sabaratnam,	 2017;	 Decolonising	 Our	 Minds,	 2016).	 According	 to	Ndlovu-Gatsheni,	decoloniality	is	“the	idea	of	remarking	the	world	such	that	the	enslaved,	 colonised,	 and	 exploited	 people	 can	 regain	 their	 ontological	 density,	voice,	land,	history,	knowledge	and	power”	(2015a,	23).	Decolonial	thought	thus	needs	 to	 lead	 to	 changes	 in	 research	methodologies,	which	 are	often	 rooted	 in	the	disciplinary	strait-jackets	and	acceptable	ways	of	knowing	(Ndlovu-Gatsheni,	2017).	 Consequently,	 many	 scholars	 argue	 that	 decolonisation	 means	 the	replacement	of	the	assumed	universality	of	Eurocentric	knowledge	systems	with	a	 plurality	 of	 knowledges	 (Darder,	 2018;	 le	 Grange,	 2016;	 Mbembe,	 2016;	Tselapedi,	2016;	Ndlovu-Gatsheni,	2015a;	Oloruntoba,	2015;	Smith,	2012).			The	campaigns	to	end	the	exploitation	of	workers,	especially	the	outsourcing	of	maintenance	and	cleaning	staff	and	their	precarious	position	at	both	institutions,	further	 enhanced	 the	 parallels	 between	 SOAS	 and	 South	 African	 academia.	Fallists	who	saw	the	students’	struggles	over	fees	in	connection	to	the	precarious	situation	 of	 university	 workers	 committed	 themselves	 towards	 fighting	 for	insourcing	 of	 university	 cleaning,	 security	 and	 other	 staff	 and	 their	 ideological	position	was	thus	against	 the	wider	neoliberal	capitalism	that	underpinned	the	South	African	economy.	It	is	this	ideological	connection	that	according	to	Satgar	
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(2016)	 links	 Fallism	 to	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 South	 African	 social	 movement	struggles	that	started	in	2007,	and	which	focused	on	service	delivery	issues	for	the	poor	and	were	famously	titled	by	Peter	Alexander	(2010)	as	the	‘rebellion	of	the	poor’.			Parallels	between	the	two	academic	spaces	–	SOAS	and	UJ	–	also	became	evident	in	my	discussions	with	UJ	staff	and	in	the	critique	of	the	two	HE	systems	in	the	literature	(Booi,	Vincent	and	Liccardo,	2017;	Muller,	2017;	Sall	and	Oanda,	2015).	Many	South	African	academics	talked	to	me	about	the	pressures	and	competing	demands	 that	 are	 put	 on	 them	 from	 their	 institutions.	 The	 need	 to	 ‘publish	 or	perish’	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 was	 juxtaposed	 with	 the	 need	 to	 teach	 classes	 for	hundreds	 of	 students	 in	 order	 to	 right	 the	 wrong	 of	 apartheid	 and	 to	 use	education	 as	 a	 means	 to	 poverty	 eradication.	 While	 on	 a	 theoretical	 level	extensive	teaching	is	a	sign	of	highly	appraised	transformation	of	HE,	it	does	not	bring	any	academic	credit	or	prestige	to	the	academic	staff.	Moreover,	being	time	and	labour	intensive,	 it	was	often	deemed	as	academic	suicide.	Research	grants	from	the	National	Research	Foundation	 (NRF),	 the	 lecturer	 research	appraisals	and	 rankings,	 and	 financial	 incentives	 for	 publishing	 are	 another	 facet	 of	 the	neoliberal	capitalist	logic	in	South	African	and	British	academia	together	with	the	aforementioned	university	 ranking	 systems	 (Levidow,	 2004).	 The	performance	targets	 then	 often	 lead	 to	 questionable	 quality	 of	 outputs	 and	 the	 inability	 of	young	academics	and	academics	of	colour	to	progress	through	the	system.			It	 must	 be	 underscored	 that	 racialised	 experiences	 within	 South	 African	academic	spaces	are	gendered,	especially	as	far	as	the	ability	of	Black	women	to	succeed	in	academic	‘ivory	towers’	is	concerned.	Their	marginalisation	has	been	criticised	 for	 decades,	 especially	 by	 post-colonial,	 third	 world	 and	 African	feminist	 scholars	 (Pailey,	 2016;	 Mama,	 2007;	 Salo,	 2007;	 Spivak,	 1988).	 Akala	and	Divala	(2016),	Lewis	(2016),	Barnes	(2007)	and	others	show	that	the	gender	gap	in	HE	can	be	seen	in	various	domains,	 including	in	university	management,	lectureship	 positions,	 curricula	 and	 in	 academic	 publishing.	 The	 intersectional	dynamics	 of	 power	 in	 South	 Africa	 is	 thus	 similar	 to	 other	 regions,	where	 the	male	 scholarship	 dominates	 over	 female	 authored	 research,	 thus	 positioning	
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scholars	of	colour	at	the	bottom	of	the	academic	hierarchy	(Briggs	and	Weathers,	2016).			Consequently,	 decolonisation	 and	 intersectionality	 became	 prevalent	 analytical	approaches	 to	 questioning	 power	 in	 South	 Africa,	which	was	 important	 to	 the	students	with	whom	and	amongst	whom	I	conducted	this	research;	however,	 it	was	also	an	integral	issue	of	my	personal	academic	experience	in	the	UK.	There	are	 many	 intellectual	 traditions,	 including	 the	 writings	 of	 many	 postcolonial,	anti-colonial	 and	 Afro-feminist	 scholars	 which	 question	 global	 epistemic	inequalities	 and	who	 could	 offer	 an	 analytical	 approach	 to	 questioning	 power,	especially	 in	 knowledge	 production.	 Despite	 the	 relevance	 of	 these	 various	theoretical	 and	 methodological	 approaches,	 the	 appeal	 of	 the	 decolonisation	discourses	to	the	students	and	its	dominance	in	the	academic	spaces	in	which	I	conducted	 the	 research,	 made	 it	 into	 the	 most	 appropriate	 tool	 to	 tackle	 this	question	 of	 epistemic	 and	 other	 power	 inequalities	 and	 thus	 shaped	 both	 my	methodological	and	conceptual	approaches,	which	I	address	in	Chapter	Four.		
Reflections	on	Positionality	and	Power		The	 information	 that	 the	 students	 and	 other	 key	 informants	 shared	 with	 me	during	 our	 encounters	were	 a	 result	 of	mutual	 interpretations	 of	 each	 other’s	identities	and	understanding	of	the	South	African	and	global	realities.	Hence,	the	individual	engagements	were	unique	in	the	way	in	which	they	were	affected	by	power.	 As	 part	 of	my	 research	methodology,	 I	 shared	with	 all	 the	 participants	some	of	my	personal	 and	academic	background.	While	 explaining	 the	 research	objectives,	 processes,	 and	 their	 implications	 for	 the	 students	 prior	 to	 their	joining	the	research,	I	included	a	brief	context	of	my	academic	career	at	SOAS.	As	an	ice-breaker	during	both	FGDs	and	SSIs,	I	told	the	students	about	being	Slovak	and	answered	any	of	 their	questions,	many	of	which	revolved	around	my	prior	experiences	 in	 South	Africa	 and	my	 impressions	 of	 the	 country,	 as	well	 as	 the	reasons	 why	 I	 had	 decided	 to	 pursue	 this	 particular	 research.	 The	 students’	perceptions	of	me	as	a	white	male	 studying	 ‘women’s	 issues’	 in	South	Africa,	 a	foreigner/outsider,	 an	 Eastern	 European	 studying	 at	 a	 British	 university,	 a	seemingly	 young	 and	 financially	 well	 to	 do	 person,	 or	 any	 and	 all	 of	 these	
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identities	 combined,	 consciously	 and	 subconsciously	 may	 have	 affected	 their	subsequent	 interview	 responses.	 Consequently,	 they	 also	 shaped	 my	 insights	into	the	role	of	power	in	understanding	symbolic	political	representation	and	the	RME.			My	 interviews	 with	 Aria	 and	 Thando	 serve	 as	 illustrative	 examples	 of	 the	diversity	of	engagements	and	interpretations.	Aria	portrayed	herself	as	someone	who	could	be	described	in	South	Africa	as	a	non-racialist,	because	although	she	thought	race	had	an	impact	on	people’s	lives,	especially	with	regards	to	accessing	economic	resources,	 she	claimed	she	did	not	 let	race	 influence	her	 interactions	and	views	of	other	people.	She	defined	herself	as	African	and	said	she	did	not	like	it	when	people	asked	her	about	her	ethnicity.	She	was	from	Mpumalanga,	but	she	had	moved	to	Gauteng	where	she	went	to	a	well-resourced	high	school,	although	it	did	not	assist	her	with	applying	 to	university.	 She	was	an	 “aspiring	plus	 size	model”,	who	felt	bullied	and	judged	in	school,	but	had	no	one	to	talk	to	because	her	parents,	who	both	worked	in	the	public	sector,	travelled	a	lot.	She	was	a	poet,	taking	 part	 in	 poetry	 groups	 and	 jam	 sessions,	 but	 was	 not	 a	 member	 of	 any	societies	or	organisations.	As	 she	was	 sharing	her	views	about	 the	 society,	 she	said:			 Aria:	I	can	sit	here	with	you	and	have	a	conversation,	[and]	people	would	be	 judging	us	 and	 I	wouldn’t	 notice,	 because	 I’m	 currently	busy,	but	if	I	had	been	in	a	surrounding	where	I’m	actually	noticing	my	 entire	 surrounding,	 you	 tend	 to	 feel	 judged.	 Every	 stare	 is	 a	judgement	in	my	eyes,	you	know.	Ján:	would	we	be	judged	because	you’re	black	and	I’m	white?	Aria:	 [sigh]	 yah,	 …	 I	 feel	 like	 South	 Africans	 are	 very	 narrow-minded.		Thando	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 was	 not	 thinking	 about	 other	 people	 during	 the	interview,	but	about	my	perceptions	of	what	she	was	saying.	She	was	an	African	young	woman	from	KZN,	whose	family	was	closely	tied	to	the	ruling	ANC,	as	her	parents	 worked	 in	 the	 public	 sector.	 Yet	 Thando	 herself	 was	 not	 actively	involved	 in	 political	 parties	 or	 student	 organisations	 at	 UJ.	 She	 believed	 that	African	culture,	especially	customs	and	traditions	such	as	slaughtering	or	black	magic,	had	been	forgotten	and	devalued	under	the	influence	of	colonial	Christian	
	54	
conversion.	During	our	interview,	some	of	her	answers	made	me	suspect	that	the	racial	difference	between	us	mattered	to	her,	so	at	the	end	of	the	conversation	I	directly	 asked	 her	 whether	 she	 would	 have	 said	 things	 differently	 had	 I	 been	Black	 African.	 Her	 response	 caught	 me	 off	 guard,	 because	 we	 had	 met	 twice	before	–	once	in	her	FGD	and	another	time	for	an	informal	hang-out	with	her	and	her	 friend	 just	 before	Christmas	2016.	Back	 then	we	 spoke	 about	our	 families,	holiday	traditions	and	I	thought	it	was	very	clear	that	I	was	a	foreigner,	with	very	different	 customs,	 worldviews	 and	 personal	 histories	 from	 most	 white	 South	Africans.	Nonetheless,	she	admitted	that	she	censored	herself,	that	she	expressed	things	differently,	because	she	did	not	know	whether	I	would	get	offended	as	a	white	person,	and	a	white	Christian	more	specifically.			The	 two	 interviews	 illustrate	 how	 the	 participants	 differed	 in	 their	interpretations	of	 the	research	encounters	based	on	 their	understanding	of	 the	world,	their	personal	experiences	and	their	application	of	their	worldviews	into	the	 research	 process	 (Liong,	 2015;	 Tarrant,	 2014).	 In	 Thando’s	 case,	 one	 can	argue	 that	 she	was	 trying	 to	 be	 sensitive	 to	 the	 potential	 upset	 that	 she	 could	cause	based	on	 the	differences	 that	 she	 expected	 existed	between	us	based	on	what	 she	 had	 witnessed	 amongst	 Blacks	 and	 whites	 in	 South	 Africa.	 In	 other	words,	 she	 was	 trying	 to	 avoid	 our	 conversation	 getting	 ‘heated,’	 friendships	getting	 ruined	and	 feelings	getting	hurt	as	many	students	 said	happened	when	South	Africans	discussed	politics.			Instead	 of	 avoiding	 or	 minimizing	 tensions	 with	 me,	 many	 students	 took	 the	opportunity	 to	 teach	me	 about	 “their	 culture.”	 They	 were	 responding	 to	 their	experiences	of	lack	of	interest	and	distrust	amongst	people	from	various	races	or	other	backgrounds	that	I	outline	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	Three	and	throughout	the	whole	thesis.	However,	to	minimise	the	potential	of	insulting	or	disgruntling	me,	 these	 students	 would	 frequently	 nuance	 their	 responses	 about	 the	behaviours	 of	 whites	 or	 men	 by	 saying,	 “no	 offense”	 or	 suggesting	 that	 their	views	pertain	to	“most”	men/whites,	implying	that	if	I	felt	differently	from	what	they	were	saying,	I	could	exclude	myself	from	their	portrayal	of	people	like	me.		
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Due	to	the	power	 inequalities	within	South	Africa	that	the	students	experience,	many	 of	 my	 respondents	 may	 have	 felt	 the	 need	 or	 the	 desire	 to	 defend	 the	positive	impact	of	women	in	positions	of	power	and	Black	women	in	particular.	In	response	to	the	frequent	downplaying	of	racism	and	patriarchy	in	the	country,	many	students	could	have	 felt	 the	pressure	to	present	 these	women	to	me	 in	a	positive	 light,	or	at	 least	 to	be	 less	 critical	of	 their	actions,	 in	order	 to	 reassert	their	worth	because	they	are	frequently	devalued	and	dehumanised.	Hence,	their	responses	to	me	may	have	differed	from	what	they	might	have	expressed	to	their	peers.	 This	 behaviour	 emerges	 especially	 as	 many	 students	 did	 not	 know	 the	details	 about	 the	 performance	 and	 impact	 of	 women	 politicians	 that	 we	discussed,	but	they	made	assumptions	about	them,	as	I	discuss	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	Five.			The	 portrayal	 of	 FPEs	 that	 the	 students	 presented	 would	 have	 also	 been	moderated	 by	 their	 perception	 of	 my	 curiosity	 and	 interest	 in	 the	 ‘subject’.	Assuming	 that	 I	 was	 studying	 female	 political	 elites	 in	 South	 Africa	 out	 of	genuine	interest	in	gender	inequality	and	with	the	objective	to	better	understand	women’s	 situation	 in	 the	 country,	 some	 students	 were	 inclined	 to	 share	 their	criticism	of	the	elites,	whom	they	perceived	to	be	causing	or	contributing	to	the	bad	situation	 in	 the	country.	At	 the	same	 time,	 they	could	also	be	exaggerating	the	plight	of	non-elite	women	and	men	to	demonstrate	the	inequality	that	exists	amongst	 elites	 and	 ‘the	 Others’	 and	 the	 urgency	 with	 which	 these	 differences	need	 to	be	addressed.	Hence,	my	 research	encounters	underscore	 the	need	 for	intersectional	thinking,	which	does	not	see	a	researcher	only	as	an	insider	or	an	outsider	 based	 on	 their	 geographical,	 epistemological,	 or	 identity-based	positionality,	 but	 a	more	multifaceted	 being,	who	 interjects	 into	 the	 individual	world	of	each	research	participant	in	complex	ways	that	cannot	be	dissected	into	neat	individual	categories.			Similarly	to	my	respondents,	I	also	approached	the	research	encounters	based	on	my	 pre-existing	 knowledge	 of	 the	 South	 African	 scholarship,	 as	 well	 as	 my	feminist	 politics	 and	personal	 experiences.	 I	was	 affected	by	my	prior	 visits	 to	Tshwane	(Pretoria),	Johannesburg	and	Cape	Town	as	a	development	practitioner	
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and	tourist.	When	I	worked	in	South	Africa	several	years	before	I	started	my	PhD,	I	 was	 inserted	 into	 a	 team	 of	 young	 Black	 African	 intern	 staff	 and	 their/our	domestic	 and	 international	 superiors.	 Through	 this	 experience,	 I	 had	 been	exposed	to	and	incorporated	into	the	domestic	power	dynamics	of	the	office	and	the	 country,	 while	 being	 nested	 in	 the	 global	 North-South	 hierarchies	 of	 the	development	 industry.	 My	 perceptions	 of	 the	 negative	 views	 that	 the	 older	generations	of	South	Africans	held	about	varsity	graduates	with	whom	I	worked	showed	 me	 the	 marginalisation	 that	 the	 youth	 sometimes	 face	 despite	 their	seeming	empowerment	through	HE.			During	 my	 subsequent	 data	 collection,	 I	 was	 frequently	 reminded	 of	 my	 past	experiences	in	South	Africa	-	the	familiarity	of	smells	of	the	deep-fried	vetkoeks	(doughnuts)	 spreading	 from	a	 supermarket	 on	my	way	 to	UJ,	 or	 the	 sounds	of	hadeda	 ibis	 birds	 in	 the	 early	 mornings,	 kept	 my	 past	 memories	 fresh	 in	 my	mind.	 Unlike	 during	my	 earlier	 time	 in	 South	 Africa,	 however,	 I	 became	more	inquisitive	 and	 conscious	 of	 my	 emotional	 responses	 to	 seemingly	 mundane	events	 and	 encounters	 that	 made	 me	 question	 the	 South	 African	 society.	 For	example,	I	recall	feeling	enraged	when	I	was	approached	in	a	supermarket	by	a	white	 stranger	 who	 presumed	 that	 I	 spoke	 Afrikaans	 as	 a	 white	 man.	 I	 still	vividly	feel	the	offence	that	overwhelmed	me	then	for	being	seen	as	a	member	of	the	 community	 that	was	 ascribed	 the	 historical	 legacy	 of	 apartheid.	 I	was	 also	hurt	and	disappointed	when	I	was	called	‘a	white	boy’	by	a	group	of	young	Black	African	men	as	I	walked	down	a	street	 in	parts	of	 Johannesburg’s	CBD,	where	I	felt	 that	 I	probably	 should	not	be;	yet,	 I	made	 those	quotidian	choices	 to	enter	these	 spaces	 as	my	personal	 symbolic	 rebellions	 against	 the	 stereotypes	 about	people	like	me.			In	response	to	these	mundane	moments,	as	well	as	my	research	encounters	such	as	 the	aforementioned	 interview	with	Thando,	 I	was	 forced	 to	engage	with	my	position	in	a	system	of	inequalities	and	privileges,	which	were	not	exceptional	to	South	 Africa	 or	 to	 something	 that	 could	 be	 compartmentalised	 to	 ‘in	 the	 field’	experience.	Under	the	influence	of	feminist	literature	and	engagements	at	SOAS,	I	came	 to	 see	my	 emotional	 reactions	 as	 processes	 of	 coming	 to	 terms	with	my	
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privileges	that	were	structural	and	global,	and	which	protected	and	strengthened	my	 life	 opportunities	 whether	 I	 recognised	 them	 as	 such	 or	 not.	 I	 tried	 to	critically	question	my	gut	instincts	to	use	the	typical	adages:	 ‘not	all	people	like	me	 are	 like	 that’	 and	 continually	 asked	what	my	 responses	 revealed	 about	 the	structures	 that	effect	my	respondents	as	much	as	me.	Overall,	 I	preconditioned	myself	 to	 stay	 alert	 to	 overt	 and	 covert	 expressions	 of	 othering	 and	(dis)empowerment,	 and	 consequently,	 to	 actively	 gauge	 and	 validate	 the	perceptions	of	the	marginalised,	which	I	expected,	sometimes	mistakenly,	 to	be	mostly	 amongst	 Black	 African	 and	 Coloured	 women	 from	 poor/lower	 class	contexts.	 I	 learnt	 to	 problematise	 and	 nuance	 these	 assumptions	 through	critically	questioning	how	and	why	my	participants’	responses	emerged.			Many	methodological	 norms	 in	 social	 sciences	 seek	 to	minimise	 the	 ‘negative’	impacts	 of	 differences	 in	 data	 collection.	 Based	 on	 my	 feminist,	 decolonial	orientations	 in	 this	 research,	 however,	 I	 reject	 the	 intellectual	 tradition,	which	seeks	to	minimise	difference	in	a	feeble	attempt	of	enabling	a	discovery	of	some	positivist	 truth.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 I	 tried	 to	 decrease	 power	 differences,	 while	constantly	 acknowledging	 their	 continued	 existence,	 presence	 and	 impact	 and	while	treating	them	as	sources	of	information	integral	to	the	final	knowledge	that	was	 produced.	 The	 aforementioned	 interview	 with	 Thando	 demonstrates	 my	direct	approach	to	questioning	difference	and	allowing	the	students	to	reflect	on	its	importance	together	with	me,	rather	than	me	reflecting	on	it	on	my	own	after	the	 research	 encounter	 (Gildersleeve,	 2010).	 However,	 I	 came	 to	 this	 practice	gradually,	 during	 the	 data	 collection	 process,	 as	 the	 need	 for	 such	 approach	became	 clearer	 to	 me	 in	 order	 to	 deliver	 a	 decolonial,	 intersectional	 research	project	from	my	positionality.			Additionally,	 I	 attempted	 to	 facilitate	 the	 students’	 active	 engagement	 in	 my	research	 and	 enhance	 their	 control	 over	 the	 knowledge	 production.	 On	 an	epistemological	 level,	 this	 included	 the	 aforementioned	 choice	 to	 use	 the	 non-prescriptive	concept	of	 ‘female	political	elite’	and	giving	the	students	the	ability	to	shape	the	research	to	their	own	context	by	not	providing	my	own	definitions	of	 FPEs.	 Similarly,	 I	 avoided	 introducing	 the	 term	 ‘role	 model’	 in	 order	 to	
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minimise	 conditioning	 the	 students	 into	 thinking	 that	 they	 should	 consider	women	in	politics	as	role	models;	nor	did	I	ask	the	students	directly	about	role	models	in	connection	to	other	people	in	their	lives.	For	example,	when	discussing	their	careers,	education-related	decisions,	hopes	and	plans	for	the	future,	I	asked	the	students	about	people	in	their	lives	who	they	wanted	to	be	like	or	whose	life	they	would	like	to	have;	people	who	they	found	successful,	inspirational	or	who	they	looked	up	to,	people	who	‘have	made	it	in	life’;	and	people	who	impacted	or	played	 a	 role	 in	 their	 decision-making.	 While	 some	 students	 instinctively	responded	using	the	phrase	‘role	model,’	others	did	not	use	the	term	at	all,	be	it	in	 connection	 to	 women	 in	 politics,	 or	 any	 other	 individuals	 we	 discussed.	Therefore,	although	I	refer	to	the	students’	role	models	throughout	the	thesis,	it	does	not	always	reflect	their	own	choice	of	words.		On	the	methodological	level,	my	decolonial	feminist	efforts	were	reflected	in	the	combined	use	of	FGDs	and	SSIs,	because,	as	it	has	been	mentioned,	they	have	the	potential	 to	 give	 participants	 a	 sense	 of	 empowerment	 in	 sharing	 experiences	with	others	or	by	gaining	a	voice	in	a	context	of	marginalization	that	many	young	women	 in	 South	 Africa	 experience	 (Hlalele	 and	 Brexa,	 2015;	 Nencel,	 2014;	Moloney,	 2011).	 The	 students’	 responses	 to	 these	 two	 methods	 varied.	 Some	students	enjoyed	the	group	setting,	because	they	had	joined	the	FGDs	in	order	to	learn	from	others	and	to	listen	to	others’	views.	Therefore,	some	stayed	quiet	and	did	 not	 engage	 much,	 but	 had	 a	 lot	 to	 say	 in	 the	 personal	 setting	 of	 the	 SSI	instead.	 Others	 were	 opinionated,	 vocal	 and	 fearless	 in	 both	 settings,	 but	preferred	 the	 one-on-one	 SSI,	 as	 it	 gave	 them	 a	 chance	 to	 express	 themselves	more	clearly;	yet	a	few	students	were	quiet	and	timid	in	both	instances.	Hence,	the	 combination	 of	 the	 research	 methods	 worked	 in	 a	 complementary	 way	because	it	afforded	the	students	at	 least	one	opportunity	to	be	in	a	setting	they	preferred.			Transnational	 feminist	writers,	 such	 as	 Ella	 Shohat	 or	 Chandra	Mohanty,	 offer	some	 inspiration	 as	 to	 how	 to	 methodologically	 approach	 decolonial,	intersectional	 feminist	 objectives	 against	 the	 theories	 developed	 in	 and	 by	western-centric	scholarship.	In	the	revisit	of	her	seminal	piece	Under	the	Western	
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Eyes,	 Mohanty	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 women’s	 solidarity	 rooted	 in	 ‘common	differences’	 needs	 to	 work	 against	 capitalism	 and	 global	 neoliberalism,	 whose	power	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 when	 one	 considers	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 most	marginalised.	 She	 writes,	 “[a]	 transnational	 feminist	 practice	 depends	 on	building	 feminist	 solidarities	across	 the	divisions	of	place,	 identity,	 class,	work,	belief,	and	so	on.	In	these	very	fragmented	times	it	is	both	very	difficult	to	build	these	alliances	and	also	never	more	 important	 to	do	so”	 (Mohanty,	2003,	250).	Political	 economists,	 Ferguson	 (2010),	 Saad-Filho	 and	 Johnston	 (2004)	 and	others	 similarly	underscore	 the	adverse	effects	of	neoliberalism	on	 the	world’s	majority,	 especially	 the	 poor	 and	 labour	 movements	 as	 forms	 of	 collective	organising.	 This	 system	of	 capitalism,	 built	 on	 financial	 capital,	 “concentrate[s]	the	 power	 and	 wealth	 in	 elite	 groups	 around	 the	 world”	 (Saad-Filho	 and	Johnston,	2004,	1)	and	is	built	on	values	of	individualism,	competition	and	citizen	responsibility.	Thus,	 it	 is	able	to	maintain	power	through	 joint	social,	economic	and	political	means.			By	operationalizing	this	research	on	women	in	politics	through	the	term	‘female	political	 elite’	 the	 intersectional	 understanding	 of	 gender,	 neoliberalism	 and	racism	 as	 systems	 of	 power	 and	 exploitation	 that	 create	 reinforcing	 and	 self-perpetuating	 sets	 of	 norms	 is	 intensified	 and	 brought	 to	 the	 fore.	 Chapter	 Six	unpacks	 the	 term	 elite	 in	 more	 detail,	 drawing	 on	 discussions	 of	 self-identification	 in	 class	 belonging	 in	 the	 South	 African	 context.	 Throughout	 the	thesis,	manifestations	of	neoliberal	values	of	individual	responsibility,	critique	of	dependency	 and	 market-based	 valuation	 of	 worth	 and	 productivity	 are	mentioned,	particularly	in	Chapter	Seven	and	the	discourses	of	‘being	deserving’.			Another	way	of	 finding	 solidarities,	 according	 to	 Shohat	 (2002),	 is	 by	mapping	how	 concepts	 travel	 and	 by	 putting	 various	 disciplines	 and	 studies	 into	conversation.	 Approaching	 intersectionality	 in	 research	 by	 articulating	 values,	characteristics	and	behaviours	that	are	attached	to	the	FPEs	by	a	wide	range	of	students	 has	 the	 potential	 for	 finding	 new	 ways	 to	 articulate	 and	 consider	feminist	 solidarities	 for	 social	 justice	 and	 activism.	 Fusing	 women’s	empowerment	 conceptualisation	 into	 the	 research	 on	 political	 representation	
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and	gender	norms,	also	moves	the	analysis	away	from	Eurocentric	presumptions	of	 liberal	democratic	context	and	away	from	dichotomies	of	the	public/political	and	 private/social.	 It	 embraces	 the	 intersectional	 identities	 that	 shape	 the	perceptions	of	women	in	politics	and	the	ideal	articulations	of	the	FPEs,	to	match	the	intersectional	nature	of	the	students’	own	lived	realities.		
Writing	and	Knowledge	Production		The	 implications	 of	 the	 intersectional,	 decolonial	 feminist	 approaches	 (Lewis,	2016;	 Pailey,	 2016;	 Oloruntoba,	 2015;	Mama,	 2007)	 on	writing	 this	 thesis	 are	several,	 and	 include	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 engage	 with	 research	 written	 by	women	of	colour,	African	scholars	and	scholars	based	 in	Africa	and	to	draw	on	knowledge	captured	in	non-peer	reviewed	sources,	such	as	newspapers,	blogs	or	popular	media	 platforms,	 such	 as	 the	 Conversation	 or	 the	 South	 African	 Daily	Maverick,	 a	 frequently	 used	 news	 portal,	 where	 key	 public	 figures	 share	 their	opinions	 and	 analyses.	Most	 crucially,	 however,	 I	 extensively	 quote	 the	 female	participants	 to	 recognise	 their	 voice	 and	 agency.	 The	 vocabulary	 that	 is	 used	throughout	the	thesis	attempts	to	capture	the	tone	and	style	of	the	students,	be	it	through	 the	 use	 of	 South	 African	 English	 words	 such	 as	 ‘yah’,	 ‘neh,’	 ‘eish’	 or	‘varsity’	 to	 refer	 to	 university,	 and	 ‘matric’	 for	 high	 school	 matriculation	certificate,	 or	 including	 phrases	 in	 other	 languages,	 if	 they	 were	 used	 by	 the	students,	such	as	yebo,	meaning	yes	in	Zulu.	In	the	quotations	I	also	use	italics	to	designate	the	original	emphasis	or	excitement	in	the	voice	of	the	student	during	our	conversations,	and	 include	sounds	and	noises,	 such	 laughs,	 claps	and	 ‘kiss-teeth’	 –	 a	 linguistic	 gesture	 of	 sucking	 air	 through	 your	 teeth	 (Patrick	 and	Figueroa,	2002)	–	because	they	are	forms	of	communication	and	relay	important	contextual	 information	 such	 as	 contempt,	 judgement	 or	 disapproval.	Grammatical	errors	made	by	both	 the	students	and	myself	are	also	kept	 in	 the	quotes.			The	extensive	use	of	 the	students’	voice	has	had	 two	main	 implications	 for	 the	research.	 Firstly,	 the	 students	 used	 terms	 for	 their	 familial	 ties	 that	might	 not	necessarily	correspond	to	the	assumed	point	of	reference	for	a	reader	from	the	global	North.	The	students	across	cultural,	racial	and	class	backgrounds	used	the	
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same	terms	such	as	parents,	siblings,	cousins,	and	children	as	they	fit	 into	their	different	worlds	and	hence,	they	refer	to	different	kind	of	persons	or	blood	ties.	Therefore,	some	students	called	their	biological	aunts	their	mothers,	and	family	friends	their	aunties;	their	cousins	were	referred	to	as	their	sisters/brothers,	or	their	step/half-parents	where	called	 their	parents.	Untangling	 the	relationships	is	 not	 of	 importance	 for	 the	 research,	 and	 hence,	 the	 terms	 are	 not	 clarified	throughout	the	thesis,	but	embraced	as	used	by	the	students.			In	 the	 thesis	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘Black	 African’,	 to	 recognise	 that	 some	 students	identified	as	Black,	others	as	African,	and	yet	others	as	Black	African,	Black	South	African,	 and	 Native	 African.	 At	 times,	 I	 refer	 collectively	 to	 Black	 African,	Indian/Asian	and	Coloured	students	as	Black	as	it	is	often	done	in	the	literature	tied	to	Black	Consciousness	and	Pan-African	thought.	This	use	of	the	term	‘Black’	is	in	some	literature	substituted	by	designation	‘non-white;’	however,	in	order	to	avoid	 centralising	 whiteness,	 I	 choose	 to	 use	 the	 term	 Black,	 acknowledging,	however,	 that	 not	 all	 of	 my	 participants,	 whether	 Indian/Asian	 or	 Coloured,	would	understand	themselves	and	their	lived	experiences	through	this	prism	of	Blackness,	 primarily	 because	 they	 feel	 that	 the	 oppression	 or	 pain	 that	 is	associated	 with	 being	 Black	 African	 differs	 from	 their	 lived	 experiences.	Additionally,	 some	 students	 also	 identified	 as	 mixed-race	 or	 specified	 a	particular	 ethnic/cultural	 group	 within	 the	 broader	 racial	 category.	 Many	students	also	chose	not	to	identify	with	any	race	or	specified	racial	group	that	is	ascribed	 to	 them.	 Therefore,	 when	 sharing	 the	 students’	 individual	 stories,	 I	respect	 their	 self-identification	 choices	 and	 their	 language.	 In	 other	 words,	 I	disclose	the	race	of	individual	students	in	the	terms	of	their	preference	or	do	not	reference	it	at	all,	which	may	at	times	cause	confusion	to	the	reader;	however,	it	inadvertently	 transmits	 the	sense	of	 contestation	 that	permeates	South	African	society.		Throughout	 the	 thesis	 I	 write	 Black	 with	 upper	 case	 B	 as	 an	 expression	 of	solidarity	 with	 the	 political	 efforts	 of	 those	 activists,	 who	 seek	 to	 change	 the	negative	values	and	political	exclusion,	which	were	ascribed	to	their	Black	racial	identity	by	the	capitalist,	patriarchal,	colonial	and	apartheid	regimes,	and	which	
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have	 been	 used	 to	 disempower	 and	 dehumanise	 them.	 Based	 on	 this	 logic,	 I	equally	refer	to	Coloureds	with	upper	case	C,	while	using	white	with	lower	case	w.	I	also	insert	myself	into	the	thesis	as	a	narrator	and	share	my	experiences	in	an	ethnographic	style	 to	continuously	remind	the	reader	of	 the	power	that	 I	as	the	 author	 possess	 over	 the	 discourses	 and	 analyses	 that	 form	 this	 thesis	 and	that	my	own	positionality	shaped	the	data-gathering	processes.		
Research	Limitations		In	addition	 to	 the	aforementioned	 limitation	stemming	 from	my	research	 focus	on	 a	 single	 university,	 there	 are	 several	 additional	 limitations	 that	 must	 be	acknowledged.	Firstly,	the	use	of	snowballing	for	participant	recruitment	based	out	 of	 the	 Sociology	 Department	 resulted	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 participants	being	students	in	the	Faculty	of	Humanities.	Although	they	pursued	degrees	in	a	variety	 of	 subjects,	 including	 Business,	 Marketing,	 Accounting,	 or	 Corporate	Communications,	there	were	no	students	in	technical	fields	such	as	Engineering	or	 natural	 and	 financial	 sciences.	 Most	 of	 the	 students	 who	 volunteered	 to	participate	were	intrinsically	interested	in	the	topic	of	FPEs	and	studying	in	the	Humanities	 Faculty,	 the	 students	 may	 have	more	 interest	 in	 social	 issues	 and	hence	 a	 higher	 propensity	 to	 express	 care	 for	 others	 or	 have	 specific	expectations	 of	 political	 elites,	 which	 might	 differ	 from	 their	 peers	 in	 other	subjects.	Nonetheless,	as	I	reveal	in	Chapter	Five,	when	discussing	the	career	and	education	choices	made	by	the	participants,	many	did	not	read	subjects	they	had	wanted	 to	 pursue	 and	 hence	 their	 studies	 were	 out	 of	 sync	 with	 their	 self-perceptions.	 Moreover,	 several	 students	 did	 not	 participate	 out	 of	 interest	 in	politics,	but	they	participated	merely	out	of	curiosity	or	as	a	favour.	This	suggests	some	potential	mitigation	of	 the	presumed	 typology	of	 students	based	on	 their	degrees.		My	deliberate	reliance	on	students’	voices,	mentioned	 in	 the	preceding	section,	also	resulted	in	the	frequent	invisibility	and	omission	of	certain	peoples	from	the	discussion.	 Many	 of	 the	 students’	 narratives,	 reflecting	 the	 wider	 societal	debates,	 approach	 power	 relationships	 in	 South	 Africa	 as	 struggles	 between	Black	Africans	and	whites,	and/or	the	rich	and	the	poor.	Other	peoples,	identities	
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and	 bodies	 are	 thus	 missing	 in	 the	 analysis,	 such	 as	 lesbian,	 gay,	 bisexual,	transgender,	 queer	 and	 intersex	 (LGBTQI)	 individuals	 and	 differently	 abled	people,	while	some,	such	as	Indian/Asian	and	Coloured	South	Africans	are	often	less	visible	as	they	should	be.	Their	neglect	in	my	participants’	considerations	of	power	meant	 that	 our	 interviews	 and	 the	 subsequent	 analysis	 of	 this	 thesis	 at	times	mirrors	this	invisibility.		Although	this	research	strives	to	adopt	feminist	decolonial	methodologies,	it	falls	short	 of	 this	 objective	 in	 several	 ways.	 Firstly,	 the	 research	 is	 not	 directly	 or	deliberately	 transformative	 of	 the	 socio-political	 structures	 or	 empowering	 of	the	individual	female	participants,	as	many	decolonial	feminist	scholars	suggest	research	should	be	 (Darder,	2018;	Smith,	2012;	Wickramasinghe,	2010).	While	the	overarching	contribution	of	the	research	is	within	the	discourses	on	political	representation	 and	 empowerment,	 the	 research	 itself	 does	 not	 directly	contribute	to	political	and	social	activism	and	change.	As	it	was	suggested	earlier,	some	 participants	 found	 the	 engagement	 in	 the	 research	 empowering	 by	 the	virtue	of	gaining	a	voice.	As	I	will	demonstrate	in	Chapter	Eight,	it	provided	them	the	 opportunity	 to	 discuss	 issues	 of	 politics	 and	 South	 African	 society	 with	authority,	which	some	of	 them	had	felt	 intimidated	about,	or	had	believed	they	were	not	equipped	to	do.	As	 I	appreciated	 their	 inputs	and	 fully	accepted	 their	views,	positioning	myself	as	an	attentive,	non-judgemental	listener	(Liong,	2015;	Conway,	2008;	Ortiz,	2005)	many	students	took	advantage	of	this	opportunity	to	assert	 themselves	 as	 knowledge	 holders	 on	 a	 subject	 that	 they	 presumed	was	outside	of	their	expertise.	However,	besides	the	individual	level	change	in	some	instances,	 the	 research	 is	 unable	 to	 deliver	 change	 in	 the	 daily	 realities	 of	 the	students.			Secondly,	the	research	design	process	was	not	participatory	and	although	it	was	significantly	 shaped	 to	 build	 on	 the	 students’	 realities	 and	 voice,	 it	 was	 not	devised	by/with	the	students	and	for	the	students	(Smith,	2012).	The	thesis	in	a	shortened	form,	be	it	as	articles,	reports	or	policy	briefs,	will	be	shared	with	all	research	participants,	with	whom	I	have	been	in	touch	periodically	since	having	left	 South	 Africa.	Moreover,	 the	 students	were	 encouraged	 to	 provide	 ongoing	
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feedback	 in	 the	 thesis	 production;	 however,	 none	 of	 the	 students	 took	 the	opportunity	to	engage	beyond	the	FGDs	or	the	interviews.		Thirdly,	the	thesis	is	focused	on	the	examination	of	the	position	of	women	in	the	21st	 century	 South	 Africa.	 It	 is	 contextualised	 and	 historicised	 through	 the	analysis	of	the	legacies	of	the	apartheid	regime,	which	in	turn	is	understood	as	a	continuation	of	the	white	settler	colonial	project	in	the	Southern	African	region.	However,	the	pre-	apartheid	colonialism	and	the	early	apartheid	histories	are	not	dealt	with	in	detail.	They	are	inherent	in	the	debates	on	Blackness,	African/Black	culture,	 community	 and	 belonging;	 and	 with	 regards	 to	 gender	 norms	 and	women’s	position	of	 power	 and	political	 leadership,	 they	 feature	mostly	 in	 the	debates	on	traditional	elites,	including	several	queens	and	female	chiefs.			The	 analysis	 of	 social	 affairs	 and	 political	 developments	 in	 the	 thesis	 ends	 in	December	 2017	 with	 the	 ANC	 presidential	 conference.	While	 many	 important	political	changes	have	occurred	in	South	Africa	since	then,	they	are	outside	of	the	purview	of	this	thesis.			Lastly,	the	sole	use	of	English,	instead	of	other	languages	of	students’	preference,	is	 a	 limitation	 for	 this	 research	 because	 of	 the	 study’s	 decolonial	 ambitions.	Ngũgĩ	 wa	 Thiong’o	 (2005)	 underscores	 that	 decolonisation	 is	 a	 process	 of	remembering	 the	 knowledge	 that	 was	 erased	 from	 the	 colonised	 subjects	through	linguisticides,	and	hence	the	dismantling	of	the	metaphysical	empire	is	achieved	 through	 the	 use	 of	 African	 languages	 and	 assigning	 them	 worth	 in	academic	 spaces	 (wa	 Thiong’o,	 2017).	 During	 a	 series	 of	 lectures	 for	 South	African	university	students	in	March	2017,	wa	Thiong’o	encouraged	the	students	to	 embrace	 their	mother	 languages	 as	 an	 act	 of	 empowerment	 (2017)	 and	 he	captured	the	tensions	young	educated	Black	African	people	experience	between	the	 call	 to	 use	 African	 languages	 as	 an	 act	 of	 decolonisation	 and	 the	 desire	 to	master	English	as	 a	 tool	 of	 social	mobility.	The	decision	 to	use	English	 for	 this	study	 is	 thus	 inherently	 part	 of	 the	wider	 power	 debates	 in	 the	 South	 African	academic	setting.	However,	as	students	at	UJ	speak	English	and	are	thus	able	to	express	 themselves	 directly,	 I	 decided	 to	 use	 English	 as	 a	 cost-effective	
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compromise	between	 losing	some	of	 the	meaning	and	richness	of	 the	students’	mother	tongues	on	one	hand	and	using	a	third-party	translator	on	the	other.			 	
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3 Contextualising	 Power	 in	 South	 Africa:	 Gender,	 Race,	 Class	
and	Age	
Introduction	This	chapter	provides	an	explanatory	note	on	the	conditions	of	the	social	order	in	 South	 Africa	 and	 contextualises	 some	 of	 the	 key	 debates	 that	 surrounded	young	women	and	womanhood	in	2016	and	2017.	Using	episodes	and	actors	that	emerged	during	my	data	collection,	both	nationally	and	locally	at	UJ	as	examples,	I	 sketch	 the	 structures,	 which	 shaped	 the	 experiences	 and	 perceptions	 of	 my	participants,	especially	gender,	race,	class	and	age.		I	argue	that	 the	situation	 in	South	Africa	 is	characterised	by	high	prevalence	of	distrust	or	suspicion,	which	arise	in	response	to	historical	and	ongoing	abuse	of	power,	 inequality	and	political,	 social	and	economic	change.	The	 first	 source	of	this	distrust	and	related	uncertainty	 is	 the	system	of	corruption	and	patronage	that	is	maintained	by	the	ruling	ANC,	but	which	permeates	political	 institutions	more	 broadly.	 The	 gendered	 impact	 of	 this	 political	 system	 is	 shown	 on	 the	example	of	the	ANC	Women’s	League	(WL).	Secondly,	I	show	how	the	notions	of	toxic	masculinity	 and	 submissive	 femininity	 are	 building	 blocks	 of	 the	 debates	surrounding	 the	 violence	perpetuated	by	 the	 state	 and	 the	universities	 against	young	women	and	men,	which	are	yet	another	facet	of	the	abuse	of	power.	The	gerontocratic	 character	 of	 the	 social	 order	 is	 then	 shown	 on	 the	 government	policies	and	approaches	to	the	youth.			The	chapter	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	the	role	of	experience	and	empathy	as	sources	of	knowledge	and	understanding	within	this	context	of	distrust,	high	inequality	and	social	change.	 It	 is	the	preference	for	experience	as	an	authentic	and	 legitimate	way	 of	 knowing	 that	 shapes	 the	 students’	 views	 on	 power	 and	political	 representation	 and	 thus	 underpins	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	 female	political	elites.			 	
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Politics	of	Patronage	and	Corruption	According	 to	 Afrobarometer	 polls	 (Lekalake,	 2017;	 2015a;	 2015b)	 corruption	has	 become	 the	 key	 societal	 concern	 for	 South	 Africans	 and	 one	 of	 the	 top	problems	in	the	country.	In	2016/2017	rampant	corruption	was	predominantly	associated	with	the	two	presidencies	of	 Jacob	Zuma,	who	became	the	president	of	the	ANC	in	2007	at	the	party	conference	in	the	town	of	Polokwane,	and	who	consequently	 became	 the	 country’s	 president	 in	 the	 2009	 national	 elections.	Zuma	retained	both	the	party	and	the	country	presidency	for	a	second	term	and	his	 time	 in	office	became	synonymous	with	conspicuous	 ‘politics	of	 the	belly’13	and	 led	 to	 his	 high	 level	 of	 unpopularity	 amongst	 many	 South	 Africans.	 Yet	corruption	 and	 patronage	 have	 been	 a	 structural	 issue	 in	 the	 country	 since	before	the	democratic	transition	in	the	1990s	and	existed	both	during	apartheid	as	 well	 as	 throughout	 the	 democratic	 presidencies	 of	 Nelson	 Mandela,	 Thabo	Mbeki	and	Kgalema	Motlanthe	who	proceeded	Jacob	Zuma.			The	 decades-long	 popular	 political	 support	 of	 the	 ANC	 and	 its	 unopposed	dominance	 that	was	 ushered	 in	with	 the	 1994	 elections,	 led	 to	 the	 blurring	 of	lines	between	the	state	and	the	party.	This	has	created	a	sense	that	the	state	is	a	resource	at	the	party’s	disposal	(Dawson,	2014a;	Plaut,	2014;	von	Holdt,	2013).	The	 practice	 of	 ‘cadre	 deployment,’	 including	 of	 top	 party	 National	 Executive	Committee	 (NEC)	members	 to	 the	 cabinet,	 created	a	 culture	of	 exploiting	 state	resources	through	the	party	for	personal	advancement.	Thus,	as	politicians	wish	to	 gain	 access	 into	 public	 offices	 and	maintain	 their	 positions,	 their	 allegiance	and	accountability	lies	with	the	party	leadership	or	the	faction	in	power,	rather	than	 the	citizens.	This	 culture	has	 stifled	 internal	and	external	debates	and	 led	many	politicians	to	toe	the	party	 line	 in	pursuit	of	self-interest	(Southall,	2017;	Gouws,	2011;	Southall,	2003).			
																																																								13	The	 term	was	made	 prominent	 in	 African	 studies	 by	 Jean	 François	 Bayart	 and	 it	 is	 used	 to	denote	 the	 tendency	 of	 those	 in	 power	 to	 use	 their	 positions	 to	 ‘feed’	 on	 state	 resources	 to	accumulate	wealth	and	to	distribute	them	to	others	to	maintain	power	(qtd.	in	Cornwall,	Robins	and	von	Lieres,	2011,	10).	Hence,	it	is	connected	to	corruption,	patronage,	and	wealth	within	the	context	of	the	state.		
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The	patronage-based	system	in	the	ANC	operates	under	the	guise	of	party	unity	and	 cooperation.	The	pressure	on	ANC	members	 to	present	 a	 united	 front	 is	 a	continuation	 of	 the	ANC’s	 apartheid	 era	 tactics	 of	 secrecy	 and	 strict	 discipline,	which	was	a	survival	tactic	against	the	persecution	by	the	apartheid	state	(Gqola,	2015;	Gumede,	 2015).	However,	 as	 issues	 and	problems	are	 forced	 to	be	dealt	with	inside	the	party	and	not	in	the	open,	public	accountability	is	compromised,	making	 this	 approach	 unsuitable	 for	 a	 political	 party	 within	 a	 democratic	political	 system.	 An	 illustrative	 example	 of	 this	 unity	 and	 discipline	 discourse	was	the	case	of	a	 female	MP,	Dr	Makhosi	Khoza,	who	served	as	the	head	of	 the	parliamentary	 committee	 on	 public	 service	 and	 administration.	 She	 caught	media	attention	due	 to	 threats	 that	 she	had	received	 for	her	oversight	visits	at	several	medical	facilities,	which	revealed	maladministration	in	public	institutions	(Khoza,	2017).	Her	profile	then	skyrocketed	after	she	openly	criticised	President	Jacob	 Zuma	 and	 the	 party	 leadership,	went	 against	 the	 Chief	Whip	 of	 the	ANC	caucus	 in	 Parliament,	 and	 voted	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 no	 confidence	 motion	 against	President	Zuma.14	She	was	branded	as	an	ill-disciplined	member	and	became	one	of	the	most	visible	MPs,	who	voted	with	the	opposition	on	this	motion.	She	was	stripped	of	her	committee	chair	role	and	eventually	left	the	party,	claiming	that	the	 ANC	 under	 the	 corrupt	 and	 illegitimate	 leadership	was	 no	 longer	 the	 ANC	that	she	had	joined	(Herman,	2017a;	Khoza,	2017;	Lowman,	2017).	Khoza’s	story	thus	embodies	the	long	history	of	discipline	and	unity	related	policing	within	the	ANC	and	the	public	image	of	widespread	corruption	that	it	contributes	to.		The	ANC-led	governments	have	also	used	the	discourses	of	discipline	and	unity	to	 articulate	 what	 a	 responsible	 South	 African	 citizen	 should	 be	 like	 and	 to	demarcate	the	spaces	for	participation.	Responsible	citizens	are	meant	to	act	and	work	in	cooperation	with	the	party	and	under	its	structures,	rather	than	through																																																									14	The	 vote	 of	 no	 confidence	 took	 place	 in	 August	 2017,	 which	 President	 Zuma	 withstood.	 It	emerged	as	a	response	to	the	April	2017	changes	in	the	cabinet,	and	especially	the	replacement	of	then	Minister	of	Finance	Pravin	Gordhan,	who	enjoyed	a	popular	image	of	the	last	beacon	of	fight	against	corruption	in	the	government.	The	reshuffle	that	President	Zuma	orchestrated	in	the	middle	 of	 the	 night	 to	 the	 surprise	 of	many	 in	 his	 party	 and	 the	 public	 at	 large	 caused	major	response	 in	 the	 general	 public,	 civil	 society,	 and	 opposition	 political	 parties.	 It	 led	 to	 mass	demonstrations	in	metropoles	and	urban	centres,	which	were	hailed	to	be	the	largest	since	the	end	 of	 apartheid	 and	 ultimately	 led	 to	 the	 vote	 of	 no	 confidence	 (Runciman,	 Nkuna	 and	Frassinelli,	2017).		
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outside	means	 such	as	protests,	 especially	 those	 that	 are	 claimed	 to	be	violent	(Mills,	 2016;	 Brown,	 2015).	 According	 to	 many	 politicians,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	democratic	state	opened	new	channels	of	engagement	which	meant	that	violent	disruptions	 lost	 their	 apartheid-era	 legitimacy,	when	 the	 struggle	 tactic	was	 to	make	 South	 Africa,	 and	 townships	 in	 particular,	 ungovernable.	 Moreover,	 the	ANC	 continues	 to	 build	 on	 its	 historical	 narratives,	 which	 presented	 the	 party	and	Black	people	as	one,	in	order	to	create	an	image	of	the	ANC	as	the	vanguard	responsible	 for	 the	 country’s	 successful	 democratic	 transition	 and	 the	 sole	proprietor	of	the	post-apartheid	development	and	achievements	(Brooks,	2017).	Civic	 and	 political	 activism	 and	 protests	 outside	 of	 the	 ANC	 have	 thus	 been	partially	delegitimised	(Selmeczi,	2015;	Ballard	et	al.,	2006).	The	Fallist	protests,	for	example,	were	often	attacked	this	way.	Their	critics	argued	that	the	students	lacked	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 delivering	 the	 promised	 post-apartheid	transformation	and	thus	showed	their	youthful	impatience.	They	also	lacked	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 new,	 democratic	 context,	 which	 made	 their	protest	 tactics	 inappropriate	 and	 obsolete.	 In	 other	 words,	 Fallist	 opponents	argued	 that	 the	 change	 of	 socio-political	 circumstances	 created	 formal,	ANC/state	 managed	 channels	 for	 voicing	 grievances	 (Luescher,	 Loader	 and	Mugume,	2017).			The	need	for	the	ANC	to	rely	on	the	discourses	of	unity	and	discipline,	combined	with	 the	 calls	 for	 citizens	 to	 be	 patient	with	 the	 transformation	processes,	 has	increased	with	 the	 rising	 dissatisfaction	 of	many	 people	with	 the	 slow	pace	 of	post-apartheid	 improvements	 of	 their	 daily	 lives	 and	 with	 service	 delivery	 in	certain	communities	in	particular	(Akinboade,	Mokwena	and	Kinfack,	2014;	von	Holdt,	 2013;	 Piper	 and	 Nadvi,	 2010;	 Miraftab,	 2006).	 The	 2016	 municipal	election	losses	for	the	ANC	in	major	metros	(Johannesburg,	Pretoria	and	Nelson	Mandela	Bay)	and	the	2017	waves	of	anti-Zuma	protests	demonstrate	the	extent	of	 the	 rising	 challenge	 to	 the	 party’s	 legitimacy.	 Consequently,	 the	 well-established	 strategy	of	 conflating	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	party	were	failing	to	deliver	the	positive	 image	for	the	ANC	in	2016-2017,	 forcing	the	anti-Zuma	faction	of	the	ANC	to	try	and	salvage	the	party’s	reputation	by	attempting	to	 distance	 the	 party	 from	 the	 government	 and	 certain	 individuals.	 The	 ANC	
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faction	 led	 by	 then	 Vice-President	 (VP)	 Cyril	 Ramaphosa,	 Lindiwe	 Sisulu	(Minister	 of	 Human	 Settlement)	 and	 Gwede	 Mantashe	 (Secretary	 General),	argued	that	despite	the	allegations	of	state	capture	and	corruption,	the	ANC	as	a	whole	 was	 able	 to	 reform	 itself	 because	 the	 values	 and	 ideas	 of	 the	 party	remained	 good.	 It	 was	 just	 certain	 individuals	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 party	who	 corrupted	 the	 ANC	 members	 and	 who	 were	 threatening	 the	 party’s	revolutionary	 mission.	 Despite	 some	 attempts	 to	 separate	 the	 ANC	 from	 the	corruption	 of	 Zuma	 presidencies,	 the	 president	 managed	 to	 maintain	 enough	support	 within	 the	 party	 to	 stay	 in	 office	 until	 the	 ANC	 party	 conference	 in	December	2017,	when	the	new	leadership	was	elected.	Moreover,	the	pressures	on	 the	 party	 to	 remain	 united	 as	 the	 conference	 was	 approaching	 were	intensified	 by	 the	 lessons	 from	past	 leadership	 contestations,	which	 led	 to	 the	splintering	of	 factions	 into	opposition	parties,	 including	Congress	of	 the	People	(COPE)	and	the	Economic	Freedom	Fighters	(EFF).			The	 ANC	 had	 previously	 succeeded	 in	 diminishing	 claims	 of	 systematic	corruption	 by	 sacrificing	 individuals,	 especially	 on	 the	 local	 level,	 where	 the	pressures	 from	 the	 citizens	 were	 most	 acutely	 felt	 (Goebel,	 2011;	 Alexander,	2010;	Bénit-Gbaffou,	2008).	However,	with	 the	rising	accusations	and	evidence	of	the	extent	to	which	the	graft	was	structural	rather	than	an	individual	anomaly,	the	distrust	of	 the	whole	political	 system	rather	 than	 individuals	was	growing.	The	 opposition	 fuelled	 this	 viewpoint	 by	 arguing	 that	 graft	 was	 so	 deeply	entrenched	 in	 the	 ANC	 that	 it	 was	 beyond	 the	 point	 of	 no	 return	 (de	 Villiers,	2017).	 Thandeka	 Gqubule	 captures	 this	 widespread	 societal	 sentiment	 of	mistrust	 and	 suspicion	 tied	 to	 corruption	 when	 she	 describes	 the	 impact	 that	Thuli	 Madonsela,	 whose	 reports	 revealed	much	 of	 this	 corruption,	 had	 during	her	 time	 in	 office.	 She	 writes,	 “Madonsela’s	 gift	 [the	 Nkandla	 report]	 to	 the	country	 was	 costly:	 bequeathing	 it	 took	 investment	 in	 her	 courage,	determination,	 flair,	 the	constitutionally	bestowed	powers	of	her	office,	and	the	altruism	 of	 her	 team.	 In	 a	 country	 where	 political	 culture	 had	 rendered	 truth	
precious	and	rare,	her	gift	was	priceless”	[my	emphasis]	(2017,	169).			
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The	 Nkandla	 scandal	 is	 one	 of	 many	 high-profile	 cases	 that	 demonstrate	 the	betrayal	of	trust	vested	in	the	political	establishment.	Students	often	spoke	about	politicians	 pretending	 to	 take	 action	 that	 would	 bring	 positive	 changes	 to	 the	people	and	hence	they	claimed	that	political	elites	were	faking	their	commitment	to	changing	the	country.	Sinqobile	was	a	Black	student	who	lived	at	home	with	her	mother,	who	was	a	cleaner.	She	was	a	pro-active	go-getter	from	a	township	in	 Gauteng:	 she	 was	 involved	 in	 various	 on-campus	 activities	 and	 as	 she	explained,	although	she	did	not	know	much	about	politics,	she	hoped	there	might	be	 something	 that	 came	 out	 of	 her	 participation	 in	 the	 research,	 because	 she	believed	that	one	never	knew	what	doors	such	engagement	could	open.	She	was	convinced	that	in	order	to	succeed	and	to	get	ahead	in	South	Africa,	she	had	to	be	active,	knock	on	doors	and	ask	for	things.	For	example,	she	had	gone	to	the	ANC	offices	to	ask	for	money	for	her	studies,	which	she	never	received	despite	having	been	promised	by	a	member	of	the	local	branch.	Moreover,	she	believed	that	the	ANC	government	only	pretended	 to	push	 for	women’s	 empowerment	 and	paid	lip	 service	 to	 women’s	 equality,	 because	 if	 they	 genuinely	 cared,	 they	 would	“empower	 the	women	 to	 have	 equal	 rights	 and	…	 to	 stop	 hate	 crimes,	 to	 stop	rape	and	to	stop	those	forms	of	inequalities	that	hinder	the	women.”	It	must	be	underscored	 that	 other	 political	 parties	 were	 similarly	 distrusted	 by	 many	citizens,	 with	 party	 membership	 and	 cross-racial	 perceptions	 representing	important	factors	affecting	this	distrust.			The	perceptions	of	the	entire	political	system	consequently	shaped	the	students’	views	of	the	ANC	WL,	which	was	expected	to	be	a	gender-aware,	women-focused	political	actor,	which	I	analyse	in	the	next	section.		
The	Patriarchal	Complacency	of	the	ANC	Women’s	League	The	 ANC	 WL	 has	 positioned	 itself	 as	 the	 dominant	 political	 voice	 on	 gender	equality	 in	the	country.	The	ANC	overall	has	built	a	relatively	positive	 image	 in	matters	of	gender	equality,	particularly	 in	 the	 international	domain,	because	of	gender	equality	provisions	 in	the	constitution,	such	as	the	commitment	to	non-sexism	or	the	creation	of	gender	state	machinery	in	the	form	of	various	oversight	bodies.	 The	 50-50	 gender	 quota	 rule	 for	 the	 party’s	 NEC	 is	 another,	 oft-cited	
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measure	 that	 feeds	 the	party’s	 gender-equality	narrative,	which	 is	perpetuated	despite	the	fact	that	Jessie	Duarte	was	the	only	woman	holding	one	of	the	top	six	leadership	roles	in	late	2017.			While	 the	WL	was	certainly	an	 important	actor	 in	contributing	towards	gender	equality	 provisions	 in	 the	 country	 and	 the	 party,	 the	 League	 was	 part	 of	 a	broader	 campaign	 led	 by	 the	National	Women’s	 Coalition	 (NWC),	 consisting	 of	civil	 society	 organisations,	 academics	 and	 feminist	 activists	 (Meintjes,	 2017;	Hassim,	 2014a;	 Gouws,	 2011).	 Studies	 show	 that	 strong,	 independent	women’s	movements	 that	 resisted	 co-optation	by	dominant	political	 forces	were	 able	 to	achieve	 favourable	results	 for	women	on	the	continent	(Tripp	and	Badri,	2017;	Berger,	2014;	Viterna	and	Fallon,	2008).	The	NWC	was	one	such	voice	in	South	Africa;	 however,	 it	 dissipated	 after	 the	 democratic	 transition	 as	many	 activists	joined	formal	political	structures	with	the	first	parliamentary	elections	under	the	auspices	 of	 the	 ANC.	 Consequently,	 the	 ANC	 WL	 became	 the	 self-positioned	primary	voice	of	Black	African	women	in	the	country	for	many	years.	However,	some	 feminist	 activists	 continue	 to	 challenge	 this	 notion,	 as	 I	 suggested	 in	Chapter	 Two,	 and	 attack	 the	 ANC	WL	 for	 its	 track	 record	 as	 well	 as	 broader	ideological	standpoints.			As	 in	 many	 other	 liberation	 and	 anti-colonial	 movements	 on	 the	 continent,	women	 activists	 in	 and	 around	 the	 ANC	 and	 its	 allies	 had	 to	 fight	 their	 male	comrades	to	bring	gender	equality	onto	the	political	agenda.	This	was	often	the	case	 based	 on	 false	 reasoning	 that	 fighting	 colonial-racial	 oppression	 came	before	addressing	gender	 inequality	and	required	unity	of	purpose	amongst	all	fighters	and	hence	issues	of	gender	oppression	were	seen	as	a	distraction.	As	a	result	of	this	mindset	and	the	patriarchal	nature	of	the	movement,	women	in	the	struggle	had	to	withstand	various	forms	of	oppression,	ranging	from	silencing	of	their	 opinions	 to	 direct	 sexual	 violence.	 As	 Redi	 Tlhabi	 (2017),	 Pumla	 Gqola	(2015)	and	others	show,	it	was	not	only	the	female	fighters	and	struggle	activists	themselves,	but	also	the	wives	and	daughters	of	male	activists	and	fighters,	and	ordinary	South	African	women	that	bore	the	brunt	of	the	violence	by	the	men	in	the	movement,	and	of	the	state	apparatus.	Despite	the	end	of	the	anti-apartheid	
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struggle,	 women	 and	 men	 in	 South	 African	 politics	 (including	 members	 of	advocacy	groups	 and	other	CSOs)	 face	 considerable	physical	 danger,	 especially	on	 the	 municipal	 level.	 Competition	 between	 ANC	 factions	 for	 control	 over	political	positions	and	thus	over	power	and	economic	opportunities,	 frequently	leads	to	the	killings	of	opponents.	The	political	killings	in	KZN	in	2017	resulted	in	the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Moerane	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry,	 which	 sought	 to	examine	the	underlying	practices	that	lead	to	such	violence	(du	Plessis,	2017a).	In	addition	to	the	threats	to	their	lives,	female	politicians	face	sexist	attacks	from	their	male	colleagues.	Rebecca	Davis	(2017b),	a	feminist	commentator,	highlights	several	 cases	 that	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 National	 Assembly	 during	 Zuma	presidencies,	 including	attacks	on	DA’s	Phumzile	van	Damme,	who	was	called	a	“straat	 meid”	 (translated	 to	 imply	 a	 sex	 worker)	 by	 a	 fellow	 MP	 during	 her	response	to	the	president’s	2017	State	of	the	Nation	Address	(SONA).			With	 the	 entrenchment	 of	 the	 party-state,	 the	women	 of	 the	ANC	 also	 became	incorporated	 into	 the	system	of	patronage	and	corruption	 (Gouws	and	Hassim,	2014;	 Hassim,	 2014b;	 Makhunga,	 2014).	 According	 to	 Lyn	 Snodgrass	 (2017),	their	 collaboration	 with	 the	 political	 system	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 Deniz	 Kandiyoti’s	“patriarchal	 bargain”	 (1988),	 which	 suggests	 that	 some	 women	 benefit	 from	being	 part	 of	 the	 system,	 as	 it	 gives	 them	 comparatively	 more	 power	 and	privilege	 over	 others.	 Leading	 South	 African	 feminist,	 Patricia	 McFadden,	 has	captured	a	similar	critique	as	follows:		 The	upward	mobility	of	a	small	clique	of	Black	women	who	fought	ferociously	 to	 retain	 their	 middle-class	 status	 and	 the	 material	wealth	associated	with	gendered	mainstreaming	is	one	of	the	most	significant	 expressions	 of	 the	 demise	 of	 gendered	 nationalist	organizing	(2018,	424).		The	most	illustrative	example	of	the	patriarchal	bargain	and	neglect	of	feminist	politics	of	the	ANC	WL	can	be	seen	in	the	League’s	responses	to	highly	publicised	cases	of	sexual	violence	against	women.	On	one	side	of	the	spectrum	is	the	case	of	Fezekile	Ntsukela	Kuzwayo	(Khwezi),	in	which	the	WL	and	other	supporters	of	the	accused	rapist	Jacob	Zuma	viciously	attacked	Fezekile.	Instead	of	siding	with	her	–	a	victim	who	stood	up	to	one	of	the	most	powerful	men	in	the	country,	who	
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had	also	been	her	family’s	friend	and	an	elder	–	many	ANC	women	of	the	struggle	era	 whom	 Fezekile	 knew	 from	 childhood	 in	 exile,	 vilified	 her	 (Tlhabi,	 2017;	Gouws,	2016b,	2010).	The	polar	opposite	of	the	spectrum	to	Fezekile	was	Reeva	Steenkamp,	 who	 was	 killed	 by	 her	 famous	 partner,	 athlete	 Oscar	 Pistorius	 in	2013.	Pistorius,	a	white	male	with	no	 ties	 to	 the	ANC	or	politics	more	broadly,	was	met	with	the	full	wrath	of	the	League,	whose	members	sat	with	Steenkamp’s	family	 during	 the	 court	 hearings	 (Gouws,	 2016b;	 The	 Citizen	 Reporter,	 2015;	Molewa,	2014).	As	these	responses	suggest,	the	organisation	works	with	men	in	power	within	the	main	ANC,	rather	than	taking	a	critical	stance	against	them.			Based	 on	 a	 survey	 from	2002,	Gouws	 and	Kotzé	 (2007,	 175)	 found	 that	 South	African	 female	 MPs	 were	 concerned	 with	 issues	 of	 gender	 equality	 and	 held	more	 liberal	 views	 than	 their	 male	 counterparts	 on	 such	 women’s	 issues	 as	abortion	or	birth	control.	Due	to	the	small	sample,	the	authors	did	not	generalise	whether	 the	 values	 of	 female	MPs	 suggest	 a	 future	 rise	 of	 feminist	 politics.	 In	light	 of	 the	 patronage,	 nepotism	 and	 corruption	 within	 the	 ANC	 and	 the	patriarchal	nature	of	the	party	structures,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	ANC	WL	and	most	female	MPs	should	not	be	expected	to	be	a	loud,	feminist	critical	voice	against	the	ANC.	However,	the	ANC	WL’s	post-apartheid	bargain	must	also	be	seen	within	a	longer	historical	trajectory	of	the	ANC.	Already	during	the	struggle,	many	women	participated	 in	 building	 a	 culture	 of	 silence	 that	 prevented	 women	 from	challenging	their	fellow	comrades	and	demanding	justice	over	issues	of	GBV.			Many	 feminist	writers	 suggest	 that	 cooperation	 and	 consensus	 building	 rather	than	confrontation	between	men	and	women	are	a	feature	of	a	particular	version	of	Afro-feminism	tied	to	the	concept	of	Ubuntu	(which	I	discuss	in	more	depth	in	Chapters	Six	and	Eight)	and	which	 foregrounds	 the	community	rather	 than	 the	individual.	Within	 these	 African	 and	 Nego-feminist15	traditions,	 motherhood	 is	also	seen	as	a	source	of	empowerment	for	African	women.	Thus,	these	feminists	articulate	a	form	of	feminist	thought	and	practice	as	a	critical	response	to	some																																																									15	Obioma	 Nnaemeka	 (2004)	 explains	 Nego-feminism	 as	 African	 feminism	 in	 opposition	 to	western,	liberation	feminism	because	it	is	firstly	based	on	negotiation	and	consensus	finding	and	because	 it	 is	 ‘no-ego,’	 showing	 that	 women’s	 concerns	 are	 about	 helping	 others,	 rather	 than	oneself.		
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western	 liberal	 feminisms,	which	patronise	African	women	 (Mama,	2017;	Win,	2017;	Steady,	2005;	Nnaemeka,	2004).	 It	 is	questionable,	whether	 the	ANC	WL	could	be	understood	in	these	terms	because	of	the	policies	that	it	advocates	and	methods	 it	 utilises.	 It	 has	 pursued	 so-called	 motherist	 politics,	 which	 was	historically	demonstrated	by	 its	 framing	of	women’s	role	 in	 the	struggle	and	 in	the	 society	 as	mothers	 and	 carers.	 It	mobilised	 and	 recruited	women	 to	work	alongside	the	ANC	to	protect	their	children	and	to	create	for	them	a	better	future	and	 hence	worked	within	 patriarchal	 African	 nationalism	 (Walker,	 1995).	 The	critique	of	 the	ANC	WL	 thus	 stems	 from	some	 feminists	who	 challenge	 gender	norms,	 which	 reduce	 women’s	 societal	 contribution	 only	 to	 motherhood	 and	reproductive	 social	 care	 within	 the	 household	 (Gouws,	 2016b;	 Hassim	 2014a,	2006b;	 Makhunga,	 2014).	 Critiquing	 the	 ANC	WL	 as	 a	 motherist	 organisation,	however,	 is	 not	 a	 devaluation	 of	 motherhood	 or	 politics	 of	 cooperation	 as	articulated	by	Afro/Nego-feminists.	It	serves	to	highlight	the	WL	as	defenders	of	a	particular	kind	of	femininity,	which	pays	lip	service	to	challenging	patriarchal	gender	norms	of	the	main	ANC	body,	and	which	works	within	the	limitations	of	the	main	party	structures	(McFadden,	2018).		
Toxic	Masculinity	and	Submissive	Femininity	Gender	discourses	in	South	African	politics	and	society	are	underpinned	by	two	key	relational	themes:	the	crisis	of	masculinity	and	girls’	empowerment,	both	of	which	entail	role	models	as	an	important	element.	Crisis	of	masculinity	or	toxic	masculinity	is	a	widespread	area	of	research	and	debate	due	to	the	high	levels	of	GBV	 in	 the	 country.	 This	 research	 and	 public	 discourse	 suggest	 that	 toxic	masculinity,	meaning	masculinity	 based	 on	 domination	 and	 violence,	 is	 one	 of	the	 key	 reasons	 behind	 sexual	 violence	 and	 is	 connected	 to	 epidemics	 of	HIV/AIDS	(Jewkes	et	al.,	2010).	Studies	such	as	by	Morrell	et	al.	(2016),	Seekings	(2014)	and	Goebel	(2011)	propose	that	many	young	men	lack	male	role	models	or	 father	 figures	 in	 their	 lives,	 who	 could	 instil	 in	 them	 values	 of	 caring	fatherhood	or	equality	between	intimate	partners	as	part	of	the	ideas	of	what	it	means	 to	 be	 a	man.	Hence,	 young	men	 and	women	 are	 exposed	 to	 patriarchal	gender	 norms	 on	masculinity	 that	 lead	 to	 harmful	 practices	 being	 transferred	across	 generations.	 The	 story	 of	 my	 respondent	 Palesa,	 a	 Black	 student	 from	
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Gauteng,	 is	 a	 revealing	 manifestation	 of	 this	 impact.	 Palesa,	 who	 was	 in	 her	second	year	of	 studies	 in	2017	and	was	not	 a	member	of	 any	organisations	or	parties,	described	how	she	felt	that	a	lot	of	her	struggles	in	life	were	a	result	of	her	absent	father,	which	led	her	to	distrust	men.	Growing	up	the	oldest	of	three	siblings,	she	was	responsible	for	various	household	chores	from	tender	age	and	had	 to	 struggle	 to	 find	 food	 at	 times;	 she	 also	 witnessed	 her	 mother	 being	dismissed	at	various	jobs	because	of	the	lack	of	official	certificates.	In	addition	to	father	 absenteeism	 and	 growing	 up	 in	 female-headed	 households,	 exposure	 to	violence	against	women	and	men	also	 contributes	 to	 toxic	masculinity.	Both	of	these	factors	are	rooted	in	the	history	of	structural	and	physical	violence	of	the	colonial,	racist,	patriarchal	apartheid	regime	and	the	transitional	period,	as	well	as	migrant	 labour	 and	 spatial	 segregation	 (Tlhabi,	 2017;	Gqola,	 2015;	 Stauffer,	2015).			Most	 of	 the	 post-apartheid	 explanations	 of	 toxic	 masculinity	 are	 linked	 to	neoliberalism	 and	 the	 associated	 high	 levels	 of	 unemployment	 or	 precarious	livelihoods,	which	 hinder	men	 in	meeting	 the	 expectations	 of	 being	 protectors	and	 providers,	 or	 household-heads	 more	 broadly	 (Buiten	 and	 Naidoo,	 2016;	Enderstein	 and	 Boonzaier,	 2015;	 Stauffer,	 2015).	 As	 one	 of	 my	 male	 Black	African	 participants	 expressed	 it,	 “No	 one	 has	 it	 as	 tough	 as	 a	 Black	 man!”	because,	 as	 he	 argued,	 Black	 African	 men	 like	 him	 were	 not	 desirable	 for	marriage,	 because	 they	 did	 not	 have	 anything	 to	 offer	 to	women	 of	 his	 age	 in	comparison	 to	 white	 men.	 This	 means	 that	 many	 young	 men	 are	 not	 able	 to	reach	social	markers	of	adult	masculinity,	such	as	marriage,	because	they	cannot	afford	 to	pay	 for	 the	wedding	or	 in	 some	communities	 to	pay	 lobola,	 the	bride	price	or	‘damages’.16				The	 masculinity	 discourses	 tend	 to	 portray	 toxic	 masculinity	 in	 singular,	universal	 terms.	 However,	 it	must	 be	 recognised	 that	 it	 is	 primarily	 the	 Black																																																									16	Paying	damages	 refers	 to	 a	practice	 amongst	 some	Black	African	peoples	 such	as	Xhosa	and	Sesoto,	when	a	man	pays	 the	 family	of	a	woman	with	whom	he	has	a	 child	out	of	wedlock.	As	Mkhwanazi	 and	 Block	 explain,	 “This	 was	 often	 a	 one-time	 payment	 of	 cows	 or	 the	 cash	equivalent.	The	payment	of	damages	accords	paternal	recognition	and	lineal	belonging	–	meaning	that	the	child	would	care	for	that	ancestral	line	–	and	allows	for	the	possibility	of	patrilocal	care”	(2016,	274).	
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African	masculinity	 that	 is	 associated	with	 the	 ideas	of	 toxicity,	 crisis	 and	GBV	(Dube,	 2016),	 which	 shows	 its	 racist,	 colonial	 underpinnings.	 The	 nuances	between	different	types	of	masculinities,	as	mediated	by	race,	class	and	sexuality,	and	 their	 implications	 on	 the	 questions	 of	 hegemony	 and	 power	 within	 a	racialised	and	economically	unequal	society,	 tend	to	be	neglected.	For	example,	Dosekun	 (2013)	 finds	 that	 amongst	 her	 research	 participants,	 who	 were	 UCT	female	students,	rape	was	perceived	as	a	Black	African	issue,	which	reflected	the	pervasive,	dangerous	racialised	myth	within	South	African	society	(Gqola,	2015).	Many	authors,	including	Buiten	and	Naidoo	(2016),	Dube	(2016),	Ratele	(2014)	and	Vincent	(2006),	warn	against	these	homogenising	tendencies	that	are	in	the	public	 domain	 and	 in	 some	 research,	 and	 highlight	 the	 tensions	 and	contradictions	that	exist	amongst	various	masculinities.			The	 fallacy	 of	 the	 violent,	 toxic	masculinity	 being	 racialised	 as	Black	African	 is	well	substantiated	by	an	incident	that	caught	media	attention	in	March	2017	and	that	took	place	at	a	Spur	restaurant.	This	incident,	captured	on	video	and	spread	across	social	and	mainstream	media,	was	a	confrontation	between	a	white	father	and	a	Black	African	mother.	The	video	shows	the	 father,	a	man	of	strong	build,	yelling	 at	 the	mother	 in	 front	 of	 their	 children,	 other	 patrons	 and	 employees.	Getting	 increasingly	 aggressive	 and	 potentially	 violent,	 the	 man	 nearly	 flips	 a	table	 and	 assaults	 the	 mother,	 while	 she	 stands	 up	 to	 him.	 The	 incident	 had	widespread	 repercussions	 because	 the	 franchise,	 apologizing	 to	 the	 mother,	banned	 the	man	 from	 its	 establishments.	 It	 further	 sought	 to	 create	 a	 panel	 of	experts	 to	 look	 into	measures	that	could	prevent	such	 incidents	at	 their	spaces	from	repeating.	While	praised	by	many,	representatives	of	the	key	Afrikaans	civil	society	organisations,	such	as	AfriForum	and	its	affiliated	trade	union	Solidarity,	encouraged	the	Afrikaner	community	to	boycott	the	chain,	because	they	argued	the	 restaurant’s	 actions	 were	 anti-Afrikaner.	 The	 boycott	 led	 to	 a	 decline	 in	company’s	 revenues	 and	 pushed	 its	 management	 to	 cancel	 the	 panel	 (Abbas,	2017;	 du	 Toit,	 2017;	 van	 Tonder,	 2017).	 The	 incident	 thus	 reveals	 the	 neglect	and	disregard	of	white	masculinities	and	 the	 racist/racialised	nature	of	gender	debates	in	the	country.			
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The	 discourses	 tied	 to	 the	 above-mentioned	 notions	 of	 toxic	 masculinity	correspond	with	discourse	of	subservient,	submissive	femininity,	or	what	Jewkes	and	 Morrell	 (2012)	 termed	 “conservative	 femininity,”	 and	 vulnerability,	especially	 amongst	 Black	 African	 young	 women	 and	 girls	 (Graham,	 2016;	Dworkin	et	al.,	2012).	This	iteration	of	Black	African	and	Coloured	femininity	is	argued	 to	 limit	 the	 aspirations	 of	 young	 women	 and	 girls,	 causing	 marriage	and/or	motherhood	 to	be	seen	as	a	woman’s	key	role	and	resulting	 in	 teenage	pregnancies	and	high	drop-out	rates	from	school	(Marteleto,	Lam	and	Ranchhod,	2008).	 Consequently,	 the	 government	 has	 sought	 to	 empower	 girls	 by	encouraging	them	to	stay	in	education	and	to	consider	maths,	sciences	and	other	fields	 of	 study	 that	 are	 typically	 branded	 as	 male-dominated,	 not	 least	 by	promoting	 successful	 female	 role	 models.	 Hence,	 while	 the	 young	 women’s	empowerment	 debates	 are	 embedded	 within	 the	 sphere	 of	 sexuality,	motherhood	 and	 reproductive	 health,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 economic	 dimension	 to	them.	As	the	masculinity	crisis	is	linked	to	high	unemployment,	weak	economic	performance,	and	the	capitalist	 labour	exploitation,	 femininity	debates	focus	on	pushing	more	women	into	education	and	STEM	(science,	technology,	engineering	and	mathematics)	to	make	them	economically	more	productive	in	those	sectors	of	the	economy	that	are	seen	as	future	drivers	of	the	knowledge,	IT	and	service-based	 economy,	 rather	 than	 in	 sectors	 such	 as	 agriculture,	 mining	 or	manufacturing	that	are	the	current	pillars	of	the	faltering	economy.			During	 my	 data	 collection	 there	 were	 several	 prominent	 campaigns	 and	incidents	which	raised	the	issue	of	young	women’s	vulnerabilities.	An	illustrative	case	 is	 the	murder	 of	 a	 young	 Black	 African	 woman,	 Karabo	Mokoena	 (eNCA,	2017c;	2017d).	The	version	of	her	story	presented	by	the	media	portrays	her	as	repeatedly	abused	by	her	boyfriend,	an	investment	trader,	living	in	Sandton,	one	of	 the	 richest	 suburbs	 of	 Johannesburg.	 Karabo	 did	 not	 leave	 the	 abusive	relationship	despite	 the	warning	of	her	 family	and	 friends,	which	some	 leading	female	 politicians,	 such	 as	 Susan	 Shabangu,	 then	 Minister	 for	 Women	 in	 the	South	 African	 Presidency,	 as	 well	 as	 Social	 Development	 Minister	 and	 the	president	of	the	ANC	WL	at	the	time,	Bathabile	Dlamini,	linked	to	young	women	and	 girls’	 vulnerability	 and	 attraction	 to	 material	 things	 (News24,	 2017).	
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Shabangu’s	 statement	 in	 particular	 caused	 an	 outcry,	when	 she	 suggested	 that	Karabo	was	weak	 inside	while	 appearing	 strong,	which	was	 interpreted	as	her	blaming	the	victim.	However,	Shabangu	later	explained	that	she	had	meant	that	Karabo	was	vulnerable	(Herman,	2017b).			Narratives	 of	 toxic	 masculinities	 and	 women’s	 vulnerability	 are	 merged	 in	Karabo’s	 story.	 The	 account	 grabbed	 the	 public	 attention	 also	 because	 at	 the	time,	her	story	seemed	to	come	after	a	string	of	many	cases	of	GBV,	from	rapes	of	minors	 to	 intimate	 partner	 violence.	 Some	 feminist	 activists	 launched	 a	 social	media	hashtag	#MenAreTrash	and	subsequently	a	#NotInMyName	campaign	led	by	 ‘woke’	men	arose	 in	response,	allegedly	 to	show	some	men’s	disapproval	of	GBV.	The	 latter	campaign	pushed	men	to	take	a	stand	against	 toxic	masculinity	and	 model	 different	 behaviour	 (eNCA,	 2017a;	 News24,	 2017;	 Rupiah,	 2017;	Samanga,	2017).	One	of	the	leading	GBV	academics,	Lisa	Vetten,	mentioned	at	the	time	 that	 the	 society	 should	 push	 forward	 alternative	 male	 role	 models	 to	address	 the	 problem.	 She	 suggested	men	 like	 the	 anti-apartheid	 struggle	 icon,	Archbishop	Desmond	Tutu,	whose	behaviour	shows	that	men	can	be	vulnerable	and	emotional	(qtd.	in	Davis,	2017a).	Hence,	women’s	vulnerability	debates	have	worked	 in	 conjunction	 with	 toxic	 masculinity	 narratives,	 leading	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	more	 role	models	 countering	 the	hegemonic	gender	norms	are	needed	 for	 both	 young	 men	 and	 women.	 However,	 only	 a	 limited	 number	 of	initiatives	 and	 programmes,	 for	 example	 MenEngage	 run	 by	 an	 NGO	 Sonke	Gender	Justice,	address	masculinities	and	male	role	models.		
Violence	against	Women	and	Black	Bodies	in	HE	As	 the	 previous	 section	 underscores,	 violence	 against	 women	 is	 an	 everyday	reality	 for	 women	 in	 South	 Africa,	 and	 for	 Black,	 poor	 women	 in	 particular,	including	 in	 the	 university	 setting	 (Singh,	 Mudaly	 and	 Singh-Pillay,	 2015;	Dosekun,	 2013;	 Gordon	 and	 Collins,	 2013;	 Clowes	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 This	 has	 been	reflected	in	my	interviews,	as	violence,	and	GBV	in	particular,	was	on	the	minds	of	my	participants	and	shaped	their	choices	and	experiences	in	and	around	their	varsity	 life.	For	example,	many	would	prefer	to	 live	 in	on-campus	residences	in	order	to	avoid	the	commute	to	campus	using	public	transport,	the	so-called	taxis,	
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which	are	notoriously	dangerous	both	due	to	the	poor	road	safety	and	because	the	sector	 is	dominated	by	male-run	cartels	and	 lacks	proper	state	control	and	supervision.	This	leads	for	example	to	frequent	sexual	abuse	and	harassment	at	taxi	 ranks.	 Moreover,	 it	 was	 a	 frequent	 occurrence	 to	 see	 student	 posts	 on	Twitter	or	Facebook	pleading	for	help	with	locating	young	women	who	had	been	taken	 into	 strangers’	 cars	 just	 outside	 the	University	 gates.	 The	posters	 feared	that	these	women	had	been	kidnapped	and/or	raped.	High	prevalence	of	‘smash	and	 grab’	 also	 posed	 dangers	 for	 those	 wealthier	 students	 driving	 to	 campus.	More	violent	crime	was	also	part	of	the	UJ	landscape.	For	example,	Kelvin	Baloyi,	a	UJ	 student,	was	 shot	 allegedly	by	 an	off-duty	 security	 guard	at	 a	party	 at	his	accommodation	 (Kubheka,	 2016;	 Abdulla,	 2016)	 and	 there	 was	 an	 armed	robbery	at	APK,	when	students	working	in	a	computer	lab	were	robbed	of	their	laptops,	tablets	and	other	devices	at	gunpoint	(Canca,	2016).			Many	 of	 my	 participants	 expressed	 their	 disappointment	 and	 anger	 with	 the	University’s	 failure	 to	 ensure	 the	 safety	 of	 students,	 and	 female	 students	 in	particular.	Fallists	 criticised	 the	university	management	 for	employing	 security	staff,	 the	 so-called	 ‘bouncers,’	 and	 devoting	 significant	 resources	 to	 police	 the	protesting	 students,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 failing	 to	 protect	 women	 from	perpetrators	of	sexual	violence	and	other	crimes,	including	their	fellow	students.	The	presence	of	bouncers	is	one	of	the	many	manifestations	of	securitisation	of	campuses	 in	 South	 Africa	 that	 has	 been	 intensified	 during	 the	 course	 of	 FMF	protests.	 The	 university	 management	 argued	 that	 security	 staff	 was	 meant	 to	protect	 the	health	 and	 safety	of	 its	 staff	 and	 the	 ‘other’	 students	 (University	of	Johannesburg,	 2017c).	 However,	 the	 bouncers	 themselves	 reportedly	intimidated	 and	 harassed	 the	 students,	 and	 hence,	 the	 staff	 that	was	meant	 to	protect	 them,	 were	 some	 of	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 sexual	 violence	 (Schutte	 and	Singiswa,	2016).	This	securitisation	was	seen	at	many	other	institutions,	as	VCs	brought	private	security	companies	and	SAPS	to	their	campuses	to	help	‘manage’	the	 threat	 of	 protesting	 students.	 However,	 UJ	 was	 particularly	 seen	 as	 a	university	ruled	with	an	iron	fist,	where	any	protest	and	dissent	were	squashed	through	intimidation	and	force.			
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The	 UJ	 management’s	 approach	 to	 securitisation	 functioned	 firstly	 by	surveillance	 and	 secondly	 by	 direct	 force.	 Some	 of	 the	 overt	 surveillance17	methods	included	members	of	UJ	protection	services	(public	safety	department)	video-recording	 protesters	 in	 order	 to	 gather	 evidence	 for	 disciplinary	proceedings.	This	evidence	facilitated	their	suspensions,	thus	removing	‘trouble	makers’	 from	 campuses	 and	 preventing	 their	 further	 activism.	 The	 covert	operations	 were	 compared	 by	 some	 students	 to	 the	 apartheid	 state	 actions	against	 the	 banned	 ANC	 in	 exile,	 which	 they	 explained	 by	 the	 VC’s	 personal	experience	in	the	student	anti-apartheid	struggle.	Some	student	activists	shared	with	me	 stories	 of	 jammed	Wi-Fi	 signal	 and	 intercepted	 communication	 lines,	and	 having	 the	 management	 refer	 to	 their	 private	 phone	 conversations	 with	fellow	 students	 during	 questioning.	 A	 documentary	 report	 produced	 by	 an	investigative	 TV	 show	 Checkpoint	 (eNCA,	 2017b)	 further	 revealed	 that	 the	university	 placed	 undercover	 security	 guards	 posing	 as	 students	 onto	 buses	which	 ran	 between	UJ	 campuses.	 These	 security	 guards	would	 report	 on	 their	overheard	student	conversations	on	protest	plans	in	order	to	prevent	them	from	occurring.	Direct	force	was	also	utilised,	especially	at	several	protest	gatherings,	when	the	police	were	called	in	to	reinforce	the	private	security	personnel.	As	UJ	professor	Jane	Duncan	showed,	the	police	units	that	were	mobilised,	such	as	the	tactical	team,	were	inadequate	and	inappropriate	to	deal	with	student	protesters	(@duncanjane,	 2016).	 Moreover,	 as	 she	 argues,	 most	 of	 the	 student	 protests	were	disruptive	rather	than	violent	 in	nature	–	a	distinction	that	the	university	management,	 as	well	 as	 the	wider	 public	 and	 political	 leaders	 did	 not	 seek	 to	make	(Duncan,	2016).			The	 fear	of	 the	police	and	 the	security	services	amongst	many	UJ	students	was	palpable.	 Several	 students	 told	me	 that	 they	avoided	 coming	 to	 campus	during	protests,	 explaining	 in	 a	 semi-joking	way	 that	 they	 did	 not	want	 to	 die.	While	some	were	 referring	 to	 fearing	 the	 chaos	 that	 often	 accompanied	 the	 protests,	students	 running	 through	 corridors	 for	 example,	 others	 insinuated	 the	inappropriate	 use	 of	 force	 by	 the	 security	 services.	 I	 attended	 one	 protest																																																									17	These	 extra-ordinary	 security	 measures	 were	 put	 in	 place	 on	 top	 of	 already	 present	 and	normalised	 surveillance,	 which	 includes	 the	 use	 of	 fingerprint	 scanners	 and	 ID	 cards	 or	 the	inspection	of	car	boots	at	campus	entry	checkpoints.	
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gathering	 where	 students	 screamed	 and	 fled	 the	 scene	 as	 a	 row	 of	 a	 dozen	security	 officers	 with	 helmets,	 batons	 and	 protective	 shields	 approached	 the	meeting	 place.	 Although	 the	 officers	 did	 not	 engage	with	 the	 students	 on	 that	particular	occasion,	it	was	their	mere	presence	that	caused	the	fearful	response.	Cases	 of	 unrestrained	 use	 of	 force	 against	 UJ	 students	 also	 happened	nonetheless;	one	such	incident	was	captured	by	an	independent	journalist	at	the	DFC	 campus	 in	 September	 2016.	 In	 this	 incident,	 which	 later	 received	 some	media	 attention	 (eNCA,	 2016c),	 the	 students	 marched	 from	 APK	 to	 DFC	 in	downtown	 Johannesburg	as	part	of	 their	disruptive	protest	strategy.	Once	 they	arrived,	the	bouncers	who	were	meant	to	stop	them	from	entering	the	university	premises,	 chased	 the	 students	 away,	 followed	 them	 to	 a	 nearby	 petrol	 station,	where	they	shoved	them	and	beat	them.		Many	 critics	 of	 Fallist	 activisms	 did	 not	 appreciate	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 student	concerns	over	the	presence	of	security	officers	on	campus.	The	historical	legacy	of	 distrust	 of	 the	 security	 apparatus	 and	 the	persistent	police	brutality	 against	Black	 bodies,	 however,	 help	 to	 explain	 the	 concerns	 of	 many	 Black	 African	students	 for	 their	 safety	 (Faull,	 2016;	 Kushner,	 2015;	 Paret,	 2015).	 The	 2012	Marikana	massacre	 is	 one	of	 the	most	horrific	 examples	of	 this	 violence,	when	the	 police	 shot	 34	 mine	 workers,	 who	 were	 protesting	 for	 better	 working	conditions	in	the	Lonmin	operated	mines	in	Rustenburg	area	of	the	North	West	province.	The	tragedy	at	Marikana	became	a	symbol	of	the	state’s	violence	and	of	the	 lack	of	 reform	 in	policing	 from	the	apartheid	era.	 It	also	showed	 the	ANC’s	protection	 of	 business	 interests	 of	 the	 mining	 giants	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	workers	(Alexander,	2017;	Benya,	2015;	Gumede,	2015).	The	students’	exposure	to	 the	 events	 of	Marikana	 and	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 implied	 institutional	treatment	 of	 Black	 African	 women	 and	 the	 poor,	 leads	 to	 the	 students’	diminished	 trust	 in	 the	 political	 establishment.	 The	 distrust	 is	 further	exacerbated	by	 the	patronising	approaches	 to	dealing	with	youth	concerns	and	the	lip	service	of	the	main	political	actors	towards	youth	empowerment.		 	
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Youth	as	Policy-Making	Objects	The	 ANC-led	 governments	 brought	 the	 growing	 young	 population	 of	 South	Africans	 to	 policy	 focus	 with	 renewed	 vigour	 since	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	 2008	financial	crisis	exacerbated	youth	frustrations	with	unemployment	and	the	lack	of	 post-apartheid	 transformation	 and	 resulted	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 student	and	 youth	 protests	 (Booysen,	 2016).	 Policies	 and	 public	 debates	 on	 youth	 in	South	 Africa	 have	 mirrored	 the	 debates	 across	 the	 African	 continent,	 where	demographic	 trends	of	 a	 growing	or	 ‘bulging’	 youth	 segment	of	 the	population	pyramids	are	taking	place.	In	2016,	nearly	20	million	South	Africans,	or	36%	of	the	 population,	were	 in	 the	 youth	 age	 bracket	 (Stats	 SA,	 2017b,	 32).	 Although	this	demographic	segment	grew	at	a	slower	rate	than	the	country’s	average,	high	levels	of	unemployment	(52%	compared	to	the	adult	population	of	31.6%)	and	the	 decline	 in	 absorption	 rates	 into	 the	 labour	 force,	 aggravate	 the	 concerns	about	the	fate	of	the	generation	and	the	country	as	a	whole	(Stats	SA,	2016b,	28).			The	youth	are	thus	seen	as	a	potential	‘demographic	dividend’	as	they	represent	the	future	workforce	and	a	potential	threat	to	the	social	order	because	they	are	at	 risk	 of	 becoming	unruly,	 radical,	 criminal	 and	unproductive	 (Van	Dijk	 et	 al.,	2011;	Boyce,	2006;	Abbink,	2005;	Diouf,	2003).	In	South	Africa,	the	21st	century	youth	 are	 therefore	 another	 potential	 ‘lost	 generation’	 (as	 was	 the	 generation	experiencing	the	height	of	apartheid	violence	and	oppression)	that	is	seen	as	not	adopting	working	habits	and	democratic	values,	which	creates	a	sense	of	moral	panic	 in	 the	 country	 (Dawson,	 2014b;	 Seekings,	 2014;	 Comaroff	 and	Comaroff,	2000;	Seekings,	1996).	Critics	of	Fallism	have	used	the	student	protests	to	justify	their	 warnings	 of	 youth	 becoming	 violence-prone,	 undemocratic	 and	 entitled	(Everatt,	2016b;	Hughes,	2016;	Malala,	2016;	Morrell,	2016;	van	der	Westhuizen,	2016b).	 Others	 used	 it	 as	 a	 testimony	 that	 the	 disenchanted	 youth	 is	 not	apolitical	 despite	 withdrawing	 from	 formal	 political	 participation,	 but	 it	 is	critically	 engaged	 with	 questions	 of	 social	 justice	 and	 equality	 (Becker,	 2016;	Bosch,	 2016;	 Hodes,	 2017).	 These	 contradictory	 assessments	 of	 the	 South	African	youth	are	a	result	of	 the	tendency	to	homogenise	young	South	Africans	through	a	generational	lens	(Higham,	2012)	and	as	a	Born-Free	(BF)	generation	
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in	 particular.	 The	 BF	 signifier	 is	 generally	 used	 to	 designate	 people	who	 have	lived	 most	 of	 their	 life	 after	 the	 1994	 democratic	 transition	 and/or	 were	 too	young	 to	 experience	 much	 of	 the	 transition	 period,	 especially	 the	 violence	between	the	ANC	and	Inkatha	Freedom	Party	(IFP)	(Mattes,	2012).18	Being	Born-Free	 is	 often	 a	 positive	 descriptor,	 because	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	 young	 people	belonging	into	this	category,	embody	a	dawn	of	a	new	era.			Many	 students	 embrace	 the	 youth	 label	 and	 identity	 in	 order	 to	 exercise	 their	agency	and	to	insert	themselves	as	political	agents.	Van	Dijk	et	al.	(2011)	suggest	that	 youth	 identity	 can	 work	 similarly	 to	 an	 ideology,	 because	 it	 allows	collectivization	and	a	means	 to	articulate	claims	 to	access	power;	 thus,	 rallying	around	 youth’s	 generational	 identity	 arises	 as	 a	 logical	 response	 when	 facing	marginalization.	 However,	 there	 are	 important	 differences	 amongst	 the	 youth,	particularly	along	gender,	class,	and	racial	lines,	which	students	do	not	disregard	because	 they	 influence	 their	 lived	 experiences.	 For	 example,	 some	 studies	(Seekings,	 2014;	 Kamper,	 Badenhorst	 and	 Steyn,	 2009;	 Boyce,	 2006)	 find	 that	young	people,	especially	Black	Africans	with	education,	are	optimistic	about	their	future	 and	 have	 a	 positive	 vision	 for	 their	 lives	 despite	 seeing	much	wrong	 in	South	Africa.	Conversely,	Lauren	Graham	(2016)	finds	that	Black	African	women	who	are	20-29	 and	 are	not	 in	 education	or	 employment,	 are	pessimistic	 about	their	future,	seeing	limited	options	afforded	to	them	beyond	motherhood	–	as	a	means	of	getting	economic	support	from	fathers	of	their	children	–	and	hustling,	even	 if	morally	wrong.	Hence,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 de-homogenise	 youth	 in	 order	 to	identify	 policies	 and	 interventions	 which	 would	 address	 the	 root	 causes	 of	inequality	and	marginalization.		Youth	 issues	 are,	 however,	 approached	 by	 the	 policy	 makers	 with	 limited	substantive	 input	 from	 the	 young	 people	 themselves.	 While	 many	 politicians	emphasise	 their	 commitment	 to	 strengthening	 the	 youth	 voice	 and	 advocate	their	 increased	 participation,	 they	 often	 pay	 lip	 service	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 youth																																																									18	A	 popular	 depiction	 of	 the	 democratic	 transition	 in	 South	 Africa	 from	 the	 apartheid	 regime	portrays	 it	 as	a	peaceful	process,	 and	a	 successful,	 globally	 replicable	 case	when	a	bloody	civil	war	was	averted.	However,	the	transition	period	was	a	violent	time	with	various	lines	of	conflict	and	with	many	casualties	as	well	as	surviving	victims.	
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power.	 The	 lack	 of	 young	 people’s	 direct,	 meaningful	 inclusion	 has	 been	extensively	critiqued	by	activists	such	as	Mark	Heywood	(2017)	and	academics,	including	 Garman	 and	 Malila	 (2017)	 and	 Malila	 et	 al.	 (2013).	 My	 informants,	Natasha,	 Pearl,	 and	 Rorisang,	 who	 worked	 for	 youth-development	 and	empowerment	 NGOs,	 also	mentioned	 that	many	 young	 people	 feel	 there	 is	 no	space	for	them	amongst	the	old	liberation	struggle	generation	in	power.19	Youth	are	 treated	as	 leaders	of	 tomorrow,	 rather	 than	 leaders	of	 today,	meaning	 that	their	time	to	be	decision-makers	and	influencers	in	positions	of	power	will	only	come	 in	 the	 future,	 as	 their	 lack	 of	 lived	 experience	 means	 that	 they	 require	advice	and	guidance	from	adults.			The	 aforementioned	 reflections	 from	 youth	 activists	 point	 to	 the	 narratives	 of	age-based,	 inter-generational	 tensions	 that	 are	 clearly	 detectable	 in	 the	 South	African	 policy	 spaces	 and	 that	 permeate	 this	 thesis.	 For	 example,	 June	 is	dedicated	as	youth	month	in	commemoration	of	the	Soweto	uprising	of	June	16,	1976,	 in	 which	 thousands	 of	 Black	 African	 students	 protested	 against	 the	imposition	 of	 Afrikaans	 in	 schools	 and	 dozens	 were	 killed	 in	 response	 by	 the	state.	In	June,	therefore,	more	than	at	any	other	time	during	the	year,	politicians	deliver	 speeches	 that	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	 youth	 for	 the	 country,	similarly	to	the	month	of	August	in	the	case	of	women.	They	invite	and	support	youth	engagement	now	to	help	shaping	the	country’s	future	that	they	will	inherit.	However,	historical	events	such	as	the	Soweto	uprising	are	hailed	by	the	current	generation	 in	 power	 as	 the	 ultimate	 benchmark	 of	 youth-activism.	 The	 older	generation,	who	was	 involved	 in	 the	struggle,	ends	up	putting	 itself	 forward	as	the	bearer	of	experience	and	knowledge,	from	which	to	learn.	Hence,	they	arise	as	 role	 models.	 Moreover,	 the	 voice	 of	 organisations,	 such	 as	 the	 Military	Veterans	Association	of	Umkhonto	We	Sizwe,	the	military	wing	of	the	ANC	from	the	 times	 of	 the	 anti-apartheid	 struggle,	 are	 separated	 from	 and	 sometimes	pitched	 against	 the	 youth	 and	 women’s	 voices	 through	 their	 corresponding	representative	bodies,	the	ANC	YL	and	WL,	as	if	there	were	no	people	who	could																																																									19	It	should	be	recognised	that	this	dynamics	of	age-based	difference	between	the	citizens	and	the	political	leaders	is	not	only	a	feature	of	the	South	African	political	system,	but	many	other	post-colonial	African	settings,	where	the	liberation	leaders	of	advanced	age	continue	to	stay	in	power	(Kiwuwa,	2015).	
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belong	to	multiple	categories	of	ANC	followers.	Young	womanhood	is	thus	left	as	a	 problematic	 category	 that	 is	 everywhere	 and	 nowhere.	 This	 institutional	approach	also	creates	a	challenge	for	the	ANC	WL	to	attract	young	Black	African	women	into	its	midst,	as	a	cursory	glance	at	the	most	publicly	visible	WL	figures	does	not	show	many	women	below	35,	if	any	at	all.			The	tensions	between	the	youth	and	the	older	generations	of	politicians	from	the	ANC	 were	 used	 by	 the	 opposition	 to	 argue	 that	 their	 youth-commitment	 was	substantially	better	than	that	of	the	ANC.	The	DA,	for	example,	showcased	some	of	 its	young	MPs	on	 their	 social	media	platforms	 in	 June	2017	as	a	 sign	of	 this	commitment.	 One	 of	 the	 profiled	 politicians	 was	 the	 youngest	 MP,	 Hlomela	Bucwa,	who	was	24	years	old	and	a	law	student	at	Nelson	Mandela	Metropolitan	University	at	the	time.	Bucwa	received	media	attention	earlier	in	the	year,	when	she	 delivered	 her	 ‘maiden’	 speech	 in	 the	 National	 Assembly	 (Democratic	Alliance,	 2017).	 Similarly,	 the	 EFF	 were	 proud	 to	 boast	 about	 their	 youthful	leadership,	which	made	them	very	attractive	to	some	young	voters.	Many	of	my	participants	 mentioned	 the	 party’s	 spokesperson	 Mbuyiseni	 Ndlozi,	 who	 was	known	under	 the	nickname	 “people’s	bae,”	meaning	people’s	babe,	 for	his	wits	and	good	looks.	At	the	age	of	32,	Ndlozi	completed	his	doctorate	in	politics	from	Wits	University	in	August	2017	and	was	hailed	as	a	role	model	for	young	people,	instead	 of	 the	 older	 generation	 of	 political	 elites	 in	 the	 ANC	 (Nkosi	 and	Matangira,	2017;	Javier,	2016).			A	simplistic	understanding	of	the	experiences	of	young	women	and	men	in	South	Africa,	 as	 well	 the	 invisibility	 of	 some	 youth,	 is	 also	 demonstrated	 in	 the	aforementioned	discourses	that	pitch	against	each	other	toxic	masculinity	on	the	one	 hand	 and	 submissive	 femininity	 on	 the	 other.	 With	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 more	nuanced,	 careful	 analysis,	 many	 potential	 solidarities	 inter-	 and	 intra-generationally	get	lost,	which	further	diminishes	trust	building	prospects	in	the	country	and	weaken	the	chances	of	changing	the	status	quo.	These	generational	binaries	and	simplifications	are	strengthened	by	the	tendencies	of	South	Africans	to	 take	 the	end	of	apartheid	as	a	point	of	historical	 rupture	which	 to	an	extent	artificially	orientates	all	points	of	analysis	and	social	organising.	While	the	end	of	
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apartheid	is	an	important,	positive	historical	caesura,	approaching	the	end	of	the	regime	 as	 a	 break-point	 can	 prevent	 long-term	 analyses	 and	 considerations	 of	systematic	and	structural	continuities	across	the	eras	and	hence	the	creation	of	intersectional	solidarities.		In	 such	 a	 context	 of	 social	 rupture,	 the	 ability	 and	 willingness	 of	 people	 to	empathise	across	various	societal	groups	–	of	those	perceived	to	be	empowered	and	disempowered	–	becomes	questioned.	Empathy,	defined	by	Kimberly	Chabot	Davis	as	“‘perspective	taking’	–	imaginatively	experiencing	the	feelings,	thoughts	and	 situation	 of	 another”	 (2004,	 403),	 is	met	with	 scepticism	 if	 at	 all	 deemed	possible,	 while	 direct	 experience	 offers	 a	 better	 chance	 of	 authentic	representation	 of	 interests.	 Jane	 Mansbridge’s	 work	 on	 the	 importance	 of	descriptive	representation	seems	particularly	applicable	in	this	environment.	In	her	seminal	article	Mansbridge	(1999)	argues	that	it	is	precisely	in	the	contexts	of	 high	 mistrust	 and	 historical	 marginalization	 of	 a	 particular	 population	 that	descriptive	 representation	 can	 help	 to	 increase	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 political	establishment.	This	logic	is	certainly	prominent,	as	many	students	believe	in	the	primacy	of	experience	as	a	source	of	knowledge	and	understanding,	as	I	discuss	in	the	next	section.	
Primacy	of	Experience	over	Empathy	Lebo	 became	 one	 of	 my	 closest	 interviewees,	 with	 whom	 I	 met	 on	 several	occasions	to	talk	about	her	efforts	to	run	a	youth	empowerment	NGO.	She	was	a	Black	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng	in	her	second	year	of	studies	in	2016.	She	worked	extremely	hard	to	set	up	an	organisation	that	sought	to	help	young	people	in	her	community	with	accessing	education	and	getting	skills	to	alleviate	poverty.	She	was	able	to	live	in	a	res	on	campus	because	of	the	bursary	that	she	had	received	from	the	company,	where	her	mother	worked	as	an	administrative	help.	Growing	up	 in	a	household	with	many	single	women,	 she	was	 shown	 the	value	of	independence	and	non-reliance	on	others,	although	she	said	she	had	also	grown	up	 in	a	 culture	 in	which	men	were	seen	as	 the	 leaders.	Taking	her	own	money,	 the	 little	 that	 she	had,	 she	got	 the	organisation	off	 the	ground	and	was	working	 tirelessly	 with	 a	 few	 friends	 to	 organise	 events	 and	 to	 raise	 further	
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funds	 for	 programmes.	 She	 was	 also	 a	 member	 of	 some	 organisations	 at	 UJ,	including	a	women’s	organisation,	which,	however,	did	not	have	much	visibility	on	 campus.	When	 I	 asked	 her	 about	 cross-racial	 and	 cross-class	 empathy,	 she	said:		 Lebo:	 I	 really	 think	 that	 until	 you	 have	 been	 in	 someone’s	 shoes,	and	you	 really	 get	 to	know	 [them,	you	 cannot	 represent	 them]	…	Let	me	say,	Steve	Biko,	Mandela,	these	people	are	Black	people,	you	have	 been	 through	 a	 lot	 of	 struggles,	 that	 is	why	 it	was	 easy	 for	them	 to	 represent	 Black	 people.	 Because	 they	 know	 what	 Black	people	go	through	on	a	daily	basis.	…	If	you	get	fed	milk	every	day,	you	get	fed	cheese20	and	every	day	you	get	50	Rands	just	to	go	and	buy	lunch	every	day	at	school,	trust	me,	…	you	will	only	be	able	to	sympathise,	but	you	won’t	be	empathetic	enough.	Ján:	You	don’t	think	you	can	be?		 Lebo:	…	The	thing	 is,	you	will	 think	you	understand.	 I	 think	these	people	 think	 that	 they	understand.	And	 they	 think	 that,	 ‘oh,	yeah,	these	people	are	 living	 in	a	hut,	 fine’,	but	as	 long	as	you	have	not	been	 in	 the	 situation	 yourself,	 I	 don’t	 think	 you	 understand,	honestly.	 That	 is	 why	 it’s	 easier	 for	 these	 people	 [who	 have	 not	experienced	 poverty]	 to	 say	 …	 ‘they’re	 exaggerating	 the	FeesMustFall’,	 ‘they’re	 exaggerating	 this	 whole	 income	 thing’,	because	they	don’t	know	how	it	feels	like.	They	really	don’t	know.		What	 Lebo	 expressed	 in	 our	 exchange	 was	 that	 direct	 experience	 was	 the	ultimate	source	of	knowledge;	 therefore,	without	being	poor	and	Black	African,	white	 people	 cannot	 truly	 understand	 her	 predicaments.	 Put	 differently,	 the	students	recognise	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	experience	other	people’s	 lives	or	as	Sara	Ahmed	puts	it	in	her	writing	on	pain	and	the	body,	“it	is	because	no	one	can	know	what	it	feels	like	to	have	my	pain	that	I	want	loved	others	to	acknowledge	how	I	feel”	(2014,	29).			If	 not	 from	 a	 direct	 personal	 experience,	 many	 students	 believed	 other	 Black	Africans	 would	 be	 able	 to	 understand	 poverty	 through,	 for	 example,	 their																																																									20	Having	cheese	was	taken	as	a	sign	of	wealth	and	class	amongst	some	Black	Africans,	which	led	to	the	rise	of	a	negative,	demeaning	phrase	‘cheeseboy’	to	ascribe	privilege.	As	Phadi	and	Ceruti	define	it,	“the	cheeseboy	was	that	boy	at	a	township	school	who	was	envied	and	derided	because	his	 parents	 could	 afford	 to	 slip	 a	 wedge	 of	 processed	 cheese	 into	 his	 lunch	 box”	 (2011,	 98).	Together	with	other	words	that	I	discuss	throughout	the	thesis,	such	as	coconut,	it	forms	part	of	the	‘remembering	discourse’	that	disciplines	social	mobility	aspirations,	and	which	is	detailed	in	Chapter	Eight.	
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extended	 families	 and	 hence	 to	 understand	 and	 represent	 their	 needs	 better.	Eddie,	 an	African	 student	 from	 a	 Gauteng	 township	was	 in	 her	 second	 year	 in	2017,	was	not	a	member	of	any	organisations	when	we	met.	As	she	put	it:		 That’s	 where	 then	 the	 difference	 comes	 in.	 She	 [a	 rich	 Black	woman]	 has	 the	 economical	 power,	 but	 she	 doesn’t	 have	 those	experiences	[of	life	in	a	township].	But	if	she’s	told,	I	think	then	she	would	be	able	to	relate,	empathise	more,	because	it’s	her	tribe,	it’s	her	people.	So,	 she	would	be	able	 to	understand	even	 though	she	didn’t	necessarily	go	through	it.		Eddie’s	 statement	 suggests	 that	 the	 shared	 racialised	experience	 creates	better	ability	 to	 empathise	 across	 class	 privilege,	which	 is	 not	 as	 automatic	 for	white	people	and	people	of	other	racial	identifications.	Within	a	similar	mind-set,	some	of	 my	 interviewees	 believed	 that	 if	 white	 people	 in	 positions	 of	 power	surrounded	themselves	with	Black	African	people	and	genuinely	listened	to	their	experiences,	they	could	undertake	action	that	would	improve	their	lives	and	the	country	 as	 a	 whole.	 Hence,	 empathy	 was	 an	 import	 basis	 for	 being	 in	 the	positions	 of	 political	 power	 and	 decision	 making,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 sufficient	 or	equal	 to	 personal	 experience.	 Therefore,	 mistrust	 amongst	 people	 requires	additional	 safeguards	 and	precautions,	which	 take	 the	 form	of	 people	who	 are	perceived	 as	 having	 fewer	 hurdles	 to	 empathy	 and	 are	 closer	 to	 genuine	understanding.	 Here	 again	 Sara	 Ahmed’s	 work	 is	 insightful.	 She	 writes,	 “the	ethical	demand	[of	witnessing	pain]	is	that	I	must	act	about	that	which	I	cannot	know,	rather	than	act	insofar	as	I	know.	I	am	moved	by	what	does	not	belong	to	me”	(2014,	31).	However,	many	students,	empowered	or	disempowered,	did	not	trust	the	powerful,	including	the	people	in	political	offices,	to	act	empathetically.			Many	 students	who	were	aware	 that	 their	 lives	were	different	 from	 their	poor	Black	African	peers,	believed	that	spending	some	time	in	a	township	or	going	to	visit	people	who	 lived	 in	places	different	 from	their	own,	would	give	them	that	necessary	knowledge	and	insights,	even	if	they	did	not	live	through	the	particular	experience.	 #FeesMustFall	 serves	 as	 a	 revealing	 example	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	students’	preference	for	experiential	knowing.	Several	Fallists	underscored	to	me	that	many	UJ	 students	 lacked	direct	 experience	with	 the	 oppressive	 aspects	 of	
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the	HE	system,	which	resulted	in	their	lukewarm	support	of	the	Fallist	cause	or	their	 lack	of	participation	 in	protests.	Towards	 the	end	of	 the	 first	 semester	 in	2017,	when	not	much	Fallist	organising	was	taking	place,	these	activists	told	me	that	part	of	their	reasoning	behind	withholding	action	at	the	time,	was	to	allow	students	 who	 were	 benefiting	 from	 NSFAS	 (National	 Student	 Financial	 Aid	Scheme)	 and	 who	 believed	 that	 the	 HE	 system	 worked	 well,	 to	 live	 through	experiences	 such	 as	 not	 being	 able	 to	 see	 their	 exam	 marks	 because	 of	 their	outstanding	debt.	They	believed	 that	under	 this	kind	of	experience,	 their	anger	would	grow	and	would	result	in	their	support	of	#FeesMustFall.			Katleho’s	 story	 substantiates	 this	 approach.	 When	 I	 met	 Katleho	 at	 a	 group	discussion	in	2016,	she	came	across	as	a	strong	feminist.	In	the	debate,	she	called	for	 more	 women	 in	 politics	 and	 for	 a	 fight	 against	 patriarchy.	 She	 found	inspiration	in	many	strong	women,	including	Helen	Zille.	She	was	a	DA	supporter	and	believed	Mmusi	Maimane,	the	leader	of	the	DA	at	the	time,	represented	the	interests	of	her	generation	and	worked	towards	an	equal	South	Africa.	She	was	living	in	the	suburbs,	with	parents,	both	of	whom	had	some	formal	education	and	were	employed.	When	I	tried	to	reconnect	with	Katleho	in	January	2017,	she	told	me	 that	 she	was	not	coming	back	 to	UJ	because	she	could	no	 longer	afford	 the	fees.	 She	 eventually	managed	 to	 resume	her	 studies	 and	when	we	met	 several	weeks	 later,	 she	 explained	 how	 her	 family	 unexpectedly	 got	 into	 financial	difficulties,	which	 caused	 her	 concerns	 over	 studies.	Not	 having	 expected	 such	situation	 to	 arise,	 she	 had	 not	 applied	 for	 NSFAS	 or	 bursaries.	 In	 the	 end,	 she	came	to	an	arrangement	with	UJ	administration	that	allowed	her	to	continue	and	having	good	marks	qualified	her	for	additional	fee	reduction.	As	she	resumed	her	studies,	she	was	making	the	best	out	of	her	UJ	experience,	becoming	chairperson	of	a	society	and	playing	on	a	sports	team,	having	felt	that	in	her	first	year	she	had	too	much	free	time	and	that	she	could	use	it	to	enhance	her	career	prospects.			Katleho’s	 experience	 of	 financial	 insecurity	 sparked	 in	 her	 a	 new	 passion	 for	FMF.	She	told	me	that	with	experience	come	emotions	that	make	the	stories	one	hears	 from	 other	 students	 so	 much	 more	 real.	 She	 applied	 the	 same	 logic	 to	apartheid	narratives	that	she	knew	from	her	parents	–	stories	that	made	her	sad,	
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as	 she	 said,	 but	 stories	which	 she	would	 forget	 the	moment	 she	walked	 away	from	the	conversation,	because	she	did	not	live	through	them.	Her	comparison	to	empathy	with	those	having	lived	through	apartheid	is	an	important	one,	because	many	 young	 people	 who	 support	 FMF,	 as	 well	 as	 movements	 and	 ideological	standpoints	 addressing	 apartheid	 legacies,	 are	 criticised	 for	 allegedly	 fighting	racial	oppression,	which	they	did	not	directly	experience.	Many	students	whom	I	spoke	 to,	 criticised	 their	 Fallist	 peers	 for	 perpetuating	 racial	 divides	 and	inequality	 by	 referring	 to	 grievances	 and	 struggles	 of	 the	 past.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	these	 students,	 evoking	 apartheid	 oppression	 was	 permissible	 for	 the	 older	generations,	while	the	younger,	BF	generation	was	‘only’	living	through	some	of	its	 legacy.	 They	 did	 not	 have	 the	 right	 to	 complain,	 because	 they	 had	opportunities	 and	 thus	 a	 choice	 about	what	 to	 do	with	 their	 lives	 unlike	 their	parents	 and	 grandparents.	 Hence,	 experience	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	argumentation	 of	 both	 the	 student	 supporters	 and	 opponents	 of	 the	 Fallist	organising.		The	narratives	of	experience	in	FMF	can	also	be	seen	in	the	assessments	of	FMF	leaders.	Many	 of	 the	 student	 leaders	 in	 the	 campaign	were	praised	by	Katleho	and	 others,	 because	 they	 lived	 through	 economic	 exclusion	 themselves.	 Their	first-hand	 experience	 made	 the	 student	 leaders	 relevant,	 appropriate	 and	authentic	 representatives	 of	 their	 imaginary	 constituents,	 although	 many	 of	them	 certainly	 lacked	 any	 representative	mandate.	 Conversely,	 several	 student	leaders	 were	 rejected	 for	 their	 elitism,	 as	 I	 discuss	more	 on	 the	 example	 of	 a	prominent	 female	 figure,	 Nompendulo	 (Ulo)	 Mkhatshwa	 in	 Chapter	 Six.	 Her	privilege	was	seen	by	some	students	as	a	barrier	to	her	understanding	the	plight	of	 ordinary	 South	 Africans	 and	 consequently	 limited	 her	 adequate	representation	of	their	interests	in	dealing	with	university	management	and	the	government,	and	ultimately	led	to	the	acceptance	of	the	proposed	freezing	of	fees	instead	 of	 making	 education	 free.	 However,	 some	 UJ	 students	 accepted	 and	valued	even	 leaders	who	did	not	have	difficulties	paying	 for	 their	 fees	because	they	were	able	to	empathise	and	contribute	solutions.	Thus,	in	the	absence	of	the	ideal,	 authentic,	 experienced	 leaders,	 some	 students	 accepted	 allies,	who	were	aware	and	competent.		
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	The	desire	for	authenticity	rooted	in	experience	is	therefore	a	desire	for	a	voice,	agency	and	control	over	representation	through	others	in	situations	where	one’s	voice	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 marginalised	 and	 undervalued.	 With	 reference	 to	 the	discourse	 of	 ‘black	 pain’	 in	 the	 #EndRapeCulture	 student	 campaign,	 which	emerged	 alongside	 Fallism,	 Amanda	 Gouws	 similarly	 argues	 that	 it	 was	 an	“expression	of	anger	and	resentment	about	not	being	heard”	(2018,	11).	Hence,	Gouws	argues	that	the	campaign	calls	on	South	Africans	to	be	moved	by	the	pain	and	 take	 responsibility.	 In	 South	 Africa,	 this	 feeling	 of	 lost	 voice	 or	(mis)representation	is	unfortunately	shared	by	students	across	racial	and	socio-economic	 groups,	 including	 many	 who	 falsely	 perceive	 their	 positionality	 as	marginalised.			It	 is	 these	 different	 views	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 experience,	 empathy	 and	 the	extent	to	which	one	can	put	themselves	into	other	person’s	shoes	that	impacted	the	students’	evaluations	of	women	in	politics	against	the	ideal	of	an	FPE.		
Trust-Building:	Cross-Racial	Encounters	in	HE	Settings	Many	 South	 Africans,	 including	 amongst	my	 participants,	 believed	 that	 due	 to	their	 ability	 to	 have	 cross-racial	 experiences	 and	 encounters,	 the	 Born	 Frees	could	bridge	 the	 lack	of	 trust	between	 racial	 groups.	Hence,	 they	 could	build	 a	sense	of	understanding	in	the	absence	of	direct	lived	experiences.	However,	the	students	are	 incorporated	into	the	value	systems	and	structures	preserving	the	apartheid/struggle	 history	 and	 hence	 are	 not	 detached	 from	 the	 past.	 Some	 of	the	 students	 viewed	 this	 critically,	 because	 they	 believed	 this	 focus	 on	 history	perpetuated	racial	tensions.	One	such	student	was	Sage	Marley,	who	considered	herself	racially	mixed	(not	Coloured),	having	a	white	father	and	a	Black	African	mother,	 while	 often	 being	 racialised	 as	white.	 Sage	Marley	was	 from	 Gauteng,	and	her	journey	into	varsity	was	a	complicated	one.	It	included	an	armed	home	invasion,	which	negatively	affected	her	ability	 to	write	 final	 exams	 in	grade	12	and	to	obtain	matric	to	commence	her	university	studies.	Although	she	was	not	a	member	of	 any	organisations,	 she	had	always	 shown	 interest	 in	art,	which	 she	wanted	to	incorporate	into	her	future	career.	She	went	to	a	high	school	that	she	
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described	as	small,	conservative	Christian	and	racially	mixed.	She	was	adamant	about	 the	 impact	 that	 an	 early	 exposure	 to	 apartheid	 history	 had	 on	 kids	 in	schools.	She	 thought	 that	young	kids	 find	 friends	across	racial	groups,	but	they	start	 drawing	 lines	 amongst	 themselves	 the	 more	 they	 get	 exposed	 to	 the	narratives	 and	 histories	 of	 apartheid.	 This	 led	 her	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	apartheid	 history	 should	 not	 be	 such	 a	 dominating	 element	 in	 early	 schooling,	but	something	that	cannot	be	forgotten	nonetheless.		Bucie	disagreed	with	Sage	Marley	on	her	opinion	about	the	teaching	of	apartheid	history.	Bucie	was	a	Black	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng,	but	she	clarified	that	she	lived	in	its	“middle	class	section.”	She	was	a	member	and	a	team	leader	in	an	on-campus	society	and	she	came	to	UJ	at	the	insistence	of	her	family,	as	she	had	originally	wanted	to	pursue	investigative	journalism	and	study	at	a	college.	However,	she	had	been	convinced	by	her	family	that	she	was	smart	enough	to	go	to	university,	but	 that	she	should	study	a	degree	that	was	 less	dangerous.	Only	after	 our	 one-on-one	 interview,	 when	 I	 learnt	 more	 about	 her	 experiences	 of	racism	 with	 the	 ‘Boers’21	in	 a	 formerly	 white	 school,	 did	 Bucie’s	 defence	 of	teaching	apartheid	history	early,	make	sense.	During	her	group	discussion	with	Sage	Marley,	she	linked	the	knowledge	of	history	to	understanding	the	difference	between	 Black	 African	 and	 white	 women	 in	 post-apartheid	 South	 Africa.	 She	argued	 that	 historically,	 white	 women	 such	 as	 Helen	 Joseph22	were	 able	 to	protest	against	apartheid	because	“as	a	Black	woman	you	had	to	go	back	to	the	township,	live	in	your	shack,	look	after	your	eight	kids,	whereas	a	white	woman	
																																																								21	Boer	is	a	term	currently	used	in	everyday	speech	interchangeably	with	Afrikaner,	although	its	underlying	connotations	vary	depending	on	the	speaker,	ranging	from	a	sense	of	pride	in	the	19th	century	Boer	history,	 to	derogatory	 term	suggesting	a	white,	 thick-headed	 farmer.	Historically,	Boers	were	 predominantly	 Dutch	white	 colonialists	who	 came	 to	 the	 South	 African	 Cape.	 The	Great	Trek	of	the	Boers	into	the	interior	as	well	as	the	wars	against	the	British,	represent	some	of	the	key	historical	moments	for	the	Afrikaners,	which	arise	against	the	perceived	imperialism	of	the	 British	 and	 their	 treatment	 of	 the	 Boers	 as	 second-class	 citizens	 (Steyn,	 2001).	 It	was	 the	latter,	derogatory	sense	of	the	term	that	Bucie	was	inferring.		22	Helen	Joseph	was	a	famous	anti-apartheid	activist	and	one	of	the	leaders	of	the	1956	Women’s	March	in	Pretoria,	when	thousands	of	women	protested	against	the	so-called	‘pass	laws’,	which	required	 women	 to	 carry	 passes	 in	 order	 to	 enter	 into	 white-designated	 urban	 areas.	 This	historic	 event	 is	of	 great	 importance	 in	 the	 country’s	 consciousness	 and	 is	 associated	with	 the	celebrations	of	August	as	women’s	month	and	the	omnipresent	phrase	‘you	strike	a	woman,	you	strike	 a	 rock’.	Helen	 Joseph	 together	with	Lilian	Ngoyi,	 Sophie	Williams-De	Bruyn	and	Rahima	Moosa	personify	the	March	and	its	multi-racial	character.	
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[would]	go	back	home	and	meet	Baas	Van	Niekerk23	and	eat	 steak	 for	 supper.”	Therefore,	 the	history	and	the	present	were	 intimately	and	permanently	 linked	for	many	of	the	BF	generation.		The	majority	of	my	participants	argued,	however,	that	young	people’s	views	on	race	 were	 a	 combined	 result	 of	 socialisation	 and	 personal	 experiences.	 Most	believed	 that	 the	 older	 generations	 had	 a	 big	 impact	 on	 the	 youth	 by	 bringing	them	up	with	a	certain	mindset	about	cross-racial	co-existence.	At	the	same	time,	they	proposed	that	because	of	their	greater	ability	to	interact	with	people	from	different	races	and	their	more	diverse	socialisation	circles,	they	were	also	able	to	accept	or	 reject	 the	opinions	of	 the	previous	generations,	which	 they	had	been	exposed	 to.	 Hence,	 according	 to	 the	 students,	 the	 generational	 differences	between	 the	 BF	 and	 the	 apartheid	 generations,	 were	 actually	 rooted	 in	 their	ability	 to	 make	 their	 opinion	 about	 other	 races	 to	 a	 fuller	 extent	 than	 their	parents	and/or	grandparents,	even	if	they	ended	up	sharing	the	same	views.			Joy,	 who	 was	 from	 a	 township	 in	 the	 North-West	 province,	 and	 whom	 I	interviewed	in	March	2017,	put	it	quite	pointedly	in	her	response	to	my	question	about	whether	white	people	could	empathise	with	Black	African	people,	 if	 they	were	unable	to	fully	understand	what	it	meant	to	be	Black	African.	She	was	born	in	a	township	in	Gauteng,	but	her	parents	moved	to	North	West,	where	they	lived	when	 we	 met.	 She	 was	 an	 NSFAS-funded	 student,	 and	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	neither	of	her	parents	were	formally	employed,	she	felt	their	life	struggles	were	easier	than	other	people’s	because	her	mother	made	sure	they	did	not	go	to	bed	hungry.	She	was	engaged	in	student	activism	on	campus,	including	a	community	outreach	group,	and	she	volunteer	with	a	youth	organisation	off	campus	as	well.	She	 said,	 “the	 current	 generation	 has	 a	 chance	 of	 learning,	 because	 they	 see.	There	is	more	interaction	between	the	younger	ones	than	the	old	ones.	So,	I	feel	like	we	are	going	somewhere…	But	the	older	generation	is	far,	far	from	where	we	are.”	Yet,	many	students	still	felt	that	they	did	not	engage	with	people	from	other																																																									23	Bucie’s	 reference	 to	 ‘Baas	 van	 Niekerk’	 captures	 two	 stereotypes	 about	 Afrikaners	 in	 South	Africa,	namely,	baas	as	a	slang	version	of	the	word	boss,	relaying	the	Black	African	accent	of	those	people	 addressing	 whites	 in	 positions	 of	 power,	 and	 van	 Niekerk	 being	 a	 typical	 Afrikaner	surname.	She	used	these	two	stereotypes	to	emphasise	her	point	of	white	women’s	privilege.		
	95	
races,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 theory,	 the	 diversity	 of	 UJ	 student	 body	 should	allow	 them	 to	 interact	 with	 people	 of	 different	 racial,	 class	 and	 gender	identifications.			The	lack	of	interaction	can	be	seen	for	example	in	the	spatial	divides	of	various	campus	 locations.	 Some	APK	 spaces	were	 unofficially	 segregated	 based	 on	 the	type	of	students	that	used	them.	A	student	feminist	activist	once	told	me	that	she	usually	 got	her	 tea	 from	 ‘Poverty	Lane,’	which	 referred	 to	a	 corridor	 in	 the	SS,	where	the	food	and	convenience	shops	were	cheaper	and	therefore	affordable	to	the	Black	African	students.	The	Poverty	Lane	stood	in	contrast	to	other	venues,	where	–	from	the	perspective	of	some	Black	African	students	–	more	expensive	meals	 meant	 that	 the	 customers	 were	 mainly	 white	 and	 Indian/Asian.	 The	barriers	 also	 showed	 in	 classroom	 participation.	 Lesego,	 a	 Black	 (African)	student,	told	me	of	a	particular	experience	that	demonstrates	the	issue.	She	was	from	a	township	in	Gauteng,	but	she	lived	in	a	student	commune	not	far	from	the	university.	 She	 described	 her	 financial	 situation	 as	 ‘normal’	 and	 said	 that	 her	mother	was	a	hard	worker,	and	so	they	never	went	hungry	and	had	a	roof	over	their	 heads.	 Her	 parents	 were	 both	 college-educated	 and	 public	 sector	employees,	 but	 she	 was	 living	 just	 with	 her	 mother,	 and	 as	 Lesego	 proudly	claimed,	she	was	both	a	father	and	a	mother	to	her.	Although	she	was	studying	a	degree	 related	 to	 politics,	 she	 was	 not	 active	 in	 any	 civic	 or	 political	organisations.	Talking	about	cross-racial	experiences	on	campus,	she	said:		We	had	a	problem	last	year	 in	Philosophy	where	we	were	talking	about	 race	 and	 racism	 and	 the	 Black	 students	 in	 particular	were	complaining,	 ‘why	 are	 white	 students	 not	 participating	 and	engaging	 and	 debating’	 and	 all	 that…	 if	 we	 [Black	 people]	 don’t	hear	their	voice,	we’re	not	going	to	solve	this	problem.	That’s	how	I	felt,	 because	 personally,	 I	 really	 wanted	 to	 hear,	 from	 their	 side,	what	 they	 thought,	 what	 they	 felt	 about	 the	 whole	 thing,	 their	experience,	you	know,	from	hearing	all	this.	Coz,	their	ancestors	or	grandpa,	 great	 grandparents,	 were	 the	 ones	 who	 actually	 went	through	 this,	 you	 know,	 and	 the	 influence	 through	 generations,	 I	would	like	to	know	more	about	that,	not	just	the	Black	side	of	the	story.		
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In	contrast	to	Lesego’s	view,	some	students	believed	that	all	students	participate	in	 classroom	debates	 equally.	Hence,	while	 there	were	very	mixed	perceptions	amongst	the	students	on	the	issue	of	participation	of	non-Black	African	students	in	debates	on	politics	and	race,	 it	was	clear	 that	 the	cross-racial	understanding	and	 exchanges	 even	 in	 university	 spaces	 require	 deliberate	 effort	 and	 careful	planning,	 as	 they	 were	 not	 happening	 organically	 (Davids	 and	 Waghid,	 2016;	Walker	 and	 Loots,	 2016).	 Hence,	 as	 other	 research,	 for	 example	 Binikos	 and	Rugunanan	 (2015)	 and	 Higham	 (2012),	 has	 also	 found,	 the	 mere	 merger	 of	institutions	 of	 higher	 learning	 such	 as	 UJ	 and	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Born-Frees	 to	interact	 across	 races,	 did	 not	 automatically	 lead	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 cross-racial	understanding.	24		It	must	 be	 underscored	 that	 several	 students	 believed	 that	 it	was	 the	 political	ideology	rather	than	lived	experiences	that	mattered	when	it	came	to	cross-racial	and	cross-class	political	representation.	Mickey,	who	did	not	personally	identify	with	a	particular	racial	category,	believed	that,	“if	I	feel	that	we	have	[the]	same	ideology,	 and	we	 have	 the	 same	 ideas	 or	whatever,	 it	 doesn’t	matter	 if	 you’re	Black	or	white,	you	can	represent	me	because	basically	 this	 is	what	 I	want	and	you’re	portraying	 it	 in	 the	world.”	Mickey	was	 in	her	 second	year	 in	2017	and	came	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 from	 financially	 stable	 home.	 Mickey’s	mother	was	a	public	sector	employee	and	while	at	UJ	she	was	not	a	member	of	any	 organisations,	 but	 she	 was	 studying	 a	 community-orientated	 degree.	 In	 a	similar	manner,	Kim,	a	Coloured	young	woman,	argued	that	race	did	not	matter	to	her	when	considering	women	in	politics.	Although	she	believed	that	her	race	made	 for	 a	 very	 specific	 experience	within	 the	 South	 African	 society,	 she	was	drawn	to	people’s	objectives.	She	argued:		 A	white	person	is	there	and	can	help	change	South	Africa,	…		why	should	I	fight	the	idea?	Coz,	if	it’s	gonna	fix	and	help	and	grow	and	develop	 South	 Africa	 as	 a	 whole,	 why	 are	 we	 fighting	 the	 idea?	Somebody	from	a	socialist	stand-point	can	say,	‘but	she’s	white,	she																																																									24	While	some	students	felt	they	did	not	understand	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	students	from	 other	 racial	 backgrounds,	 several	 Black	 African	 students	 in	 particular	 also	 argued	 that	because	 of	 the	 centrality	 of	 whiteness	 in	 their	 everyday	 lives,	 they	 have	 to	 understand	white	South	Africans,	who	in	return,	however,	do	not	understand	them.		
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doesn’t	understand’	or	‘she’s	Coloured,’	‘she’s	Indian,’	but	I	feel	like	we	really	need	to	let	go.		Kim	 and	 Mickey’s	 comments	 would	 very	 likely	 be	 met	 with	 opposition	 from	some	of	their	peers	as	a	sign	of	their	class	privilege.	As	I	discuss	in	more	detail	in	later	chapters,	some	students	would	argue	that	class	shields	people	like	Kim	and	Mickey	 from	appreciating	 the	 importance	of	 race	 in	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	many	poor	 Black	 African	 women	 and	 men.	 However,	 it	 must	 be	 acknowledged	 that	Mickey	 and	 Kim’s	 viewpoint	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 South	 African	 social	fabric	and	demonstrates	the	acute	sense	of	distrust,	inequality	and	change.		
Conclusion	A	brief	overview	of	the	political,	gender	and	youth	debates	in	South	Africa	at	the	time	 of	 my	 research	 provided	 in	 this	 chapter,	 sets	 the	 stage	 for	 the	 further	exploration	 of	 the	 perceptions	 of	 women	 in	 politics	 held	 by	 the	 university	students	 and	 the	 empowerment	 potential	 of	 FPEs	 as	 an	 ideal	 more	 broadly.	 I	have	 argued	 that	 the	 South	 African	 social	 order	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 being	marred	 by	 distrust	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 ongoing	 as	well	 as	 historical	 abuse	 of	power.	 This	 abuse	 is	 firstly	 seen	 in	 the	 system	 of	 corruption	 and	 patronage	associated	 with	 the	 ANC-led	 government,	 in	 which	 many	 female	 politicians	become	engulfed,	either	as	passive	victims	or	co-opted	self-interested	agents,	as	can	be	seen	with	the	ANC	WL.	Secondly,	abuse	is	dominant	in	the	understanding	and	portraying	of	 gender	 relations,	 and	 the	 role	of	women	 in	 the	 society	more	broadly,	through	a	simplistic	binary	analysis	of	toxic	masculinity	and	submissive	femininity,	which	leads	to	GBV.	The	widespread	violence	targeting	Black	bodies,	and	 in	 particular	 poor	 Black	 African	 women,	 is	 another	 manifestation	 of	 the	abuse	of	power.	Lastly,	 the	mistrust	 is	 also	generational,	whereby	 the	youth	of	the	country	is	portrayed	to	be	both	an	investment	opportunity	and	a	risk	for	the	country	and	thus	a	subject	of	decision-making	by	older,	experienced	generations.	However,	those	in	power	seem	to	be	paying	lip	service	to	the	promises	of	change	and	 empowerment	 towards	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 young	people.	The	 result	 of	 this	 racist,	 ageist	 and	 patriarchal	 system,	which	 is	 evident	 in	 the	university	spaces	as	much	as	in	other	spheres	of	the	students’	daily	reality,	 is	a	
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lack	of	trust	in	the	state,	be	it	in	form	of	the	old	government	political	elites	or	the	police.		The	belief	of	widespread	abuse	of	power	and	distrust	leads	the	students	to	rely	on	 lived	 experience	 as	 the	 ultimate	 source	 of	 knowledge	 and	 authenticity.	Empathy	 and	 some	 level	 of	 experience	 is	 thus	 often	 insufficient	 to	 guarantee	trust,	 although	 it	 is	 the	 prerequisite	 for	 any	 potential	 understanding	 and	representation	 of	 people	 from	 different	 racial,	 class,	 and	 gender	 backgrounds.	The	 desire	 to	 overcome	 distrust	 leads	 many	 students	 to	 positively	 evaluate	others	 with	 presumed	 shared	 experience,	 be	 it	 women	 in	 politics	 or	 student	peers.	As	Pumla	Dineo	Gqola	(2015,	75)	shows	on	the	example	of	South	African	women	 fighting	misogyny,	 in	 this	 context	 of	 abuse	 of	 power	 and	mistrust	 it	 is	possible	to	attack	your	critics	by	challenging	their	knowledge	of	what	‘real’	South	Africa	 is.	 The	 process	 of	 policing	 and	 disciplining	 of	 what	 is	 perceived	 as	 the	norm	 for	 women	 and	 men	 in	 South	 Africa	 is	 addressed	 in	 the	 conceptual	framework	for	the	thesis	in	the	following	chapter.	 	
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4 Conceptual	Framework:	Identity,	Difference	and	Power	
Introduction	As	I	outline	in	Chapter	One,	in	this	research	I	approach	the	RME	mechanism	as	a	process	of	empowerment,	whereby	the	perceptions	of	the	values,	characteristics	and	 behaviours	 associated	 with	 elite	 women	 in	 politics	 are	 understood	 as	normative	 resources	 in	 decision-making.	 Previous	 studies	 analysing	 the	 RME	(see	for	example	Mariani,	Marshall	and	Mathews-Schultz	[2015],	Desposato	and	Norrander	 [2009],	 Campbell	 and	 Wolbrecht	 [2006],	 Dolan	 [2006];	 Lawless	[2004],	Atkeson	[2003],	and	High-Pippert	and	Comer	[1998])	show	that	specific	contextual/societal	or	individual-level	factors,	such	as	political	congruence,	age,	race,	 education	 or	 employment,	 influence	 women’s	 participation	 and	 hence	moderate	the	RME.	In	other	words,	these	identities	and	characteristics	have	been	found	to	impact	women’s	ability	to	see	women	in	politics	to	be	‘women	like	us’	or	to	 be	 descriptively	 ‘close’	 to	 them	 (Childs	 and	 Lovenduski,	 2013).	 Thus,	 the	studies	 highlight	 that	 gendered	 experience	 is	 mediated	 by	 other	 salient	identities,	 views	 and	 experiences.	 Therefore,	 to	 analyse	 elites	 as	 potential	 role	models	 requires	 linking	 the	perceived	difference	of	 identities	 to	 the	systems	of	power	 and	 to	 understand	 identity-based	 norms	 as	 mechanisms	 or	 means	 of	creating	and	subverting	systems	of	power.	This	becomes	even	more	crucial	in	a	context	 of	 distrust,	 abuse	 of	 power	 and	 scepticism	 about	 people’s	 ability	 to	empathise	as	suggested	in	previous	chapter.		In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 draw	 out	 concepts	 from	 three	 bodies	 of	literature	that	facilitate	this	analysis	and	that	are	used	throughout	the	remainder	of	 the	 thesis.	 Firstly,	 I	 outline	 how	 role	 model	 scholarship	 in	 sociology	 and	psychology	which	focuses	on	education	and	careers,	approaches	difference	in	the	relationship	between	role	models	and	those	who	perceive	them.	This	 literature	highlights	that	people	instigate	a	response	either	as	positive	role	models	or	anti-heroes	 based	 on	 the	 construal	 and	 agency	 of	 those	 who	 look	 up	 to	 them	 and	those	 who	 see	 them	 as	 sufficiently	 similar	 to	 themselves.	 Subsequently,	 I	 tie	these	 insights	 to	 elite	 studies,	 which	 show	 how	 difference	 is	 created	 and	challenged	as	a	technique	of	power	that	sustains	the	social	order	through	the	use	
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of	norms	and	discourses.	Based	on	these	two	bodies	of	literature,	I	propose	that	an	intersectional	approach	which	considers	identities	and	structures	of	power	is	necessary	 to	 analyse	 the	 interactions	 between	 the	 empowered	 and	 the	empowering,	 or	 the	 role	 models/elites	 and	 those	 who	 perceive	 them.	Intersectionality	 allows	 us	 to	 approach	 identities	 and	 systems	 of	 power	 as	 co-constitutive	 and	 temporary	 and	 thus	 subject	 to	 change.	 Hence,	 by	 articulating	values,	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	 attached	 to	 FPEs	 and	 explaining	 them	through	the	existing	identities	and	structures	of	gender,	race,	class	and	age,	it	is	possible	to	learn	more	about	the	empowerment	potential	of	the	RME.	
Role	Model	Theorising	in	Education	and	Career	Development	Sociological	 and	 psychological	 research	 on	 role	 models	 in	 the	 context	 of	education	 and	 professional/career	 development	 is	 grounded	 in	 socialisation	theories.	 Hence,	 it	 shares	 basic	 premises	 with	 the	 RME	 literature	 in	 political	science.	 It	 also	 engages	with	 gender	 and	 other	 systems	 of	 power	 and	 identity-based	difference.	South	Africa-based	research	by	Madhavan	and	Crowell	(2014)	and	 by	 other	 scholars	 globally	 (Archard,	 2012;	 Lockwood,	 2006;	 Quimby	 and	Santis,	2006;	Karunanayake	and	Nauta,	2004)	finds	for	example	that	the	absence	of	 women	 in	 certain	 professions	 and	 academic	 disciplines	 creates	 and	perpetuates	barriers	 to	women’s	 interest,	 participation	and	progression	within	these	 arenas,	 thus	 mirroring	 the	 findings	 from	 aforementioned	 political	representation	 scholarship.	 While	 much	 of	 this	 literature	 does	 not	 advance	theoretical	 debates	 on	 power	 or	 social	 order,	 it	 offers	 valuable	 insights	 for	theorising	role	models	as	individuals	whose	impact	is	affected	by	the	perceived	difference	with	those	who	perceive	them.			In	 this	 body	 of	 literature,	 there	 are	 various	 theoretical	 perspectives	 on	 role	models,	 which	 MacCallum	 and	 Beltman	 (2002)	 identify	 as	 sociological,	 which	focus	 on	 breaking	 stereotypes	 through	 observance	 of	 “non-traditional	 others”	(2002,	 21);	 social	 cognitive,	 which	 seeks	 behavioural	 changes	 based	 on	observing	 someone	 “seen	 as	 attractive,	 important	 or	 relevant”	 (2002,	 22);	sociocultural,	 which	 perceives	 role	 models	 as	 a	 part	 of	 situated	 learning	 of	cultural	practices	(2002,	23);	and	 lastly	a	humanist	perspective,	which	 looks	at	
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role	 models	 for	 personal	 growth	 and	 socio-emotional	 support	 (2002,	 24).	Scholars	 often	 articulate	 this	 role	 model	 typology	 through	 their	 own	terminology,	 while	 maintaining	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 different	 perspectives.	Madhavan	 and	 Crowell	 (2014),	 for	 example,	 researched	 role	 models	 amongst	Black	African	adolescents	between	ages	14	and	22	in	the	South	African	province	of	Mpumalanga,	and	they	used	Allen’s	typology,	which	differentiates	role	models	as	 “ethical	 templates”,	 “symbols	 of	 special	 achievement”	 and	 “nurturers/	mentors,”	(2014,	723).	These	various	perspectives	reveal	that	role	models	come	from	numerous	spheres	of	life	and	are	applicable	in	different	ways,	depending	on	the	 individual	 young	 person	who	 looks	 up	 to	 the	 role	model.	Moreover,	many	role	 models	 belong	 to	 multiple	 categories	 concurrently	 and	 hence	 the	distinctions	are	to	an	extent	arbitrary.			One	of	the	key	definitional	differences	that	emerges	across	role	model	typologies,	is	 the	 question	 of	whether	 a	 role	model	 is	 an	 individual	worth	 emulating,	 and	hence,	 someone	whom	 young	 people	 find	 inspiring,	 or	 they	 are	 a	 person	with	general	 influence	 on	 a	 young	 person’s	 life.	 While	 people	 in	 the	 former,	emulation-based	 definition	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 ‘positive’	 role	models,	 because	 they	are	chosen	for	exhibiting	positive	attributes	and	achievements	that	are	desired,	the	latter	definition	also	opens	the	possibility	of	‘negative’	role	models,	used	for	example	by	Archard	(2012)	or	Quimby	and	Santis	(2006).	Negative	role	models	influence	the	youth	by	motivating	people	to	avoid	 their	negative	traits,	because	as	Donald	Gibson	(2003,	592)	shows,	people	construe	role	models	by	extracting	from	 their	 behaviour	 ways	 how	 it	 can	 help	 them.	 Both	 of	 the	 approaches	 to	understanding	role	models,	however,	are	embedded	in	the	idea	that	role	models	provide	an	impetus	towards	the	action	of	role	modelling,	a	“cognitive	process	in	which	 individuals	actively	observe,	 adapt,	 and	 reject	attributes	of	multiple	 role	models”	(Gibson,	2003,	593)	to	achieve	a	desired	outcome.		Scholarship	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 positive	 conceptualizations	 of	 role	 models	highlights	 the	 importance	of	 similarity	between	 the	young	 individual	 and	 their	role	model.	Similarity	is	seen	as	a	pre-condition	for	someone	to	draw	inspiration	from	 their	 role	model,	or	postulated	 reversely,	 the	 role	model	must	be	 seen	as	
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sufficiently	 similar,	 so	 that	 the	 young	 person	 can	 believe	 that	 they	 too	 can	achieve	what	 their	role	model	has	achieved,	especially	 if	 they	 feel	marginalised	or	 at	 a	disadvantage	because	of	 this	 shared	 similarity.	The	 similarity	 can	be	 in	identity	 markers,	 such	 as	 race	 and	 gender	 (Marx,	 Ko	 and	 Friedman,	 2009;	Lockwood,	 2006;	 Karunanayake	 and	 Nauta,	 2004)	 but	 as	 MacCallum	 and	Beltman	(2002,	37)	highlight,	shared	identity	does	not	automatically	mean	that	the	 role	 model	 will	 instigate	 some	 kind	 of	 behaviour	 change.	 The	 process	 of	recognizing	this	similarity,	or	‘identification,’	highlights	the	fluidity	of	identity,	its	reconfiguration	in	reaction	to	subject	positions	and	discourses,	as	well	as	the	role	of	‘symbolic	resources’	that	sustain	it	(Hall,	1996).			Role	models’	degree	of	similarity	 is	also	conceptualised	through	social	distance	or	 eliteness	 in	 several	 studies	 to	 show	 that	 exceptionalism	 of	 role	 models,	especially	 amongst	 celebrities	 and	 experts,	 can	 affect	 the	 perceptions	 of	similarity	and	relevance.	These	studies	argue	that	high	 level	of	eliteness	on	the	part	of	the	role	model	can	prevent	their	positive	impact,	because	it	 leads	to	the	conclusion	that	the	role	models	are	too	different	and	their	achievements	are	not	attainable	 for	 the	 ordinary	 (Hoyt,	 2013;	 Hoyt,	 Burnette	 and	 Innella,	 2012;	Rudman	and	Phelan,	2010).	The	aforementioned	study	by	Madhavan	and	Crowell	(2014,	 733)	 includes	 a	 category	 of	 ‘heroes’	 amongst	 celebrities,	 athletes	 and	politicians.	The	authors	argue	that	the	youth	in	their	study	were	acutely	aware	of	difficulties	in	replicating	their	heroes’	achievements.	Consequently,	they	warn	of	the	 danger	 that	 heroes’	 successes	 might	 be	 seen	 as	 unattainable	 and	 be	demotivating	 or	 deflating.	 Concerns	 with	 eliteness	 or	 exceptionalism	 are	especially	 pertinent	 for	 young	 people	 with	 low-levels	 of	 confidence	 and	 self-esteem.	 As	 MacCallum	 and	 Beltman	 conclude,	 for	 these	 young	 people,	 role	models	 “who	 can	 demonstrate	 how	 success	 is	 achieved	may	 be	more	 effective	than	 expert	 models”	 (2002,	 37).	 It	 is	 precisely	 these	 findings	 of	 salience	 of	identity-based	 similarity,	 that	 fuel	 the	 concern	 that	women	 in	 politics	may	not	serve	as	role	models	for	being	seen	as	too	elite	and	hence	too	different.			Many	students	in	my	research	were	confronted	with	people	whose	life	trajectory	or	 circumstances	 they	 wished	 to	 avoid	 and	 thus	 who	 could	 be	 considered	 as	
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negative	role	models.	Ranging	from	“that	cousin	who	got	pregnant”,	to	“that	aunt	who	works	as	a	cashier	at	Pick’n’Pay”	(a	supermarket	chain)	or	“that	uncle	who	drinks,”	 these	 individuals	 serve	 as	 negative	 role	 models	 because	 they	 offer	 a	normative	 reference	point	 for	 the	students’	 articulation	of	 the	 ideal	 role	model	qualities.	 However,	 for	my	 research	 participants,	 role	models	were	 exclusively	associated	with	a	positive	meaning	and	were	seen	as	people	to	emulate.	Hence,	in	the	thesis	I	use	the	term	role	model	only	in	the	positive	sense,	the	same	way	it	is	understood	by	my	research	participants.	The	term	anti-hero	or	deterrent	model	is	 then	used	 to	designate	people	whose	 life	and	behaviours	as	a	whole	or	 their	elements	are	to	be	avoided.	FPEs	can	therefore	serve	as	empowerment	resources	either	as	anti-heroes	and	role	models	and	are	thus	analysed	in	the	thesis	in	these	terms.		
Normative	Power	of	the	Elites		The	identification	of	sources	and	nature	of	eliteness	or	the	degree	of	difference	that	is	posed	as	a	potential	barrier	for	role	models,	is	the	focus	of	elite	studies.	As	a	 field	of	 inquiry,	 it	 is	marked	by	disciplinary	tensions.	Studies	of	African	elites	are	 often	 rooted	 in	 the	work	 of	 European	 sociologists	 and	 their	 exploration	 of	class	 difference	 on	 the	 continent	 (Daloz,	 2007).	 In	 many	 post-colonial	 African	countries,	 class-based	 analysis	 was	 historically	 long	 disputed	 on	 its	 relevance.	Walter	Rodney,	for	example,	argued	that	“[c]olonialism	did	not	create	a	capital-owning	and	factory-owning	class	among	Africans	or	even	inside	Africa;	nor	did	it	create	an	urbanised	proletariat	of	any	significance	(particularly	outside	of	South	Africa)”	 (2012	 [1972],	 216).	 In	 this	 approach,	 class	 was	 seen	 in	 Marxist,	material/economic	 terms,	 and	 hence	 social	 stratification	 analysis	 on	 the	continent	was	perceived	via	other	systems	of	difference	such	as	ethnicity.	Lentz	(2016)	and	Spronk	(2014)	highlight	the	changes	in	perceptions	of	African	elites	since	 the	 immediate	 post-colonial/independence	 period.	 They	 note	 that	 the	initial	 focus	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	was	 connected	 to	 the	western	 interest	 in	understanding	the	post-independence	trajectories	and	to	anticipate	the	political	and	 economic	developments	 in	 these	 countries.	The	 elites	were	 in	 this	 context	individuals	with	colonial/western	education	and	with	positions	within	the	state	administration	and	in	many	cases	also	associations	with	the	military.	They	were	
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understood	 as	 holders	 of	modernity,	who	would	deliver	 progress	 in	 the	newly	independent	countries	and	hence	they	were	seen	as	change	makers	as	well.	The	anthropological	 and	developmental	disciplinary	 focus	 shifted	 towards	 the	poor	and	 the	 marginalised	 in	 the	 1970s/1980s,	 together	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 good	governance	agenda,	which	suggested	that	corruption	and	patronage	of	the	elites	was	the	main	obstacle	to	development	and	the	cause	of	the	people’s	poverty	and	underdevelopment.			In	the	aforementioned	context	of	mass	poverty,	class	was	dismissed	as	a	useful	concept	on	the	continent;	yet	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	class	stratification	has	 received	 considerable	 attention	 and	 became	 a	 widely	 used,	 albeit	continuously	 disputed	 concept.	 Based	 on	 the	 National	 Income	 Distribution	Survey	from	2010-2011	and	Income	Tax	 information,	Anna	Orthofer	(2016,	21,	23)	 found	 that	 only	 10%	 of	 the	 South	 African	 population	 owned	 90%	 of	 the	country’s	wealth	and	up	to	60%	of	its	income,	making	the	country	into	one	of	the	most	 unequal	 in	 the	 world.	 However,	 the	 de-racialisation	 of	 opportunities	combined	with	poverty-eradication	efforts	following	the	end	of	apartheid,	which	I	 elaborate	more	 in	 Chapter	 Six,	 facilitated	 social	mobility,	 especially	 for	 Black	South	 Africans,	 creating	 new	 impetus	 to	 consider	 more	 closely	 social	differentiation	in	the	country	and	to	adopt	a	class-based	lens.			Spronk	 (2014,	 94)	 highlights	 that	 currently	 the	 African	Development	 Bank	 for	example,	 treats	 elite	 as	 individuals	 in	 the	 top	20%	of	 the	 society	and	 the	basic	economic	 differentiation	 of	 poor,	 middle	 class	 and	 the	 elite	 thus	 frequently	revolves	around	individual	or	household	income	or	daily	expenditure.	However,	many	 critical	 scholars	 both	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	 elsewhere	 have	 embraced	 the	argument	 that	 lived	 experiences	 within	 separate	 income	 brackets	 vary	 vastly;	hence,	 economic,	 monetary	 or	 material	 lens	 to	 class	 difference	 does	 not	necessarily	 offer	 an	 adequate	measure	 of	 opportunities	 afforded	 to	 individuals	with	 a	 particular	 income.	 Skills-based	 or	 employment-based	 classifications,	which	 are	 assumed	 to	 mirror	 and	 nuance	 the	 economic	 conceptualisation	 of	class,	share	a	similar	weakness,	namely,	they	do	not	encapsulate	other	sources	to	power.	 Hence,	 while	 eliteness	 does	 include	 economic	 power,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
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understood	more	holistically	 to	 include	 cultural,	 social	 and	 symbolic	 resources	(Savage	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 which	 consequently	 expanded	 the	 picture	 of	 eliteness	beyond	employment,	skills	and	wealth	(Anthias,	2013;	Savage	et	al.,	2013;	Daloz,	2007).			John	 Scott	 (2008)	 argues	 that	 including	 status	 and	 cultural	 resources	 was	damaging	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 elite,	 because	 scholars	 started	 to	 use	 the	 term	 too	broadly.	The	 centrality	of	power	and	domination	was	 lost,	which	weakened	 its	analytical	applicability	and	resulted	in	the	abandonment	of	the	concept	and	the	decline	of	elite	studies.	Consequently,	Scott	 suggests	 that	elites	ought	not	 to	be	understood	as	a	social	class	or	a	status	group,	because	eliteness	is	about	access	and	control	over	power	and	domination,	which	do	not	automatically	arise	with	employment,	wealth	or	property,	which	are	the	analytical	markers	of	classes	and	status	groups	(2008,	34–35).	As	Wright	(2009,	7)	further	explains,	“inequalities	of	 income	 and	 wealth	 connected	 to	 the	 class	 structure	 are	 sustained	 by	 the	exercise	 of	 power,	 not	 simply	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 individuals.	 The	 inequalities	…	require	the	use	of	power	to	enforce	exclusion.”	This	exclusion	is	with	regards	to	opportunities	 of	 others	 which	 can	 be	 restricted,	 for	 example	 by	 access	 to	education,	race,	rights	or	citizenship.	Therefore,	as	Deborah	James	highlights,	it	is	necessary	 to	 move	 away	 from	 rigid	 class	 lines	 and	 differentiations	 in	 South	Africa,	where	transformation	processes	have	resulted	in	contradictions	between	“objective	economic	circumstances	and	subjective	measures	of	worth	and	value”	(2014,	22).		Burger	and	McAravey’s	(2014)	propose	differentiating	classes	in	highly	unequal	societies	such	as	South	Africa	based	on	the	level	of	their	empowerment.	Although	they	focus	on	identifying	quantifiable	markers	of	empowerment,	such	as	years	of	obtained	 education	 or	 access	 to	 services	which	 is	 in	 line	with	 aforementioned	class	 approaches,	 their	 reference	 to	 empowerment	 is	 insightful	 and	 can	 be	expended	 to	 include	 normative	 power	 as	 well,	 which	 is	 tied	 to	 the	aforementioned	 cultural,	 social	 and	 symbolic	 resources.	 As	 the	 transitional	processes	in	South	Africa	are	happening	at	various	speeds,	the	adjudication	and	perception	of	who	 is	 in	power	and	who	 is	 the	elite,	becomes	a	contested	 issue,	
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leading	the	majority	of	the	population	to	claim	hurt	and	injury,	to	borrow	from	Sara	 Ahmed	 (2014,	 32-33),	 and	 to	 seek	 to	mobilise	 discourses	 to	 (re)claim	 or	secure	 privileges.	 Analysing	 the	 empowerment	 potential	 of	 the	 perceptions	 of	female	 political	 elites,	 as	 I	 do	 in	 this	 research,	 thus	 requires	 that	 popular	interconnections	of	status	and	class	are	accepted,	especially	when	one	considers	cultural	capital	as	intrinsic	to	class	articulations	and	ultimately	an	expression	of	power	(Southall,	2016;	Seekings	and	Nattrass,	2015;	Savage	et	al.,	2013).			The	centrality	of	power	and	 influence	 in	elite	 studies	has	 led	many	scholars	 to	distinguish	 typologies	of	 elites.	 Some	scholars	 try	 to	 analyse	 the	extent	of	 elite	power	 and	 influence,	 and	 thus	 distinguish	 between	 elites	 and	 super/power	elites.	Others	 recognise	different	 spheres,	 in	which	 the	elites	 can	exercise	 their	power.	 This	 approach	 conceptualises	 so-called	 functional	 elites,	 meaning	 that	there	are	exceptional	individuals/groups	within	specific	spheres,	fields	or	values,	such	 as	 politics,	 economics,	 and	 religion	 (Lentz,	 2015;	 Savage	 and	 Williams,	2008;	Scott,	2008;).	However,	as	Salverda	and	Abbink	(2013)	and	others	(Daloz,	2003)	highlight,	elites	transverse	categories	and	are	intertwined	through	shared	interests,	networks	and	discourses,	although	they	may	not	be	 joined	enough	to	form	class	consciousness	or	be	permanently	constituted	and	reproduced;	hence,	they	might	not	be	considered	a	class.	In	the	context	of	post-colonial	Africa,	Daloz	further	highlights	the	connection	between	politics	and	economics	by	suggesting	the	 “Big	Men”	 approaches	 being	most	 suitable	 for	 understanding	 eliteness.	 He	shows	 that	 these	 men	 redistribute	 both	 wealth	 and	 social	 capital	 and	 create	networks,	 even	 within	 the	 context	 of	 multiparty	 democracies.	 Therefore,	focusing	on	defining	the	cut-off	points	where	certain	elite	levels	start	and	end,	or	in	which	 sector	 their	 sphere	 of	 influence	 is	manifested,	 distracts	 from	 the	 key	focus,	 which	 should	 be	 on	 analysing	 processes	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 creating	difference,	by	which	power	becomes	configured	and	maintained.			Norms,	as	building	blocks	of	social	order,	discipline	people	to	behave	in	certain	ways	and	therefore	are	reflections	of	power	and	tools	of	maintaining	the	status	quo	 favouring	 the	 elite.	 Haugaard	 (2003,	 88)	 argues	 that	 social	 order	 is	established	 through	 structures	 –	predictable,	 routinely	 repeated	actions,	which	
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when	enacted	or	performed	are	met	with	confirming	actions,	and	which	have	a	shared,	accepted	social	meaning.	Social	order	thus	creates	power,	which	allows	people	to	be	placed	or	to	place	themselves	outside	of	 the	structure.	Haugaard’s	theorizing	 of	 social	 order	 draws	 partially	 on	 Foucault’s	 work	 in	Discipline	and	
Punish	 (1995),	which	outlines	the	techniques	that	build	the	power	of	the	norm.	Foucault	 shows	 various	 techniques	 of	 disciplinary	 power,	 which	 include	normalizing	 judgement,	 together	 with	 surveillance,	 observation	 and	examination.	Based	on	his	analysis	of	practices	used	 in	 the	18th	century	French	hospitals,	schools,	prisons	and	other	 institutions,	he	extrapolates	the	aspiration	of	the	state	to	create	a	disciplined	society,	where	power	is	most	effective	because	people	follow	rules	and	regulations	(the	norms),	without	those	in	power	having	to	 exercise	 violence/physical	 power	 against	 them.	 Foucault	 thus	 arrives	 at	 the	conclusion	 that	 normalizing	 judgements	 create	 pressures	 to	 conform	 and	 thus	create	a	homogenous,	disciplined	social	body.	As	he	explains:		 [N]ormalization	becomes	one	of	the	great	instruments	of	power	at	the	end	of	 classical	age.	For	 the	marks	 that	once	 indicated	status,	privilege	 and	 affiliation	 were	 increasingly	 replaced	 –	 or	 at	 least	supplemented	 –	 by	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 degrees	 of	 normality	indicating	 membership	 of	 a	 homogenous	 social	 body	 but	 also	playing	a	part	in	classification,	hierarchization	and	the	distribution	of	rank	(1995,	184).		Gender	as	a	form	of	power	works	as	a	constructed	set	of	norms,	which	regulates	behaviour	and	 can	 therefore	be	policed	and	disciplined.	Power	 is	 thus	wielded	through	 “[s]ocialization,	 education,	media,	 secrecy,	 information	control	and	 the	shaping	 of	 political	 beliefs	 and	 ideologies,”	 and	 ultimately	 influences	 one’s	consciousness	 towards	accepting	and	 internalising	gender	norms	 (Gaventa	and	Cornwall,	2008,	466).	Penny	Vera-Sanso	further	explains	that	masculinities	and	femininities,	 as	 socially	 constructed	sets	of	 characteristics,	hold	power	because	“they	 are	 metaphors	 attributing	 hierarchically	 structured	 values	 to	 ways	 of	being,	doing	and	relating.	These	metaphors	are	used	actively	by	a	range	of	actors	to	 create	 and	 discipline	 subjectivities	 and	 dispositions	 and	 to	 naturalise	 and	legitimate	 relations	 of	 inequality”	 (2016,	 80).	 Gender	 as	 a	 system	 of	 power,	
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therefore,	 is	 manifested	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 circumscribe	 or	 shape	 the	 possible	actions	of	others,	which	stabilises	the	social	order	(Haugaard,	2003).		Constraints	that	are	put	on	what	is	deemed	as	possible	to	change,	are	embedded	within	particular	systems	of	knowledge	and	discourses,	and	reified	by	scientific	knowledge	 or	 by	 references	 to	 nature	 and	 religion.	 As	 Cynthia	 Enloe	 (2004)	argues,	words	like	‘always’,	‘natural,’	or	‘tradition’	are	used	to	avoid	questioning	of	social	order	and	those	in	power.	What	Enloe	thus	suggests	is	that	norms,	and	in	 the	 case	 of	 her	work	 gender	 norms	 in	 particular,	 are	 often	 naturalised	 and	disguised	 as	 culture	 or	 custom.	 Filomina	 Chioma	 Steady	 defines	 culture	 as	 a	“collective	pattern	of	living	that	conveys	the	norms	and	values	of	society	that	is	handed	down	from	generation	to	generation.	It	is	both	dynamic	and	resilient	and	has	positive,	 negative	 and	neutral	 attributes”	 (2005,	8).	Thus,	 fear	of	 exclusion	from	 a	 wider	 collective	 or	 a	 particular	 community	 of	 belonging,	 where	 the	majority	 adheres	 to	 the	 norms	 and	 acts	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 customs	 and	traditions	 of	 a	 particular	 culture	 is	 a	 form	 of	 punishment,	which	 Judith	 Butler	(2006	 [1990])	 argues	 is	 precisely	 the	 technique	 of	 power	 which	 disciplines	gender	performances.			Race	 equally	 functions	 as	 a	 system	 of	 disciplinary	 power	 as	 articulated	 by	Foucault,	 and	 racial	 categories,	 which	 were	 introduced	 in	 South	 Africa	 by	 the	apartheid	 regime,	 served	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 surveillance	 and	 monitoring	 of	 the	population	 (Posel,	 2001).	 Achille	 Mbembe,	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 race,	 further	proposes	that	those	who	are	oppressed	by	race	and	racism	evoke	race	to	create	a	sense	of	community	because	of	 the	 loss	of	kinship	that	arose	out	of	slavery.	He	writes:		 We	can	therefore	say	of	the	invocation	of	race	that	it	is	born	from	a	feeling	 of	 loss,	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 community	 has	 suffered	 a	separation,	 that	 it	 is	 threatened	 with	 extermination,	 and	 that	 it	must	 at	 all	 costs	 rebuilt	 by	 reconstituting	 a	 thread	 of	 continuity	beyond	time,	space,	and	dislocation	(2017,	33).		Thus,	 the	 threat	 of	 continued	 exclusion	 from	 the	 social	 order	 that	 is	 built	 on	whiteness	and	which	privileges	it	on	one	hand,	and	the	threat	of	exclusion	from	
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the	protective	space	of	the	community	of	the	oppressed	on	the	other,	both	wield	disciplinary	 power	 and	 lead	 to	 the	 pressure	 to	 follow	 the	 norms	 of	 the	 two	communities.	Consequently,	 they	create	tensions	and	pressures	on	the	targeted	population	not	to	be	the	exception	from	either,	which	are	mutually	exclusive	(see	for	 example	 Nyamnjoh	 [2016]	 on	 racialised	 othering	 by	 Black	 African	 South	Africans	 against	 other	 Black	 Africans).	 Normative	 power	 and	 its	 disciplining	through	exclusion	has	notable	similarities	with	the	postcolonial	theorising	of	the	process	 of	 ‘othering’.	 Being	 the	 exception	 or	 being	 ‘the	 Other’,	 as	 used	 by	postcolonial,	 critical	 race	 and	 feminist	 scholars,	 points	 out	 how	 the	 European	patriarchal,	 racist	 capitalism	 and	 colonialism,	 are	 built	 on	 the	 exclusion	 and	oppression	of	the	Other,	as	a	way	of	defining	the	self	as	the	norm.		Much	 of	 the	 early	 elite	 scholarship	 neglected	 women’s	 experiences,	 failing	 to	consider	various	ways	through	which	women	can	access	and	exercise	power	by	assuming	Black	African	women’s	blanket	a	priori	disempowerment,	victimhood	and	 ‘Otherness’.	 Feminist	 scholars	 such	 as	 Patricia	 McFadden	 (2018)	 or	 Lindi	Manicom	 (2005),	 however,	 have	 shown	 the	 important	 differences	 amongst	(Black)	African	women	in	post-colonial	era,	including	along	class	lines	and	hence	through	 their	 access	 to	 positions	 of	 power	 and	 privilege,	 resulting	 in	 the	disregard	 of	 the	 interests	 of	 poor	 rural	 women	 and	 cleavages	 in	women’s/feminist	 political	 and	 social	 organising.	 One	 of	 the	 key	 studies	 on	African	 elite	 women	 is	 Tanja	 Müller’s	 (2005)	 analysis	 of	 post-independence	Eritrea.	The	liberation	experience	plays	an	important	role	in	the	Eritrean	nation-building	 ideology,	 which	 is	 dominated	 and	 led	 by	 the	 men	 of	 the	 Eritrean	People’s	Liberation	Front,	 and	 is	 thus,	 in	many	ways,	paralleled	 to	 the	 story	of	the	 anti-apartheid	 struggle	 and	 the	 ANC	 in	 South	 Africa.	 Müller	 examines	 the	views	 and	 experiences	 of	 elite	 women	 in	 two	 sets	 of	 roles,	 firstly,	 within	 the	political	leadership	and	secondly	in	business	and	academia.	The	former	group	of	women	 comprises	 of	 ex-fighters	 and	 the	 latter	 are	 women	 who	 pursued	education	and	individual	professional	careers	instead.	She	argues	that	emphasis	on	 elite	women’s	 education	 is	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 post-colonial	 focus	 on	 the	educated	African	 (male)	 elites,	 as	 revealed	 also	 by	 other	 scholars,	 for	 instance	
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Carola	Lentz	 (2016),	Mattia	Fumanti	 (2007)	and	Amina	Mama	(2007).25	Hence,	Müller	 and	 others	 highlight	 women’s	 various	 sources	 of	 power	 and	 privilege	behind	their	elite	status.			As	a	result	of	the	need	for	a	comprehensive	look	on	elites,	Salverda	and	Abbink	provide	an	all-encompassing	definition	of	elite	as	a	“relatively	small	group	within	the	 societal	 hierarchy	 that	 claims	 and/or	 is	 accorded	 power,	 prestige,	 or	command	over	others	on	 the	basis	of	 a	number	of	publicly	 recognised	 criteria,	and	 aims	 to	 preserve	 and	 entrench	 its	 status	 thus	 acquired”	 (2013,	 1).	 Put	differently,	 the	definition	suggests	 that	elites	are	exceptional	people	because	of	their	small	number,	as	well	as	due	to	their	possessing	of	power	or	prestige	that	is	not	available	to	the	rest	of	the	society.	Salverda	and	Abbink’s	definition	requires	however	 an	 additional,	 explicit	 recognition	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 contestation	(Daloz,	 2007)	 and	 competing	 claims	 over	 power	 and	 recognised	 criteria	 to	ascribe	eliteness,	to	suit	the	highly	unequal	and	extremely	polarised	society	such	as	 in	 South	 Africa.	 Due	 to	 the	 ongoing	 transformation	 of	 economic,	 social	 and	political	power	relations	and	resources	 in	South	Africa,	 the	perceptions	of	who	has	 power	 and	 command	 over	 people,	 or	 who	 is	 ascribed	 prestige,	 varies	amongst	 the	 people	 and	 hence,	 there	 is	 ongoing	 competition	 over	 eliteness,	which	must	be	specifically	emphasised	in	elite	conceptualisation.			The	 analysis	 of	 lifestyle	 and	 tastes	 has	 been	 a	 dominant	 form	of	 class	 analysis	and	conspicuous	consumption,	displays	of	wealth	and	excess	are	often	framed	as	a	sign	of	elite	distinction	or	difference.	Thurlow	and	Jaworski	(2017b)	show	that	elite	is	often	discursively	used	to	describe	something	as	luxurious,	prestigious	or	of	 superior	 quality,	 whether	 it	 meets	 such	 qualities	 or	 not.	 Its	 discursive	deployment	 caters	 to	 the	 desire	 for	 the	 every-day	 accessibility	 of	 such																																																									25	While	Mamphela	 Ramphele	 (2017)	 highlights	 the	 need	 for	 elites	 to	 be	 educated,	 she	 argues	that	 many	 African	 leaders	 after	 independence	 substituted	 education	 with	 their	 struggle	credentials,	which	contributed	to	the	crises	in	many	of	these	countries.	Mazrui	(1990)	similarly	shows	 the	difference	between	 some	 ‘philosopher-kings’	 of	 this	post-independence	 era,	 such	 as	Tanzania’s	Julius	Nyerere	or	Uganda’s	Milton	Obote,	and	Idi	Amin	or	Daniel	arap	Moi	of	Kenya	on	the	other.	Nonetheless,	many	of	the	intellectuals,	‘philosopher	kings’	as	Mazrui	calls	them,	did	not	manage	 to	 achieve	 justice	 for	 their	 people.	 Many	 decolonial/anticolonial	 scholars	 such	 as	 wa	Thiong’o	 (2017;	 2005)	 further	 challenge	 the	 type	 of	 education	 these	 political	 elites	 received,	which	was	primarily	through	western	universities.	Thus,	they	were	subject	to	European	‘memory	of	the	continent’	and	the	European	ways	of	knowing.		
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experiences	and	making	it	affordable	for	the	masses,	especially	for	people,	who	are	 elite	 ‘wannabes’.	 The	 authors	 show	 that	 eliteness	 needs	 to	 be	 visible	 and	recognizable	 to	 the	 non-elites,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 must	 be	 economically	unachievable	 and	 unaffordable.	 Hence,	 it	 functions	 both	 as	 a	 positive,	aspirational	quality,	while	at	 the	same	 time,	 it	has	 in	 it	already	 the	seeds	of	 its	own	critique	and	resistance,	as	any	other	structures	of	power.			Jean	Pascal	Daloz	 (2012)	 and	other	 scholars	 (see	 for	 example	Anthias	 [2013]),	highlight,	 however,	 that	 in	 some	 contexts,	 elites	 deploy	 ‘pretend	 modesty’,	discretion	or	 inconspicuousness	rather	than	ostentatious	display	of	 their	status	to	others.	Using	the	anecdotal	example	of	“bourgeois	bohemian”	Daloz	suggests	that	some	elites	express	feelings	of	“downward	social	identification”	(2012,	218–219).	 Similarly,	 elites	 who	 have	 recently	 gained	 their	 status	 also	 use	 pretend	humility:			 The	dilemma	they	[elite	newcomers]	are	confronted	with	consists	of	simultaneously	distinguishing	themselves	from	those	who	share	their	 origins	 and	 from	 “aspirational	 peers”	 (which	 requires	 that	they	show	off	their	success	to	a	certain	degree),	whilst	conforming	to	the	canon	of	restraint	favoured	by	the	established	elites	in	order	to	ensure	their	acceptance	by	this	group	(Daloz	2012,	215).			Moreover,	 based	 on	 his	 work	 in	 Nigeria	 and	 other	 west	 African	 countries,	 he	argues	 against	 universalism	 and	 theorising	 of	 elite	 difference	 across	 various	contexts,	 as	 it	 is	 done	 in	 much	 of	 the	 Eurocentric	 western	 sociology.	 Hence,	considering	 how	 difference	 is	 constructed,	 subverted	 or	 obfuscated	 through	norms	and	discourses	needs	to	be	analysed	as	a	function	of	power	in	the	specific	spatial	 and	 temporary	 context,	 which	 is	 one	 of	 the	 tenants	 of	 intersectional	theorising,	which	I	discuss	in	the	next	section.		
Identity,	Difference	and	Intersectionality	Intersectionality	 takes	 gender	 inequalities	 as	 concurrently	 reinforced	 and	mutually	constituted	through	other	“socially	constructed	categories	of	difference	and	 inequality”,	 which	 co-create	 the	 “unequal	 material	 realities	 and	 the	distinctive	social	experience”	of	women	and	men	(Hill	Collins	and	Chepp,	2013,	
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68,	 60).	 Rooted	 in	 constructivist	 thought,	 intersectionality	 thus	 acknowledges	agency,	resistance	and	change	of	norms	and	power	structures	and	enhances	our	understanding	of	the	complex	nature	of	role	models	and	of	representation	more	broadly.	Consequently,	it	has	become	a	popular	concept	in	scholarship	on	gender	and	representation	to	analyse	the	impact	of	various	forms	of	difference,	not	only	on	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 and	 collective	 identity	 (Alexander,	 Bolzendahl	 and	Jalalzai,	 2018;	 Kantola	 and	 Lombardo,	 2017;	 Mügge	 and	 Erzeel,	 2016),	 but	ultimately	on	the	level	of	structures	of	power.			The	 concept	 of	 intersectionality	 is	 traced	 most	 directly	 to	 the	 works	 of	 Black	feminist	 scholars	 in	 the	 USA,	 such	 as	 Kimberlé	 Crenshaw	 (1991),	 Hill	 Collins	(1993),	 or	 bell	 hooks	 (2001),	 but	 its	 theoretical	 underpinnings	 are	 present	 in	earlier	 works	 of	 women	 of	 colour,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 post-colonial/Third	 World	feminist	thought	represented	for	example	by	Mohanty	(2003)	or	Spivak	(1988).	As	Batliwala	explains	with	reference	to	 the	spread	of	 liberation	theology	 in	 the	1980s,	 women’s	 empowerment	 became	 a	 “more	 political	 and	 transformatory	idea	 for	 struggles	 that	 challenged	 not	 only	 patriarchy,	 but	 also	 the	mediating	
structures	 of	 class,	 race,	 ethnicity…	 which	 determined	 the	 nature	 of	 women’s	position	 and	 condition	 in	 developing	 societies”	 [my	 emphasis]	 (2007,	 558).	Hence,	women’s	empowerment	scholarship	has	had	at	 its	core	 intersectionality	of	power,	despite	the	fact	that	the	concept	had	not	been	extensively	used	by	most	authors	in	the	early	stages	of	this	scholarship.			Unlike	 in	the	European	academia,	where	 intersectionality	 is	relatively	recent	 in	gender	and	representation	scholarship,	its	application	is	more	established	in	the	US	context	(Mügge	et	al.,	2018).	For	example,	Brown	and	Gershon	(2016)	use	the	concept	 in	 their	 study	 of	 self-representation	 of	 US	 Congresswomen	 of	 colour,	demonstrating	the	equal,	non-hierarchical	importance	of	race	and	gender	in	their	website	profiles.	Melanie	Hughes	(2011)	applies	the	concept	when	analysing	the	impact	of	minority	and	gender	quota	systems,	finding	that	national	level,	tandem	quotas	 are	 most	 beneficial	 for	 minority	 women,	 who	 otherwise	 lose	 out	 to	majority	 women	 or	 minority	 men.	 Hence,	 much	 of	 the	 political	 science	scholarship	has	operationalised	intersectionality	by	incorporating	race	and	class	
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amongst	 a	 plethora	 of	 variables,	 such	 as	 education,	 party	 affiliation,	 political	efficacy,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 only	 a	 few	 studies	 also	 ability	 or	 sexuality	 (Evans,	2016b).			For	many	gender	and	political	representation	scholars,	intersectionality	became	a	 mechanism	 of	 inclusion	 (Choo	 and	 Ferree,	 2010).	 It	 is	 used	 to	 include	 the	voices	 of	 the	 systematically	 excluded	 and	 marginalised	 citizens,	 particularly	women	 of	 colour/black	 ethnic	 minority	 women.	 McCall	 (2005)	 explains	 this	approach	 to	 intersectionality	 as	 intracategorical,	 because	 it	 seeks	 to	 de-homogenise	 or	 de-essentialise	 ‘women’	 by	 incorporating	 race	 and	 class	differentiation	 and	 recognises	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 category,	 while	 working	within	 it.	 Many	 intersectionality	 theorists	 highlight	 that	 although	 these	approaches	have	their	merit	and	provide	valuable	insights,	there	is	a	need	for	a	more	complex	 intersectional	analysis	 (Hughes	and	Dubrow,	2017;	Severs,	Celis	and	 Erzeel,	 2016),	 that	 grasps	 the	 unique	 nature	 of	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	 the	‘multiply	 marginalized’	 (Choo	 and	 Ferree,	 2010)	 and	 the	 consequent	 unique,	sometimes	 even	 paradoxical	 way	 they	 act	 and	 think	 as	 political	 beings.	 It	 is	precisely	 this	 objective	 that	 I	 strive	 to	 meet	 in	 this	 study.	 Although	 it	 works	within	 a	 particular	 category	 of	 women,	 namely	 university	 students	 within	 a	specific	age	bracket,	as	I	suggest	in	Chapter	Two,	the	treatment	of	categories	of	difference	in	this	study	are	challenged	and	not	accepted	as	static	or	pre-defined.	This	 research	 is	 thus	 ‘sceptical’	 (McCall,	 2005)	 of	 categories	 because	 of	 the	analytical	 weakness	 or	 even	 inappropriateness	 of	 identity	 categories	 that	 are	pre-determined,	 strictly	 tied	 to	 the	body,	 and	which	 are	 understood	 as	 pre-set	boundaries	of	belonging	and	difference.			Youth	 is	 one	 of	 such	 contested	 categories.	 Honwana	 (2012),	 van	 Dijk	 et	 al.	(2011),	Abbink	(2005),	Durham	(2000)	and	other	scholars	highlight	 that	youth	as	 a	 generational	 category	 is	 socially	 constructed,	 yet	 the	 abilities	 and	opportunities	of	adolescents	 to	meet	 the	markers	of	adulthood	are	often	out	of	sync	with	 social	 expectations	 attached	 to	 a	 specific	 biological	 age	 or	 a	 human	developmental	stage.	While	in	some	contexts	generational	transitions	have	been	linked	 to	 rites	 of	 passage,	 for	many	 young	people	 in	 South	Africa	 adulthood	 is	
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connected	 to	 employment,	 independence,	 and	 familial/marital	 relations	 and	responsibilities.	As	 a	 result	 of	high	 levels	of	unemployment	and	poverty,	many	poor	 Black	 African	 men	 and	 women	 feel	 unable	 to	 progress	 into	 adulthood,	making	 an	 age-based	 definition	 disconnected	 from	 their	 lived	 realities.	Motherhood	 also	 serves	 as	 a	 particularly	 pertinent	 example	 of	 the	 socially-constructed	 nature	 of	 youth,	 as	 in	much	 of	 the	western	 thought,	 child-rearing	responsibilities	together	with	other	domestic	social	reproduction	tasks	are	often	seen	as	a	sign	of	adulthood.	Many	young	people	in	South	Africa	and	other	parts	of	the	continent,	however,	assume	these	responsibilities	at	a	younger	age	than	their	European/American	 counterparts	 (Blum	 and	 Boyden,	 2018),	 but	 remain	perceived	and	treated	as	adolescents.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	discursive	use	of	‘teenage	pregnancy’	rather	than	‘teenage	motherhood’	is	a	manifestation	of	the	age-based	 power	 hierarchy.	 As	motherhood	 could	 be	 a	 source	 of	 power,	 older	generations	 of	 men	 and	 women,	 and	 young	 men	 might	 be	 resistant	 to	relinquishing	power	to	the	younger	generation	of	women.	Hence,	young	women	continue	 to	be	marginalised	 through	gender	and	age-based	hierarchies	 (Harris,	2012,	2004).	Therefore,	age-based	cohorts	or	generations	are	best	understood	as	context	 specific,	 historically	 bound	 social	 constructions	 of	 relations	 (Durham,	2000),	meaning	that	they	can	be	challenged	and	questioned.		Scholarship	 within	 constructivist	 tradition	 is	 particularly	 insightful	 in	operationalizing	research	steeped	in	identity	categories,	that	many	people	view	as	naturalised,	set	notions	of	who	we	are	–	our	core.	In	her	seminal	work,	Gender	
Trouble,	 Judith	 Butler	 (2006	 [1990])	 offers	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 theoretical	foundations	 of	 some	 feminist	 thought,	 which	 presupposes	 that	 a	 subject	 is	gendered	 and	 oppressed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 cultural	 processes	 and	 hence	 whose	‘authentic’	identity	can	be	re-discovered.	Instead,	she	highlights	the	construction	of	the	subject	through	temporarily	and	contextually	bound	discourses,	and	that	subjects	 do	 not	 exist	 in	 some	 kind	 of	 objective	 reality	 or	 pure	 form.	 Although	Butler	 does	not	 specifically	 evoke	 the	 concept	 of	 intersectionality,	 some	of	 her	critique	 and	 theorizing	 gets	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 concept	 and	 its	 analytical	applicability.	Butler	writes:		
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The	theories	of	feminist	identity	that	elaborate	predicates	of	color,	sexuality,	 ethnicity,	 class,	 and	 able-bodiedness	 invariably	 close	with	 an	 embarrassed	 “etc.”	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 list.	 Through	 this	horizontal	 trajectory	 of	 adjectives,	 these	 positions	 strive	 to	encompass	a	situated	subject,	but	invariably	fail	to	be	complete.	…	It	 is	 the	supplément,	 the	excess	 that	necessarily	accompanies	any	effort	to	posit	identity	once	and	for	all	(2006,	196).		Butler’s	 observation	 about	 the	 ‘etc.’	 phenomenon	 is	 rooted	 in	 her	 underlying	argument	 of	 instability	 of	 identities	 and	 their	 construction	 through	discourses,	and	 hence	 in	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 power,	 according	 to	 the	 Foucauldian	tradition.	Stuart	Hall	(1996)	similarly	builds	on	Butler’s	and	others’	theorisation	and	proposes	to	replace	the	notion	of	identity	with	identification,	to	highlight	the	construction	process	 and	 its	 unstable,	 unfixed	nature.	He	 takes	 identity	 to	be	 a	“suture”	that	temporarily	links	discourses	and	subject	positions	(1996,	6).			The	influence	of	constructivism	in	intersectionality	scholarship	can	therefore	be	seen	 in	 the	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 contextuality	 (Anthias,	2013;	 Brah	 and	 Phoenix,	 2013;	 Walby,	 Armstrong	 and	 Strid,	 2012).	Acknowledging	that	power	and	inequalities	are	specific	to	a	particular	time	and	space,	avoids	the	 ‘etc.’	phenomenon.	Ange-Marie	Hancock	famously	argued	that	the	 focus	on	 the	 ‘etc.’	 phenomenon	 is	often	 turned	 into	 “oppression	Olympics”,	meaning	 the	urge	 to	create	a	 laundry	 list	of	 inequalities	and	 including	as	many	marginalised	 identity	 categories	 as	 possible	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 most	excluded	and	disadvantaged	people	in	society.	Highlighting	the	temporality	and	instability	of	identifications,	also	means	that	change	is	possible,	both	at	the	level	of	an	individual	as	well	as	structurally	and	systematically	(Walby,	Armstrong	and	Strid,	 2012).	 Hence,	 intersectional	 analysis	 avoids	 determinism,	 which	underscores	 the	 original	 political	 objectives	 of	 its	 scholars,	 namely,	 to	 bring	about	social	justice	and	challenge	racialised	patriarchy.			Accepting	 that	 identities	 are	 temporary	and	unstable	 constructions	also	means	that	 inequalities	and	oppressions	cannot	be	understood	 in	an	additive	manner.	Nira	Yuval-Davis	(2007)	and	Floya	Anthias	(2013)	explain	the	additive	approach	to	 intersectionality	 as	 arising	 from	 a	 misunderstanding	 of	 the	 analogy	 of	
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intersection	in	Crenshaw’s	(1991)	early	work	in	which	she	coined	the	term,	and	which	 resulted	 in	 the	 false	 understanding	 of	 the	 oppression	 of	 Black	 working	class	 women,	 as	 three	 separate	 oppressions	 added	 onto	 each	 other.	 However,	intersectionality	conceptualises	oppression	and	inequality	as	jointly	constituted,	constructed	or	shaped.	Walby,	Armstrong	and	Strid	(2012)	propose	that	despite	the	fluidity	of	categories,	some	get	stabilised	at	a	particular	moment	in	time	and	with	 appropriate	 historical	 contextualisation	 can	 be	 used.	 They	 highlight	 that	one	 needs	 to	 be	 careful	 not	 to	 see	 inequalities	 as	 a	 sum	 of	 their	 parts,	 while	giving	 each	 constitutive	 power	 its	 recognition.	 Lena	 Gunnarsson	 (2017)	similarly,	 yet	 from	 a	 different	 entry	 point	 into	 the	 debate,	 argues	 in	 favour	 of	embracing	the	messy	 interlinks	that	 intersectional	analysis	brings	and	suggests	that	 feminist	 debates	 over	 whether	 race,	 class	 and	 gender	 are	 inseparable,	 or	whether	 they	 are	 truly	distinct	 and	 individual,	 are	not	productive.	 Instead,	 she	argues,	“We	can	put	our	energy	into	more	precise	theorizations	of	how	different	power	 processes	work	 for	 and	 against	 each	 other	 in	 different	 spatio-temporal	locations	and	for	different	subjects”	(2017,	120).			The	poststructuralist	feminist	lens	offers	a	valuable	suggestion	as	to	how	one	can	resolve	the	tensions	surrounding	the	use	of	identity	categories	while	challenging	their	 parameters.	 The	 limitations	 of	 language	 and	 significations	 that	 are	associated	with	the	existing	categories	means	that	new	frames	can	be	articulated	to	capture	the	specific	experiences	and	realities	of	the	particular	time	and	space.	In	the	case	of	South	Africa,	race,	class,	and	gender	–	and	often	invisibly,	silently	included	 sexuality	 through	 the	 heteronormativity	 of	 gender	 –	 are	 systems	 of	oppression	 and	 identity	 categories	 of	 importance	 and	 are	 used	 both	 by	 the	students	 and	 the	 citizens	 to	 communicate	 their	 lived	 experiences.	 They	 are	equally	used	by	political	and	social	elites,	often	as	tools	of	cheap	populist	point	scoring.	Thus,	as	Winker	and	Degele	(2011)	argue,	articulating	new	frames	which	are	informed,	but	not	dominated	by	these	categories	of	importance	and	salience,	offers	 an	 analytical	 way	 forward.	 Yuval-Davis	 (2006,	 203),	 drawing	 on	Castoriadis,	calls	 for	 ‘creative	 imagination,’	and	thus	highlights	 the	need	to	 find	the	 right	 language	 to	 name	 and	 explain	 various	 positionings.	 Based	 on	 these	theories	 of	 intersectionality,	 in	 Chapters	 Seven	 and	 Eight	 I	 analyse	 the	 ideal	
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values,	 characteristics	and	behaviours	expected	of	FPEs	as	 they	arise	 from	two	sets	of	discourses,	 and	hence	 from	power	 structures	which	effect	 the	 students’	lived	realities	and	perceptions.	These	discourses,	and	the	identities	that	they	give	rise	to,	are	explained	and	analysed	using	the	categories	of	gender,	race,	class	and	age;	 hence,	 these	 existing	 categories	 do	 not	 dominate	 the	 FPE	 values,	characteristics	and	behaviours,	but	are	used	to	tie	FPEs	and	the	students	to	the	systems	of	power	and	the	prevalent	social	order.			Intersectionality	 is	 very	 much	 decolonising	 in	 its	 rationale	 and	 strategies.	Considering	the	intersecting	and	co-constructed	axes	of	power	affecting	women	and	 men	 in	 South	 Africa	 –	 making	 them	 at	 once	 the	 oppressors	 and	 the	oppressed,	 the	 empowered	 and	 disempowered	 –	 avoids	 the	 Eurocentric	tendency	to	assume	blanket	inferiority	and	powerlessness	of	African	women	and	the	 dominance	 and	 power	 of	 men.	 Many	 decolonial	 scholars	 are	 nonetheless	critical	of	intersectionality	and	reject	its	use	in	favour	of	other	concepts,	such	as	assemblages,	 heterarchies	 and	 entanglements	 (Grosfoguel,	 2018;	 Isoke,	 2016;	Mendoza,	2016).	However,	I	argue	that	their	critical	stance	on	intersectionality	is	against	 the	way	 it	has	been	used	by	many	scholars,	who	 rely	on	 static	 identity	categories	 and	 structures,	 and	 who	 consequently	 replicate	 the	 colonial	epistemologies	 and	 inequalities.	 Secondly,	 decolonial	 scholars,	 as	well	 as	 some	intersectionality	 theorists	 such	 as	 Yuval-Davis	 (2007),	 critique	 the	 use	 of	intersectionality	 which	 fails	 to	 consider	 structural	 interconnections	 in	 their	‘glocal’	iterations	(Mendoza,	2016).	Put	differently,	they	critique	scholars	who	do	not	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	 global	 racial	 capitalism	 and	 the	 political	 economy	when	they	use	intersectionality	(Anthias,	2014).			My	 interview	 with	 Lady	 T,	 a	 Black	 student	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng,	demonstrates	 the	 importance	 of	 linking	 the	 local	 and	 global	 levels	 to	 analyse	normative	 power.	 In	 2017,	 Lady	 T	was	 in	 her	 second	 year,	 and	 she	was	 not	 a	member	of	any	organisations	on	campus,	nor	did	she	participate	in	the	protests,	as	she	 thought	of	UJ	mostly	as	a	place	 to	study	and	pass	her	courses.	She	 lived	with	 her	 aunt,	 siblings	 and	 cousins,	 as	 her	 parents,	 who	 were	 teachers,	 had	passed	away	a	long	time	ago.	Her	family	depended	on	social	grants	and	living	in	a	
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township	 far	 from	 campus	 meant	 that	 she	 had	 a	 stressful,	 long	 commute	 on	public	transport	each	day.	Not	many	young	people	who	lived	around	her	went	to	varsity,	 nor	 did	 other	 members	 in	 her	 immediate	 family.	 She	 was	 hoping	 to	continue	 studying	 after	 finishing	 her	 bachelor’s	 degree,	 getting	 multiple	doctorates	and	also	working	and	being	a	mother	at	the	same	time.	She	thought	it	was	all	doable,	but	 it	would	make	her	 life	very	busy.	When	we	were	discussing	the	possibility	of	 rich	people	understanding	 the	poor,	 she	described	how	some	Black	African	people	are	not	able	to	understand	the	experiences	of	the	poor.	She	said:		 Lady	 T:	 OK,	 it	 would	 be	 like	 this	 situation.	 I’m	 Black,	 I’m	 rich;	you’re	 Black,	 you’re	 poor.	 We	 are	 both	 Black,	 so	 you	 can	 also	achieve	what	I	have	coz	we	are	both	Black	[laugh].	Ján:	 But	 is	 that	 not	 true?	 Is	 there	 any	 reason	 why	 you	 couldn’t	become	rich?	Lady	T:	 I	can	say,	 it	 is	because	of	where	you	come	from.	Because,	OK,	for	instance,	there	are	Black	Americans,	they	are	rich,	they	are	Black	people,	but	[they]	are	rich	because	of	the	economy	they	come	from.	And	we	are	Black,	 from	South	Africa	or	Zimbabwe…,	but	we	are	like,	still	enclosed	into	that	poorness,	because	of	our	economy,	where	we	come	from.			Lady	 T’s	 reference	 to	 the	 global	 racialised	 world-order	 was	 just	 one	 of	 many	examples,	 when	 students	 referred	 to	 the	 international	 context	 which	 shaped	their	perceptions	of	their	own	lives.	Many	were	keen	supporters	and	admirers	of	Michelle	 Obama,	 Oprah	Winfrey	 and	 Beyoncé,	 while	 many	 Fallists	 often	 drew	connections	 to	 the	 BlackLivesMatter	 campaign	 in	 the	 USA,	 being	 connected	through	 their	 critiques	 of	 institutionalised	 racism	 and	 neoliberalism.	 These	connections	were	 also	 often	 framed	 through	 the	 debate	 of	 Pan-Africanism	 and	global	solidarity	of	Blackness.	Yet	other	students	brought	up	the	global	nature	of	patriarchy	 based	 on	 the	 experiences	 of	 Hillary	 Clinton	 in	 the	 presidential	elections	in	2016.	Hence,	decolonial	perspectives	on	intersectionality	encourage	us	 to	 think	 about	 role	 models	 and	 FPEs	 within	 the	 systems	 and	 structures	 of	power,	their	normative	operations	and	disciplining	on	a	‘glocal’	level.			The	 decolonial	 critique	 of	 intersectional	 research	 can,	 consequently,	 be	reconciled	by	conceptual	and	methodological	choices.	Maria	Lugones	(2008),	for	
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example,	 joins	 intersectionality	 with	 coloniality	 of	 power	 concept	 by	 Anibal	Quijano	to	show	how	the	‘modern	gender	system’	is	racialised	and	in	service	of	global	 Eurocentric	 capitalism.	 Thus,	 intersectionality	 and	 decolonisation	 may	work	as	re-enforcing,	rather	than	opposing	concepts.	Lugones	(2008)	as	well	as	Filomina	 Steady	 (2005)	 and	Oyèrónkẹ́	 Oyèwùmí	 (2002)	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	question	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 gender-centred	 analysis	 in	 contexts,	 where	other	 societal	 organising	 principles,	 such	 as	 seniority,	 were	 more	 salient.	 The	imperial	 insertion	of	 gender	hierarches	and	 their	exploitation	by	 the	apartheid	regime	 have	made	 gender	 an	 applicable	 analytical	 concept	 for	 research	 in	 the	South	African	context,	only	if	not	taken	in	isolation	from	the	other	structures	of	difference	and	oppression,	which	 the	apartheid	regime	also	exploited	(Stauffer,	2015;	Moffett,	2006;	Walker,	1994),	but	if	understood	as	intersecting	with	other	systems	of	power.		
Conclusion	The	framework	for	this	thesis,	as	presented	in	this	chapter,	is	built	on	role	model	literature	 from	sociological	and	psychological	research,	studies	of	African	elites	and	intersectionality	theorising,	which	together	facilitate	an	analysis	of	identities	and	 difference	 as	 tools	 of	 maintaining	 and	 subverting	 power	 hierarchies.	 As	norms	 are	 products	 of	 power	 and	 are	 used	 to	 maintain	 social	 order	 by	 the	powerful	 elite,	 the	 role	model	 scholarship	 highlights	 the	 need	 to	 examine	 how	women	 in	 politics	 are	 perceived	 along	 the	 continuum	 of	 difference	within	 the	existing	 normative	 systems,	 and	 whether	 they	 are	 too	 elite	 to	 be	 deemed	 an	accessible,	 meaningful	 alternative	 vision	 against	 the	 students’	 lived	 realities.	While	 role	 model	 research	 has	 shown	 the	 different	 ways	 by	 which	 people	construe	role	models	and	anti-heroes	and	draw	on	them,	elite	studies	underscore	how	 difference	 can	 be	 created	 or	 subverted	 through	 norms	 and	 discourses	 to	maintain	power	hierarchies.	 Intersectional	 theories	bring	 these	 two	conceptual	elements	 together	 by	 highlighting	 the	 instability	 and	 temporality	 of	 identities	and	 difference,	 and	 the	 co-constitutive	 nature	 of	 the	 systems	 of	 power	 that	underpin	 them.	 Hence,	 they	 highlight	 their	 social	 construction	 and	 ultimately	people’s	agency	as	individuals	and	groups	within	systems	of	power.		 	
	120	
5 Exceptional	People:	Career	and	Life	Journey	Role	Models	
Introduction	In	 this	 chapter	 I	 focus	on	 the	analysis	of	 important	decisions	 that	 the	 students	believed	they	had	made	in	their	lives.	For	the	majority	of	my	participants,	it	was	the	decision	to	embark	on	university	studies	at	UJ	that	was	the	only	and	the	most	important	decision	 they	 felt	 they	had	made	by	 themselves.	 It	was	made	within	the	limitations	imposed	on	them	by	their	socio-economic	and	financial	situation	and	the	wishes,	needs,	and	preferences	of	key	individuals	in	their	lives.	However,	the	 most	 crucial	 consideration	 was	 to	 pursue	 a	 degree,	 which	 trumped	 other	preferences	and	desires,	such	as	the	subject,	the	institution	and	the	location.			I	argue	that	this	decision-making	process	was	rooted	in	the	students'	perceptions	of	the	socio-economic	situation	in	the	country	as	precarious	and	thus	requiring	flexibility	in	planning	for	future	life	and	employment.	Consequently,	the	students’	decisions	 about	 their	 HE	 were	 influenced	 amongst	 other	 factors	 by	 their	considerations	 of	 different	 life	 journeys	 and	 pathways	 of	 various	 male	 and	female	role	models	and	anti-heroes,	rather	than	by	specific	educational	or	career	outcomes.	The	students	felt	that	it	was	more	important	to	focus	on	learning	how	to	navigate	through	life,	which	is	marked	by	flux	and	instability,	rather	than	on	planning	an	educational	 trajectory	 towards	a	 specific	 job	or	a	career.	 In	such	a	context,	women	in	politics	fail	to	serve	as	role	models	in	the	process	of	strategic	decision-making,	because	the	students	did	not	desire	their	political	careers,	nor	did	they	fix	themselves	on	these	women’s	particular	professional	posts	and	jobs.	This	lack	of	consideration	of	women	in	politics	was	also	prevalent	when	thinking	about	them	as	general	life-journey	role	models,	as	the	students	did	not	have	the	information	 that	 they	 would	 want	 to	 know	 about	 female	 politicians	 to	 draw	inspiration	from	their	experiences	and	hence	they	were	not	able	to	see	through	an	assumed	difference	between	their	lives	and	the	lives	of	these	women.		The	belief	that	women’s	presence	in	politics	 is	exceptional	and	thus	against	the	social	 order	 and	 the	 norms,	 therefore,	 does	 not	 come	 through	 as	 a	 direct,	consciously	 articulated	 resource	 in	 decision-making	 that	would	 be	 included	 in	
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the	students’	repertoire,	despite	 the	gender,	racial	and	class	similarity	between	the	women	in	politics	and	the	university	students	at	the	point	of	origin	of	their	life	 journeys.	The	 lack	of	 information	 thus	 emerges	 as	 a	barrier	 to	overcoming	the	 presumed	 difference	 between	 the	 students	 and	 the	 FPEs.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	chapter	addresses	one	aspect	of	the	RM	theory.		
Role	Models	and	Career	Aspirations	Being	 in	 their	 late	 teens	 and	 early	 20s,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 young	women	who	participated	in	my	study	assigned	high	importance	to	their	decision	to	pursue	HE	at	UJ.	Some	of	the	students	articulated	this	decision	from	a	reversed	perspective,	such	as	deciding	not	to	work	after	completing	matric	or	not	getting	married	and	starting	a	family.	Put	differently,	the	pursuit	of	a	degree	was	a	central	component	of	 their	 life	 history	 and	 decision-making.	 Most	 of	 the	 key	 people	 who	 the	students	 identified	 as	 having	 influenced	 their	 choices	 were	 people	 from	 their	personal	 or	 close	 social	 circles.	 Taneeka’s	 pathway	 into	 her	 diploma	 in	accounting	 demonstrates	 the	 role	 that	 such	 key	 individuals	 play.	 Taneeka’s	mother	was	a	homemaker	with	a	high	school	certificate,	and	her	father	was	the	sole	provider	in	the	household,	working	in	accounting	and	finance.	They	lived	in	an	 Indian/Asian	 township	 in	 Gauteng,	 and	 although	 she	 needed	 a	 bursary	 to	study,	she	did	not	describe	their	circumstances	as	being	poor.	After	high	school,	she	 did	 not	 know	what	 she	wanted	 to	 do,	 so	 she	 spent	 two	 years	 after	matric	working.	 She	 took	 the	 only	 job	 she	 was	 offered,	 which	 was	 in	 her	 uncle’s	accounting	 company.	Having	 enjoyed	her	 experience	 and	 thinking	 that	 the	pay	was	 decent,	 she	 had	 saved	 some	 money	 and	 started	 her	 diploma	 course.	Taneeka’s	 future	goals	 included	having	her	own	accounting	 firm,	and	“being	an	awesome	boss,”	while	at	the	same	time	being	a	mother	and	running	a	household	–	time-demanding	responsibilities	that	she	believed	were	achievable.	Taneeka’s	choice	 of	 an	 accounting	 career	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	 gender	norms,	because	she	sought	an	occupation	that	would	give	her	a	source	of	income	that	was	 independent	 of	 her	 current	 and	 future	 family,	 which	 she	 justified	 by	highlighting	the	precariousness	of	women’s	 lives	 in	contemporary	South	Africa.	She	believed	that	one	never	knew	what	could	happen,	and	therefore,	she	must	be	able	to	take	care	of	herself.		
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	The	exposure	to	women	in	the	public	sphere	could	have	contributed	to	Taneeka’s	and	 other	 students’	 inner	 belief	 that	 being	 independent,	 sustaining	 themselves	on	their	own,	and	being	a	boss	of	their	own	firm	was	in	the	realm	of	the	possible.	However,	women	in	politics	were	not	identified	and	construed	in	such	a	way	by	the	students,	including	by	the	handful	of	those	interested	in	a	career	in	politics,	which	 they	 understood	 primarily	 as	 working	 in	 the	 government	 at	 either	 the	national	 or	municipal	 level.26	A	 few	 additional	 students	 were	 not	 categorically	opposed	to	the	idea	of	getting	into	politics,	if	the	opportunity	arose;	however,	it	was	 not	 their	 primary	 vision	 for	 their	 professional	 future	 at	 the	 time.	 Some	of	these	 politically-minded	 students	 were	 pursuing	 bachelor’s	 degrees	 in	 Public	Management	and	Governance,	Philosophy,	Politics	and	Economics,	or	in	Politics.	Mbali,	Tshiamo	and	Kim	were	three	students	who	were	doing	a	Politics	degree,	but	 their	 level	of	 conviction	about	 their	 future	 career	 in	politics	were	different	and	I	discuss	them	in	turn	to	demonstrate	the	variety	of	approaches	to	thinking	about	their	future	careers.			Mbali	was	from	a	township	in	Gauteng	and	from	her	perspective,	she	was	from	an	average	home	as	far	as	their	economic	situation	was	concerned.	She	said	that	although	her	family	would	not	have	bread	every	once	in	a	while,	or	struggled	to	pay	for	electricity,	her	mother	was	able	to	provide	for	them.	Mbali	was	the	first	one	in	her	family	to	go	to	varsity	and	she	was	100%	set	on	becoming	a	diplomat.	She	did	not	doubt	her	chances	to	succeed.	She	portrayed	herself	as	a	diplomat	in	the	making	 and	most	 of	 her	 answers	 and	 views	were	 shaped	by	 this	 prospect.	She	stressed	to	me	the	importance	of	showing	South	Africa	in	a	good	light	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	which	made	her	very	critical	of	the	behaviour	of	the	EFF	MPs	during	 the	 2017	 SONA	 debate	 in	 Parliament,	 when	 they	 disrupted	 the	proceedings	 and	 badgered	 Jacob	 Zuma	 to	 show	 that	 they	 considered	 his	Presidency	 illegitimate.	Mbali	hoped	that	 in	10	years’	 time	she	would	not	be	 in	South	Africa,	but	that	she	would	be	an	ambassador	to	the	UN	and	travelling	the	world.	 However,	 she	 did	 not	 consider	 diplomacy	 to	 be	 part	 of	 politics,	 but																																																									26	I	return	to	some	of	the	reasons	behind	the	students’	lack	of	desire	to	enter	politics	in	Chapter	Seven,	when	I	discuss	the	expectations	of	FPE	as	educated,	competent	and	skilled,	which	has	been	a	frequent	subject	of	attacks	on	women	in	politics.	
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something	that	was	above	politics;	hence,	she	was	not	a	member	of	a	party	or	an	organisation	 and	 she	 did	 not	 see	 herself	 as	 having	 a	 career	 in	 politics.	 This	difference	was	primarily	in	her	belief	that	politics	was	divisive,	while	diplomacy	brought	peace	and	cooperation.			Tshiamo	on	the	other	hand	found	herself	studying	a	degree	in	Politics	after	a	few	years	of	trying	to	get	into	varsity	for	a	Law	degree.	Unexpectedly,	she	ended	up	coming	 to	 UJ	 despite	 getting	 into	 a	 law	 programme	 at	 another	 institution,	because	she	had	fallen	 in	 love	with	the	university	which	she	said	became	more	important	 to	 her	 than	 her	 love	 for	 law.	 Yet,	 she	 did	 not	 give	 up	 on	 law	completely,	 because	 she	 was	 still	 considering	 pursuing	 it	 after	 finishing	 her	current	 degree.	 Tshiamo	 was	 an	 African	 student	 from	 the	 Free	 State,	 who	described	her	neighbourhood	as	middle	class	with	pockets	of	poverty.	Her	father	worked	for	the	government	and	her	mother	was	a	teacher,	which	allowed	her	to	go	 to	 a	 well-funded	 high	 school	 and	 even	 take	 some	 college	 courses	 before	enrolling	in	university.	While	at	UJ,	she	was	not	a	member	of	an	organisation	or	a	society.	She	was	not	sure	what	she	could	do	with	her	degree	in	Politics,	especially	because	she	was	uncertain	 if	 she	was	passionate	enough	about	 it,	although	she	enjoyed	the	modules	she	was	taking.	She	said	her	parents	asked	her	all	the	time	what	she	was	going	to	do,	and	so	she	pondered:			 With	 Politics,	 I	 don’t	 know	where	 I’m	 going.	 Am	 I	 going	 to	 be	 a	political	 analyst?	 And	 then?	 I	 don’t	 know.	 Coz	 you	 see,	 in	 South	Africa	 the	 problem	 is	 corruption.	 You	 would	 do	 so	 much	 with	 a	political	degree…	I	would	do	a	lot,	but	with	corruption,	you	have	to	have	connections.		Her	motivation	to	go	into	politics	was	there	–	 it	was	the	desire	to	do	things	for	the	country,	but	she	did	not	think	it	was	necessarily	a	career	route	open	for	her	because	of	the	patronage	system	in	the	government.		Kim	shared	Tshiamo’s	concerns	over	corruption	and	the	need	for	connections	in	order	 to	succeed	 in	politics,	and	so	she	was	also	unsure	whether	she	would	be	able	 to	 make	 it	 into	 Parliament	 or	 the	 cabinet	 as	 she	 hoped.	 Becoming	 the	president	 of	 the	 country	 was	 not	 realistic	 for	 her	 in	 her	 mind,	 because	 she	
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thought	people	were	too	traditional	and	would	not	allow	a	female	president	to	be	elected.	 So,	 she	 had	 given	 up	 on	 that	 ambition.	 What	 she	 also	 shared	 with	Tshiamo	was	that	she	had	not	always	considered	doing	a	Politics	degree,	and	she	was	 still	 considering	 her	 options	 in	 other	 fields.	 She	 was	 from	 a	 township	 in	Gauteng,	 and	 lived	with	her	mother,	 a	 bank	 employee,	whom	she	described	 as	being	in	control	of	Kim’s	life	and	someone	very	good	with	making	sure	that	they	were	 financially	 stable.	 What	 drew	 Kim	 to	 Politics	 and	 made	 her	 want	 to	persevere	on	the	path,	however,	was	the	ambition	to	be	a	Coloured	girl	who	‘had	made	 it’	 and	 who	 could	 represent	 Coloured	 people	 who	 do	 not	 have	 a	 voice.	Faced	with	 stereotypes	 of	 underachievement	 and	 lack	 of	 belonging	 in	 politics,	she	 felt	 responsible	 to	 show	her	 younger	 cousins	 and	other	people	 that	 it	was	possible	 to	 succeed	 as	 a	 Coloured	 girl.	 Although	 she	 was	 not	 active	 in	 any	organisations	on	campus	or	outside	of	UJ,	 she	said	she	wanted	 to	bring	change	for	 the	 country	 as	 a	 whole	 –	 for	 all	 South	 Africans,	 no	matter	 what	 race	 they	were.			It	 must	 be	 added	 that	 none	 of	 the	 white	 and	 Indian/Asian	 students	 that	 I	interviewed	desired	to	enter	politics	and	the	majority	of	the	students	across	all	racial	 groups	 believed	 that	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 for	 a	 white	 or	 Indian/Asian	person	 to	 become	 the	 president	 of	 the	 country,	 because	 the	 majority	 of	 the	voters	 were	 Black	 Africans,	 who	 did	 not	 trust	 people	 from	 other	 races.	 For	example,	one	Indian	student	from	Wits,	whom	I	met	on	the	recommendation	of	a	participant	 who	 studied	 at	 UJ,	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 only	 appropriate	 that	 the	representatives	descriptively	reflect	the	majority	and	hence	she	said	she	did	not	consider	an	active	political	career	despite	studying	Politics.	Instead,	she	wanted	to	find	different	ways	of	being	a	change-maker.			While	 vastly	 different	 in	 their	 relationship	with	politics	 as	 a	 career	 field	 and	 a	subject	of	study,	what	the	three	above-mentioned	students	shared	was	that	they	did	 not	 say	 they	were	 directly	 influenced	 by	 seeing	 specific	women	 or	men	 in	politics.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 did	 not	 explicitly	 connect	 their	 degree	 and	subsequent	 career	 choices	 to	 being	 inspired	 and	 motivated	 by	 specific	individuals	in	politics	and	hence	the	RME	in	its	most	direct,	obvious	form	was	not	
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in	place.	However,	it	would	be	misleading	to	assume	that	women	in	politics	were	failing	 as	 career	 role	 models	 in	 comparison	 to	 women	 in	 other	 fields,	 as	 the	reliance	 on	 role	 models	 for	 specific	 career	 and	 education	 choices	 was	 overall	limited.	 While	 Taneeka	 for	 example	 consciously	 chose	 a	 field	 of	 study	 as	 a	stepping	 stone	 towards	 her	 desired	 career,	 most	 students’	 decision	 making	processes	showed	that	pursuing	any	HE	degree	was	more	important	than	getting	into	 a	 programme	 leading	 into	 specific	 jobs,	 which	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 students’	perceptions	of	the	uncertain	situation	in	the	country.	
Tenuous	Links	between	Education	and	Careers	A	common	 ‘how	I	got	 into	UJ’	student	story	was	premised	on	the	 fact	 that	 they	had	not	 gotten	 into	 their	 first-choice	programmes.	Afterwards,	 they	 received	 a	list	 of	 courses	with	open	 slots,	 googled	what	 the	 subjects	meant	 (because	 they	had	never	heard	of	some	of	them)	and	then	selected	a	degree	just	to	avoid	taking	a	gap	year	or	sitting	at	home	‘doing	nothing’.	Another	frequent	narrative	was	of	students	applying	for	a	wide	range	of	courses	at	multiple	institutions,	in	order	to	increase	their	chances	of	getting	into	university.	What	these	narratives	show	is	a	disconnect,	 or	 at	 least	 an	unclear	 interaction,	between	 the	HE	 system,	people’s	socio-economic	circumstances	and	the	country’s	underperforming	economy	with	its	perceived	precarious	 labour	market.	 In	 this	 context,	many	students	 find	 the	idea	 of	 having	 a	 degree	 more	 important	 than	 the	 specific	 subject	 they	 study,	which	means	 that	 there	 is	 little	planning	or	calculation	of	career	pathways	and	hence	 limited	 scope	 for	 specific	 career	 role	models	 to	whom	 they	 could	 attach	their	life’s	vision.			The	high	desire	 for	university	education	stemmed	partially	 from	the	belief	 that	the	chances	for	acceptable	salaried	employment	without	a	degree	were	limited	if	one	 was	 not	 going	 into	 business	 or	 entrepreneurship.	 Most	 students	 were	convinced	 that	 degrees	 did	 not	 guarantee	 employment	 because	 of	 the	 bad	economic	 situation,	 and	 because	 of	 several	 other	 factors,	 especially	 having	connections.	The	strengths	of	these	connections	were	shaped	by	one’s	race	and	class,	 while	 their	 gender	 was	 also	 perceived	 by	 some	 students	 as	 a	 potential	obstacle,	 which,	 however,	 they	 were	 ready	 to	 face	 head	 on.	 Hence,	 having	
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connections	mattered	for	employment	in	all	spheres,	and	not	only	in	politics.	It	is	not	 surprising	 that	 according	 to	 opinion	 surveys,	 job	 creation	 and	 youth	employment	 were	 some	 of	 the	 youth’s	 biggest	 concerns	 and	 demands	 for	government	 action,	 together	 with	 corruption	 and	 health	 (Kashe-Katiya	 and	Tenbusch,	 2016).	 However,	within	 a	 competitive	 job	market,	 students	 thought	that	 degrees	 offered	 at	 least	 some	 advantage,	 which	 differentiated	 them	 from	thousands	 of	 South	 Africans	 who	 are	 designated	 as	 NEETs	 (not	 in	 education,	employment	 or	 training),	 and	 who	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 stuck	 and	 unable	 to	advance	in	life.			Students	from	all	socio-economic	circumstances	and	racial	identifications	shared	this	 view	 of	 HE	 degrees.	 Many	 Indian/Asian	 and	 white	 respondents,	 whose	parents	 had	 well-paid	 jobs	 despite	 not	 having	 university	 degrees,	 or	 who	 got	their	 post-secondary	 qualifications	 later	 in	 their	 professional	 life,	 also	underscored	 the	 importance	 of	 having	 at	 least	 an	 undergraduate	 degree.	 Even	these	 students,	who	 could	 potentially	 rely	 on	 the	 safety	 nets	 and	 resources	 of	their	families,	believed	that	the	economy	had	changed	since	when	their	parents	were	entering	the	job	market	and	unlike	the	previous	generation,	young	people	faced	 tougher	 competition	 and	 higher	 demands.	 The	 students’	 perception	 is	confirmed	by	data	on	graduate	employment	 from	the	 last	decade,	which	shows	that	graduate	employment	has	been	consistently	higher	than	the	employment	of	people	with	only	a	matric,	and	considerably	higher	than	those	without	completed	secondary	 schooling	 (de	 Lannoy	 and	 Graham,	 2017;	 Mlatsheni	 and	 Ranchhod,	2017;	 Bhorat,	 Cassim	 and	 Tseng,	 2016;	 Babson,	 2014)	27.	 Combined	 with	 the	limited	availability	of	university	placements,	getting	into	university	renders	field	of	study	and	career	selection	a	secondary	consideration.			
																																																								27	Several	 studies	 (qtd.	 in	 Baldry	 2013)	 show	 that	 graduate	 unemployment	 rose	more	 quickly	than	 other	 forms	 of	 unemployment	 in	 the	 late	 2000s;	 however,	 most	 of	 the	 studies	 focus	 on	graduates	as	holders	of	any	post-matric	qualifications	rather	than	just	university	degrees.	At	the	same	time,	there	has	been	an	overall	 increase	in	HE	enrolments	(Baldry,	2013,	791).	Moreover,	one	also	has	 to	consider	 the	 issue	of	under-employment	based	on	skills,	as	Baldry	(2013,	798)	finds	 that	 27%	of	 her	 graduate	 research	 participants	 took	 on	 a	 job	 below	 their	 skills	 level.	 In	other	words,	graduates	still	have	higher	employment	vis-à-vis	their	peers,	even	if	not	matching	their	skillsets.	
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The	 students’	 concerns	 over	 their	 employment	 prospects	 were	 intensified	 by	public	 debates	 of	 deepening	 economic	 instability	 in	 South	 Africa	 that	 started	with	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis.	 Throughout	 my	 data	 collection,	 these	 debates	centred	 around	 the	 looming	 ‘junk	 status’	 of	 the	 economy,	 as	 the	 three	 leading	ratings	agencies,	Fitch,	Moody’s,	and	Standard	&	Poor’s,	were	periodically	issuing	statements	 about	 their	 re-evaluations	of	 South	Africa’s	 investment	 grade.	They	warned	 that	without	major	 reforms,	 they	would	downgrade	 the	 country	below	investable	 grades,	 which	would	make	 it	more	 expensive	 for	 the	 South	 African	government	 to	 borrow	money	on	 international	markets	 and	would	 slow	down	the	already	sluggish	growth	and	foreign	investments.	In	April	2017	the	agencies	ultimately	downgraded	the	country	in	response	to	the	aforementioned	removal	of	then	Finance	Minister	Gordhan	from	office	(Bond,	2017a).			As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 perceived	 economic	 instability,	many	 students	 believed	 that	although	they	could	and	should	put	 together	a	vision	or	a	plan	 for	 their	 future,	they	must	be	able	 to	adjust	 them.	This	meant	that	 they	had	to	be	open-minded	and	flexible	about	their	careers	as	well.	Consequently,	 it	was	 less	 important	for	the	 students	 to	 look	 for	 specific	 career	 role	models	 in	 order	 to	 identify	which	degree,	 course	or	 training	 to	 take;	 instead,	 there	was	more	value	 in	 identifying	people	who	were	able	to	suggest	how	to	progress	through	life	by	demonstrating	skills	 and	 qualities,	 such	 as	 perseverance,	 resolve	 and	 ingenuity	 that	 such	instability	and	precariousness	required	and	which	crossed	from	the	personal	to	the	professional	 life.	That	 is	not	 to	 imply	that	none	of	 the	students	had	specific	career	role	models	or	 that	all	of	 them	had	role	models	 to	begin	with.	However,	they	 used	 these	 role	 models	 in	 combination	 with	 other	 individuals	 and	 the	importance	of	the	career	role	models	decreased	the	more	students	believed	their	life	situations	were	precarious	and	volatile.	With	the	key	exception	of	two	of	my	research	participants	who	were	active	Fallists,	very	few	students	saw	this	socio-economic	 precariousness	 and	 instability	 as	 a	 result	 of	 exploitative,	 profit-maximizing	 global	 neoliberalism.	 Moreover,	 none	 of	 them	 drew	 out	 the	implications	of	 this	political	 economy	on	 the	 functioning	of	 the	HE	sector.	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	debates	about	neoliberalism	in	South	African	academia	were	 prominent	within	 universities	 at	 the	 time.	Most	 of	 the	 students	 accepted	
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the	 instability	 as	 a	 fact	 of	 life	 and	 criticised	 it	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 fee-affordability	 and	 access	 to	 varsity	 education.	 However,	 they	 did	 not	 draw	 the	broader	 contextual	 linkages,	which	 could	be	 seen	as	a	 failure	of	universities	 to	foster	critical	democratic	citizenship	(Keet,	2014;	Enslin	2003).	
Race	and	Precarious	Life	The	discourses	 of	 instability	 and	unpredictability	 of	 life	 in	 South	Africa	 have	 a	distinctly	 racialised	 character,	 with	 both	 the	 privileged	 and	 underprivileged	groups	being	dissatisfied	with	the	status	quo.	For	some	Indian/Asian	and	white	students,	 the	 precariousness	 was	 linked	 to	 their	 fear	 for	 their	 safety.	 Some	respondents	highlighted	the	physical	dangers,	including	violence	against	women,	and	 the	 threats	 to	 their	 lives,	 citing	examples	of	white	 farmer	killings,	or	 ‘Boer	moeders’.	 An	 Afrikaner	 student,	 whose	 family	 lived	 on	 a	 plot	 not	 far	 from	Johannesburg,	felt	worried	for	her	family’s	safety,	especially	because	their	living	situation	 resembled	 those	 farm	 settings	where	 the	murders	 had	 occurred.	 She	was	hoping	to	go	abroad	and	settle	somewhere	where	she	could	easily	bring	the	rest	of	her	family	with	her.	She	went	as	far	as	calling	the	white-farmer	murders	a	genocide.	Another	Afrikaner	student,	whose	father	worked	in	an	Afrikaner	CSO,	mentioned	 that	although	she	 thought	 that	South	Africa	was	a	beautiful	country	and	 people	 were	 nice,	 she	 would	 not	 want	 to	 bring	 up	 her	 family	 there.	 The	country	was	getting	more	and	more	unsafe	in	comparison	to	what	she	was	told	her	 grandparents’	 experiences	 had	 been.	 The	 sense	 of	 threat	 was	 for	 some	 of	these	 students	 enhanced	 by	 the	 inflammatory	 racialised	 rhetoric	 of	 politicians	such	 as	 the	 EFF	 leader	 Julius	 Malema,	 who	 had	 been	 repeatedly	 accused	 of	inciting	racial	hatred	when	discussing	issues	of	land	ownership	and	the	place	of	white	people	on	the	continent	(The	Citizen	Reporter,	2016).			Most	 white	 students	 and	 some	 Indians/Asians	 also	 emphasised	 what	 they	experienced	as	racial	discrimination	in	their	education	and	career	opportunities,	which	came	through	affirmative	action	policies.	Some	students	labelled	it	reverse	racism	 or	 reverse	 apartheid.	 Probably	 the	 most	 widespread	 symbol	 of	 these	policies	 was	 Black	 Economic	 Empowerment	 (BEE)	 or	 Broad-Based	 Black	Economic	 Empowerment	 (BBBEE),	 which	 denote	 policies	 seeking	 to	 promote	
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more	 Black	 Africans	 and	 other	 formerly	 disadvantaged	 people	 in	management	and	 business	 ownership	 through	 measures	 such	 as	 quota	 or	 preferential	procurements.	Their	impact	has	largely	been	limited	to	profiting	a	small	number	of	 already	 well-established	 and	 connected	 Black	 Africans,	 while	 failing	 to	transform	the	structures	of	the	economy	for	the	benefit	of	the	majority	(Jeffery,	2016;	 Southall,	 2014;	 von	 Holdt,	 2013).	 Nonetheless,	 it	 was	 perceived	 as	discriminatory	and	limiting,	which	led	some	white	and	Indian/Asian	students	to	either	actively	consider	emigrating	or	feeling	acutely	aware	of	the	potential	that	they	would	need	to	leave,	should	the	situation	continue	to	deteriorate	from	their	perspective.	 Their	 future	 in	 the	 country	 was,	 at	 least	 in	 their	 mind,	 very	uncertain,	even	if	they	decided	to	stay.			The	issue	of	white	emigration	is	part	of	the	broader	white	victimhood	narratives	which	 emerged	 with	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 Afrikaner	 hegemony	 of	 the	 nationalist	state	(Villet,	2017;	van	der	Westhuizen,	2016a).	Charles	Villet	(2017)	pointedly	links	 these	 discourses	 of	 victimhood	 to	 the	 global	 narratives	 of	 white	supremacists,	 as	 they	 bolster	 the	 ‘swart	 gevaar’	 (black	 danger)	 ideas	 held	 by	some	white	South	Africans.	The	unease	with	global	cosmopolitanism	and	cultural	mixing	that	is	part	of	these	global	narratives	of	whiteness,	as	van	der	Westhuizen	(2016a)	 points	 out,	 contributes	 to	 the	 cultural	 ‘inward	 migration’	 of	 the	Afrikaners	to	protect	their	identity	within	white	enclaves.			Many	Black	students	consider	these	perceptions	of	some	white	South	Africans	as	a	 reactionary	 push	 back	 against	 Black	 African	 empowerment.	 Amongst	 these	students,	most	had	very	 little	or	no	sympathy	for	these	 ‘white	 fears’	and	 ‘white	tears’	not	least	because	whites	continue	to	be	beneficiaries	of	the	political,	social	and	 economic	 structures	 which	 were	 built	 in	 South	 Africa	 by	 and	 for	 whites.	Hence,	 whites’	 economic	 and	 education	 opportunities	 have	 been	 proven	 to	continue	 to	 be	 better	 than	 of	 the	 Black	 students,	 even	 if	 the	 white	 students	personally	did	not	feel	they	were	being	systematically	privileged	(Kruss,	2016).	Many	 Black	 African	 students	 argued	 that	 the	 everyday	 struggle	 against	 racial	oppression	and	the	lived	experiences	of	structural	and	physical	violence	against	Black	bodies	did	not	leave	them	the	energy	or	the	desire	to	care	for	the	feelings	
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that	 the	 whites	 were	 experiencing.	 According	 to	 their	 views,	 the	 emotional	labour	of	understanding	Blackness	and	coping	with	the	decline	of	white	privilege	should	be	dealt	with	by	white	people,	rather	than	demanding	the	Black	African	people	to	do	it	with	or	for	the	whites.			Joy	 was	 one	 of	 these	 students.	When	 we	 were	 discussing	 racial	 relations,	 she	mentioned	the	pain	and	hurt	she	felt	when	she	had	heard	the	stories	of	what	the	older	 generations	went	 through.	 However,	 she	 did	 not	wish	 to	 identify	with	 a	specific	race.	She	believed	that	although	race	still	mattered	in	the	country,	citing	examples	of	discrimination	that	she	had	experienced	and	witnessed,	she	believed	that	politics	was	supposed	to	be	about	 ideologies.	The	 following	exchange	with	Joy	shows	how	her	perspective	on	affirmative	action	policies	differed	from	some	of	the	white	students:		Ján:	 So,	 do	 you	 think	 it’s	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 there	 is	 reversed	discrimination	these	days?	Joy:	Against?	Ján:	Against	whites.	Joy:	 No	 [laugh],	well,	 there	 can	 be…	 I	 like	 that	 you	 use	 the	word	discrimination.	I	doubt	it.	Where?	Ján:	I	think	some	people	would	suggest	that	because	of	policies	like	BEE	[there	is	reversed	discrimination].	Joy:	 Ah,	 [mockingly],	 that’s	 cute.	 [laugh].	White	 people	 are	 upset	about	that?	[disbelief]	That’s	really	adorable.	I	feel	like	such	things	are	[laugh]	…		Ján:	 No,	 say	 what	 you	 feel,	 are	 those	 things	 not	 helping	 Black	people?	Joy:	[laugh]	You	know,	are	they	helping	us?	It	feels	like	the	BBEE	is	only	helping	a	certain	number	of	people,	hence,	I	am	saying	there	is	this	division	of	wealth	[economic	inequality]	now,	that’s	more	what	we	should	focus	on.	I	am	not	saying	we	must	leave	the	whole	race	issue	 aside,	 because	 that	 is	 still	 a	 problem,	 but	 there	 is	 more	inequality	 in	 wealth	 than	 there	 is	 in	 different	 races.	 So	 white	people	 saying	 [there	 is	 reversed	 discrimination]	 …	 I	 don’t	 know	what	kind	of	discrimination.		Joy’s	critical	and	dismissive	view	of	what	some	perceive	as	white	disadvantage	or	unfair	 treatment	 was	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 opinions	 of	 some	 other	 Black	African	 students,	 who	 actually	 concurred	with	 the	white	 students’	 sentiments,	rejecting	 affirmative	 action	 as	 discriminatory.	 As	 they	 believed	 that	 the	 key	
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political	and	social	objective	of	the	country	should	be	achieving	socio-economic	equality,	 affirmative	 action	 policies,	 both	 racial	 and	 gender-based,	 meant	 that	people	were	not	being	treated	equally.	Hence,	these	policies	undermined	a	vision	of	 equal,	 non-racist	 and	 non-sexist	 society.	 Maremane	 was	 an	 African	 student	who	like	Joy	lived	in	a	township,	but	her	focus	was	not	on	economic	inequality.	Rather,	 she	 thought	 that	men	were	 being	 forgotten.	 She	 used	 an	 example	 of	 a	campaign	 ‘Take	 a	 girl	 child	 to	 work’,	 which	 seeks	 to	 boost	 young	 women’s	professional	 career	 aspirations,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 girls’	empowerment	 discourses.	 Maremane	 thought	 that	 boys	 too	 should	 be	 shown	different	work	opportunities	and	in	other	words,	be	given	equal	opportunities.			Similarly,	talking	about	her	own	job	prospects,	Phillipine	believed	that	as	a	Black	African	 woman	 she	 was	 at	 an	 advantage	 and	 that	 Black	 African	 women	 were	being	valued	in	the	post-apartheid	era.	It	was	a	seemingly	contradictory	position	to	her	earlier	statements	during	our	interview,	when	she	had	said	that	as	a	girl	she	had	felt	discriminated	against	at	home.	Growing	up	in	a	village	in	Limpopo,	she	was	determined	to	come	to	university,	having	seen	the	situation	in	her	rural	area,	and	being	convinced	the	only	way	for	a	better	life	was	through	education.	At	UJ,	she	was	not	active	in	organisations	or	political	parties,	and	she	was	able	to	study	only	because	she	received	NSFAS	funding,	although	it	was	not	sufficient	to	ensure	that	she	always	had	enough	money	for	food.	Growing	up,	she	said	she	had	been	expected	to	do	all	 the	typical	girl	duties,	 from	serving	 food	to	 the	men,	 to	doing	 the	 dishes,	 which	 made	 her	 feel	 unequal.	 However,	 when	 I	 asked	 her	whether	she	felt	limited	in	her	career	options	as	a	Black	African	woman,	she	said	that	everyone	was	given	equal	opportunities	now,	unlike	maybe	 ten	years	ago,	and	 if	 she	was	not	given	a	 job,	 she	would	use	her	 race	and	gender	 to	 fight	 the	potential	discrimination.			Phillipine’s	 thinking	 is	 in	 line	 with	 a	 considerable	 number	 of	 students	 who	believed	 that	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa	all	people	were	equal.	They	 linked	equality	to	the	constitution,	which	was	hailed	by	the	government	and	the	public	at	 large	as	a	symbol	of	national	pride.	It	 is	vested	with	a	lot	of	symbolic	power,	together	 with	 the	 judiciary,	 which	 allegedly	 protects	 the	 poor	 and	 the	
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marginalised.	 However,	 as	 several	 scholars	 point	 out,	 the	 ANC	 policies	capitalised	on	the	individualism	and	liberalism	of	the	constitution	to	continue	the	apartheid-era	economic	privileges	of	the	few,	which	I	explore	further	in	Chapter	Six.			Overall,	 most	 Black	 African	 students	 in	 my	 research	 did	 not	 raise	 economic	opportunities	as	a	reason	to	permanently	emigrate,	as	some	non-Black	Africans	had.	 Nor	 did	 they	 cite	 the	 violence	 against	 Black	 bodies	 and	 sexual	 violence	against	 women	 as	 a	 reason	 to	 leave,	 despite	 being	 proportionally	 much	more	affected	than	the	white	youth.	This	finding	is	in	line	with	aforementioned	studies	that	looked	at	the	Black	African	youth	perspectives	on	their	future	in	the	country,	which	 find	 that	 despite	 their	 discontent	 with	 their	 situation,	 they	 are	 positive	about	 their	 future	 outlooks.	 For	 example,	 while	 40%	 of	 the	 respondents	 in	Kamper,	Badenhorst	and	Steyn’s	(2009)	study	wanted	to	go	abroad	to	work,	only	12%	said	that	they	would	leave	permanently.	In	a	later	study,	Tanja	Bosch	found,	however,	that	“a	surprisingly	large	number	of	youth	indicated	that	they	wish	to	leave	South	Africa	and	live	abroad	because	of	corruption	in	the	country”	(2013,	124),	while	Amoateng	(2016,	111)	found	that	around	32%	of	Black	students	at	UJ	who	 participated	 in	 his	 research	 were	 considering	 leaving	 the	 country,	 in	contrast	 to	60%	of	Coloured	and	nearly	50%	of	whites,	which	he	 linked	 to	 the	latter’s	lower	sense	of	belonging	in	South	Africa.	It	could	be	argued	that	since	the	study	by	Kamper,	Badenhorst	and	Steyn	in	2008,	which	was	before	the	economic	crisis,	 the	 prospects	 for	 youth	 in	 all	 racial	 groups	 in	 South	 Africa	 have	deteriorated,	 which	 could	 explain	 the	 different	 findings	 in	 the	 more	 recent	studies.	 However,	 even	 amongst	 Black	 students	 in	 my	 study,	 the	 desire	 to	permanently	emigrate	from	South	Africa	was	not	high,	with	many	people	being	open	to	going	abroad	to	study	or	work,	but	wanting	to	return	to	be	close	to	their	families	and	to	develop	the	country.	
Higher	Education	for	the	Labour	Market	To	 conclude	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 education-career	 link	 and	 its	impact	on	 role	models,	 it	 is	 important	 to	highlight	 the	 critique	 that	was	 raised	against	universities	in	the	2016-2017	period,	namely	that	they	provide	education	
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that	was	not	relevant	for	‘real-life’	and	that	they	did	not	teach	practical	skills	that	students	would	need	in	their	 future	employment.	Mirroring	discourses	in	other	neoliberal,	 market-	 driven	 education	 contexts,	 South	 Africans	 questioned	 the	appropriateness	 of	 HE	 for	 the	 local	 labour	 market	 conditions	 and	 economic	needs	 of	 the	 country.	 Studies	 echo	 this	 concern,	 as	 they	 show	 a	 persistent	misalignment	between	qualifications	and	employment	opportunities	(de	Lannoy	and	Graham,	2017;	Trudeau	and	Omu,	2017;	Baldry,	2016;	Bhorat,	Cassim	and	Tseng,	 2016;	 Babson,	 2014).	 Consequently,	 the	 university	 staff	 and	administration	 were	 being	 pressured	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 relevance,	 which	 I	observed	 when	 I	 attended	 several	 first-year	 student	 orientation	 events	 in	February	2017.			UJ	 Humanities	 faculty	 organised	 a	 series	 of	 speakers	 for	 new	 students	 to	 tell	them	about	the	resources	that	were	available	to	them	while	at	varsity,	as	well	as	some	problems	that	they	could	expect	to	encounter.	A	lecturer	from	the	Politics	Department	was	 tasked	with	 telling	 the	 students	 about	 their	 career	 prospects	with	a	Humanities	degree,	which	at	UJ	covered	a	range	of	subjects	from	Politics	and	 Economics,	 to	 languages	 and	 Philosophy.	 At	 the	 start	 of	 their	 talk,	 the	lecturer	asked	the	first	years	to	raise	their	hand	if	they	chose	to	study	Humanities	and	how	many	had	done	so	 in	spite	of	 their	parents’	wishes.	With	a	 few	hands	raised	and	 through	 the	 laughs	and	chuckles,	 the	 lecturer	 framed	 their	 talk	as	a	response	 to	 parents’	 and	 friends’	 concerns	 about	 getting	 jobs.	 They	 drew	 on	examples	of	famous	people	with	such	degrees,	including	a	popular	South	African	radio	host	Anele,	who	holds	a	degree	 in	International	Relations,	and	proceeded	to	 suggest	 that	 the	 courses	 would	 teach	 them	 widely	 applicable,	 transferable	skills	 that	 could	be	used	 in	any	career	 the	students	eventually	pursue	and	 that	are	 desired	 by	 employers.	 The	 talk	was	 therefore	 aimed	 at	making	 the	 degree	more	 acceptable	 and	 relevant	 and	 assuage	 students’	 concerns	 about	 job	opportunities	and	employment.			Transferable	 skills	 were	 also	 the	 focus	 of	 a	 talk	 that	 I	 gave	 to	 some	 first-year	students	 towards	 the	end	of	 their	 first	 semester	 in	2017.	 I	 volunteered	 to	help	the	student	support	services	and	was	asked	to	speak	to	a	group	of	students	who	
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were	enrolled	 in	the	so-called	Extended	Humanities	programme.	This	degree	 is	designed	 as	 a	 four-year	 bachelor’s	 degree	 unlike	 the	 usual	 three-year	programmes,	in	order	to	assist	students	who	did	not	have	some	academic	skills	and	 thus	 it	 sought	 to	 address	 the	 aforementioned	 causes	 of	 low	 student	retention.	 I	 was	 asked	 to	 talk	 about	 pursuing	 a	 PhD	 and	 to	 encourage	 the	students	 to	 take	 a	 long-term	 perspective	 on	 their	 education.	 I	 was	 meant	 to	prompt	 them	 into	 thinking	 about	 their	degrees	 as	 a	means	of	 achieving	 career	objectives	and	 to	 consider	what	 they	 could	do	 in	 their	 first	 year	 already	 to	 set	themselves	 up	 for	 success.	 Their	 degree	 exposed	 the	 students	 to	 a	 variety	 of	subjects,	but	it	did	not	necessarily	provide	them	a	clear	job	pathway.		In	my	 talk	 I	 echoed	 some	 of	 the	 points	 raised	 by	 the	 abovementioned	 Politics	lecturer,	 namely,	 for	 students	 to	 think	 about	 skills	 they	 were	 learning	 as	applicable	 in	 various	 contexts	 and	 to	 make	 them	 attractive	 to	 potential	employers	in	a	variety	of	fields.	After	the	talk,	one	of	the	students	asked	me	what	kind	 of	 pay	 rise	 he	 could	 expect	 if	 he	 obtained	 a	 PhD.	 The	 student’s	 question	brought	to	the	fore	the	frequent	fixation	that	I	noted	amongst	my	participants	on	accumulating	multiple	degrees,	qualifications	and	certificates	as	a	 tool	 towards	achieving	 economic	 objectives	 and	 desired	 life-outcomes.	 However,	 there	 was	little	 consideration	 of	 appropriateness	 or	 need	 for	 such	 qualifications	 for	 a	particular	 career,	 nor	 a	 consideration	 of	 a	 potential	 danger	 of	 being	 overly	qualified	 for	 certain	 jobs	 that	 might	 be	 immediately	 available	 for	 young	graduates.	 This	 ought	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 complementary	 effect	 of	 my	 earlier	observation	that	students	considered	role	models	for	their	journeys	through	life,	rather	than	for	particular	careers	due	to	the	situation	of	socio-economic	 flux	 in	South	Africa.			With	the	perceived	lack	of	relevance	of	women	in	politics	as	career	role	models	for	the	majority	of	the	students,	the	next	section	addresses	women	in	politics	as	life	journey-based	role	models	instead.			 	
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The	Importance	of	Relevant	Information:	Nkosazana,	Winnie	and	Thuli		In	order	 to	draw	 inspiration	 from	the	 life	 journeys	of	women	 in	politics	and	 to	consider	 their	 exceptional	positions	 to	be	 relevant	 and	applicable	 to	 their	own	lives,	 the	 students	must	be	privy	 to	pertinent	 information	about	 these	women.	According	to	the	students	in	my	research,	most	women	in	politics	in	South	Africa	were	not	well-known	and	visible,	or	at	least	not	to	the	same	degree	as	the	men.	The	students	identified	a	variety	of	reasons,	ranging	from	the	patriarchal	nature	of	politics	and	society,	to	the	women’s	own	lack	of	ambition	and	activity,	leading	to	 limited	media	attention	and	political	 irrelevance.	Some	also	mentioned	 their	hesitation	to	talk	about	women	in	politics	because	they	did	not	know	much	about	them.	 They	 felt	 that	 they	would	 need	 to	 do	 further	 research	 to	 be	 sufficiently	informed.	 Many	 South	 African	 women	 in	 politics	 had	 information	 about	themselves	easily	available,	be	it	through	the	party	websites,	their	political	office	websites	 (Parliament	or	 the	Government)	 or	 their	 own	 social	media.	However,	these	sources	were	clearly	not	reaching	the	students,	who	would	have	to	actively	seek	out	this	information,	which	many	did	not	do.			Several	 women	 in	 politics	 were	 publicly	 scrutinised	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	biographies	and	 life	histories	 in	 the	2016-2017	period	and	both	 their	personal	and	 professional	 lives	 were	 questioned.	 By	 contrasting	 the	 narratives	 around	NDZ	and	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela	and	other	women	whom	the	students	saw	as	role	models	outside	of	politics,	it	emerged	that	the	students	did	not	have	the	
kind	of	information	that	they	would	like	to	know	about	most	women	in	politics,	in	order	 for	 them	 to	 decide	 whether	 their	 journeys	 were	 worth	 considering	 for	their	 own	 situations.	 This	 gap	 between	 the	 desired	 and	 provided	 information	echoes	 the	 concerns	 raised	 in	 some	 studies	 that	 many	 young	 people	 find	information	 in	 the	mainstream	media	 sources	 irrelevant	 for	 them	 (Wasserman	and	Garman,	2014;	Malila	et	al.,	2013).			The	 case	 of	 NDZ’s	 candidature	 for	 the	 ANC	 leadership	 role28	holds	 all	 the	prerequisites	for	high	female	visibility	and	information	availability.	The	visibility																																																									28	Other	 female	 candidates	 for	 the	 position	 of	 the	 ANC	 president,	 Baleka	 Mbete	 and	 Lindiwe	Sisulu,	 entered	 the	 race	 later	 in	 2017	 and	 hence,	 they	 did	 not	 feature	 in	 the	 debates	with	my	
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of	 women	 in	 politics,	 especially	 as	 candidates	 for	 office,	 is	 a	 well-established	factor	 that	 impacts	 their	 role	 model	 potential	 (Gilardi,	 2015;	 Atkeson	 and	Carrillo,	 2007;	 Campbell	 and	 Wolbrecht,	 2006;	 Atkeson,	 2003).	 Based	 on	 the	assumption	that	ANC	would	win	the	2019	national	parliamentary	elections,	NDZ	was	 considered	 the	 first	 viable	 female	 candidate	 to	 become	 the	 president	 of	South	 Africa.	 Additionally,	 it	 was	 a	 highly-contested	 race.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 the	interviews	 and	 group	 discussions,	 NDZ	was	 seen	 as	 running	 primarily	 against	then	VP	Cyril	Ramaphosa,	who	was	positioned	as	a	polar	opposite	to	her.	Their	competition	was	seen	as	a	fight	for	the	spirit	of	the	party	and	a	pivotal	decision	for	 the	 party’s	 future	 survival.	 Consequently,	 NDZ	 became	 a	 household	 name,	while	prior	to	her	return	to	South	Africa	in	2017,	she	had	spent	four	years	away	from	the	national	political	spotlight	as	the	Chairperson	of	the	AU	Commission.			Most	 of	 the	 students	 were	 only	 aware	 of	 her	 high-level	 position	 at	 the	international	 level,	rather	than	knowing	what	she	actually	achieved	 in	her	role.	The	 lack	 of	 recent	 exposure	 amongst	 the	 ordinary	 South	 Africans	 against	 her	main	competitor	was	a	concern	for	NDZ	supporters.	It	was	alleged	that	in	order	to	 gain	 more	 visibility,	 she	 was	 appointed	 as	 an	 MP	 in	 September	 2017	 and	would	 subsequently	 be	 offered	 a	ministerial	 role,	which	did	 not	 happen	 in	 the	end	(Matuba,	2017c).	Similar	to	the	very	generic	knowledge	of	her	international	posting,	 her	 previous	 national	 political	 track	 record	 was	 not	 discussed	 by	 the	majority	of	the	students,	beyond	the	mere	fact	that	some	of	them	knew	that	she	held	positions	in	previous	cabinets.	Her	supporters	and	campaigners,	especially	in	 the	ANC	WL,	which	 started	 to	put	 its	weight	behind	her	 towards	 the	 end	of	2016,	 used	 to	 propagate	 her	 ministerial	 experience	 as	 evidence	 of	 her	qualifications	 to	 be	 the	 next	 president	 (Matuba,	 2017b).	 They	 highlighted	 that	she	 served	 in	 all	 post-apartheid	 governments,	 was	 an	 anti-apartheid	 struggle	heroine	and	held	a	medical	degree,	which	was	especially	emphasised	if	the	media	or	 the	 public	 did	 not	 refer	 to	 her	 as	 Dr	 Nkosazana	 Dlamini-Zuma.	 These	strategies	served	to	counter	the	claims	that	her	candidature	was	primarily	due	to	
																																																																																																																																																															research	participants	to	the	same	extent	as	NDZ	and,	therefore,	I	do	not	consider	their	cases	in	this	instance.	
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her	 relationship	 with	 Jacob	 Zuma	 and	 the	 desire	 of	 his	 faction	 to	 avoid	prosecution	and	continue	state	looting	(du	Plessis,	2017b;	Matuba,	2016b).			NDZ’s	 connection	 to	 Jacob	 Zuma	 also	 dominated	 my	 discussions	 with	 the	students,	especially	those	with	limited	knowledge	of	her	political	track	record.	It	was	used	to	judge	her	fitness	for	the	presidency	and	subsequently	whether	she	was	worthy	of	their	vote.	Some	students	praised	her	for	the	divorce	and	going	for	the	hyphenated	surname	as	a	sign	of	her	empowered	stance	as	a	Black	African	woman.	 Sat-Ra	Nthabi	was	 one	 of	 her	 admirers.	 She	was	 a	 Black	 student	who	grew	up	 in	a	 township	 in	Gauteng	and	came	to	varsity	after	having	worked	 for	several	years	 in	administrative	 jobs,	which	she	had	realised	would	never	allow	her	 to	 progress	 professionally.	 Hence,	 she	 was	 older	 than	 most	 of	 my	 other	participants	and	one	of	a	few	students	who	were	mothers.	Despite	the	advice	of	her	family	that	being	a	single	mother	she	should	not	leave	the	safety	and	stability	of	 her	 job,	 she	 had	 done	 just	 that	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 a	 degree.	 She	 was	 very	engaged	 in	student	activities,	 including	holding	a	 leadership	position	 in	a	Black	students’	organisation	and	led	a	community-based	NGO	outside	of	the	university.	When	we	discussed	her	opinions	about	NDZ,	it	transpired	that	NDZ’s	life	history	mattered	to	Sat-Ra	Nthabi	and	made	NDZ	into	an	inspiration:		 Nkosazana	Zuma	encourages	me…	coz	she	is	from	the	rural	areas,	and	she	 found	herself	 in	a	polygamous	marriage,	she	got	out,	you	know,	coz,	…	with	us,	it’s	still	a	little	bit	taboo	to	divorce	and	you’re	still	 labelled.	 …	 So,	 if	 you	 see	 a	woman	 that	 knows	 that	 she	was	unhappy	and	to	get	 it	 into	her	own	hands	and	to	walk	away	from	that	 situation	 and	 still	 make	 a	 success	 of	 herself,	 and	 now,	 be	leading	 the	 biggest	 organisation	 in	 Africa	 [laugh]	 it’s	 like	 [laugh]	[clap],	yay	[laugh].		Other	 students,	 however,	 thought	 that	 NDZ	 had	 shown	 poor	 judgement	 by	marrying	someone	 like	Zuma	 in	 the	 first	place.	Moreover,	having	children	with	him	 meant	 that	 their	 connection	 was	 still	 strong,	 despite	 the	 divorce,	 and	therefore,	his	influence	over	her	was	to	be	anticipated.	NDZ’s	campaign	tried	to	move	 the	 focus	 away	 from	 her	 personal	 life,	 which	 was	 likely	 a	 calculated	political	move,	as	the	core	of	her	supporters	came	from	her	ex-husband’s	faction;	and	 so,	 critically	 analysing	 their	 complex	 relationship	 could	 have	 cost	 her	 the	
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support	of	his	faction.	The	key	issue	affecting	the	students’	views	was	therefore	whether	 NDZ	 was	 able	 to	 be	 an	 independent	 female	 politician	 with	 her	 own	views,	objectives	and	credentials	based	on	her	personal	and	professional	life.	The	debates	 around	 NDZ	 thus	 show	 the	 kind	 and	 the	 breadth	 of	 information	 the	students	considered	in	their	evaluations	of	women	in	politics	and	hence,	which	was	required	for	them	to	consider	women	in	politics	as	potential	role	models.			The	 abundant	 access	 to	 information	 that	 the	 students	 found	 interesting	 and	relevant	 partially	 explains	 the	 dominance	 of	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela	 as	 an	example	of	an	FPE	in	my	research.	Tropes	about	her	life	were	widely	known	to	the	students.	They	cited	her	association	with	Nelson	Mandela	and	her	own	track	record	as	a	liberation	heroine	as	the	reasons	why	they	thought	of	her	as	an	FPE.	During	the	course	of	my	data	collection	she	appeared	in	the	media	several	times,	including	for	her	80th	birthday	in	September	2016,	when	she	was	hailed	by	other	women	 in	politics,	 such	as	Baleka	Mbete	 (2016),	 as	 the	ultimate	mother	of	 the	nation.	Many	politicians	spoke	highly	of	her	courage,	strength	and	of	her	role	as	a	symbol	of	perseverance	in	the	struggle	for	people	in	the	townships	(Ramaphosa,	2016b).	Celebratory	events	and	parties	commemorating	her	achievements	lasted	for	 weeks,	 which	 enhanced	 her	 special	 status	 in	 the	 collective	memory	 of	 the	country.			While	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela	 continued	 to	 comment	 on	 the	 affairs	 of	 the	ANC	 and	 the	 country	 more	 generally,	 it	 was	 her	 past	 history	 that	 garnered	students’	 interest.	 They	 spoke	 about	 her	 personality	 traits,	 which	 were	manifested	in	her	actions.	She	was	labelled	as	powerful,	speaking	her	mind	and	not	being	 intimidated,	 leading	 the	struggle	as	a	woman	 in	a	patriarchal	 society	and	 stepping	up	as	 a	 leader	during	her	husband’s	 absence.	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela’s	personal	circumstances	as	a	mother	without	a	husband,	as	well	as	her	romantic	 affairs	 were	 also	 mentioned,	 but	 not	 critically,	 and	 some	 students	underscored	the	unfair	negative	publicity	that	she	had	received.	Some	students	falsely	 associated	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela	 and	 other	members	 of	 the	 older	generation	of	women	 in	politics	with	 the	Women’s	March	of	1956.	None	of	 the	four	 leading	women	 of	 the	Women’s	March,	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Three,	were	
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brought	 up	 specifically	 as	 individual	 examples	 of	 FPEs	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	although	 some	 students	 did	 speak	 about	 the	 women	 from	 the	 March	 more	broadly	 and	 collectively.	 Other	 liberation	 figures,	 such	 as	 Albertina	 Sisulu	 or	Adelina	Tambo,	were	also	mentioned	by	some	students,	and	women	such	as	Ruth	First,	an	anti-apartheid	activist	 researcher	and	 journalist,	were	referenced	only	by	 their	 association	 to	 other,	 predominantly	 male	 figures	 (for	 example	 her	husband	Joe	Slovo)	or	by	their	roles,	rather	than	by	their	names	and	in	their	own	right.			What	 my	 findings	 about	 these	 historical	 female	 leaders	 suggest	 is	 that	 what	mattered	 to	 students	were	 collective,	 generalizable	behaviours	 and	personality	traits,	while	particular	women	and	their	life	journeys	fell	to	the	sideline.	The	only	exceptions	were	hyper-visible	women	such	as	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela,	who	continued	 to	be	 given	personalised	 attention	 in	 the	public	 domain	 at	 the	 time;	however,	 this	 was	 predominantly	 based	 on	 their	 past	 actions	 and	 life-stories,	which	were	interesting	sources	of	information	–	much	more	so	than	the	details	of	their	 career	 positions	 or	 qualifications.	 Keitumetse,	 an	 African	 (black)	 law	student	from	Gauteng,	captured	the	difference	between	the	kind	of	information	a	student	would	 like	 to	 know	 about	women	 in	 politics	 and	 the	 information	 that	was	available.	She	grew	up	in	a	township,	but	she	was	from	a	financially	secure	home.	Although	her	father	and	mother	were	separated,	he	was	helping	to	pay	for	Keitumetse’s	 studies.	 She	 grew	 up	 with	 her	 mother,	 aunt	 and	 cousins,	 and	women	 in	 her	 family	 were	 all	 educated,	 be	 it	 through	 a	 college	 or	 university.	While	at	UJ,	she	joined	a	day	house	and	was	a	community	engagement	volunteer,	and	she	also	worked	off	campus,	especially	 in	promotions.	She	said	she	did	not	believe	 in	 gender	norms	which	made	Black	African	women	be	 submissive,	 and	she	 said	 she	definitely	 did	not	 follow	 the	 stereotypes.	When	 I	 asked	her	 about	women	in	politics	and	being	able	to	look	up	to	them,	she	said:		 The	 first	 thing	 that	 comes	 to	 politics	 for	 me	 is	 corruption.	 Like,	[sigh]	 she	 probably	 corrupted	 something,	 she	 probably	 paid	someone	to	get	where	she	 is,	but	then	you’re	 like,	nah,	 let	me	not	judge	a	book	by	its	cover.	Let’s	find	out	more	about	this	person,	but	then,	 there	really	 isn’t	much	to	know	about	 that	person.	…	You’re	just	like,	I	can	be	like	her	to	a	certain	extent,	but,	eish,	is	she	really	
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nice?	…	You	start	wondering	those	things,	trust	me.	You	just	keep	swaying	until	you	make	up	your	mind.	You	just	become	too	critical	to	that	person	until	they	can	change	your	perspective	that	you	have	of	them.		Keitumetse’s	 statement	 shows	 that	 professional	 track	 records	 are	 never	separated	 from	 personal	 and	 character-based	 considerations.	 These	 personal	considerations	 are	 communicated	 through	 the	 biographical	 information	 the	students	have	access	to	and	in	the	case	of	many	women	in	politics,	the	relevant	and	 desired	 information	 is	 not	 readily	 available.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 this	information,	 students	make	 decisions	 based	 on	 their	 constructed	 assumptions.	For	 example,	 those	 students	who	 found	NDZ	 inspiring	without	 knowing	much	about	her,	did	 so	mostly	on	 their	belief	 about	what	 she	as	a	woman	 in	politics	must	 have	 done	 in	 order	 to	 get	 where	 she	 was.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 was	 the	qualities	 that	 they	 vested	 into	 an	 idealised	 version	 of	 NDZ	 as	 an	 FPE	 that	 led	them	 to	 their	 perception	 of	 NDZ	 as	 a	 role	model.	 Those	who	 rejected	 her	 had	little	doubt	 that	on	paper	 she	had	 the	 required	experience	 to	be	a	presidential	candidate.	She	was	accepted	as	an	exceptional	woman	and	for	many	students	she	was	 even	 a	 woman	 who	 successfully	 challenged	 power	 that	 relegates	 Black	African	women	out	of	decision-making.	However,	with	the	lack	of	personal-level	character	 information	 about	 her,	 the	 students	 applied	 their	 knowledge	 and	assumptions	about	 the	 socio-political	norms	 in	 the	 country	and	about	 the	ANC	under	Jacob	Zuma	onto	her	person29.	In	the	case	of	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela,	the	opposite	was	the	case,	as	although	being	intimately	connected	with	the	ANC,	it	was	her	personal	life	history	during	apartheid	that	dominated,	instead	of	ANC-politics	of	 the	post-1994	era,	which	 can	partly	be	explained	by	ANC	distancing	itself	 from	 her	 in	 the	 late	 1990s.	 Hence,	 even	 if	 well-known,	 the	 mere	exceptionalism	of	women’s	positions	of	power	in	a	context	of	patriarchal	gender	norms,	does	not	 suffice	 to	 satisfy	 the	 students’	 information	needs.	They	do	not	provide	 the	 necessary	 details	 on	 women’s	 generic	 life	 pathways	 to	 be																																																									29	Similarly	 to	 NDZ,	 Busiswe	Mkhwebane	 who	 was	 appointed	 the	 public	 protector	 after	 Thuli	Madonsela	in	October	2016,	was	scrutinised	in	the	public	based	on	her	potential	connections	to	Jacob	Zuma,	as	well	as	her	professional	qualifications	and	character,	which	was	undermined	by	her	 stint	 with	 the	 South	 African	 state	 security	 apparatus.	 She	 featured	 heavily	 in	 student	discussions	 which	 took	 place	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Mkhwebane’s	 selection	 and	 her	 case	 further	substantiates	the	importance	of	information,	the	political	system	and	the	close	interconnection	of	private	histories,	professional	track	record	and	qualities.	
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empowering	 resources	 that	 the	 students	would	 be	 able	 to	 see	 as	 obviously	 or	directly	relevant.			Sat-Ra	 Nthabi’s	 perceptions	 of	 Thuli	 Madonsela	 also	 demonstrate	 how	suppositions	 held	 by	 the	 students	 impact	 their	 views	 of	 individual	 women	 in	absence	of	information.	During	our	interview	she	differentiated	various	kinds	of	women	 in	 politics.	 In	 contrast	 to	 women	 who	 made	 it	 because	 of	 their	association	 with	 important	 men,	 such	 as	 Winnie	 Madikizela-Mandela,	 she	believed	 that	 women	 like	 Thuli	 Madonsela	 made	 it	 because	 of	 their	 class	positioning.	She	said:		 And	 your	 Thuli	 Madonselas	 again,	 for	 someone	 who’s	 like	 me,	coming	from	the	township,	I	can’t	look	up	to	her	because	she	is	not	from	the	township.	She	had	better	living	conditions	than	I	did,	you	know;	so	for	me,	 it’s	 like	I	wanna	be	 like	her,	but	I	can’t	say	she’s	my	role	model,	because	she	couldn’t	even	have	walked	 the	path	 I	walk,	you	know?		…		She’s	always	had	an	advantage,	you	know,	she	had	 the	 good	 schools,	 she	 didn’t	 have	 to	 stress	 about	 going	 to	varsity	and	all	of	those	things.			Sat-Ra	Nthabi’s	 remarks	were	 echoed	 by	many	 students,	 albeit	 not	 specifically	with	 regards	 to	Madonsela.	 However,	 class	 difference	was	 not	 an	 issue	 for	 all	Black	 African	 students	 who	 came	 from	 township	 settings,	 or	 from	 poor	households	as	it	could	be	assumed.	More	importantly,	however,	Sat-Ra	Nthabi’s	statement	shows	the	impact	of	misinformation	about	women	in	politics,	because	Madonsela	 was	 actually	 born	 in	 Soweto	 to	 a	 patriarch	 father	 who	 was	 an	informal	 trader	 and	 worker,	 while	 her	 mother	 was	 a	 domestic	 worker	 and	 a	hustler.	In	her	early	years,	Madonsela	was	a	teacher	and	also	an	imprisoned	anti-apartheid	activist	before	she	pursued	her	law	career	and	became	involved	in	the	political	 transition	 process	 through	 contributing	 to	 the	 constitution	 drafting,	ultimately	 leading	 to	 her	 post	 as	 the	 public	 protector	 in	 2009	 (Gqubule,	 2017;	Ngqola,	 2014).	 Hence,	 her	 life	 story	 does	 have	 a	 role	model	 potential,	 but	 the	issue	of	information	arises	as	an	inhibiting	factor.		
The	Impact	of	the	Political	System	Access	to	information	about	women	in	politics	must	be	seen	within	the	context	of	the	 political	 system	 in	 which	 they	 function.	While	 the	 PR	 system	 is	 positively	
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associated	with	women’s	successful	entry	 into	office,	 the	potential	downside	of	this	 system	 is	 its	 tendency	 to	 accentuate	 the	parties	 as	 collectives,	 rather	 than	particular	politicians	(Achury,	Ramírez	and	Cantú,	2017;	Valdini,	2013;	Atkeson	and	Carrillo,	2007;	Shugart,	Valdini	and	Suominen,	2005).	What	enhances	these	collectivising	tendencies	of	the	PR	system	in	the	case	of	South	Africa	is	the	ANC	portraying	itself	as	a	national	liberation	movement.	The	party	was	established	as	‘one	with	 the	people’	 and	 at	 least	 discursively	 is	 based	on	 the	 idea	of	 popular,	broad-based	movement.	 It	 continues	 this	 image	 with	 its	 populist	 rhetoric	 and	appeals	 to	 its	 historical	 origins	 (Brooks,	 2017)	 and	 incorporates	 the	 values	 of	collectivism	 and	 Ubuntu	 as	 leading	 African	 values.	 Individual	 ambition	 and	desire	for	limelight	then	arises	as	a	negative	trait,	which	leaves	little	room	for	the	individual	 profiling	 of	 women	 and	 for	 the	 presentation	 of	 their	 life	 journeys	outside	 of	 the	 broader	 ANC/struggle	 framing.	 Patricia	McFadden	 captures	 this	tendency	 of	 African	 nationalism	 in	 her	 call	 for	 new	 kind	 of	 feminism	 that	recognises	the	individual.	She	writes,		Just	 the	 realization	 that	 the	 time	 for	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 feminism	has	arrived,	which	puts	the	individual	Black	woman	at	the	center	of	its	 epistemology	 and	 lived	 aesthetic,	 creates	 a	 deep	 rupture	with	the	 ideological	 and	 often	 intimate	 hold	 that	 nationalism	 has	 had	over	Black	feminist	politics	and	activism	(2018,	421).		Many	 ANC	 female	 politicians	 have	 a	 long	 track	 record	 within	 the	 liberation	struggle	and	the	movement/party.	Consequently,	being	a	 ‘constant	presence’	 in	politics,	 the	 media	 would	 not	 have	 any	 particular	 impetus	 to	 promote	 their	individual	histories,	unlike	in	the	case	of	new	or	controversial	entrants,	who	are	unknown	to	both	the	youth	and	the	older	generations.	An	example	is	MP	Bridget	Masango,	who	was	in	2017	the	shadow	Social	Development	Minister	for	the	DA.	Her	 life	 story	was	profiled	 in	 the	Daily	Maverick	 (Thamm,	2017),	as	 she	raised	critique	 against	 Bathabile	 Dlamini.	 She	 was	 a	 new	 face	 in	 politics,	 with	 a	relatively	 low	 profile,	 having	 entered	 the	 DA	 and	 Parliament	 late	 in	 her	 life.	Although	her	story	most	probably	did	not	get	widespread	coverage	through	the	Daily	 Maverick	 story,	 it	 shows	 the	 relative	 lack	 of	 impetus	 to	 show	 the	biographies	of	women	who	are	‘stalwarts’	which	is	detrimental	to	their	relevance	in	the	eyes	of	the	youth.			
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The	DA	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	ANC	in	this	regard,	as	it	had	not	been	able	to	claim	to	be	‘one	with	the	people’.	The	DA	has	always	functioned	as	a	political	party	 in	the	post-apartheid	history,	rather	than	as	a	mass	movement.	 Its	voters	are	 not	 as	 strongly	 affiliated	 with	 the	 party,	 while	 the	 ANC	 is	 for	many	 Black	Africans	 like	 a	 family	 or	 the	 ‘mother’	 (Gordon,	 Struwig	 and	 Roberts,	 2017;	Suttner,	2017a;	Paret,	2016;	Struwig,	Gordon	and	Roberts,	2016;	Dawson,	2014a;	Southern,	2011).	Hence,	the	individual-group	dynamics	functions	in	the	reversed	directionality	for	the	DA,	with	key	leaders	being	the	embodiments	of	the	party’s	values	as	a	whole.	Helen	Zille,	arguably	one	of	the	most	controversial	figures	in	my	 research,	 and	 Mmusi	 Maimane,	 her	 successor,	 are	 the	 most	 illustrative	examples.			Most	of	my	research	participants	 formed	their	opinions	about	 the	DA	based	on	what	they	knew	about	either	of	these	two	politicians	as	 its	top	representatives.	Zille	 was	 seen	 by	 a	 handful	 of	 students	 as	 someone	 who	 represented	 their	interests,	while	 several	 revered	her	 as	 a	woman	 in	 politics	 that	 they	 said	 they	could	look	up	to.	She	was	respected	as	a	successful,	strong	woman	in	politics,	as	she	made	it	to	the	position	of	Premier	and	leader	of	a	major	political	party.	Her	journalism	 background	 and	 her	 reporting	 on	 the	 murder	 of	 Steve	 Biko,	 a	prominent	 Black	 African	 thinker	 and	 activist,	 was	 known	 to	 some	 of	 my	participants	 and	 they	 gave	 Zille	 credit	 for	 her	 past	 contributions	 to	 the	 South	African	transformation.	Yet	her	weaknesses	and	flaws	were	many.	Some	students	labelled	 her	 tweets	 or	 political	 campaigning	 strategies	 as	 outright	 racism	 and	others,	 especially	white	 students,	 saw	 them	more	 apologetically	 as	 thoughtless	or	as	showing	 flawed	political	competency	 in	an	era	when	South	Africans	were	sensitive	 to	 race	 issues.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 aggravating	 elements	 of	 Zille’s	personality	for	Black	African	students	was	their	perception	that	she	was	hiding	her	true	views	and	beliefs.	They	argued	that	Zille’s	inauthenticity	was	best	seen	in	her	appeals	to	Black	African	voters	before	elections.	She	was	remembered	for	dressing	up	in	traditional	garments	and	singing	and	dancing	with	Black	African	people,	 only	 to	 change	 her	 attitudes	 after	 the	 elections	 were	 over.	 A	 feminist	Fallist	student,	assessed	Zille	almost	apologetically	in	this	way:		
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I	 respect	her,	 I	 don’t	wanna	 lie.	As	 a	 female,	 I	 respect	her,	 as	 she	was	so	strong,	and	she	was	going	for	it.	She	did	not	stop,	and	I	like	that	 type	of	 character.	But	 of	 course,	…	 for	me,	when	 she	 started	using	Black	bodies	 to	get	Black	votes,	 that’s	when	I	was,	nah,	you	can’t	do	that.		Many	students	also	recalled	the	2016	municipal	elections,	when	shortly	after	the	polls	 closed	 and	 DA	 made	 inroads	 in	 key	 municipalities,	 Zille	 reacted	 to	 UCT	Black	African	students	by	tweeting	“If	this	woke	bunch	hate	being	UCT	students	so	much,	pls	help	them	out	of	their	misery	and	withdraw	funding.”	(@helenzille,	2016).	Some	students	interpreted	this	as	a	sign	that	during	the	campaign	she	was	on	 her	 best	 behaviour,	 but	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 DA	 got	 what	 it	 wanted	 from	 Black	African	 people,	 she	 showed	 her	 true	 opinions	 about	 the	 Black	 African	 youth.	Zille’s	 comments	 from	 March	 2017	 on	 the	 positive	 aspects	 of	 colonialism	 in	Singapore	were	arguably	one	of	 the	most	divisive	of	her	political	moves	at	 the	time	 (Zille,	 2017).	 Her	 article	 led	 to	 internal	 party	 investigations	 and	 a	demanded,	unreserved	public	apology,	which	she	provided	 in	 the	end	and	thus	prevented	being	recalled	by	the	party	from	her	premiership	position.			Unsurprisingly,	many	Black	Africans	ascribed	whiteness	to	the	party,	as	a	result	of	Zille’s	actions,	which	was	further	exacerbated	by	the	perceived	dominance	of	whites	amongst	 its	MPs	and	supporters.	Despite	 the	change	 in	 leadership,	 they	still	believed	in	her	control	over	the	party	from	the	sidelines.	Moreover,	many	of	the	students	who	critiqued	her	also	subscribed	to	the	idea	that	economic	power	of	 the	white	minority	 in	 South	Africa	meant	 that	 they	 had	 real	 political	 power	and	control.	Therefore,	they	would	dismiss	Maimane	as	a	puppet	or	a	Black	face	to	attract	voters.			Other	 Black	 African	 as	well	 as	white	 students	 saw	 the	 transition	 from	 Zille	 to	Maimane	as	a	sign	of	the	party’s	transformation.	It	was	a	confirmation	that	it	can	no	 longer	 be	 considered	 a	 white	 party	 or	 the	 party	 that	 could	 bring	 back	apartheid	based	on	its	historical	legacy,	as	the	DA	arose	from	mergers	of	various	smaller	opposition	parties,	including	the	remnants	of	the	NP.	Yet	another	group	of	students	saw	the	transition	primarily	as	a	gender	issue,	whereby	Zille	had	to	be	 replaced	 by	 a	 (Black	 African)	 man,	 despite	 the	 plethora	 of	 strong	 female	
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candidates	for	the	role.	It	must	be	noted	that	the	DA	supporters	were	more	prone	to	give	 the	party	 the	benefit	of	 the	doubt	 that	 the	 transition	 to	Maimane	was	a	genuine	 expression	of	non-racialism,	while	 those	who	 supported	other	parties,	or	did	not	have	particular	party	preference,	were	more	sceptical	of	this	change,	which	 is	 to	 be	 expected	 as	 party	 affiliations	 shape	 the	 citizens’	 perceptions	 of	socio-economic	and	political	issues.		A	majority	of	 the	 students	 across	political	 affiliations	 considered	South	African	politics	 and	 Parliament	 in	 particular	 to	 be	 a	 ‘circus’	 and	 expressed	 their	frustration	with	 the	MPs’	 constant	 fighting	 that	was	witnessed	 in	 the	National	Assembly.	 Others	 labelled	 Parliament	 a	 ‘joke’	 and	 said	 that	 they	 watched	 the	parliamentary	 sessions	 on	 TV	 for	 “all	 the	 wrong	 reasons,”	 meaning	 that	 they	watched	 it	 as	 a	 source	 of	 entertainment	 or	 to	 see	 what	 drama	 would	 unfold,	rather	than	to	learn	about	policies	or	to	gain	important	insights.	Some	took	a	less	sarcastic,	yet	equally	pessimistic	view	and	thought	that	it	was	often	disrespectful	and	undignified;	 this	was	especially	 the	case	with	regards	 to	 the	disruptions	of	the	SONA.			In	 place	 of	 what	 the	 students	 witnessed	 in	 the	 Parliament,	 many	 of	 my	participants	desired	political	parties	coming	together	for	the	sake	of	the	country.	They	 called	 for	 collaborative	 and	 bridge-building,	 rather	 than	 divisive	 politics,	which	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 iteration	 of	 their	 desire	 for	 societal	 healing	 (Berger,	2014).	These	students	believed	that	all	political	parties	had	some	beneficial	and	interesting	ideas	and	strengths,	which	should	be	combined	for	the	benefit	of	the	country.	This	observation	reflects	 the	results	of	 the	2015	Afrobarometer	study,	which	 also	 underscored	 the	 desire	 for	 cooperation	 in	 light	 of	 the	 difficult	situation	 that	 the	 country	 was	 in	 (Lekalake,	 2017).	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 could	 be	argued	that	the	ANC’s	persistent	messaging	on	unity	and	responsible	citizenship	has	 led	many	to	believe	that	only	cross-societal	and	political	collaborations	can	bring	 the	 desired	 development	 for	 all.	 Many	 of	 the	 students	 were	 therefore	struggling	 to	 decide	 which	 party	 they	 would	 vote	 for,	 as	 they	 said	 they	 liked	various	elements	of	the	parties.	At	the	same	time,	they	considered	the	symbolic	issues	such	as	race	and	class	of	the	parties	and	their	representatives.	While	the	
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students	did	not	 frame	 this	view	 in	 the	political	 science	 jargon,	but	 in	essence,	they	desired	coalition	politics.			In	 the	 ANC-dominated	 political	 system	 and	 in	 the	 corrupt,	 conflict-ridden	environment	 marred	 by	 distrust	 and	 inequality	 that	 was	 dominating	 the	perceptions	 of	 young	 South	 Africans	 in	 2016-2017,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 women	 in	politics	 tended	to	be	painted	with	the	broad	brush	of	dirty	politics.	Most	of	my	research	participants	 embraced	 this	 viewpoint	 and	none	of	 them	believed	 that	politics	as	a	professional	field	was	ethical	or	honest.	Even	those	who	sought	to	go	into	 politics,	 qualified	 their	 entry	 by	 saying	 that	 they	would	 be	 different	 from	those	currently	 in	power.	They	were	adamant	 that	 they	would	not	 fall	 into	 the	same	trap	as	their	predecessors.	Therefore,	with	the	potential	exception	of	Thuli	Madonsela,	women	in	politics	did	not	serve	as	ethical	role	models	either,	which	then	negatively	 impacted	 their	 ability	 to	be	 seen	as	 journey-based	 role	models	and	 career	 role	 models,	 as	 all	 of	 these	 spheres	 impact	 each	 other	 and	 do	 not	function	 in	 isolation.	 Individuals	who	were	mentioned	 as	 role	models	 for	 their	ethics	 and	 morality	 were	 for	 example	 Nelson	 Mandela,	 Mahatma	 Gandhi	 and	Mother	Theresa.	However,	 they	were	mentioned	only	 by	 a	 handful	 of	 students	and	white	and	Indian/Asian	students	 in	particular,	suggesting	that	the	majority	of	 the	 students	 did	 not	 have	much	 need	 or	 demand	 for	 ethical	 role	models	 in	contrast	to	the	journey-based	role	models.		
Conclusion		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 the	 students’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 economic	situation	 in	 South	 Africa	 resulted	 in	 a	 tenuous	 link	 between	 education	 and	careers,	 and	 the	 concurrent	 desire	 of	 most	 students	 to	 pursue	 HE,	 without	prioritising	an	academic	discipline	or	field,	in	order	to	secure	a	degree	certificate.	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	worldview,	 students	 sought	 generic	 life-journey	 role	models	rather	than	specific	career	inspirations,	as	it	was	more	important	for	them	to	be	able	 to	 flexibly	 navigate	 through	 life,	 rather	 than	 to	 commit	 to	 a	 particular	professional	 destination.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 the	 students’	 disregard	 of	 women	 in	politics	as	a	direct,	consciously	articulated	source	of	 inspiration	or	role-models,	
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even	 for	 students	 pursuing	 degrees	 in	 Politics	 and	 governance-related	disciplines,	and	those	hoping	for	future	careers	in	the	field.			Moreover,	 due	 to	 the	 limited	 availability	 of	 relevant	 information	 about	 the	 life	histories	 of	 women	 in	 positions	 of	 political	 power,	 the	 students	 filled	 in	 their	knowledge	 gaps	 with	 perceptions	 of	 the	 ethical	 and	 moral	 drawbacks	 and	failings	of	 the	South	African	political	realm.	The	weaknesses	and	failures	of	 the	political	system	were	attached	to	the	individual	women,	which	further	detracted	from	their	consideration	as	role	models.	Consequently,	many	female	students	at	least	 questioned	 women	 in	 politics	 as	 relevant	 role	 models	 or	 rejected	 them	outright.	Therefore,	 the	 exceptional	position	 that	 these	women	occupy	and	 the	challenge	 of	 gender	 or	 racial	 and	 class	 norms	 that	 they	 represent	 become	ineffective	 as	 a	 direct	 empowerment	 resource	 for	 young	 women,	 who	 pursue	higher	education	and	seek	professional	careers.			 	
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6 Exceptional	People:	The	Elites,	Leaders	and	Middle	Classes	
Introduction	Tensions	 surrounding	 the	 notion	 of	 eliteness	 and	 the	 changes	 in	 students’	interpretations	 of	 eliteness	 through	 the	 modifying	 descriptors	 ‘female’	 and	‘political’	are	the	focus	of	this	chapter.	While	the	students	understood	FPEs	to	be	women	in	positions	of	political	power,	especially	in	the	national	government	and	Parliament,	 and	 within	 the	 main	 political	 parties,	 they	 saw	 elites	 as	 a	 broad	category	 of	 people	 with	 power,	 means,	 and	 influence.	 The	 most	 common	qualities	of	elites	as	an	elusive,	undefined	socio-economic	group	were	greed	and	selfishness,	which	were	 also	 associated	with	many	women	 in	 politics	 as	 elites.	Thus,	for	many	students	the	idea	of	being	an	elite,	aspiring	to	be	an	elite	or	being	called	an	elite	–	because	of	their	university	education,	which	is	accessible	only	to	a	 small	 portion	 of	 the	 population	 and	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 means	 towards	 economic	wellbeing	 –	 was	 instinctively	 unpalatable	 at	 worst	 and	 subject	 to	 various	stipulations	at	best.		Eliteness	 became	 acceptable	 and	 even	 desirable	 to	 many	 students	 under	 two	conditions.	Firstly,	it	was	embraced	when	it	was	interpreted	as	leadership.	This	characteristic	 was	 ascribed	 to	 eliteness,	 especially	 in	 politics,	 on	 a	 normative	level,	rather	than	being	widely	observed	in	practice.	The	expected	qualities	and	behaviours	of	FPEs,	however,	went	beyond	leadership	and	are	discussed	in	other	chapters	 in	 more	 detail.	 Secondly,	 students	 accepted	 eliteness	 when	 it	 was	disguised	as	middle	classness.	The	narratives	of	the	rising	or	new	Black	middle	class	 (BMC)	 during	 the	 post-apartheid	 transition	 are	 often	 conflated	 with	 the	notions	 of	 Black	 elite,	 building	 on	 the	 history	 of	 confusing,	 interchangeable	terminology.30	To	 the	 majority	 of	 my	 participants,	 middle	 classness	 is	 vested	with	 economic	 wellbeing	 similar	 to	 eliteness,	 yet	 it	 is	 devoid	 of	 the	 negative																																																									30	My	use	of	 the	description	of	Black	MC	or	elite	 as	 ‘new’	 refers	 to	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 size	and	composition	 in	 these	 groups	 after	 the	 removal	 of	 racist	 legislation,	 which	 had	 blocked	 Black	populations	 from	social	mobility	during	apartheid.	 It	 is	not	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	had	not	been	Black	elites	or	MC	 in	 the	past.	Class	and	privilege	existed	during	apartheid	because	 the	regime	offered	education,	governance	and	other	opportunities	to	some	Blacks	and	Black	Africans	in	an	attempt	to	shift	their	allegiance	towards	the	regime	and	away	from	Black	liberation	movements	(Ngoma,	2016;	Khunou,	2015;	Healy-Clancy,	2014;	James,	2014).	Additionally,	these	classes	were	not	static	either,	but	 they	modified	 in	response	to	government	policies	over	 the	decades	of	 the	apartheid	rule	(Southall,	2016).		
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values	of	greed.	Thus,	claiming	leadership	and	middle	class	identification	allows	the	 students	 to	 admit	 their	 desire	 for	 social	mobility	 and	 economic	wellbeing,	without	compromising	their	moral	or	ethical	values.	Moreover,	through	students’	specification	 of	 what	 political	 elites	 should	 be	 rather	 than	what	many	women	and	men	in	politics	are,	eliteness	can	become	both	aspirational	and	inspirational	and	hence	 it	 serves	as	an	empowerment	resource	and	a	challenge	 to	 the	social	order.	Elites	thus	function	for	most	students	both	as	role	models	and	deterrent	models	because	they	denote	a	set	of	exceptional	individuals	based	on	whom	they	can	envision	alternative	possibilities	for	themselves.		
Eliteness	as	Power,	Wealth	and	Prestige	Tasked	 with	 identifying	 specific	 individuals	 whom	 the	 students	 considered	 as	examples	 of	 FPEs,	 my	 participants	 chose	 women	 who	 occupied	 particular	political	positions,	which	gave	them	access	to	power	and	influence,	even	if	they	did	not	exercise	them.	This	meant	that	the	students	focused	in	their	discussions	and	 interviews	predominantly	 on	politicians	 active	on	 the	national	 level	 at	 the	time,	 such	 as	MPs	 (Baleka	Mbete,	 then	 Speaker	 of	 the	National	 Assembly)	 and	members	 of	 cabinet	 (Bathabile	 Dlamini,	 Lindiwe	 Sisulu),	 or	 women	 who	 held	such	posts	 in	the	past	(NDZ,	Helen	Zille,	Lindiwe	Mazibuko,	 former	DA	MP,	and	Dr	 Phumzile	 Mlambo-Ngcuka,	 former	 Vice-President	 and	 then	 Director	 of	 UN	Women).	Other	women,	who	the	students	also	 included	as	political	 influencers,	were	 either	 part	 of	 the	 broader	 state	 apparatus	 (Thuli	 Madonsela,	 Busisiwe	Mkhwebane,	 and	 Riah	 Phiyega,	 former	 Police	 Commissioner)	 or	 the	 anti-apartheid	 struggle	 (Winnie	 Madikizela-Mandela,	 Albertina	 Sisulu	 and	 Dr	Mamphela	Ramphele).	As	 a	 result	 of	 power	 and	 influence,	which	distinguished	these	women	 and	 other	 elites	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 society,	 some	 students	 also	questioned	whether	women	 in	 the	media,	 the	 judiciary,	and	 in	business	should	be	included	as	FPEs.	However,	most	of	the	students	rejected	them	from	the	FPE	categorisation,	because	they	argued	that	these	women	did	not	fit	into	what	they	deemed	to	be	politics.			Despite	 the	 overarching	 consensus	 amongst	 the	 students	 over	 the	 specific	women	who	could	be	considered	an	FPE,	the	debates	about	who	was	the	elite,	or	
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whom	 they	 would	 describe	 as	 elite	 more	 broadly,	 proved	 to	 be	 less	straightforward.	 The	 conflicting	 meanings	 and	 expectations	 that	 emerged	 are	probably	 most	 illustratively	 summarised	 in	 a	 statement	 from	 Lebo.	 She	expressed	 how	 her	 thinking	 about	 eliteness	 evolved	 as	 her	 group	 discussion	progressed:		 Honestly,	 this	 whole	 conversation	 is	 actually	 changing	 my	perspective	…	coz	I	was	always	thinking,	elites	–	those	rich	people	there…	 but	 now,	 they	 [FGD	 participants]	 are	 bringing	 it	 to	 the	household	 and	 it’s	 actually	 making	 me	 think	 …	 Even	 in	 Politics	[class]	 we	 are	 taught	 that	 elites	 [are]	 those	 people	 who	 are	 up	there.	We’re	not	taught	that	elite	can	be	someone	who	you	can	look	up	to	anywhere,	maybe	at	church,	home,	anywhere.		Lebo’s	response	emerged	as	some	of	her	group	peers	started	applying	eliteness	to	their	mothers,	whom	they	labelled	as	elite	to	demonstrate	their	high	opinions	of	them	and	credit	them	with	positive	attributes.	This	application	of	the	term	was	thus	 eliteness	 as	 prestige	 or	 excellence	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 qualities	 and	achievements	 of	 other	 people.	 Lebo’s	 comment	 also	 demonstrates	 a	 perceived	dichotomy	 between	 those	 who	 have	 eliteness	 as	 power	 and	 those	 who	 have	eliteness	as	prestige	and	status,	despite	the	fact	that	ideal	female	political	elites	should	represent	a	merger	of	the	two.			Additionally,	 according	 to	my	participants’	 responses,	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	 no	consensus	 on	 who	 the	 individuals	 with	 ‘real’	 power	 were,	 besides	 mysterious	super	 elites,	 who	were	 assumed	 to	 be	 ‘out	 there,’	 but	 were	 rarely	 specifically	named.	In	the	public	discourse	at	the	time,	a	few	exceptions	included	for	example	the	Rupert	or	Gupta	families,	who	were	some	of	the	richest	people	in	the	country,	connected	 to	 large	 business	 empires	 and	 who	 were	 clearly	 designated	 as	powerful	players	 in	South	Africa.	However,	 the	students	spoke	overwhelmingly	in	 vague	 terms	 about	 individuals	 and	 groups	 who	 ‘controlled	 the	 strings’	 and	who	were	the	‘puppet	masters’.			Kirsty	 captured	 the	 tensions	 and	uncertainties	 around	people	 in	power	during	our	discussion	of	Nelson	Mandela’s	 role	 in	 changing	South	Africa.	Kirsty	was	 a	Coloured	student,	whose	family	was	originally	from	the	Eastern	Cape	province	–	
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she	said	that	was	“where	she’s	from,”	but	she	had	lived	most	of	her	life	in	one	of	Gauteng’s	biggest	metropoles.	Her	 father	was	 a	 teacher	whose	 job	 took	him	 to	various	parts	of	the	world,	while	her	mother,	who	got	pregnant	at	a	young	age,	struggled	with	employment.	Kirsty	portrayed	her	mother	as	the	dominant	one	in	the	relationship	nonetheless.	She	said	that	paying	fees	was	a	struggle,	but	both	of	her	parents	 insisted	that	she	pursue	varsity.	When	we	met	for	our	 interview	in	late	 2016,	 she	was	 just	 finishing	 her	 first	 year	 at	 UJ	which	 she	 described	 as	 a	growing	 experience.	 She	 was	 disenchanted	 with	 politics,	 and	 coming	 from	 an	ANC-household,	 she	 did	 not	 discuss	 politics	 at	 home,	 nor	 was	 she	 an	 active	member	of	student	activist	groups	or	other	organisations.	Kirsty	praised	Nelson	Mandela	as	 someone	 she	 looked	up	 to	 for	being	humble	and	 forgiving,	but	 she	viewed	current	people	in	power	very	differently:			 I	 feel	 like,	 South	 Africa,	 the	 society,	 …[sigh]…	 the	 power	 some	people	 have…	 the	 different	 classes,	 and	 all	 of	 these	 things	 that	people	 put	 us	 into.	 That	 we	 are	 put	 into,	 by	 other	 people	 that	actually	have	this	power…	I	just	feel	like	sometimes,	neh,	when	the	opportunity	 is	 not	 there,	 how	will	 I	 be	 able	 to	 be	 heard?	 If	 poor	people	are	not	even	being	heard	at	 this	 time.	…	People	 from	Alex	[township	 in	 Johannesburg]	 are	 fighting,	 they’re	 speaking	 out	about	 the	 corruptions	and	everything	else,	 they’re	protesting	and	then,	 they’re	 trying	 to	 make	 a	 change,	 but	 then,	 there’s	 nothing	happening.	 Then	 who	 am	 I	 to	 try	 to	 make	 that	 change,	 you	understand?	 So	 yeah,	 I	 just	 feel	 like	 it’s	 about	 the	 power	 that	certain	people	have	 in	order	 to	make	a	change.	And	 I	don’t	know	how,	 yah,	Nelson	Mandela	was	 part	 of	 the	ANC,	 he	was	 part	 of	 a	political	 group	 and	 whatever,	 but	 then,	 who	 am	 I?	 I	 am	 just	 a	student,	you	know?		Kirsty’s	 statement	 shows	 that	 people	 perceived	 elites	 to	 possess	 power	 over	others,	 including	 over	 young	 people	 and	 Coloured	minority,	 into	 which	 Kirsty	belonged.	 However,	 it	 was	 hard	 to	 distil	 who	 all	 these	 ‘others’	 were.	 Her	statement	 further	 highlights	 that	 elites	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 were	 able	 to	disregard	 the	 grievances	 of	 non-elites,	 whose	 demands	 for	 change	 remained	unanswered,	which	shows	the	self-interest	that	characterises	eliteness.		Students	 associated	 elites,	 including	most	women	 in	politics,	with	 self-interest,	selfishness,	greed,	and	corruption.	Arya	was	a	Black	NSFAS-	funded	student	from	
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a	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 a	mother	 of	 a	 young	 girl.	 In	 2017,	 she	was	 in	 her	second	 year	 of	 studies	 and	 lived	 with	 her	 parents,	 commuting	 a	 considerable	distance	to	campus.	She	was	a	few	years	older	than	most	of	her	peers,	as	she	had	done	a	learnership	after	matric,	then	started	a	different	course,	but	abandoned	it	as	she	had	her	baby.	She	was	therefore	re-starting	her	studies,	 this	time	at	UJ’s	APK,	 where	 she	 also	 joined	 a	 volunteering	 community	 engagement	 society.	 In	our	debates	about	elites,	 she	said	 that	 if	 she	were	 to	say	 to	her	 family	 that	she	wanted	to	be	an	elite,	she	would	be	accused	of	“loving	(material)	things,”	which	demonstrates	 the	 economic	 and	 material	 understanding	 of	 elites	 that	 many	South	Africans	shared	with	her.			One	 of	 the	 frequently	 cited	 examples	 of	 greedy	 behaviour	was	 the	 president’s	private	 residence	 in	 Nkandla,	 which	 the	 students	 saw	 as	 an	 unprecedented,	excessive	waste	of	public	money	on	one	individual	and	his	family,	instead	of	on	those	people,	who	did	not	 have	 anything.	Hence,	Nkandla	was	 a	 symbol	 of	 the	excessive	wealth	of	the	elite	and	was	framed	through	the	language	of	selfishness	and	greed.	The	students	thus	echoed	the	public	discourses	and	media	narratives	about	South	African	politics	at	the	time.	Politicians	were	generally	portrayed	by	other	 political	 actors	 and	 non-political	 commentators	 as	 not	 thinking	 about	 or	not	 caring	 about	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 poor,	 the	 unemployed	 and	 the	 otherwise	marginalised.			The	proponents	of	 this	anti-elite	discourse	were,	perversely,	often	the	accusers	and	the	accused	at	once.	For	example,	while	the	ANC	at	all	levels	of	government	was	depicted	by	the	DA	or	the	EFF	as	being	run	by	out-of-touch,	self-interested	elite,	 the	 ANC	 was	 quick	 to	 retaliate	 and	 suggest	 that	 the	 elites	 were	 either	outside	 of	 the	 party,	 namely	 the	 white	 capitalists,	 foreign	 interests,	 or	 only	 a	specific	 faction	 of	 the	 party	 that	was	 captured	 by	 private	 interests.	 Therefore,	being	 called	 an	 elite	 became	 a	 political	 strategy	 to	 discredit	 critical	 and	oppositional	 voices,	 together	 with	 being	 called	 a	 spy,	 a	 sell-out,	 or	 a	 counter-revolutionary.31	To	 strategically	 differentiate	 themselves	 and	 others	 from	 the																																																									31	Being	 considered	 a	 spy	 in	 South	Africa	 has	 a	 very	 particular	 connotation	 and	 history	 in	 the	anti-apartheid	 struggle.	 As	 the	 ruling	 regime	 used	 to	 spy	 on	 liberation	 fighters	 at	 home	 and	
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political	elites	embroiled	in	greed	and	selfishness,	many	politicians	used	the	label	of	political	leader,	and	thus	contributed	towards	the	creation	of	a	discursive	link	between	 the	 idea	 of	 political	 eliteness	 and	 leadership,	 which	 I	 explore	 in	 the	following	section.	
Political	Elite	–	Leader	Link	and	Generational	Tensions	Students	 in	 my	 research	 often	 seamlessly,	 unnoticeably,	 substituted	 the	 word	elite	 with	 the	 word	 leader.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 questions,	 “who	 is	 an	 FPE?”	 or	“what	characteristics	does	an	FPE	have?”	 the	answer	would	often	start	with,	 “a	leader	 is.”	The	 interchangeable	use	was	a	sign	of	 the	students’	expectation	that	political	elites	should	be	leaders,	which	was	very	common	also	in	the	media	and	in	 commentaries	 offered	 by	 politicians	 and	 other	 prominent	 figures.	 It	 is	 this	understanding	of	FPEs	as	 leaders	that	creates	a	bridge	between	the	students	 in	my	 research	and	women	 in	politics,	 as	 the	 students	 saw	 themselves	as	 leaders	too.	 However,	 unlike	 eliteness,	 the	 idea	 of	 leadership	 was	 not	 vested	 with	negative	connection	to	greed	and	corruption.	This	understanding	of	leadership	is	in	contradiction	to	some	literature	in	which	African	leaders	–	understood	as	NGO	or	 company	managers,	 directors	 and	 executives	 –	 are	 embroiled	 in	 patronage,	nepotism,	 corruption	 and	 autocratic	 tendencies	 (Kuada,	 2010;	 James,	 2008),	similar	to	the	political	elites.		Several	leadership	scholars,	such	as	Ngunjiri	(2016),	Brubaker	(2013)	and	Ncube	(2010),	 argue	 that	 qualities	 and	behaviours	 that	 are	 expected	 amongst	African	leaders,	be	it	 in	politics	or	managerial	roles,	differ	from	those	articulated	in	the	western	 context.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 influence	 that	 culture,	 in	 particular	 the	difference	 between	 collective	 and	 individualistic	 societies,	 and	 socio-political	realities	 exert	 on	 one’s	 perceptions	 of	 leadership	 as	well	 as	 on	 the	 leadership	style	 options	 available	 to	 individuals	 (Kuada,	 2010).	 According	 to	 the	aforementioned	 scholars,	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Ubuntu,	which	 can	 translate	 as,	 “A																																																																																																																																																																abroad	 to	 undermine	 the	 resistance,	 spies	 caused	 a	 substantial	 loss	 of	 life	 and	 suffering,	 and	much	 violence	 was	 perpetuated	 against	 alleged	 collaborators	 in	 return.	 The	 discourses	 of	National	 Democratic	 Revolution,	 which	 are	 perpetuated	 by	 the	 ANC	 post-1994,	 continue	 to	position	any	critique,	 challenge	and	opposition	 to	 the	ANC	as	counter-revolutionary	and	hence	discursively	 link	 it	 to	 the	amoral,	 racist	standpoint	(Brooks,	2017;	Sinwell,	2011).	Hence,	being	called	a	spy,	traitor	or	sell-out	is	a	discursive	strategy	to	discredit	and	delegitimise	an	individual	(van	der	Westhuizen,	2016b).	
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person	is	a	person	through	other	persons”	(Metz,	2017)	encompasses	the	values	and	 behaviours	 that	 leaders	 are	 expected	 to	 demonstrate	 amongst	 the	 Bantu	populations	 in	various	regions	of	 the	continent.	Brubaker	(2013,	116)	 links	the	notion	 of	 Ubuntu	 leadership	 to	 the	 western	 conceptualisation	 of	 ‘servant	leader’32	who	 is	 defined	 by	 putting	 followers	 first.	 However,	 Ubuntu	 also	influences	 leaders’	 behaviours	 and	 values,	 which	 emphasise	 collectivism	 and	solidarity;	which	consider	the	development	or	empowerment	of	employees	and	followers;	and	 in	which	 leaders	are	models	of	ethical	behaviour	(Ncube,	2010).	Moreover,	 they	 are	 also	 seen	 in	 the	 role	 of	 Christian	 values	 and	 spirituality	(Ngunjiri,	2016).	Several	African	feminists	also	put	Ubuntu	as	the	foundation	of	the	 value	 system	 for	Africans	 and	African	women	 in	 particular	 (Tamale,	 2008;	Manicom,	2005;	McEwan,	2005).	Ngunjiri	(2016)	and	Ndlovu	(2016)	argue	that	African	 women	 leaders	 enact	 Ubuntu	 leadership	 together	 with	 servant	leadership	through	motherhood	roles.	Consequently,	Ubuntu	female	leaders	also	call	for	change	and	transformation	in	order	to	achieve	the	desired	society.			South	African	politicians	evoke	Ubuntu	as	 the	guiding	principle	 for	 the	country	and	 it	 is	 used	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 South	Africans	 are	 caring	 and	 self-less,	 and	that	 their	 leaders	 should	 be	 the	 same,	 hence	 it	 is	 a	 value	 that	 is	 in	 direct	contradiction	of	policies	and	practices	 that	marginalise	 the	poor	and	women	 in	particular	(Singh,	Mudaly	and	Singh-Pillay,	2015;	Stauffer,	2015;	Bond,	2014).	It	was	 also	 instrumentalised	 and	 fused	 with	 Christian	 values	 during	 the	 post-apartheid	 transition	 process,	 especially	 by	 Archbishop	 Desmond	 Tutu	(Ramphele,	 2016;	 Eze,	 2010).	 Despite	 a	 discursive	 prominence	 of	 Ubuntu	 in	South	 Africa	 and	 in	 the	 leadership	 scholarship,	 none	 of	 the	 students	 in	 my	research	 recalled	 it	 as	 a	 value	 that	 they	 expected	 FPEs	 to	 perform	 or	 enact.	Moreover,	 only	 a	 handful	 of	 them	mentioned	 the	 concept	more	 broadly,	when	thinking	 about	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 South	 Africa.	 This	 seeming	 irrelevance																																																									32	There	 are	 several	 theoretical	 approaches	 to	 ethics	 in	 leadership	which	 could	 be	 seen	 in	 the	Ubuntu-based	 theorisation	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 servant	 leadership.	 These	 include	 for	 example	authentic	 leadership,	which	 is	 based	on	 transparency	 and	openness	 in	 relations	 to	 employees;	and	transformative	leadership,	which	brings	people	together	around	values	and	goals	and	is	thus	inspiring,	as	opposed	to	transactional	which	focuses	on	system	of	rewards	and	penalties	(Kuada,	2010).	 Similarly,	 transformative	 change	 leadership	 is	 conceptualised	 by	 Srivastava	 (2018)	 as	based	on	the	needs	of	the	community,	as	well	as	on	empathy,	and	other	characteristics,	needed	to	bring	about	transformative	change.		
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underscores	the	critique	that	language	used	by	academics	and	political	leaders	is	often	 irrelevant	 to	 young	 people.	 For	 example,	 women	 in	 the	 aforementioned	studies	by	Ndlovu	(2016)	and	Ngunjiri	(2016)	were	over	40	years	old,	while	 in	Brubaker’s	(2013)	study,	the	mean	age	was	39,	with	youngest	participants	being	21,	which	could	explain	the	discrepancy	in	the	use	of	Ubuntu	and	highlights	the	importance	of	age	 in	conceptualising	eliteness	and	 leadership.	Additionally,	 the	language	of	 service	or	 the	vocabulary	of	 ‘being	a	 servant’	was	also	marginal	 in	the	students’	description	of	FPEs,	but	it	was	expressed	in	other,	more	gendered	terms	such	as	care.	This	linguistic	preference	can	potentially	be	explained	by	the	connotation	of	the	word	servant	in	the	racist,	patriarchal,	economically	unequal,	colonial	 post-apartheid	 South	 Africa,	 where	 for	 many	 Black	 students,	service/servitude	 may	 imply	 exploitation,	 humiliation	 and	 oppression.	Nonetheless,	many	 of	 the	 values	 behind	 Ubuntu	 leadership,	 service	 leadership	and	 transformative	 change	 leadership	 represent	 expected	 characteristics	 and	behaviours	of	FPEs,	as	I	demonstrate	in	more	detail	in	Chapters	Seven	and	Eight.	The	fact	that	Ubuntu	did	not	appear	in	the	students’	vocabulary	cannot,	however,	be	dismissed	as	a	mere	sign	of	their	ignorance	or	lack	of	Black	consciousness.	It	needs	to	be	seen	as	emblematic	of	wider	tensions	that	the	students	experienced	with	the	notions	of	modernity,	tradition,	culture,	community	and	history,	which	were	 accentuated	 by	 the	 problematic	 practice	 of	 differentiating	 good,	 ethical,	Ubuntu	style	political	leaders	of	the	past,	from	the	current	corrupt	political	elites	and	‘non-leaders’	in	simplistic	binary.		The	distinction	between	political	leaders	of	the	past	and	the	present-day	political	
elites	was	often	based	on	ethics	and	service	(Jones,	2017;	Ronnie,	2017).	In	other	words,	the	actions	of	the	ANC	and	other	political	elites	have	been	characterised	by	analysts	such	as	Raymond	Suttner	(2015)	as	a	“crisis	of	 leadership,”	as	 they	failed	 to	 put	 service	 of	 others	 before	 their	 own	 interests.	 Many	 South	 African	commentators	 and	 writers,	 including	 Maserumule	 (2017),	 Reddy	 (2017)	 and	Suttner	 (2017b)	 argued	 during	 the	 time	 of	 my	 data	 collection	 that	 care	 and	selflessness	 were	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 ethical	 leadership,	 which	 were	 missing	 in	contemporary	South	Africa.	This	discourse	 intensified	with	 the	aforementioned	revelations	of	state	capture	and	the	so-called	Gupta	leaks	–	exposé	of	emails	from	
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companies	 owned	 by	 the	Gupta	 family,	 showing	 the	 family’s	 connection	 to	 the	state	–	through	to	the	vote	of	no	confidence	in	President	Zuma	in	August	2017.	Mcebisi	Ndletyana,	a	political	 scholar	based	at	UJ,	 argued	 in	his	 remarks	at	 the	2016	Ahmed	Kathrada	lecture	that	ethical	leadership	was	needed	in	South	Africa	and	he	proposed	that	such	leadership	was	seen	in	Thuli	Madonsela,	who	was	the	keynote	 speaker	 at	 the	 event.	 In	 the	 media,	 Madonsela	 was	 often	 linked	 to	political	 leaders	 of	 the	 past,	 such	 as	 Nelson	 Mandela,	 who	 was	 hailed	 as	 an	exemplary	ethical	leader	(Gqubule,	2017;	Ncube,	2010).	Mandela,	and	other	ANC	struggle	heroes	 like	Albert	Luthuli	and	OR	Tambo,	were	also	frequently	evoked	in	public	events	and	political	speeches	in	2016	–	2017	(Callinicos,	2017;	Mkhize,	2017;	Phosa	qtd.	in	eNCA,	2017e;	Ramaphosa,	2016a;	Suttner,	2016b)	as	ethical	leaders,	not	least	because	the	ANC	dedicated	2017	to	the	memory	of	OR	Tambo	and	2017	also	marked	50	years	since	Luthuli’s	death.			The	 connections	 and	 distinctions	 between	 political	 elites	 and	 leaders	 in	 the	public	 domain	were	used	 to	 either	 exploit	 or	 avoid	 the	negative	 association	 of	eliteness	 with	 greed	 and	 selfishness.	 For	 example,	 in	 her	 remarks	 about	 the	commemoration	of	Fidel	Castro	in	2016,	Nosiviwe	Mapisa-Nqakula,	who	was	at	the	time	Minister	of	Defence	and	Veterans,	is	quoted	to	have	said:		 I	 listened	 to	 many	 memorial	 speeches	 yesterday	 around	 the	country.	The	question	 I	want	 to	 ask	 is,	why	 could	we,	the	leaders,	not	mobilise	 thousands	of	people	 to	 fill	 up	 these	venues…	 I	don't	want	 to	 believe	 that	South	Africans	are	snobbish.	 I	 think	we	 are	 a	very	loving	nation.	But	I	think	we	could	have	done	more	in	the	past	few	days	for	the	celebration	of	the	life	of	Fidel	[my	emphases]	(qtd.	in	Herman,	2016).			Mapisa-Nqakula’s	 framing	 of	 the	 issue	 achieves	 two	 goals.	 Firstly,	 she	 puts	herself	and	the	ANC	into	the	category	of	leaders	instead	of	elites,	hence	avoiding	the	 negative	 discourse	 of	 elitism	 and	 appropriating	 the	 positive	 values	 of	leadership.	Secondly,	 she	warns	 the	general	population	not	 to	act	snobbishly,	a	behaviour	 which	 is	 associated	 with	 elitism	 and	 which	 carries	 negative	connotation	and	normative	judgement.			
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In	a	similar	manner,	the	VC	of	Wits,	Professor	Adam	Habib,	used	the	elite-leader	distinction	 in	 his	 commentary	 on	 the	 2016	 FMF	 protests.	 In	 an	 opinion	 piece,	Habib	 (2016)	 writes	 about	 what	 he	 calls	 duplicity,	 or	 Janus-faced	 actions	amongst	FMF	leaders,	“It	[duplicity]	suggests	that	despite	their	criticisms	of	the	
existing	political	elite,	some	of	the	prominent	leaders	among	this	new	generation	of	activists	are	displaying	behavioural	traits	that	are	typical	of	the	most	venal	of	
the	 current	 politicians	 [my	 emphases].”	 Habib’s	 articulation	 clearly	 connects	elitism	with	corrupt	and	amoral	behaviour	and	attaches	 it	 to	 the	 leaders	of	 the	FMF;	hence,	he	further	builds	the	tension	in	the	elite-leader	connection.			The	claiming	of	leadership	identity	by	political	elites	can	be	understood	as	a	form	of	pretend	discretion	or	downward	 identification	 to	hide	difference	and	power	inequality.	At	the	same	time,	students’	claiming	of	leadership	in	distinction	from	eliteness,	 shows	 their	 attempt	 at	 subversion	 of	 those	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 as	elite	 wannabes.	 Several	 leadership	 scholars	 show	 that	 leaders	 arise	 by	demonstrating	 salient	 qualities	 of	 the	 group.	 Studies	 conducted	 amongst	university	students	in	Australia,	for	example	(Platow	et	al.,	2006;	Platow	and	van	Knippenberg,	 2001)	 suggest	 that	 leaders	 are	 endorsed	 based	 on	 their	 relative	prototypicality	 of	 the	 group	 that	 they	 represent.	 However,	 as	 Steffens	 et	 al.	(2014)	 further	clarify,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	 leaders	are	 the	most	average	of	the	 type.	 They	 show	 that	 leaders	 arise	 from	 being	 “the	 ideal-type	 of	 what	 it	means	 to	 be	 ‘one	 of	 us’	 [original	 emphasis]”	 (2014,	 1002–1003).	 Hence,	leadership	straddles	a	balance	between	being	different	from	others,	while	being	within	the	norm	at	the	same	time.	Rainbow	Murray	(2018)	uses	similar	logic	in	her	 arguments	 about	 political	 representatives	 in	what	 she	 terms	 a	 paradox	 of	representation	 –	 the	 seemingly	 mutually	 exclusive	 desire	 of	 voters	 for	 their	representatives	 to	 be	 the	 best	 of	 what	 the	 society	 has	 (the	 most	 intelligent,	talented,	honest,	etc.)	while	at	the	same	time	being	people	like	us.			The	extent	to	which	the	older	struggle	generation	of	Nelson	Mandela,	OR	Tambo	or	 Ahmed	 Kathrada	 were	 hailed	 as	 comparative	 benchmarks	 of	 leadership,	demonstrates	a	cult	of	personality	and	a	saviour-like	deification	of	these	struggle	leaders.	 As	 Keith	 Gottschalk	 (2016)	 observes,	 “South	 Africans	 and	 their	media	
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are	prone	 to	either	canonise	a	politician	as	a	saint,	 such	as	Nelson	Mandela,	or	demonise	him	as	a	monster,	as	Zuma.”	Sabelo	Ndlovu-Gatsheni	 (2015b)	argues	that	 Nelson	 Mandela	 was	 aware	 of	 his	 personal	 symbolism	 and	 iconic	 status	when	he	was	in	prison	and	maintained	his	moral	character	after	being	released	from	prison	instead	of	turning	into	what	the	author	calls	a	monster.	It	is	thus	to	be	expected	that	several	of	my	research	participants	recalled	Nelson	Mandela	in	their	 interviews,	 suggesting	 that	 he	 was	 an	 ideal	 political	 elite-leader.	 Nos,	 an	African	 student	 from	a	 township	 in	Gauteng,	 described	what	 she	would	 like	 to	see	 from	 a	 leader	 by	 using	 Nelson	 Mandela	 as	 a	 benchmark.	 She	 was	 in	 her	second	year	when	she	attended	one	of	the	group	discussions.	She	was	a	bursary	recipient	and	was	not	a	member	of	any	organisations	on	or	off	campus.	Nos	was	living	with	her	cousin,	as	her	mother	passed	away	when	she	was	still	a	teenager	and	her	 father	did	not	 live	with	 them.	She	 liked	 living	 in	a	 township	because	 it	was	 an	 exciting	 space,	 yet	 she	 did	 not	 have	 indoor	 sanitation,	which	was	 very	common	for	many	township	housing	units,	and	she	highlighted	how	people	living	in	other	parts	of	 town	did	not	realise	how	different	 life	 in	a	 township	was.	She	said:			 Ideologically,	I	would	like	to	see	someone	who	would	strive	to	unite	South	 Africa	 as	 a	 country	 and	 to	 bring	 in	 that	 positiveness	 that	[Mandela]	gave	[to	the	country].	Remember,	that	positiveness	that	Mandela	 had	 for	 all.	 Coz	 now	people	 are	 always	 complaining,	we	are	lacking	that	hope	that	we	used	to	have...a	leader	like	that.			At	 the	 age	 of	 23,	 Nos	 was	 too	 young	 to	 personally	 remember	 the	 euphoria,	optimism	and	hope	that	came	with	Nelson	Mandela’s	release	from	prison	in	1990	and	 his	 subsequent	 presidency;	 however,	 it	 was	 very	 much	 in	 the	 public	consciousness	and	impressed	upon	the	youth	even	if	they	did	not	experience	it.	It	is	important	to	note	that	many	non-Black	African	students	found	Nelson	Mandela	an	ideal	political	elite,	because	of	his	commitment	to	non-racialism	and	equality,	which	 mattered	 to	 the	 students,	 who	 believed	 that	 non-Black	 Africans	 were	experiencing	a	form	of	reversed	racism	two	decades	on.			Nelson	 Mandela’s	 legacy	 and	 leadership	 were	 at	 the	 time	 of	 my	 research,	however,	 debated	 in	 light	 of	 the	 perceived	 failure	 of	 the	 ANC-led	 efforts	 to	
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achieve	 structural	 transformation	 of	 the	 South	 African	 society	 and	 economy	(Hodes,	 2017;	Booysen,	 2016;	 van	der	Westhuizen,	 2016b).	 Zary	Motaung	was	one	of	the	students	who	critiqued	the	democratic	settlement.	She	was	an	African	student,	 a	 member	 of	 a	 campus	 choir,	 and	 came	 from	 a	 metropole	 area	 in	Gauteng.	 She	 was	 living	 with	 her	 mother,	 who	 was	 a	 retired	 nurse.	 She	commuted	to	the	university	in	her	own	car,	and	while	she	financed	her	first	year	of	studies	with	a	loan,	she	qualified	for	NSFAS	for	her	second	year.	Talking	about	Nelson	Mandela,	she	said,	“I	would	say	he	sold	us	out,	coz	all	we	got	was	freedom	and	 the	 initial	 fights	 weren’t	 for	 the	 control	 over	 the	 economy.”	 Despite	 her	challenge	 of	 the	 political	 settlement	 which	 she	 argued	 was	 orchestrated	 by	Nelson	 Mandela,	 Zary	 Motaung	 did	 not	 question	 the	 exceptionality	 of	 his	character	and	personality.			With	the	rising	challenge	to	the	legacy	of	Nelson	Mandela	and	other	past	figures,	their	 relevance	 to	 the	 youth	 may	 be	 decreasing.	 While	 Nelson	 Mandela	 did	feature	 in	 my	 interviews,	 he	 was	 not	 an	 omnipresent	 figure	 and	 was	 not	 the	readily	 cited	 inspirational	 political	 elite	 I	 had	 assumed	 prior	 to	 the	commencement	of	my	data	collection.	When	I	asked	Arnetia,	a	Coloured	student,	member	of	a	sports	team	and	a	sports	coach	off	campus,	from	the	Western	Cape,	about	 inspirational	 individuals	 in	 her	 life,	 she	 described	 many	 people	 in	 her	private	life	and	in	her	family.	She	spoke	about	friends	who	ran	away	from	life	of	drugs	and	gangs,	and	parents	who	worked	hard	to	show	her	that	she	can	achieve	things	in	spite	of	the	racial	stereotypes	that	faced	her.	In	response	to	my	query	about	 any	 famous	 people,	 she	 said,	 “everyone	 looks	 up	 to	 Nelson	Mandela,	 so	who	 am	 I	 [not	 to]?	 [laugh].”	 Her	 response	 hints	 at	 the	 clear	 benchmark	 that	Nelson	Mandela	has	become	as	a	political	 leader-elite,	yet	 in	reality,	he	may	no	longer	 speak	 so	 directly	 and	 readily	 to	 the	 lives	 that	 the	 young	 people	 lived	nearly	25	years	since	he	became	the	president.			Writing	about	Nelson	Mandela’s	legacy,	Dion	Forster	(2016)	argues	that	the	“loss	of	faith”	in	people	like	Nelson	Mandela,	has	potentially	positive	effects	for	South	Africa.	He	proposes	that	it	compels	South	Africans	to	see	themselves	as	agents	of	change	 and	 it	 forces	 the	 youth	 in	 particular	 to	 become	 more	 active.	 Many	
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political	 commentators	 and	 leading	 figures	 also	maintained	 that	 South	 African	public’s	 reliance	 on	 leaders	 has	 facilitated	 the	 crisis	 in	 the	 country	 and	 hence	citizens	needed	 to	perceive	 themselves	as	 leaders,	 and	 take	action	 (Madonsela,	2017;	Mashele	and	Qobo,	2014).	However,	as	a	result	of	the	persona-focus,	much	of	 the	 political	 action	 has	 tended	 to	 be	 individual	 orientated,	 rather	 than	systematic	as	I	show	in	Chapter	Three.	For	example,	the	citizen	activism	against	corruption	and	state	capture	in	2016	–	2017	focused	on	President	Jacob	Zuma	as	the	 embodiment	 of	 the	 problem.	 This	 was	 the	 case	 in	 the	 opposition	 led	campaign	#ZumaMustFall	(Sangham,	2017),	or	the	EFF-led	call	for	Zuma	to	‘pay	back	 the	 money’	 for	 Nkandla	 upgrades.	 The	 numerous,	 failed	 votes	 of	 no	confidence	in	Zuma	also	personified	the	systematic	corruption	in	the	individual	or	his	 immediate	circle	 (Suttner,	2016c).	However,	many	of	 the	students	 in	my	research	 combined	 the	 individual	 and	 systematic	 views	 on	 corruption.	 On	 one	hand,	 they	 acknowledged	 its	 deep-rooted	 structural	 feature,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	the	need	to	remove	the	president,	as	the	highest	leader,	from	office.			The	 distinctions	 and	 connections	 between	 eliteness	 and	 leadership	 and	 its	generational	separations	within	the	political	realm	described	in	this	section	have	complex	 implications	 for	 youth	 engagement	 in	 politics	 and	 their	 identification.	On	one	hand,	young	people	are	expected	to	meet	the	idolised	narratives	of	ethical	leadership	qualities	of	the	struggle	era.	They	see	older	generations	in	power	and	are	not	exposed	to	many	of	their	age	peers	entering	the	formal	political	spaces;	and	 even	 those	 in	 positions	 of	 power,	 are	 not	 being	 praised	 for	 successfully	meeting	 the	 historical	 benchmarks	 and	 being	 elites	 –	 leaders	 with	 superior	qualities	 that	would	 be	worth	 emulating.	 Consequently,	 the	 students	 are	 faced	with	 discourses	 and	 norms	 which	 undermine	 their	 aspirations	 towards	leadership	within	 the	highest,	 ‘elite’	 realm	of	 formal	national	 politics,	 and	 thus	diminish	 their	 leadership	 aspirations	 to	 a	 localised	 level.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	however,	the	current	elites	being	presented	as	failing	at	leadership	expectations	offers	 an	 opportunity.	 It	 opens	 for	 the	 students	 and	 the	 youth	 some	 room	 to	consider	engaging	with	politics	and	thus	challenging	the	existing	order	and	those	in	power	by	seeking	to	do	better	than	those	in	power.		
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The	generational/age-based	differentiations	around	eliteness	and	leadership	are	further	 paralleled	 with	 distinctions	 between	 the	 BF	 and	 struggle	 generations	rooted	 in	materialistic	 self-interest.	Materialism	 and	 conspicuous	 consumption	are	associated	with	the	post-apartheid	era	and	thus	are	attached	to	the	BF	youth	in	 particular,	 as	well	 as	with	 social	 climbers	 as	 represented	 by	 new	 elites	 and	middle	classes,	which	I	explore	in	the	following	section.	
Eliteness	as	Being	Middle	or	Working	Class	The	Black	elites	and	the	Black	MC	in	South	Africa	are	connected	to	each	other	on	several	 fronts.	 Firstly,	 the	 understanding	 of	 Black	 elites	 as	 exceptional	individuals,	leaders	of	the	society	and	the	driving	force	of	change,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	Four,	 is	currently	applied	 to	 the	growing	BMC	 instead.	BMC	 is	often	vested	with	the	potential	to	transform	the	South	African	society	because	of	their	skills,	education,	employment	and	their	desire	for	higher	level	social	and	political	goods	(Everatt	2016a),	which	were	previously	attached	to	the	Black	African	elite.	Based	 on	 democratic	 theory	 from	 other	 geo-political	 contexts,	 it	was	 assumed	that	the	BMC	would	enhance	South	African	democracy	because	it	was	expected	to	shift	political	allegiance	from	the	ANC,	with	which	 it	was	aligned	in	the	anti-apartheid	 struggle,	 and	 thus	 challenge	 its	 one-party	 dominance.	 The	 2016	municipal	 election	 results	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 DA	 in	 urban	 metropoles,	 could	provide	some	validity	to	this	theory.	In	light	of	the	election	results,	David	Everatt	(2016a)	 argues	 that	 the	 traditionalist	 faction	 behind	 President	 Zuma	 was	 not	gaining	 traction	 amongst	 people	 who	 were	 “becoming	 better	 educated,	 more	Afropolitan	 and	 cosmopolitan,	 demanding	 high	 quality	 services	 and	 choice	 in	everything	from	politics	to	personal	trainers.”			However,	 the	BMC	 in	South	Africa	arose	primarily	on	 the	back	of	public	 sector	employment,	 and	 only	 a	 small	 proportion	 emerged	 via	 a	 business	 and	 private	sector	 route,	 as	was	 envisioned	 in	 the	 aforementioned	BEE	policies.	Due	 to	 its	ties	to	the	ANC-operated	patronage	system	and	the	public	sector,	it	is	argued	that	the	BMC	does	not	want	to	risk	its	favourable	status	quo	tied	to	the	ruling	party.	Equally	 importantly,	 due	 to	 the	 persistent	 experiences	 of	 racial	 discrimination	and	inequality	in	the	workplace,	many	BMC	voters	reject	the	DA	as	the	embodied	
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white	party,	or	support	it	only	opportunistically	as	a	rebellion	vote,	rather	than	a	vote	 based	 on	 political	 conviction	 and	 identification	 (Ngoma,	 2016;	 Southall	2016;	Mattes,	2015).	Moreover,	some	members	of	the	elite	and	the	MC	also	built	their	wealth	as	‘tenderpreneurs’	–	individuals	who	have	amassed	their	riches	on	the	back	of	winning	government	tenders.	Tenderpreneurs	are	the	embodiment	of	the	 ANC-associated	 corruption	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 (counter)elite,33	which	 are	both	 tied	 to	 the	 public	 sector	 and	 the	 state	 (Southall,	 2014;	 von	Holdt,	 2013).	Hence,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	 ANC,	many	educated,	globally	minded	students	remain	loyal	to	the	party	even	if	they	do	not	vote	for	it.		The	confusing	nature	of	 the	BMC-elite	discourses	 is	 further	accentuated	by	 the	different	 lived	 experiences	within	 the	MC,	 because	 of	 the	 precarious	 nature	 of	some	 of	 the	 occupations	 that	 tend	 to	 be	 grouped	 under	 this	 label.	 Schotte,	Zizzamia	and	Leibbrandt	 (2017)	call	 this	 the	 ‘vulnerability’	of	 the	MC,	meaning	that	its	MC	status	is	not	secure	and	is	subject	to	change,	for	example	due	to	the	loss	of	employment.	This	understanding	can	be	seen	as	a	version	of	the	precariat,	that	Guy	Standing	(2011,	11-16)	explains	as	a	class	in	the	making,	which	emerges	as	 a	 result	 of	 globalisation	 and	 growing	 fragmentation	 of	 traditional	 social	stratification.	Precariat	is	unique	or	non-conforming	with	the	typical	approaches	to	understanding	both	 class	and	 status,	because	 it	 is	marked	by	 insecurity	and	instability	 with	 regards	 to	 issues	 such	 as	 labour	 market,	 skills	 reproduction,	income	or	representation	(Standing	2011,	17)	 leading	 for	example	 to	a	discord	between	education	levels	and	wages.	Similarly	to	this	notion	of	insecurity	of	the	precariat,	Schotte,	Zizzamia	and	Leibbrandt	(2017)	argue	that	the	MC	should	be	split	between	the	stable	and	the	vulnerable	MC,	with	employment	status,	gender	and	 other	 factors	 substantially	 impacting	 one’s	 ability	 to	 maintain	 the	 MC	position.	Similar	distinctions	within	the	BMC	can	be	seen	in	the	works	of	Southall	(2016)	 and	 Seekings	 and	 Nattrass	 (2015),	 who	 also	 point	 out	 the	 different	opportunities	 afforded	 to	 bank	 till	 workers,	 teachers,	 and	 senior	 managers	 in	SOEs,	all	of	whom	are	considered	BMC.																																																										33	The	 term	counter-elite	does	not	denote	here	a	negative	value	 judgement,	but	a	group	 that	 is	challenging	 the	 existing	 elite	 and	 is	 synonymous	 with	 terms	 such	 as	 the	 ‘elite	 wannabes’	(Thurlow	and	and	Jaworski,	2017a;	2017b)	or	the	‘nouveaux	rich’	(Daloz,	2007).	
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	The	occupational	 differences	within	 the	middle	 class	 also	bring	 to	 the	 fore	 the	category	of	 ‘working	class,’	which	is	used	in	popular	self-identification,	political	debates	 and	economic	analyses.	Guy	Standing	argues	 that	 the	working	 class	or	the	proletariat	in	recent	history	meant:		 workers	 in	 long-term,	 stable,	 fixed-hour	 jobs	 with	 established	routes	 of	 advancement,	 subject	 to	 unionisation	 and	 collective	agreements,	with	 job	 titles	 their	 fathers	 and	mothers	would	have	understood,	facing	local	employers	whose	names	and	features	they	were	familiar	with	(2014,	10).			In	 the	 South	 African	 context,	 however,	 working	 class	 self-identification	 and	perceived	 belonging	 also	 contravenes	 the	 traditional	 approaches	 to	 class	designation.	For	example,	 Ichharam	(2006)	 finds	 that	 informal	 female	garment	workers	identify	themselves	with	the	working	class	without	formal,	contractual	employment	 relationships,	 the	 same	 way	 as	 formally	 employed	 educated	professionals,	 such	 as	 teachers	 and	 other	 public	 sector	 employees	 (Ngoma,	2016).	Thus,	being	a	‘worker’	encompasses	a	wide	range	of	people	with	different	employment	 statuses	 and	 in	 various	 professions	 with	 diverse	 lived	 realities.	Workers	then	range	from	domestic	workers,	who	continue	to	be	the	backbone	of	South	 African	 households,	 through	 to	 miners	 and	 farm	 labourers,	 to	 student	workers	 in	 the	 university	 departments.	 Despite	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 self-identifications,	however,	in	light	of	the	lack	of	structural	changes	to	the	economy,	the	category	has	largely	been	racialised	as	Black	African.	As	Ngoma	(2016,	177)	points	 out,	 “The	 working	 class	 denotes	 a	 racial	 category	 in	 South	 Africa,	therefore,	 identity	 construction	 along	 the	 working	 class	 lines	 dovetails	 with	racial	and	Black	solidarity,”	which	explains	why	many	members	of	the	Black	MC	see	themselves	more	as	working	class,	and	why	my	research	participants	rarely	attributed	the	working-class	identity	to	white	South	Africans.			The	 self-perceived	 ‘worker’	 identity	 is	 partially	 created	 by	 the	 political	obfuscation	 of	 leftist	 rhetoric	 and	 rightist	 politics	 pursued	 by	 the	 ANC.	 The	phrase	 “talk	 left-walk	 right”	 spearheaded	 by	 the	 South	 African	 scholar	 activist	Patrick	Bond,	has	become	widely	used	to	describe	the	ANC	neoliberal	capitalist	
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politics,	hidden	by	the	populist	Marxist	rhetoric.	The	close	ties	of	 the	ANC	with	labour-related	 structures	 in	 the	 Tripartite	 Alliance,	 namely	 the	 South	 African	Communist	 Party	 (SACP)	 and	 COSATU	 (Confederation	 of	 South	 African	 Trade	Unions),	 have	 facilitated	 this	 obfuscating	 of	 class	 identities.	 Their	 cooperation	enabled	the	ANC	to	claim	the	close	ties	to	the	working	class	and	to	use	its	partner	structures	 for	 voter	 mobilisation	 (Plaut,	 2014).	 For	 example,	 during	 the	 2017	ANC	policy	conference,	the	party	re-committed	itself	as	“a	broad	church,	a	multi-class	movement	with	 a	 strong	 bias	 to	 the	working	 class	 and	 the	 poor”	 (Zuma,	2017).	 Nonetheless,	 the	 Alliance	 came	 under	 considerable	 strain	 under	 the	presidency	of	Jacob	Zuma	and	by	late	2016,	COSATU’s	support	for	the	president	diminished	 in	 light	 of	 the	 state	 capture	 revelations.	 Many	 COSATU	 member	organisations	 joined	 the	 call	 for	 the	president	 to	 step	down,	while	 at	 the	 same	time	COSATU	was	 critiqued	 for	 enabling	 Zuma’s	 rise	 to	 power	 in	 2007,	 hence,	bearing	some	blame	for	the	status	quo	(Hamill,	2017).			COSATU	was	also	criticised	by	 the	so-called	progressive	 left	academics	over	 its	lack	of	protection	of	workers	in	the	2016	–	2017	negotiations	over	the	national	minimum	wage	bill	and	several	 labour-related	 laws	around	strikes	and	dispute	negotiations.	The	high	levels	of	unemployment	and	the	large	scale	job-shedding	in	key	sectors	such	as	mining	and	agriculture,	which	offered	jobs	predominantly	for	low-skilled	workers,	also	show	the	lack	of	protection	of	some	members	of	the	working	 class	 (Yu,	 Kasongo	 and	 Moses,	 2016).	 These	 academics,	 for	 instance	Carin	Runciman	(2017),	Andries	Bezuidenhout	(2017)	or	Patrick	Bond	(2017b),	link	the	unfavourable	legal	changes	to	the	transformation	in	the	composition	of	much	 of	 the	 unions’	 leadership	 and	membership,	 as	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades	unions	 have	 become	 more	 professionalised,	 skilled	 and	 managerial.	 As	Bezuidenhout	(2017)	puts	it	“South	Africa’s	trade	union	federation	had	become	a	home	for	middle	class	civil	servants,	rather	than	a	working	class	federation.”	His	observation	 is	 further	 substantiated	 by	 the	 description	 that	 Schotte,	 Zizzamia	and	Leibbrandt	 (2017)	provide	of	 the	South	African	middle	class.	They	suggest	that	a	stable	MC	member	is	most	likely	to	be	“male,	African,	about	46	years	old,	has	completed	secondary	education,	is	employed	with	a	permanent	work	contract	
and	union	coverage,	 and	 the	 household	 is	 likely	 to	 reside	 in	 an	 urban	 area	 in	
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Gauteng	province,	where	Johannesburg	and	Pretoria	are	located”	[my	emphasis]	(2017,	 4).	 Their	 findings	 thus	 demonstrate	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 the	 unions	away	from	the	low-skilled,	less	educated	workers	towards	educated	middle	class	professionals.		
Consumption	&	Economic	Wellbeing	In	 addition	 to	 democratic	 change,	 middle	 classness	 is	 also	 associated	 with	improved	 economic	 wellbeing	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 Black	 African	 poor,	 who	represent	the	majority	of	the	country’s	population.	As	conspicuous	consumption	of	 the	 BMC	 has	 dominated	 the	 perceptions	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 BMC	 (Khunou,	2015),	the	BMC	is	easily	conflated	with	the	idea	of	Black	elite.	As	only	a	fraction	of	 Black	 Africans	 benefited	 from	 BEE	 and	 other	 affirmative	 action	 policies	extensively	 in	 economic	 terms	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 large	number	 of	 the	poor,	the	BMC	is	similar	to	the	elite	because	it	is	small	in	size,	yet	it	has	both	perceived	and	 real	 economic	 power	 vis-à-vis	 the	 poor.	 Thus,	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	BMC	and	the	elite	might	be	rather	arbitrary	 from	the	perceptive	of	 the	poor	or	primarily	 analytical	 in	 use,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	my	 research	participants.			In	the	case	of	the	BMC	in	South	Africa,	conspicuous	consumption	can	be	framed	as	 an	 attempt	 of	 the	 emerging	 or	 aspiring	 elite	 to	 portray	 the	markers	 of	 elite	distinction,	which	however,	becomes	an	exercise	in	pretence,	because	it	is	often	not	 backed	 by	 the	 appropriate	 economic	 power.	 Hence,	 the	 displays	 of	 class	markers	 are	 rooted	 in	high	 levels	 of	 credit	 and	debt	 (James,	 2014).	Due	 to	 the	role	of	comparisons	and	perceptions,	being	middle	class	and	being	elite	may	be	based	 on	 perceived	 similar	 lifestyles.	 Sarah	 Nuttall	 describes	 the	 conflation	mechanism	behind	class	status	in	her	analysis	of	what	she	calls	the	Y-Generation	culture,	 as	exhibited	 in	 the	 Johannesburg	 suburb	of	Rosebank.	 She	argues	 that,	“The	 stylizations	 of	 the	 self…	 are	 based	 on	 a	 delicate	 balance	 between	 actual	emerging	 lifestyles	 of	 middle-class	 black	 youth	 and	 the	 politics	 of	 aspiration.”	(2004,	439)	Hence,	no	matter	whether	it	is	labelled	as	middle	class	or	elite,	class	status	is	experienced	and	perceived	differently,	depending	on	where	one	lies	on	
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the	 spectrum	 of	 disempowerment	 and	 empowerment	 vis-à-vis	 the	 neoliberal	economy.			Posel	and	Casale	(2011)	find	that	amongst	Black	Africans,	unlike	whites,	there	is	a	higher	 level	of	discrepancy	between	perceived	and	actual	economic	standing.	In	 other	 words,	 more	 of	 those	 who	 are	 in	 the	 top	 third	 of	 wealth	 perceive	themselves	as	either	middle	 income	or	poor,	which	the	authors	attribute	to	the	lack	of	information	about	the	economic	situation	against	the	whites	(2011,	206,	215).	 Study	 by	 Phadi	 and	 Ceruti	 (2011)	 similarly	 shows	 that	 Sowetans	with	 a	vastly	different	economic	and	employment	backgrounds	consider	themselves	to	be	middle	 class	 and	 highlight	 that	 a	 common	 theme	 in	 their	 identification	 is	 a	notion	 of	 affordability/consumption,	which	 is,	 however,	 based	 on	 comparisons	which	can	be	either	upward	or	downward	orientated.	Moreover,	 the	Sowetans’	comparisons	are	not	limited	only	to	a	reference	group	that	is	‘like	them’	but	are	informed	 by	 a	 broader	 awareness	 of	 others’	 situation.	 One	 of	 my	 African	participants	 living	 in	a	 township	 in	Gauteng,	Nomthandanzo,	demonstrates	 this	point	quite	well.	At	19,	she	was	living	with	her	parents	and	brothers,	and	was	a	mother	to	a	baby	boy.	She	was	studying	to	become	a	community	worker,	hoping	to	 help	 others	 in	 the	 future.	When	 she	was	describing	 her	 living	 situation,	 she	said	she	felt	privileged	because	unlike	many	other	people	living	in	townships,	she	had	never	gone	hungry,	because	her	mother	had	always	made	sure	that	she	and	her	 brothers	 were	 fed,	 and	 that	 they	 even	 had	 cake	 to	 celebrate	 big	achievements.	Similarly,	white	South	Africans,	especially	Afrikaners,	have	sought	to	establish	themselves	against	the	global	structures	of	whiteness,	leading	to	the	perception	of	other	(white)	people	being	better	off	than	them	(Steyn,	2001)	and	there	being	another	elite	class	with	whom	to	compare.	Ultimately,	this	leads	to	a	distorted	 understanding	 of	 economic	 realities	 and	 positionalities	 against	 other	South	Africans.			Inequality	combined	with	pretence	status	markers	is	also	visible	at	UJ.	Observing	students,	it	may	seem	that	the	reputation	of	UJ	as	an	institution	for	the	working-class/poor	is	at	odds	with	the	self-representation	of	the	students	or	that	the	class	make-up	of	the	student	body	is	not	as	skewed	towards	the	lower	percentiles	as	it	
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might	be	suggested	in	popular	imagery	of	the	institution.	While	some	UJ	students	are	 certainly	 economically	well	 off,	 others	 only	 portray	 certain	 status	 through	their	urban	chic	fashion	choices	and	use	of	tech	accessories,	while	the	reality	of	their	 economic	 disposition	 remains	 hidden.	 Some	 students	 are	 on	 one	 hand	dependent	on	charity	funded	meals	provided	by	the	NGO	Gift	of	the	Givers,	and	others	 are	 preparing	 for	 their	 next	 holiday	 trip	 to	 Europe	 or	 have	 the	 latest	MacBook	Air	in	their	designer	bag.	Many	of	my	interviewees	spoke	about	times	both	 as	 young	 children	 and	 while	 at	 varsity,	 when	 they	 did	 not	 have	 enough	money	to	buy	food	at	the	end	of	month	before	their	parents	send	them	another	instalment	of	pocket	money	or	being	without	a	phone	–	and	thus	not	responding	to	 my	 WhatsApp	 messages	 –	 because	 it	 broke	 down	 and	 they	 just	 could	 not	afford	to	replace	it.	According	to	a	2017	Student	Spend	Report	(Student	Village,	2017),	 Black	 African	 students	 spent	 most	 money	 on	 clothing	 and	 jewellery,	followed	 by	 groceries	 and	 airtime/data.	 Students	 from	 the	 remaining	 racial	groups	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 spend	 most	 on	 groceries	 (albeit	 more	 than	 Black	African	 students),	 followed	by	 clothing	 and	pay	TV.	This	 spending	break-down	fits	with	 the	 narrative,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 youth	 has	 bought	 into	 consumerist	culture	and	is	too	preoccupied	with	material	things.		While	 the	 BMC	 and	 youth	 literature	 does	 not	 frequently	 frame	 the	 issues	 of	consumption	and	displays	of	wealth	through	a	gendered	lens,	one	can	clearly	see	the	connection	with	 the	Black	African	masculinity	debates	 from	Chapter	Three,	which	result	in	the	inability	of	many	young	men	to	reach	the	expected	markers	of	adult	 masculinity.	 The	 idea	 of	 ‘Black	 Diamond’	 (Mda,	 2009)	 is	 probably	 most	illustrative	 of	 the	 class	 bearings	 on	 masculinity,	 as	 the	 term	 refers	 to	 Black	African	men	who	have	become	rich	after	 the	end	of	apartheid.	They	have	been	able	 to	 afford	 a	 lavish	 life	 style,	 demonstrated	 most	 stereotypically	 in	 their	fashion	choices,	luxury	cars	and	residences	in	gated	communities	and	expensive	neighbourhoods	 such	 as	 Sandton.	 Vincent	 (2006)	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	pressures	on	Black	African	men	to	display	their	masculinity	outwardly	through	clothing	 or	 their	 pose	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	white	Afrikaner	men,	who	 are	 able	 to	appear	‘unkept’	and	‘careless’,	because	of	their	self-assured	status.	It	is	certainly	a	difference	one	can	observe	when	walking	around	UJ.		
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	The	 feminine	 parallel	 to	 the	 Black	 Diamond	 masculinity	 emerged	 in	 my	discussion	 with	 Tshiamo,	 who	 captured	 it	 in	 our	 chat	 over	 racial	 divides	 on	campus.	 When	 I	 asked	 her	 whether	 she	 had	 white	 friends	 and	 whether	 she	interacted	with	white	 students	 beyond	 the	 classroom	 setting,	 she	 said	 she	 did	not:		 Tshiamo:	 Because	 they	 [white	 students]	 tend	 to	 segregate	themselves	 from	us,	 coz	we	don’t	have	beautiful	 cars,	 they’re	 like	the	‘it’	girls,	and	I’m	like,	you	know	what	[claps],	I	can’t	do	that.	Ján:	You	don’t	think	you’re	the	‘it’	girl?	Tshiamo:	No!	I’m	not!	[laugh]	No	I’m	not	[shock/	offended]	I	don’t	even	look	like	an	‘it’	girl.	Ján:	How	does	an	‘it’	girl	look	like?	Tshiamo:	Ah,	like	the	flashing	money,	they’ve	got	beautiful	phones,	they’ve	got	their	car	keys,	so	whenever	we’re	talking,	they’ll	be	like,	guys,	what	time	is	it?	I	have	to	leave	-	the	traffic.	And	I’m	like,	I	use	a	Megabus	[silent	voice]	[laugh].	Ján:	[claps]	But	is	it	an	issue	of	race?	Is	it	more	of	a	class	[issue]?	Tshiamo:	No,	it’s	not	an	issue	of	race.	Ján:	Do	you	have	Black	girls	who	do	that?	Tshiamo:	Yes.	Ján:	[laugh]	Tshiamo:	You	do!	Ján:	Tell	me!	Tshiamo:	So,	those	kind	of	Black	girls,	those	are	the	ones	who	hang	out	with	 those	 kind	 of	 white	 people,	 and	 Indian,	 yes,	 but	 I	 don’t	think	 it’s	 a	 biggie,	 coz…	 	 there	 are	 different	 levels	 of	 life,	 I’m	 not	there	yet.			Tshiamo’s	 final	 statement	 shows	 a	 contradiction	 that	 underpins	 the	 notion	 of	eliteness.	On	one	hand,	she	is	critical	of	the	‘it’	girls,	yet	it	appears	that	she	might	want	to	become	one	of	them.	The	status	thus	represents	a	mixture	of	economic	wellbeing,	which	is	attractive	and	desired,	but	it	also	presents	other	traits	which	are	contradicting	the	normative	expectations	and	which,	therefore,	discipline	the	drive	towards	eliteness	to	a	level	that	does	not	challenge	the	structures	keeping	those	in	power.		The	 disciplinary	 power	 against	 the	 intersectionally	 defined	 elite	 identification	emerged	 during	 my	 interview	 with	 a	 second-year	 psychology	 student	 from	
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Gauteng.	 The	 student	 had	 heard	 about	 my	 research	 in	 2016,	 when	 I	 came	 to	recruit	participants	in	one	of	her	classes,	but	she	had	decided	not	to	join.	She	told	me	that	at	the	time	she	had	not	been	convinced	by	my	presentation,	and	did	not	take	me	 seriously,	 but	was	only	persuaded	 to	 come	and	 talk	 to	me	after	being	asked	by	one	of	her	friends.	During	our	interview	she	suggested	that	I	could	have	asked	others	 to	speak	on	my	behalf	during	 the	 lecture	 to	gain	more	credibility.	Despite	her	original	hesitation,	however,	she	engaged	fully	and	critically	with	the	issues	that	we	discussed	and	was	very	open-minded	about	the	idea	of	privilege	and	economic	inequality	in	the	country.	Being	Indian,	she	was	mindful	of	the	fact	that	her	position	was	better	than	many	of	her	Black	African	fellow	students.	She	was	very	empathetic	about	their	life	struggles	and	was	aware	of	the	poverty	that	many	 of	 them	 experienced.	 I	 remember	 thinking	 it	 was	 refreshing	 that	 unlike	many	other	students	 I	had	spoken	 to	before,	and	who	described	 themselves	as	middle	class,	she	openly	said	she	was	“upper	middle	class.”	When	she	elaborated	on	 her	 lifestyle,	 however,	 it	 seemed	 as	 if	 she	were	 downplaying	 her	 economic	circumstances	by	describing	herself	as	middle	class	instead	of	elite.	She	spoke	of	her	high	school	education	where	one	year	cost	more	than	her	entire	university	degree	at	UJ	–	she	said	her	parents	were	saving	money	by	her	coming	to	UJ.	She	was	a	member	of	a	prestigious	club	of	students,	who	were	being	groomed	to	be	future	 leaders	 and	 go	 abroad.	 She	 told	 me	 about	 properties	 that	 her	 family	owned,	both	in	and	outside	of	Johannesburg,	including	one	up	North	where	her	father	went	 to	 play	 golf.	 She	disliked	 going	 to	 the	 shopping	 centre	 by	 the	APK	campus,	where	many	students	did	their	shopping,	but	preferred	shopping	malls	in	upscale	Sandton.			What	the	student’s	story	underscores	is	her	inability	or	unwillingness	to	be	seen	as	elite	and	hence	similarly	to	the	elite-leader	connection,	shows	the	desire	of	the	elites	 to	 adopt	 downward	 social	 identification	 and	mask	 difference.	 Therefore,	the	student’s	 self-characterisation	should	not	come	as	a	 surprise	 in	 light	of	 the	historic	practices	and	ongoing	trends	in	South	Africa,	which	are	reinforced	by	the	criticism	 of	 the	 elites	 in	 the	 global	 context	 of	 a	 post-Bernie	 Madoff,	 99%	 and	Panama	Papers	world.	Moreover,	class	pretence	as	a	response	to	difference,	be	it	upward	 or	 downward,	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 as	 yet	 another	 element	 fuelling	
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the	culture	of	mistrust	that	characterises	South	Africa,	which	impacts	the	ability	and	desire	of	students	to	identify	role	models	amongst	elite	women.			What	the	discourses	so	far	show	is	that	elites	are	linked	and	often	conflated	with	middle	classes	as	a	result	of	the	specific	historical	processes	of	change	that	have	been	 taking	 place	 in	 South	 Africa	 since	 the	 end	 of	 apartheid,	 which	 are	underpinned	 in	 HE.	 The	 intersection	 of	 education,	 wealth,	 status	 and	 social	mobility	 narratives	 can	 best	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 example	 of	 France	 Bourgouin’s	(2012)	 study	 on	 African	 transnational	 capitalists	 in	 Johannesburg.	 Bourgouin	focuses	on	foreign-	educated	Black	Africans	in	their	late	20s	to	mid	40s,	recruited	to	work	 in	 the	city.	She	argues	 that	 their	 lifestyle	displaying	wealth	and	excess	was	 a	 form	 of	 identity-building	 around	 performing	 the	 expected	 behaviour	 of	capitalist	 predators,	 who	 are	 cosmopolitan	 because	 they	 are	 not	 tied	 to	 one	place,	but	 follow	global	 capital	and	 thus	are	not	parochial	or	 local.	 In	 this	way,	they	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 other	 classes	 as	well	 as	 other	 international	elites.	Bourgouin	concludes:			 they	 [transnational	 African	 capitalists]	 stand	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	generation	of	African	elite	ahead	of	them;	their	fathers	and	uncles	who	are	often	stereotyped	as	nepotistic,	rent	seeking,	and	corrupt	African	political	elite.	On	the	other	hand,	they	earned	their	privilege	through	 the	 merit	 of	 their	 success	 at	 internationally	 renowned	business	 schools	 and	 by	 their	 skills	 and	 talent	 as	 young	professionals	 in	 the	 global	 finance	 sector	 [original	 emphases]	(2012,	69).		Rachel	 Spronk	 (2014)	 studies	 a	 similar	 cohort	of	 young	urban	professionals	 in	Nairobi.	 The	 ‘yuppies’	 that	 she	 follows	 were	 in	 different	 kinds	 of	 professions	from	Bourgouin’s	capitalists;	however,	according	to	her,	they	were	middle	class	because	 of	 their	 education	 and	 occupations,	 their	 consumption	 patterns	 and	their	 sense	 of	 modernity.	 She	 argues	 that	 unlike	 the	 elites,	 these	 urbanites	needed	 education	 to	 achieve	 their	 status,	 rather	 than	 being	 able	 to	 rely	 on	opportunities	 afforded	 to	 them	 by	 their	 families’	 economic	 status.	 The	transnational	 capitalists	 and	 the	urban	yuppies	 certainly	differ	 in	 the	 extent	of	their	conspicuous	consumption-based	lifestyles	underpinned	by	their	disposable	income.	 However,	 they	 are	 both	 assumed	 to	 be	 educated	 to	 university	 level,	
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achieving	their	status,	and	see	themselves	as	bearers	of	modernity	and	prestige.	These	values	mirror	the	qualities	and	expectations	that	students	at	UJ	associated	both	 with	 middle	 classness	 for	 themselves	 and	 eliteness	 for	 female	 political	elites.		The	tensions	and	conflations	between	eliteness	and	middle	classness,	as	well	as	the	 values	 and	 characteristics	 associated	 with	 the	 class	 terminology,	 can	 be	observed	in	the	debates	around	education	institutions	and	Fallist	activism,	which	I	outline	in	the	following	section.	The	close	interaction	between	student	politics	and	 daily	 experiences	 within	 HE	 context	 make	 the	 debates	 of	 eliteness,	leadership	 and	 middle	 classness	 in	 HE	 particularly	 pertinent	 for	 the	understanding	of	the	emancipative	potential	of	FPEs.	
Eliteness	and	Middle	Classness:	Wits	vs.	UJ	Eliteness	is	a	significant	feature	within	the	South	African	education	system.	The	use	 of	 the	 term	mirrors	 the	 class	 and	 racialised	 narratives	 that	 are	 associated	with	 eliteness	 more	 broadly	 (Badat	 and	 Sayed,	 2014).	 Within	 the	 secondary	education,	 it	 is	 most	 visible	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 so-called	 “former	 Model	 C	schools,”	which	were	institutions	historically	reserved	for	white	students	during	apartheid	and	which	had	since	been	converted	to	either	private	or	public,	mixed-raced	schools.	Due	to	the	long-term,	state-sponsored	support,	these	schools	had	the	resources	to	build	a	reputation	of	high	student	achievement	and	success,	as	well	as	exclusivity,	inaccessibility	and	unavailability	for	the	majority	of	the	Black	population.	 Thus,	 Model	 C	 schools	 became	 elite	 institutions.	 Many	 of	 these	schools	 have	 not	 been	 fully	 transformed	 in	 their	 institutional	 practices,	 as	 I	demonstrate	 in	more	detail	on	the	case	of	Pretoria	Girls’	High	in	Chapter	Eight.	Therefore,	 the	 racially	 and	 socio-economically	 charged	 language	 surrounding	former	Model	 C	 schools	 has	 continued.	 For	 example,	 NDZ	 infamously	 attacked	the	 schools	 during	 one	 of	 her	 campaign	 speeches	 in	 2017;	 saying	 they	 were	racist	places	where	young	people	were	being	taught	to	be	critical	of	the	ANC	(du	Preez,	2017).	Thus,	many	former	Model	C	schools,	especially	those	that	operate	
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on	 high	 student	 fees,	 maintain	 a	 level	 of	 exclusivity	 and	 exclusion,	 which	 is	juxtaposed	to	many	poorly	resourced	and	ailing	public	schools	in	quintiles	1-3.34			In	 the	 realm	 of	 HE,	 historically	 white	 universities	 such	 as	 Wits,	 UCT	 or	Stellenbosch	 University	 also	 continue	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 elite	 institutions.	Eliteness	 of	 these	 institutions	 is	 both	 a	 form	 of	 economic	 exclusion	 and	 high	status	or	prestige,	which	 is	rooted	 in	the	universities’	academic	excellence.	35	In	the	 economic	 realm,	 eliteness	 underscores	 that	 costs	 of	 fees	 prevent	 many	students	 from	 pursuing	 studies	 at	 these	 institutions,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	qualify	 with	 their	 admissions	 point	 scores,	 or	 as	 some	 FMF	 activists	 and	supporters	 put	 it,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 ‘academically	 deserving’.	 Many	 of	 my	respondents	 confirmed	 the	 economic	 obstacle	 when	 they	 explained	 their	decision	 to	 come	 to	 UJ.	Wits	was	 for	many	 of	 them	 the	main	 alternative	 to	 UJ	because	 of	 its	 location	 in	 Johannesburg.	 Those	 students	who	were	 accepted	 to	their	desired	programmes	at	Wits	and	chose	to	come	to	UJ	instead,	did	so,	they	said,	because	of	the	financial	implications,	while	some	said	that	they	did	not	even	bother	applying	to	Wits,	knowing	that	they	could	not	even	afford	the	registration	fees,	 let	 alone	 the	 tuition.	The	FMF	 call	 to	 remove	high	 costs	 of	 education	was	thus	 framed	 as	 a	 demand	 to	 remove	 structural	 barriers	 which	 keep	 the	(predominantly	white,	but	also	Black)	elites	in	power	through	education	and	by	extension	through	economic	and	employment	opportunities.		As	 most	 elite	 universities	 are	 formerly	 white	 institutions,	 the	 notions	 of	academic	 excellence	 and	 achievement	 continue	 to	 be	 inherently	 racialised	 as																																																									34	It	must	be	acknowledged	that	there	were	also	elite	schools	for	Black	Africans	during	apartheid,	such	as	the	Inanda	Seminary	in	KZN,	which	was	a	former	missionary	boarding	school	for	girls.	As	Healy	Clancy	 (2014)	argues,	 the	 institution	was	allowed	 to	prepare	girls	 to	pursue	professions	such	as	nursing	and	teaching,	because	they	were	needed	by	the	regime	and	because	girls	were	seen	as	less	politically	dangerous	than	Black	African	men.	According	to	the	author,	the	institution	was	seen	by	Black	Africans	as	a	special	place	of	protection	for	black	bourgeois	and	“preparation	for	social	mobility”	(2014,	174).	35	In	 this	 section	 I	 focus	 solely	 on	 public	 or	 state-subsidised	 universities.	 In	 South	 Africa	 as	elsewhere,	 there	 are	 also	private	HE	 institutions,	which	are	 considerably	more	expensive	 than	public	institutions.	One	private	university	that	students	mentioned	in	my	research	was	Monash	University,	where	several	of	them	had	applied,	but	if	they	got	accepted	and	chose	not	to	attend,	it	was	 primarily	 due	 to	 costs.	 However,	 the	 controversy	 around	 eliteness	 is	 not	 associated	with	these	private	institutions	as	it	is	with	some	of	the	public	universities,	not	least	because	of	the	fact	that	the	latter	are	state-subsidised,	historically	white	and	enjoy	high	levels	of	 international	and	domestic	recognition	for	academic	excellence.	
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white.	 Although	 these	perceptions	 have	been	 challenged	by	 Fallists	 and	 others	within	the	university	spaces,	who	build	on	a	long	history	of	anti-colonial	thought,	the	 racial	differences	are	 still	 embedded	 in	 the	 thinking	of	many	students.	One	interesting	 example	 emerged	 during	 the	 students’	 debate	 over	 the	aforementioned	 leadership	 succession	within	 the	DA.	 Students	 in	 an	FGD	were	questioning	why	a	capable,	young	Black	African	woman	like	Lindiwe	Mazibuko,	who	held	the	highest	opposition	post	in	Parliament	between	2011-2014,	did	not	replace	Helen	Zille	at	the	helm	of	the	party.	The	spat	and	the	fall-out	between	the	two	 politicians	 over	 Mazibuko’s	 ability	 and	 readiness	 to	 lead	 the	 party,	 be	 it	within	Parliament	 in	 2011	or	 nationally	 after	 the	 2014	 elections,	was	partially	revived	 during	 the	 time	 of	 my	 data	 collection,	 as	 Zille	 (2016)	 published	 her	memoires,	in	which	she	shares	her	perceptions	of	their	relationship	and	how	the	events	unfolded.	While	focusing	on	the	issue	of	competition	between	women	and	especially	 between	 women	 of	 different	 generations	 and	 races	 that	 the	 Zille-Mazibuko	incident	manifested,	Arya	proposed:			 I	think	it’s	because…	most	of	the	things	in	South	Africa,	stem	back	from	 the	 apartheid	 history.	 Helen	 Zille,	 I	 think,	 saw	 it	 difficult	 to	trust	a	Black	person	[Mazibuko]	because	of	 the	education	system.	So,	 you	 [Mazibuko]	 had	 Black	 education,	 so	 I	 [Zille]	 received…	better	 education	 than	 you,	 so	whatever	 you’re	 proposing	 it’s	 still	[inferior].		As	 the	 conversation	 continued,	 other	 students	 suggested	 that	 it	 was	 not	 a	question	of	education,	as	Mazibuko	received	her	university	degree	after	the	end	of	 apartheid,	 and	 hence,	 did	 not	 suffer	 from	 the	 inferior	 Bantu	 (Black	African)	education	 system.	 The	 debate	 about	 the	 incident	 shows	 that	 the	 students	continued	to	be	emotionally	and	intellectually	challenged	by	the	racist	apartheid	legacy	and	its	impacts	on	the	notion	of	eliteness	and	quality	of	HE	institutions.			The	 economic	 factors	 underpinning	 one’s	 ability	 to	 study	 at	 the	 so-called	 elite	universities	 led	many	 students	 to	make	 assumptions	 of	what	 kind	 of	 students	attend	 institutions	 like	Wits,	 transposing	 the	 aforementioned	 elite	 values	 onto	the	students	who	attend	them.	As	one	of	my	interviewees	put	it,	she	did	not	want	to	go	to	Wits,	because	she	believed	‘Witsies’	thought	that	they	were	“better	than	
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others.”	 This	 student	 was	 from	 a	 Coloured	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 was	 a	member	 of	 a	 day	 house	 at	 APK	 but	was	 not	 active	 in	 other	 organisations.	 Her	father	dropped	out	of	university	and	ended	up	starting	his	own	business,	while	her	mother	was	an	accountant.	Her	parents	were	divorced	and	she	felt	closer	to	her	 father	because	she	struggled	with	her	mother’s	relationship	with	her	racial	identity,	which	amplified	her	negative	views	of	Wits	as	a	white	 institution.	Her	mother	went	to	RAU,	UJ’s	predecessor,	because	it	was	a	white	institution	at	the	time.	According	to	 the	student,	her	mother	thought	of	herself	as	white,	and	did	not	want	her	daughter	to	go	to	a	Black	African	school	that	UJ	has	become,	but	to	a	better,	white	institution.	Hence,	her	decision	to	come	to	UJ	was	an	act	of	rebellion	against	whiteness	 as	 a	measure	 of	 excellence	 and	 an	 embrace	 of	 her	 Coloured	identity.			The	student’s	story	demonstrates	the	widely	held	assumption	that	the	majority	of	the	students	at	Wits	are	from	rich	family	backgrounds,	are	primarily	white	or	‘coconuts’	 and	 perceive	 themselves	 as	 superior	 to	 others	 –	 the	 main	 signs	 of	elitism.	These	views	of	Wits	students	exist	despite	the	fact	that	it	has	increased	its	 Black	 African	 student	 population	 dramatically	 since	 the	 end	 of	 apartheid.	According	to	the	2015	enrolment	data,	nearly	70%	of	the	students	at	Wits	were	Black	 (Sooful,	 2015).	 Descriptive	 and	 numerical	 transformation	 of	 the	 student	body	has	been	the	easiest	form	of	transformation	to	achieve	from	the	perspective	of	HE	 institutions,	while	 changes	 to	 the	 academic	 staff	 and	 the	 curriculum	 are	lagging	behind	(Daniels	and	Damons,	2011).	Hence,	the	racialised	view	of	a	Wits	student	 is	more	 a	matter	 of	 historical	 baggage	 than	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 current	status	 quo,	 while	 changes	 to	 the	 students’	 class	 and	 racial	 identifications	 and	consciousness	remain	debated.			The	last	element	of	the	elite	discourses	around	Wits	is	well	summarised	by	Kiara.	When	I	interviewed	her	in	February	2017,	she	was	in	her	second	year	and	joined	a	 community	 engagement	 group	 as	 a	 volunteer.	 She	 had	 her	 eyes	 set	 on	becoming	a	brand	manager	for	a	fashion	and	beauty	house,	such	as	Coco	Chanel.	She	was	from	a	township	in	Gauteng	and	was	very	proud	of	being	from	a	hip	and	happening	location.	Kiara	 lived	with	her	mother,	grandmother	and	her	brother,	
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and	while	her	mother	only	had	a	matric,	her	sisters	were	advocates	(higher-level	legal	counsellors),	so	her	university	career	was	not	unprecedented	in	her	family.	She	started	her	studies	without	funding,	but	by	the	second	year	she	was	able	to	get	 NSFAS	 and	 was	 preparing	 to	 move	 into	 on-campus	 residence.	 When	 we	discussed	the	financial	claims	made	by	FMF	protesters,	she	mentioned	the	media	focus	 on	 Wits	 and	 other	 HWUs	 over	 formerly	 underprivileged	 institutions	(Hodes,	 2017),	 where	 the	 activists	 also	 experienced	 violent	 clashes	 with	authorities,	 but	 did	 not	 have	 sufficient	 social	 and	 political	 clout	 to	 attract	attention.	I	asked	if	she	would	have	wanted	to	go	to	Wits	instead	of	UJ:		 Kiara:	Yeah,	I	did	want	to	go	to	Wits,	because	it’s	like,	when	you	say	you	are	at	Wits,	they	treat	you	differently.	Ján:	Oh,	OK,	in	what	way?	Kiara:	Like,	when	you	say	you’re	at	Wits	…	they	assume,	ah	[kiss-teeth]	you’re	better,	you	are	an	A	student,	 coz	 like	Wits	 is	known	for	that,	you’re	an	A-student,	you’re	a	nerd,	and	stuff	like	that…	Ján:	So,	do	you	want	that?	Or	you	don’t	want	to	be	[that]?		Kiara:	Yeah,	I	don’t	want	to	be	treated	like	that.		Ján:	Isn’t	it	good	to	have	a	status	like	‘I	am	from	an	elite	school,	I’m	going	to	Wits’?	Kiara:	Yah,	you’re	from	Wits,	but	then	what?	Yah,	I	am	from	UJ,	but	I’m	doing	this,	and	this,	and	that,	so	 it’s	 just	 like,	 it’s	 just	a	status,	it’s	 just	 a	 status	 that’s	 been	 put	 up	 by	 the	 public	 and	 somehow	people	fear	students	from	Wits,	like,	‘ooh,	Wits’,	like	you	know,	and	then	it’s	like	UJ,	ah,	UJ	…,	ah,	it	is	a	nice	school.		Kiara’s	 answers	 show	 that	 Wits’	 elite	 status	 was	 also	 associated	 with	 its	academic	 reputation,	 as	much	as	 it	was	about	 economic	exclusion36.	Moreover,	the	reference	to	people	fearing	Wits	students	hints	to	the	differences	in	students’	political	 behaviour,	 which	 has	 been	 made	 prominent	 by	 Fallist	 activism,	 and	which	was	also	rooted	in	the	socio-economic	profile	of	the	student	body.			Reflecting	 the	abovementioned	discourses	about	 the	democratising	potential	of	the	 middle	 classes,	 which	 has	 arguably	 not	 materialised	 (Mattes,	 2015)	 some	academics	 and	 commentators	 argued	 that	 the	 working-class	 and	 poor	background	of	UJ	students	meant	that	they	were	not	as	politically	and	radically																																																									36	Increasingly	the	description	and	identification	of	Wits	and	other	HWU	as	elite	is	being	replaced	by	 labels	 as	 ‘research-focused’	 or	 ‘research-intensive’	 to	 maintain	 the	 positive	 attributes	 of	academic	excellence	and	distinction,	while	hiding	the	elite	label	and	its	negative	connotations.		
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minded	as	their	middle	class/elite	counterparts	at	Wits.	Most	students	at	UJ	were	allegedly	not	willing	to	put	their	education	in	danger,	knowing	that	their	degrees	were	a	tool	of	social	mobility	for	them	and	their	families.	They	were	not	going	to	risk	the	future	wellbeing	of	their	families	for	political	goals,	which	would	benefit	primarily	the	future	generations	of	students,	and	were	consequently	less	likely	to	take	politically-related	risks	in	comparison	to	their	wealthier	counterparts.	Many	students	 I	 spoke	 to	were	 aware	of	 this	perception	of	UJ	 students	 and	 the	 ‘bad’	reputation	 that	 the	 university	 got	 amongst	 FMF	 activists,	 because	 UJ	 APK	was	one	of	the	last	campuses	to	join	the	national	protests	in	2015.	At	the	same	time,	however,	several	students	said	that	they	had	chosen	to	come	to	UJ	because	it	was	seen	 as	 less	 violent	 and	 protest-	 ready	 than	 Wits,	 making	 it	 into	 a	 positive	element	 of	 UJ	 character.	 Moreover,	 because	 of	 the	 relative	 affordability	 of	 the	university	fees	and	the	financial	assistance	that	many	students	receive,	they	were	less	likely	to	see	FMF	as	a	political	cause	to	support.	Other	factors	contributing	to	the	varying	levels	of	political	activism	include	Wits’	institutional	culture	based	on	the	 history	 of	 anti-apartheid	 political	 activism	 and	 the	 aforementioned	‘authoritarian’	approach	to	protest	of	VC	Rensburg	and	the	management	at	UJ.			In	 a	 seemingly	 paradoxical	 way,	 some	 argue	 that	 many	 Fallists	 were	 not	 the	wealthy	 socially-protected	 individuals,	 but	 the	 poorest	 and	 the	 most	marginalised	 students,	 who	 joined	 because	 they	 had	 nothing	 to	 lose.	 This	observation	 underscores	 yet	 again	 the	 difficulty	 of	 categorising	 students	 into	various	 socio-economic	 classes,	 as	 their	 lived	 experiences	 of	 poverty,	precariousness	 and	 opportunity	 vary.	 The	 class	 profile	 of	 a	 Fallist	 student,	therefore,	tends	to	be	either	a	poor	and	marginalised	Black	African	student	or	an	elite/middle	class	student.	KG,	an	African/Black	male	student	activist	in	his	final	year	of	studies,	summarised	this	observation	during	one	of	my	focus	groups:		 Kids	 of	 the	 working	 class	 parents,	 Black	 parents	 especially,	 you	know,	 how	 afraid	 they	 are	 to	 be	 involved	 because	 if	 I	 get	suspended…	 I	have	 three	younger	 sisters	 to	 take	 care	of	 [taps	on	the	 table],	 and	all	 those	 things,	…	She	 [Shaeera	Kalla]	didn’t	have	that	 [to]	 worry	 about.	 She	 could	 put	 her	 face	 on	 the	 line,	 her	reputation	of	the	line,	you	know,	her	body	on	the	line,	because	she	can	go	back	and	dad	will	be	 like,	no,	 let’s	go	to	UCT	or	you	know,	
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better	off,	 let’s	 take	you	to	Australia	next	year,	so	you	can	go	and	finish	off.			In	 his	 statement,	 KG,	 who	 was	 from	 the	 North	 West	 province,	 referred	 to	 a	student	 activist	 Shaeera	 Kalla,	 who	 together	 with	 Ulo	 Mkhatshwa,	 became	prominent	 female	 figures	 in	 the	 FMF	 in	 2015	 at	Wits.	 Both	women	were	 ANC	members	of	the	SRC	and	as	KG’s	statement	reveals,	they	were	at	times	criticised	and	 delegitimised	 for	 their	 elite	 upbringing,	 which	 referred	 to	 both	 their	financial	standing	as	well	as	the	political	connections	of	their	families	(Furlong,	2016;	Nemakonde,	2015).	Shaeera	continued	to	be	a	dominant	FMF	figure	during	my	 fieldwork,	 while	 Ulo	 became	 largely	 discredited.	 Many	 activists	 and	academics	 I	 spoke	 to	mentioned	 that	 students	believed	Ulo	was	profiting	 from	her	FMF	role	by	building	her	personal	brand	and	putting	the	collective	 interest	and	views	secondary	 to	her	personal	agenda	 (Gillespie,	2015).	 In	 this	way,	her	eliteness	fit	in	with	the	narrative	of	selfishness	and	greed.		In	addition	to	being	discredited	by	their	elite	status,	some	student	leaders	within	FMF	 and	 in	 HE	 more	 broadly,	 were	 accused	 of	 being	 sell-outs,	 because	 they	worked	 closely	 with	 the	 university	 management	 and/or	 without	 the	endorsement	of	the	wider	student	body.	Some	students	were	specifically	accused	of	being	paid	off	by	 the	management	 to	stop	causing	 trouble.	Hence,	 they	were	seen	to	have	sold	the	ideals	for	personal	gain.	For	example,	when	I	attended	the	student	engagements	with	 the	VC	at	UJ,	 the	UJ	APK	SRC	was	challenged	by	 the	audience	members	about	their	collaboration	with	the	university	management.	In	September	2016,	 for	example,	student	society	representatives	sat	on	a	panel	as	key	voices	of	the	student	body.	However,	many	audience	members	thought	that	they	should	not	be	engaging	with	the	management,	while	other	student	leaders	were	 suspended	 in	 connection	 to	 the	 arson	 of	 the	 auditorium.	Hassled	 by	 calls	from	the	audience,	the	students	were	intimidated	into	leaving	the	stage.			Fallism	 emphasised	 as	 part	 of	 its	 ideological	 grounding,	 a	 horizontal,	 so-called	‘leaderless’	 structure,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 direct	 democracy.	 Consequently,	many	 FMF	 branches,	 including	 the	 ones	 at	 Wits	 and	 UJ,	 were	 critical	 of	 SRC	members	who	were	either	positioned	as	FMF	leaders	or	presented	themselves	as	
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its	 key	 leaders	 (Becker,	 2016;	 Kamanzi,	 2016;	 Pithouse,	 2016;	 Satgar,	 2016).	Funzani,	 a	 Black	woman	 activist	 and	member	 of	 a	 political	 organisation	 at	 UJ,	was	 an	 honours	 student	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng.	 Although	 she	 was	 very	active,	and	I	frequently	saw	her	addressing	crowds	of	students	during	protests	in	October	2016,	she	wanted	to	be	understood	as	one	of	many	leaders,	rather	than	a	single	 individual,	who	 tried	 to	 position	 herself	 as	 the	 voice	 of	 FMF.	 For	 her,	 it	went	against	 the	spirit	of	 the	 ‘movement’	and	against	 the	collective	decision	 to	embrace	 a	 flat	 organisational/membership	 structure.	 Angela	 Davis37	(2016)	summarised	 this	 perspective	 by	 proposing	 that	 FMF	 was	 not	 leader-less,	 but	leader-full,	with	many	 strong	Black	African	women	 fighting	against	 racism	and	patriarchy	 in	HE	and	 the	wider	South	African	 society.	The	 leader-full	narrative	captures	more	 accurately	 the	 aforementioned	 elite-leader	 link,	 as	 it	 recognises	the	 positive-side	 of	 leadership,	 but	 denounces	 hierarchy	 of	 eliteness,	 which	would	suggest	superiority,	privilege	and	power	over	others.			The	 FMF-induced	 debates	 about	 race	 and	 class	 in	 HE	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	positive	 value	 associated	 with	 being	 middle	 class.	 The	 favourable	 notion	 of	middle	classness	can	be	seen	in	the	praise	that	many	students	expressed	towards	UJ	 management	 and/	 or	 the	 government	 for	 pushing	 through	 the	 ‘Missing	Middle’	 agenda.38	For	 example,	 UJ	 ran	 a	 fundraising	 campaign	 for	 the	 Missing	Middle	 (University	 of	 Johannesburg,	 2016a)	 while	 the	 government	 featured	‘Missing	 Middle’	 in	 its	 HE	 funding	 policy	 announced	 in	 September	 2016.	 The	policy	 was	 proposed	 as	 a	 compromise	 between	 the	 demands	 for	 free	 HE	 as	furthered	 by	 some	 FMF	 proponents,	 and	 the	 concerns	 over	 financial	sustainability	 expressed	 primarily	 by	 universities’	 leadership.	 The	 government	agreed	 to	 cover	 fee	 increases	 of	 up	 to	 8%	 for	 the	 students	 who	 came	 from																																																									37	The	Black	feminist	scholar,	Angela	Davis,	delivered	the	2016	annual	Steve	Biko	lecture	at	the	University	of	South	Africa	(UNISA),	where	she	addressed	the	students	and	commented	on	their	activism,	international	connections	to	BlackLivesMatter	and	inter-generational	relations	amongst	social	justice	activists.		38	Students	who	belonged	into	the	so-called	Missing	Middle	were	not	able	to	receive	funding	from	NSFAS,	hence,	they	were	not	poor	enough,	or	they	were	not	able	to	prove	to	be	poor	enough,	to	have	 their	 fees	paid;	 but	 equally,	 they	were	not	 rich	 enough	 to	pay	 for	 their	 tuition	 and	other	costs	 themselves,	without	 acquiring	 loans	 or	 bursaries	 Several	 students	 I	 spoke	 to	mentioned	that	they	knew	people	who,	or	they	themselves,	had	to	lie	on	their	NSFAS	applications	in	order	to	qualify	for	funding.	Many	FMF	supporters,	therefore,	critiqued	NSFAS	because	they	said	it	forced	Black	African	people	to	document	and	prove	their	poverty,	which	robbed	them	of	their	dignity.	
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households	 with	 an	 income	 below	 ZAR	 600,000	 a	 year	 (approximately	 GBP	32,000).	Students	who	were	above	the	income	bracket	were	expected	to	pay	the	increased	 tuition	 on	 their	 own,	 while	 poor	 students	 who	 qualified	 for	 NSFAS	would	have	their	entire	tuition	covered	by	the	state	through	the	scheme.			This	policy	was	welcomed	by	most	of	the	students,	whether	they	benefitted	from	the	NSFAS	scheme	or	not.	The	underlying	assumption	was	that	it	was	undeniable	that	the	state	should	be	taking	care	of	the	poorest,	but	it	should	not	be	forgetting	those	in	the	middle,	where	many	South	Africans	think	they	belong.	The	notion	of	being	in	the	‘middle’,	was	not	only	positive	for	those	from	the	lower	classes,	who	could	 see	 it	 as	 an	 aspirational	 category	 into	 which	 they	 could	 ascend.	 Many	students,	whose	described	 life	 style	 could	be	 seen	 in	 economic	 terms	as	upper	class	 or	 elite,	 did	 not	 label	 themselves	 as	 such,	 mirroring	 the	 aforementioned	findings	by	Mosa	Phadi	and	Claire	Ceruti	(2011)	amongst	others.		
Conclusion	In	this	chapter	I	have	highlighted	the	conflations	and	contradictions	surrounding	the	 students’	 perceptions	 of	 eliteness.	 These	 paradoxes	 stem	 from	 the	 term’s	designation	 of	 prestige	 and	 superior	 status	 on	 one	 hand,	 and	 greed	 and	corruption	 on	 the	 other,	 which	 are	 rooted	 in	 economic	 self-interest	 of	 an	unclearly	defined	group,	which	possesses	power	and	 influence.	Students’	 initial	instinct	 to	 reject	 eliteness	 as	 a	 form	 of	 exceptionalism	was,	 however,	 nuanced	firstly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 re-formulating	 eliteness	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 leadership,	whereby	 power	 and	 influence	 lose	 their	 selfish	 connotation.	 Secondly,	acceptance	of	eliteness	was	modified	by	the	replacement	of	eliteness	with	middle	classness,	 which	 allowed	 the	 students	 to	 admit	 their	 desire	 for	 economic	wellbeing	 and	 change.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 ongoing	 post-1994	 transformation	process,	 middle	 classness	 and	 eliteness	 get	 intertwined	 through	 higher	education,	conspicuous	consumerism	and	precariousness	of	class	positioning.			Nonkululeko,	who	was	a	Black	master’s	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng	and	a	 close	 friend,	 articulated	 the	 tensions	 around	 class	 identification	of	 university	students	in	an	insightful	way.	She	and	I	would	get	into	frequent	arguments	about	
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what	was	important	in	life	and	what	made	someone	successful.	As	she	explained,	for	someone	like	her,	who	had	lost	her	mother	at	a	young	age	and	grew	up	with	a	father	who	did	not	put	food	on	the	table	nor	had	given	her	money	to	buy	bread,	emotional	satisfaction	came	secondary	to	financial	stability	when	thinking	about	her	future.	These	thoughts	would	even	lead	her	to	conclude	that	maybe	pursuing	a	master’s	degree	had	not	been	the	best	choice	for	her,	because	her	friends	in	the	townships	 who	 were	 no	 longer	 studying	 but	 working,	 were	 able	 to	 buy	 cars,	while	 she	 still	 struggled	 to	make	 ends	meet,	working	 several	 student	 jobs	 and	fighting	to	get	scholarships.	When	I	asked	her	whether	being	a	university	student	in	 South	Africa	meant	 that	 she	was	 an	 elite	 and	whether	 that	made	her	 better	than	other	people,	she	responded:				That’s	what	 people	 think	 [that	 you’re	 an	 elite	 and	 you’re	 better],	but	at	the	end	of	the	day,	you’re	still	broke,	I	mean,	being	in	varsity	means	 you’re	 a	 classless	 person,	…	 I	 don’t	 think	 you	 belong	 to	 a	certain	class	when	you’re	at	university…	it’s	either	before	or	after	university	 that	 you	 then	begin	 to	 integrate	 into	 a	 certain	 class,	…	I’m	saying	you’re	classless,	because	you	can	either	go	up	or	down,	yes,	 there	 is	a	high	percent	of	you	going	up,	because	 if	you	gonna	get	a	good	job	and	start	growing	and	moving	up	the	rank,	but	then	for	some	people	who	don’t	find	jobs,	they	just	go	back	to	either,	if	they	 come	back	 from	poor	 background,	 they	 go	 back	 to	 the	 poor	background,	and	they	try	their	best	to	level	up.			Nonkululeko’s	sentiment	echoes	the	insufficiency	of	class	concepts	for	university	students	in	South	Africa.	I	have	shown	in	this	chapter	that	due	to	the	aspirational	nature	 of	 education	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 social	 mobility	 and	 change,	 we	 can	 best	characterise	university	students	as	an	exceptional	group	in	South	African	society,	rather	 than	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 eliteness,	 middle	 classness	 or	 poverty.	 The	identification	with	 change	means	 that	 there	 are	more	 ‘levels’	 –	 as	 the	 students	say	–	to	be	reached,	and	that	there	is	something	exceptional	to	strive	for.	These	higher	 levels,	 or	 something	 better	 and	 superior,	 are	 in	 essence	what	 eliteness	means,	even	if	it	is	ultimately	disguised	under	the	label	of	leadership	and	middle	classness	to	avert	the	negative	political	and	economic	associations	that	the	term	elite	often	evokes.	Hence,	elites	serve	a	similar	function	as	role	models	and	anti-heroes	because	they	enable	a	vision	of	the	student’s	ideal	self	as	a	particular	kind	of	a	leader,	whose	further	qualities	are	analysed	in	the	following	two	chapters.			 	
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7 Exceptional	 People:	 The	 Deserving	 and	 Hard-Working	
Achievers	
Introduction	This	 chapter	 offers	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 first	 set	 of	 values,	 characteristics	 and	behaviours	 that	students	attributed	 to	 the	 ideal	of	an	FPE,	namely	 those	which	are	connected	to	the	discourse	of	being	deserving.	These	narratives	highlight	that	eliteness	 ought	 to	 arise	 from	hard	work	 and	 struggle	 in	 order	 to	 be	 deserved,	hence,	 eliteness	 can	 be	 a	 positive	 and	 emancipative	 ideal	 if	 it	 is	 achieved	 and	earned.	The	discourse	is	manifested	in	various	spheres	of	students’	lives,	ranging	from	social	welfare,	 land	ownership,	employment,	and	 their	 immediate	context	of	HE.	It	has	been	widely	internalised	and	applied	by	the	students	across	various	positionalities	 and	 backgrounds,	 and	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 students’	 praise	 of	entrepreneurs	and	their	acceptance	of	successful	female	businesswomen	as	life-	journey	role	models.	Moreover,	students	also	expect	FPEs	to	deserve	their	power	and	 privilege	 through	 education	 and	 competency	 and	 to	 actively	 sustain	 these	characteristics	 throughout	 their	 time	 in	 their	 positions	 of	 power	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 their	 deserved	 exceptionalism.	 The	 notion	 of	 deserved	 eliteness	 thus	helps	students	 to	 legitimise	mobility,	economic	wellbeing	and	change,	 similarly	to	the	aforementioned	middle-classness	and	leadership.		Overall,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 discourse	 of	 ‘being	 deserving’	 exercises	 disciplinary	power	over	the	students’	desire	for	eliteness.	By	circumscribing	their	normative	expectations	of	who	an	elite	should	be,	it	seeks	to	shape	their	realm	of	possible	change.	It	works	in	complementarity	with	the	second	discourse	of	‘remembering	
where	you	come	from’	 to	weaken	the	students’	resolve	and	ability	 to	want	 to	be	elite	and	 thus	carry	out	 changes	which	would	challenge	 those	 in	power.	At	 the	same	 time,	 however,	 the	 students’	 own	 normative	 construction	 of	 the	 ideal	female	political	elite	based	on	the	anti-heroes	they	witness	in	positions	of	power,	facilitates	 their	empowerment.	Hence	 it	has	 the	potential	 to	subvert	elites	who	benefit	 from	 the	 status	 quo.	 This	 chapter	 thus	 offers	 insights	 into	 power	 of	discourses	 against	 the	 lived	 realities	 of	 the	 students.	 It	 uses	 different	intersectional	identities,	such	as	being	educated,	underpinned	by	the	structures	
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of	gender,	race,	class	and	age,	and	so	helps	to	explain	the	empowering	potential	of	female	political	elites.	
Who	is	Deserving?	The	Impact	of	Neoliberalism	The	 welfare	 system	 in	 South	 Africa,	 as	 well	 as	 globally,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	prominent	examples	where	the	idea	of	being	deserving	is	central	to	both	popular	and	policy-level	debates.	The	system	of	social	grants	in	the	country,	including	old	age	pension	and	disability	grants,	is	a	deracialised	continuation	of	the	apartheid	era	policies,	which	sought	to	help	the	deserving	–	white	and	later	some	Black	–	poor	(Seekings	2008a).	It	targets	the	elderly,	the	disabled	and	children	and	thus	individuals,	 who	 are	 considered	 poor	 not	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 own	 doing.	 As	Everatt	(2008)	and	Seekings	(2008a)	show,	since	the	democratic	era,	 there	has	been	a	problematic	 lack	of	clarity	from	the	ANC	on	who	should	be	the	target	of	the	welfare	system,	or	in	other	words,	who	is	the	most	deserving	group	in	South	Africa.	Whether	people	are	 considered	deserving	 is	 typically	adjudicated	based	on	 need;	 for	 example,	 who	 are	 the	 poorest	 of	 the	 poor,	 or	 who	 are	 the	 most	disadvantaged	 groups.	 Seekings	 (2008a)	 highlights	 that	 while	 historical	disadvantage	 is	 measured	 on	 a	 group	 rather	 than	 individual	 level,	 being	deserving	of	assistance	is	also	impacted	by	the	consideration	of	one’s	individual	achievement	and	intent.	For	example,	working	age	people	who	are	unemployed	are	 not	 the	 target	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	welfare	 system,	 but	 of	 the	 public	works	schemes.	The	underlying	logic	of	this	distinction	is	the	‘dignity	of	work’	principle,	combined	with	the	belief	that	should	a	citizen	have	had	the	opportunity	to	work,	but	 did	 not	 take	 the	 opportunity,	 and	 thus	 showed	 idleness,	 they	 were	 less	deserving	of	public	support.			Due	 to	 limited	 resources,	 the	 judgement	 of	who	 is	 the	most	 deserving	 of	 state	assistance	is	a	key	policy	conundrum.	Under	President	Thabo	Mbeki,	neoliberal	policies	shifted	the	government	approaches	away	 from	comprehensive	welfare.	This	ideological	and	rhetorical	move	occurred	together	with,	and	in	spite	of,	the	growth	 of	 some	 of	 the	 grants,	 such	 as	 child	 support	 grant,	 which	 was	incrementally	expanded	to	include	higher	age	groups.	With	the	emphasis	on	poor	citizens	needing	to	be	taught	not	to	wait	for	handouts,	but	to	be	active	and	help	
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themselves,	the	discourses	around	who	deserves	welfare	are	a	key	component	of	the	 ANC	 building	 of	 a	 ‘responsible	 citizen’.	 As	 Pumla	 Gqola	 (2015),	 Richard	Pithouse	 (2018)	 and	 others	 argue,	 the	 poor	 in	 South	 Africa	 are	 consequently	made	to	feel	ashamed	and	responsible	for	their	poverty	and	are	forced	to	work	hard	to	get	out	of	their	situation.	Similarly,	Kabeer	(2014)	warns	that	the	system	is	based	on	the	lack	of	recognition	of	the	contribution	that	is	provided	by	women	through	unpaid	care	work	and	hence	based	on	a	lack	of	understanding	of	social	reproduction	 as	 reciprocally	 deserving	 of	 state’s	 protection	 and	 support.	Although	 Jacob	Zuma	ran	on	a	pro-poor	populist	 ticket	 in	opposition	 to	Mbeki,	the	marginalisation	 of	 the	 poor	 did	 not	 improve	 under	 his	 presidency,	 despite	some	 changes,	 such	 as	 setting	 of	 minimum	 working	 wage	 (Everatt,	 2008;	Seekings	2008a).			At	multiple	times	since	the	end	of	apartheid,	it	was	unsuccessfully	proposed	that	the	 grants	 system	 should	 be	 replaced	 by	 Basic	 Income	 Grant	 (BIG)	 (Ferguson,	2010).	Some	of	the	arguments	in	favour	of	the	BIG	included	the	avoidance	of	the	so-called	‘Black	tax’,	which	means	that	grants	are	being	used	by	Black	Africans	to	support	 their	 extended	 social	 networks	 rather	 than	 to	 benefit	 the	 direct	recipients	 only.	 BIG	 would	 provide	 money	 to	 all	 South	 Africans	 and	 it	 would	therefore	 allow	 people	 to	 invest	 their	 money	 instead	 of	 sharing	 it	 with	 their	networks,	 which	 hinders	 the	 grant’s	 transformative	 economic	 potential.	 This	argument	 in	 favour	of	 a	welfare	mechanism	 is	 according	 to	Ferguson	 (2010)	 a	demonstration	that	‘neoliberal	moves’	can	be	used	for	pro-poor	outcomes.	While	it	might	be	possible	to	create	such	a	balance	between	neoliberal	moves	and	pro-poor	 outcomes,	 the	 dominant	 neoliberal	 approaches,	 which	 are	 racialised	 and	gendered,	tend	to	undermine	pro-poor	social	justice,	and	they	shape	the	context	in	which	students	articulated	their	understanding	of	who	is	deserving	of	social,	political	and	other	rewards	and	benefits.		The	issue	of	land	ownership	mirrors	the	neoliberal	rhetoric	of	social	welfare	and	it	represented	a	key	societal	issue	for	the	students	at	UJ.	In	2016-2017,	the	EFF	continued	 to	 put	 political	 pressure	 on	 the	 ANC	 to	 resolve	 the	 land	 ownership	problem	in	the	country,	which	re-sparked	debates	about	constitutional	reforms	
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that	 would	 establish	 land	 expropriation	 without	 compensation	 in	 order	 to	facilitate	 land	 redistribution.	 Various	 modifications	 to	 land	 legislature	 were	discussed	in	March	2017,	around	the	annual	budget	speech,	and	leading	up	to	the	ANC	policy	conference	in	July	2017.	They	included	proposals	to	curb	and	control	foreign	land	ownership,	as	well	as	to	re-open	the	opportunity	for	South	Africans	to	 launch	tenure	claims,	because	many	South	Africans	with	presumed	claims	to	land,	from	which	they	had	been	dispossessed	by	colonialism,	did	not	manage	to	meet	 the	 1998	 deadline	 (Walker,	 2014).	 Thus,	 the	 public	 debates	 focused	predominantly	 on	 legal	 and	 institutional	 mechanisms,	 which	 would	 make	 the	process	of	land	redistribution	between	racial	groups	more	effective.39			According	to	Walker	and	Dubb	(2013)	only	7.5%	of	previously	white	owned	land	was	 transferred	 to	 the	 state,	 communal	 ownership	or	private	Black	ownership	between	1994	and	2012.	However,	the	true	status	of	land	ownership	and	control	in	 South	 Africa	 was	 often	 misrepresented	 and	 misunderstood	 amongst	 the	public,	not	least	due	to	the	failure	to	complete	a	full	land	audit	and	to	obtain	a	full	picture	of	the	status	quo	(Merten,	2017).	While	the	main	transfer	mechanism	had	been	 based	 on	 a	 willing-buyer,	 willing-seller	 principle,	 since	 2011	 the	 focus	shifted	 away	 from	 facilitating	 Black	 ownership	 towards	 state	 ownership	 with	long-term	 leases	 to	 citizens.	 The	 policy	 was	 meant	 to	 provide	 sufficient	 land	tenure	 security	 from	 the	 state,	while	 circumventing	 the	 issue	 of	 limited	 credit	and	 finances	 of	many	poor	Black	people	 in	 rural	 communities,	which	prevents	them	 from	 acquiring	 land.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 land	 reform	 initiatives	 fail	because	 of	 administrative	 incompetency,	 under-resourcing	 of	 relevant	 staff,	 as	well	 as	on	political	 interference	and	corruption,	 leaving	 the	 rural	poor	without	land	 security	 and	benefitting	 those	with	existing	economic	 resources	 (Hall	 and	Kepe,	2017).			
																																																								39	These	debates	should	be	understood	within	the	larger	populist	discourse	of	‘radical	economic	transformation’	and	‘white	monopoly	capital’	that	arose	in	South	Africa	in	this	period.	The	ANC	and	its	allies	used	these	discourses	as	a	PR	strategy	to	distract	from	state	capture	allegations.	The	strategy	was	 linked	 to	 the	aforementioned	Gupta	 family	and	 the	public-relations	 company	Bell	Pottinger	(Johnston,	2017).	
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The	 magnitude	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 land	 amongst	 UJ	 students	 became	 apparent	during	 my	 first	 visit	 to	 the	 SRC	 offices	 at	 APK	 campus.	 Hoping	 to	 meet	 some	student	 leaders,	 I	 entered	 the	 offices	 and	 asked	 for	 people	who	 could	 help	me	contacting	 the	 societies	 on	 campus.	While	 chatting	 to	 some	 students,	 a	 young	woman	approached	me	and	demanded	 that	 I	 ‘give	back	 the	 land’.	Without	 any	introductions	or	prior	 conversations,	with	no	warning	 signs	or	hesitations,	 she	bluntly	asked,	why	I	stole	her	and	her	people’s	land	and	she	insisted	that	I	give	it	back.			Many	students	in	my	research,	especially	Black	African	women,	approached	the	issue	of	land	ownership	through	a	utilitarian	perspective.	They	argued	that	land	represented	an	 important	economic	asset,	and	consequently,	 it	was	a	source	of	continued	inequality	that	needed	to	be	addressed;	yet,	they	rejected	the	idea	of	expropriation	without	considering	the	ability	of	new	owners	to	use	the	land	and	run	farms.	The	popular	discourse	at	the	time	suggested	that	many	farms,	whose	ownership	was	transferred	from	whites	to	Blacks,	fail.	Vumela	Advisory	Fund,	for	example,	 found	 that	 90%	 of	 the	 farmland	 transferred	 by	 2012,	 lost	 its	productivity	(Odendaal,	2017);	which	was,	however,	disputed	by	others,	such	as	land	researchers	Ben	Cousins	and	Alex	Dubb	(2013).			One	of	the	key	reasons	cited	behind	the	farm	failures,	was	the	new	owners’	lack	of	resources	and	capital.	Their	inability	to	pay	for	machinery,	seeds,	 labour	and	other	 production	 inputs	 differentiated	 the	 new,	 predominantly	 Black	 African	owners	 from	 the	previous,	 presumably	 commercially	 successful	white	 farmers.	Most	 of	 the	 students,	 however,	 focused	 on	 a	 parallel	 explanation,	 namely	 the	perceived	lack	of	managerial	and	technical,	agricultural	skills	amongst	the	Black	Africans.	During	our	debates,	many	respondents	said	that	if	they	personally	were	given	some	land,	they	would	not	have	any	idea	what	to	do	with	it,	so	it	would	be	a	waste	to	give	it	to	them.	To	these	students,	land	redistribution	policy	could	only	be	successful,	if	there	were	additional	support	and	training	provided	for	the	new	Black	 African	 owners.	 The	 key	 underlying	 assumption,	 however,	 was	 that	 the	new	owners	would	need	 to	be	able	 to	use	 the	 land	and	produce	 from	 it,	which	
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echoes	 the	 logic	 associated	with	 deserving	welfare,	 namely,	 having	 shown	 the	right	effort,	intent	and	achievement	(Seekings,	2008a).			At	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 students	 also	 expressed	 a	 more	 unconditional,	ideological	standpoint	and	believed	in	land	redistribution	without	compensation,	as	 they	 thought	 the	 land	 had	 been	 stolen	 from	 its	 original	 owners,	 who	were	their	ancestors	and	forbearers.	They	asked	for	justice	and	fairness.	Even	amongst	these	students,	however,	there	were	concerns	with	the	practical	implications	of	such	 transfers.	 Hence,	 these	 two	 views	 –	 utility	 and	 justice	 –	 were	 held	concurrently,	 rather	 than	 in	strict	opposition.	Many	white	students	argued	that	the	land	should	not	be	confiscated	and	redistributed	without	compensation,	if	at	all,	 because	 the	 current	 owners	 deserved	 it	 through	 their	 hard	 work	 and	productivity.	 Even	 if	 the	 land	 had	 been	 stolen	 by	 previous	 generations,	 its	current	 owners	 should	 not	 be	 punished	 unfairly.	 White	 students	 thus	 used	similar	 rationales	 and	 discourses	 as	 Black	 African	 students,	 albeit	 from	 a	 very	different	 positionality	 and	 without	 much	 consideration	 of	 the	 greater	exploitative	economic	structures,	which	were	built	on	the	cheap	labour	of	Black	Africans.	What	the	shared	rationality	suggests	is	the	prevalence	of	values	which	underscore	being	deserving	as	a	result	of	achievement	and	effort.		
Deserving	Free	Higher	Education	Similar	attitudes	penetrated	 the	debates	on	 free	HE,	with	many	students	 in	my	research	 believing	 it	 was	 not	 an	 entitlement	 or	 a	 right	 for	 all.	 Many	 students	claimed	 that	 should	 the	 economy	 allow	 it,	 which	 it	 did	 not	 at	 the	 time,	 young	South	 Africans	 should	 be	 provided	 with	 economic	 means	 to	 pursue	 their	education.	On	the	surface,	it	appeared	that	HE	was	conceived	of	and	articulated	as	a	constitutionally-guaranteed	right,	especially	if	one	considered	the	dominant	voices	 of	 Fallist	 activists,	whose	 argumentation	was	 rooted	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	rights	and	relied	on	the	Constitution	and	the	Freedom	Charter	–	one	of	the	key	policy	 documents	 articulated	 by	 the	ANC	 and	 its	 allies	 in	 the	 1950s.	However,	most	students	in	my	research	limited	the	right	to	free	HE	to	those,	who	worked	hard	and	were	 smart	 enough	 to	 come	 to	varsity,	 or	 in	other	words,	 those	who	deserved	it.		
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	An	example	of	such	a	view	was	shared	with	me	by	Rumbi,	who	had	lived	in	South	Africa	for	over	a	decade	but	was	originally	from	Zimbabwe.	Although	she	thought	of	South	Africa	as	her	home	and	was	planning	to	stay,	she	clearly	differentiated	herself	 and	 other	 Zimbabweans	 from	 South	 Africans.	 She	 was	 living	 with	 her	uncle,	 her	 mother	 and	 her	 siblings	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 believed	 that	 for	 a	 Black	African	girl	 like	herself,	who	was	 a	 child	of	 immigrants,	 education	was	a	must.	She	was	finishing	her	first	year	at	UJ	in	early	2016	and	although	she	was	not	an	active	member	of	a	group	or	a	party,	she	said	she	would	like	to	vote,	 if	she	had	the	right.	She	was	critical	of	other	students’	views	on	HE	and	what	she	thought	was	a	sense	of	entitlement:			 That’s	 why	 I	 don’t	 really	 agree	 with	 this	 whole	 #FeesMustFall	movement,	because	I	feel	like	that’s	also	to	an	extent	just	a	sense	of	entitlement.	You	actually	have	to	work	hard	for	the	things	that	you	have	 coz,	 you	 know,	 I	 come	 from	 a	 country	 right	 now,	 where	everyone	is	leaving	because	we	don’t	have	basic	things.	…		so	I	feel	like	people	just	want	to	sit	and	just	get	everything.	Which	isn’t	fair	because	that’s	not	how	life	works.	 I	don’t	 think	that’s	how	people	should	go	about	things	because	it	makes	you	very,	…	it	makes	you	lazy.	I	feel	like	if	you	never	have	to	work	for	anything,	so	you	don’t	appreciate	anything	that	you	have.		Seeing	things	that	come	easy	in	life	as	less-valuable	was	also	reflected	in	some	of	the	 students’	 conviction	 that	 free	 education	 would	 negatively	 impact	 their	degrees,	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 education,	 and	 their	 future	 employment.	 Many	students	believed40	that	providing	free	education	as	a	government	policy	would	mean	that	 the	university	would	not	have	 the	resources	 to	provide	services	 like	free	 Wi-Fi	 on	 campus	 or	 to	 pay	 the	 academic	 staff,	 who	 would	 subsequently	emigrate	together	with	the	rich	youth.	This	would	result	in	further	deterioration	of	the	quality	of	the	South	African	HE.	Others	suggested	that	it	would	also	lead	to	a	decreased	value	of	their	degrees	on	the	labour	market,	because	free	education	would	mean	that	underserving	students,	who	did	not	work	hard	or	who	were	not	smart	 enough,	 would	 get	 in.	 Lulu,	 a	 young	 Black	 woman	 from	 a	 township	 in																																																									40	It	 ought	 to	 be	 underscored	 that	 students	 often	 misunderstood	 and	misrepresented	 Fallists’	objectives.	However,	I	use	the	students’	views	not	to	describe	and	analyse	Fallism,	but	to	reveal	the	underlying	values	and	beliefs	of	the	students	who	participated	in	my	research.		
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Gauteng,	 held	 this	 view.	 She	 lived	 with	 her	 grandmother,	 while	 her	 college-educated	 parents	 and	 her	 sister	 lived	 elsewhere.	 Having	 her	 own	 room,	electricity	 and	 not	 going	 hungry	made	 her	 self-identify	 as	middle	 class,	 which	was	financed	from	her	grandmother’s	pension.	However,	she	funded	her	studies	with	NSFAS	because	her	father	got	retrenched	and	could	not	pay	for	her	second	year.	She	was	soft-spoken	and	well-read	on	the	latest	news,	and	she	was	also	a	member	of	 a	 society	 for	women.	When	we	were	discussing	FMF,	 she	 critiqued	the	idea	of	free	education:		 It	[free	education]	is	not	really	feasible,	because	you	know,	fees	are	really	 expensive,	 so	 expecting	 the	 government	 to	 really	 pay	 for	everything	 for	 free,	 it’s	 gonna	make	 things	 even	more	 hard	 than	what	they	are,	because	I	feel	like	once	we	go	out	and	look	for	jobs,	then	we’re	gonna	earn	less,	because	they’re	gonna	say,	‘oh	but	your	education	was	free,	…	you’re	just	gonna	have	less	salary,	coz	we’re	paying	 what	 you	 paid	 for	 your	 education’.	 So,	 I	 feel	 like	 people	should	 deserve,	 should	 be	 academically	 and	 financially	 deserving	to	be	in	a	university	and	people	shouldn’t	just	think	everything	will	fall	in	their	lap	and	everything	is	cool.			The	importance	of	young	people	deserving	access	to	HE	through	hard	work	can	also	be	 seen	 in	 the	negative	perceptions	 that	 students	held	 about	 taking	 a	 gap	year	between	high	school	and	university.	Many	students	told	me	that	they	were	
forced	 to	 take	 a	 gap	 year,	 because	 they	 did	 not	 secure	 a	 place	 at	 varsity,	 or	because	they	did	not	have	the	resources	to	pay	for	their	education.	Taking	a	gap	year	then	becomes	a	battle	with	pressures	to	avoid	sitting	at	home,	because	such	idle	youth	are	judged	and	perceived	negatively	for	not	contributing	towards	their	upkeep	or	to	the	community.	For	the	fear	of	becoming	one	of	these	young	people,	many	 of	my	 participants	who	 could	 do	 so,	 sought	 to	 get	 further	 qualifications,	such	as	their	driver’s	license	or	computer/typing	training,	to	show	that	they	did	not	waste	 the	gap	year,	but	remained	deserving	of	going	 to	university,	because	they	were	hard	workers	and	they	were	developing	themselves	despite	adversity.			The	 impacts	of	 this	negative	attitude	of	alleged	 idleness	of	 the	gap	year	can	be	seen	in	the	example	of	two	of	my	participants,	Zahra	and	Umme.	Zahra	lived	in	a	neighbourhood	which	she	described	as	nice,	quiet	and	safe.	She	commuted	to	UJ	from	 her	 parents’	 house	 and	was	 taken	 in	 by	 car.	 Her	 father	 paid	 her	 fees,	 so	
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finances	were	not	a	 concern	 for	her	education.	 She	was	very	 self-critical	 about	her	gap	year	experience,	because	she	portrayed	herself	as	falling	into	the	‘worst’	category	of	young	women,	who	did	not	work	or	do	any	training.	As	she	put	it,	she	just	watched	series	on	TV,	played	games	and	watched	other	young	people	trying	to	be	their	best.	After	having	struggled	with	figuring	out	what	she	had	wanted	to	do	 during	 the	 gap	 year,	 she	 came	 to	UJ	 and	was	 in	 her	 second	 year	 of	 studies	when	we	met	in	2017.	There	was	a	sense	of	self-deprecation	in	her	statements,	making	 it	clear	 that	she	 felt	she	was	not	good	enough	 in	comparison	 to	others,	who	used	their	gap	year	for	self-	improvement,	or	who	continued	to	be	engaged	in	societies	and	organisations	on	campus,	which	she	was	not.		Umme	 did	 not	 identify	 with	 a	 racial	 group,	 but	 she	 wanted	 to	 be	 considered	South	African.	Similarly	to	Zahra,	she	lived	at	her	parents’	house,	but	she	drove	herself	to	campus.	She	saw	herself	as	privileged	and	as	she	put	it	“well	taken	care	off.”	She	used	to	play	sports,	but	when	I	interviewed	her	during	her	second	year	of	 study	 in	 2017,	 she	was	 not	 a	member	 of	 any	 clubs	 or	 organisations.	 Umme	took	a	gap	year	after	matric	because	she	did	not	know	what	she	was	passionate	about.	Afforded	the	opportunity	to	use	family	connections,	she	had	had	exposure	to	 various	 fields	 of	 work	 during	 her	 gap	 year	 and	 presented	 the	 year	 as	 an	experience	 that	 ultimately	 led	 to	 a	 positive	 outcome	 because	 she	 found	 her	passion	that	she	was	pursuing	in	the	end.	However,	when	talking	about	students,	and	about	young	people	who	supported	FMF	in	particular,	she	was	very	critical	of	those	who	–	as	she	put	it	–	sat	around	and	did	nothing.	She	was	convinced	that	there	were	opportunities	out	there	that	the	students	should	take	advantage	off,	if	they	did	not	start	studying	after	matric:		 For	example,	if	I	say	that,	OK	I	just	finished	matric,	but	don’t	have	enough	money	to	go	to	university	or	college,	what	else	can	I	do?	So,	then	you	either	 find	a	 learnership	or	some	companies	actually	do	training.	….	if	you	have	a	solid	plan	in	your	head,	regardless	of	the	limited	resources	that	you	have,	you	can	do	it.	The	problem	I	find	with	a	lot	of	people	is	that	they’re	lazy	and	it	irritates	me.	You	want	all	 these	 things,	 but	 world	 owes	 you	 nothing.	 You’re	 entitled	 to	
nothing	and	a	 lot	of	people	don’t	understand	 that.	They	 think,	 ‘no	I’m	a	human,	I	am	entitled	to	this,	and	this	and	this,	and	I’m	gonna	take	it	and	if	I’m	not	gonna	get	it,	I’m	gonna	fight’.			
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Umme’s	 opinions	 demonstrate	 the	 widespread	 neoliberal	 iteration	 of	 being	 a	hard	worker	and	the	expectation	that	people	should	be	able	 to	pull	 themselves	up	by	 their	bootstraps.	Some	students	with	a	similar	mind-set	also	argued	that	the	 government	 should	 only	 provide	 free	 education	 for	 pupils	 on	 primary	 and	secondary	level	in	order	to	give	everyone	equal	basic	opportunities.	According	to	these	students,	 further	success	or	 socio-economic	wellbeing	did	not	have	 to	be	tied	to	HE.	They	saw	varsity	as	a	choice	and	hence	something	that	should	not	be	paid	for	by	the	government.			The	 views	 expressed	 by	Umme	 and	 a	 host	 of	 other	 UJ	 students	 show	 to	 some	extent	a	 lack	of	awareness	or	appreciation	of	structural	barriers	 faced	by	poor,	predominantly	Black	Africans	 in	 the	 job	 seeking	process.	UJ’s	 Centre	 for	 Social	Development	 in	Africa	 conducted	 research	 into	 youth	 employment	 (de	 Lannoy	and	Graham,	2017;	2016),	which	found	that	the	barriers	to	employment	include	for	 example	 application	 costs.	 Many	 employers	 only	 take	 paper	 applications,	which	means	that	young	people	have	to	travel	somewhere,	where	they	can	type	and	print	their	CVs,	which	they	then	have	to	post.	IT-based	applications	can	also	be	exclusionary	for	the	poor	due	to	the	high	costs	of	mobile	data,	which	even	led	to	a	campaign	#DataMustFall.	Moreover,	 job	offers	are	often	only	advertised	 in	newspapers	 or	 not	 advertised	 at	 all.	 Applying	 for	 newspaper-advertised	openings	 has	 financial	 implications	 and	 attracts	 a	 large	 number	 of	 applicants,	making	 the	 competition	 very	 stiff.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 not	 having	 jobs	 publicly	advertised	suggests	the	need	for	connections	and	social	networks	to	learn	about	possible	opportunities,	which	is	also	exclusionary.			Based	 on	 Umme	 and	 Zahra’s	 stories,	 one	 could	 falsely	 assume	 that	 that	 their	views	were	a	result	of	their	privileged	class	positioning.	However,	students	from	across	 racial	 and	 economic	 backgrounds	 held	 similar	 views	 on	 the	 need	 to	 do	something	and	not	be	lazy	to	prove	that	one	deserves	access	to	higher	education.	Many	students	chose	to	work	during	their	gap	year	either	to	save	money	for	their	degrees	or	to	get	extra	 income	for	their	own	spending,	as	their	parents	did	not	want	them	to	be	lazy,	even	if	they	could	afford	to	support	them.	Conversely,	there	were	a	few	students	who	did	not	work,	even	if	their	families’	financial	situation	
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was	not	strong.	While	it	may	seem	paradoxical,	their	parents	and	guardians	were	worried	 that	 once	 these	 young	people	 started	 earning	money,	 they	would	 love	the	material	 things	 that	 they	 could	 then	 afford	 and	would	 decide	 not	 to	 go	 to	university	at	all.	Their	warning	was	thus	based	on	their	fear	that	students	would	become	stuck	in	low	paying	jobs	for	the	rest	of	their	lives	and	would	not	be	able	to	 progress	 and	 achieve	 a	 better	 standard	 of	 living.	 Consequently,	 for	 some	poorer	 households	 the	 potential	 future	 benefits	 of	 an	 educated	 daughter	were	worth	the	temporary	economic	strain	of	someone	just	sitting	at	home.	Therefore,	the	 opinions	 and	 considerations	 about	 gap	 years	 were	 shared	 across	 socio-economic	divides	and	were	based	on	the	belief	that	hard	work	and	personal	self-development	make	one	deserving.		The	student’s	socio-economic	backgrounds,	however,	made	a	difference	in	their	lived	 experiences	 of	 the	 gap	 year,	 and	 these	 differences	 were	 very	 much	gendered.	 For	 example,	 in	 Zahra’s	 case,	 her	 father’s	 and	 family’s	 values	 were	largely	 influenced	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 certain	 Indian/Asian	 cultural	 practices	and	Muslim	beliefs,	suggesting	that	a	young	woman	like	her	should	get	married	at	a	young	age,	if	she	was	not	studying.	Therefore,	during	her	gap	year	she	faced	the	 choice	 to	 either	 start	 studying	 the	 following	 year	 or	 to	 get	 married	 and	become	a	house-wife.	Rejecting	marriage,	as	she	had	thought	of	herself	too	young	to	get	married	at	the	time,	she	decided	to	study	at	UJ	instead.	Many	Black	African	and	 Coloured	 young	women	were	warned	 by	 their	 families,	 friends	 and	 social	circles	 against	 early	 pregnancies	 that	 can	 happen	 during	 the	 gap	 year.	 It	 is	 a	widespread	 stereotype	 that	 sitting	 around	 ‘doing	 nothing,’	 meaning	 not	 doing	anything	productive	such	as	studying	or	working,	makes	young	women	and	girls	vulnerable	 to	 getting	 pregnant.	 This	 in	 turn	 is	 presumed	 to	 have	 negative	consequences	 on	 their	 lives.	 Sat-Ra	 Nthabi,	 who	 was	 a	 mother	 of	 three,	 went	through	such	an	experience	and	formed	a	critical	view	of	taking	a	gap	year:		 I	 always	 discourage	 people	 with	 taking	 a	 gap	 year	 after	 matric.	Don’t	 take	a	gap	year.	Go	straight	 to	varsity,	coz	 if	you	take	a	gap	year,	 [laugh]	 then	 you’re	 gonna	 look	 at	 your	 boyfriend	 and	anything	is	possible.	And	I	think	that’s	kinda	what	happened	to	me.	[laugh].	Yah,	it	was	kinda	like	your	stupid…	not	a	choice,	because	I	
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didn’t	make	 that	 choice,	 but	 it	was	kinda	 like	being	 irresponsible	and	not	thinking.		During	 the	 interview,	 Sat-Ra	 Nthabi	 went	 on	 to	 describe	 her	 father’s	 reaction	when	 she	 had	 gotten	 pregnant,	 or	 as	 she	 put	 it,	 when	 she	 was	 making	 her	mistakes.	With	 fondness	 in	her	voice,	 she	described	how	highly	 she	 thought	of	her	father,	who	was	a	pastor,	because	he	did	not	judge	her	or	otherwise	ostracise	her.	 She	 contrasted	 his	 attitude	 from	 other	 people	 in	 the	 township,	 who	automatically	disregard	a	young	pregnant	girl’s	life	chances.			The	fear	of	social	judgement	is	a	powerful	way	of	disciplining	young	women	and	extending	 control	 over	 their	 bodies.	 It	 is	 not	 surprising,	 that	 several	 students	proudly	 highlighted	 that	 their	 parents	 or	 their	 church	 communities	 promoted	being	 non-judgemental	 as	 an	 ideal	 and	 a	 virtue.	 These	 students	 said	 that	 they	were	 brought	 up	 in	 value	 systems	 that	 did	 not	 denounce	 other	 Christian	denominations	or	Black	Africans	who	followed	traditional	beliefs	and	practices.	Others	claimed	that	they	did	not	judge	those	who	displayed	their	wealth	through	conspicuous	consumption,	or	women	and	girls	who	got	pregnant	at	a	young	age.	While	 these	 non-judgemental	 views	 were	 expressed	 by	 some	 students,	 they	portrayed	themselves	as	exceptions	to	the	majority	of	South	Africans,	whom	they	considered	 to	 be	 very	 judgemental,	 or	 in	 other	 words,	 who	 disciplined	 young	women	against	the	standards	of	sexual	abstinence	and	moral	piety.			The	norms	related	to	sexuality	and	being	deserving	of	social	benefits	or	support	were	clearly	shown	in	the	students’	descriptions	of	what	it	meant	to	be	a	 ‘good	girl,’	when	 they	were	 growing	 up.	 The	 ideal	 girlhood	 or	 young	womanhood	 to	which	most	of	them	felt	held,	was	articulated	in	opposition	to	someone	who	went	out	late,	drank	and	partied.	Such	women	and	girls	did	not	meet	the	standard	of	hard	work,	because	they	did	not	stay	home	to	do	their	chores	and	to	study.	The	students’	 articulation	 of	 being	 a	 good	 girl	 resonates	 with	 the	 idea	 of	respectability,	 which	 has	 been	 identified	 in	 contemporary	 South	 Africa	 for	example	 by	 Bhana	 and	 Anderson	 (2013)	 amongst	 young	 Coloured	 women	 in	KZN,	and	which	has	been	shown	by	Bridger	(2018)	and	Healy-Clancy	(2014)	to	be	an	important	element	of	dominant	femininities	amongst	Black	Africans	during	
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the	 apartheid	 era.	 Clark	 (2018)	 and	 others	 (see	 for	 example	 Isoke	 [2016])	highlights	how	many	contemporary	African	feminists	on	the	continent	and	in	the	diaspora,	including	many	South	African	hip-hop	artists,	challenge	respectability,	which	 arose	 from	 racialised	 stereotypes	 of	 insatiable	 hypersexualised	 African	women.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 such	 norms,	 many	 of	 the	 students	 felt	 that	 the	 young	women	who	partied	and	hence	did	not	work	hard,	did	not	deserve	access	to	free	HE	or	at	least	were	not	as	deserving	of	it	as	those	who	did.			Students	believed	 that	 sexuality	was	similarly	used	 to	 judge	women	 in	politics.	Although	 some	 students	 thought	 that	 several	 of	 them	 got	 their	 positions	undeservingly	because	of	their	marital	or	familial	relations,	they	did	not	believe	that	 most	 women	 slept	 their	 way	 to	 the	 top.	 The	 students	 said	 that	 this	stereotype	was	often	used	to	discredit	women	either	by	other	women	competing	for	 the	 same	 positions	 or	 by	 men.	 While	 most	 students	 harshly	 rejected	 this	attack	on	powerful	 and	 successful	women,	 they	were	more	 likely	 to	negatively	judge	 their	 peers	 and	 consider	 them	 underserving	 if	 they	 demonstrated	behaviour	 that	 countered	 the	 ‘good	 girl/woman’	 norms.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	applied	different	levels	of	judgement	to	their	age	peers.41		It	must	be	deliberately	stated	that	the	neoliberal	values	of	self-improvement	and	Puritan,	 hard	work	 logic	 (Giddens,	 2001),	 which	 underpin	 the	 students’	 views	about	who	 is	 deserving,	 intersect	with	 gender,	 age	 and	 race	 and	 thus	 exercise	their	normative	power.	With	regards	to	race,	 in	addition	to	the	aforementioned	example	 of	 land	 ownership	 or	 academic	 institutional	 standards	 (discussed	 in	various	 chapters),	 internalisation	of	whiteness	 as	 a	 benchmark	of	 excellence	 is	also	manifested	in	some	students’	critique	of	affirmative	action	policies	and	the	presumed	sense	of	entitlement	that	they	perceived	amongst	some	Black	African	people.	 Phillipine,	 for	 example,	 compared	 the	 attitude	 and	 actions	 of	 Black	African	 people	 like	 her	 parents	 to	whites.	When	we	were	 discussing	 access	 to																																																									41	Many	students	clearly	engaged	 in	behaviour	that	went	against	 this	articulation	of	 femininity,	while	 only	 a	 few	 talked	 about	 it	 openly	 and	 embraced	 it	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 their	 disregard	 of	 the	prevalent	norms.	However,	whether	the	students	adhered	to	or	rejected	the	norms	does	not	bear	influence	on	the	fact	that	they	recognised	it	as	an	ideal	norm,	which	shaped	their	evaluations	of	other	women	and	the	expectations	that	they	held	of	FPEs	as	ideal	versions	of	themselves.	
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education	 and	 whether	 white	 students	 had	 an	 advantage,	 she	 proposed	 that	white	 students	 indeed	 had	 it	 easier,	 because	 their	 parents	 could	 pay	 for	 their	studies	and	so	 they	did	not	have	to	rely	on	NSFAS.	However,	her	rationale	was	not	 based	 on	 systematic	 or	 structural	 racism,	 but	 on	 her	 own	 parents’	insufficient	 efforts	 and	 actions.	 She	 believed	 that	 Black	 African	 parents	 should	have	tried	harder	over	the	last	20	years	to	get	degrees	and	get	on	the	same	level	as	white	parents,	 because	 there	was	nothing	 in	 their	way	 to	 stop	 them	getting	ahead	 in	 life	and	to	provide	more	for	their	children.	Phillipine’s	views	assigned	high	value	to	working	white	parents,	who	served	as	a	benchmark	against	which	all	other	groups	in	South	Africa	were	assessed.			Affirmative	action	policies,	such	as	entry	quotas	into	universities,	are	also	closely	tied	 to	 the	 debate	 about	 who	 deserves	 access	 to	 HE.	 Some	 students	 across	different	 backgrounds	 felt	 that	 these	 policies	 gave	 unfair	 advantage	 to	 Black	Africans	in	an	era,	when	race	should	no	longer	matter.	These	students	believed	that	 skills	 and	 education	 should	 be	 the	 determinant	 factors	 of	 success	 and	achievement.	 One	 such	 student	was	 Thobile.	 She	was	 an	 African	 student	 from	Mpumalanga,	but	she	lived	not	too	far	from	the	university	in	a	student	commune.	She	was	 able	 to	 finance	 her	 first	 year	 of	 studies	 through	 instalments	with	 the	assistance	of	her	father	who	encouraged	her	to	get	educated	and	go	to	university,	when	she	had	been	hesitant	during	her	high	school	years.	For	her	second	year,	she	was	waiting	for	NSFAS	funding	to	come	through	when	we	met,	as	late	as	in	March	2017,	nearly	month	and	a	half	into	the	first	semester.42	During	her	time	at	UJ,	she	was	pursuing	a	degree	that	was	connected	to	politics,	and	after	struggling	to	adjust	to	the	workload	in	the	first	year,	she	was	coping	well,	although	she	did	not	 manage	 to	 engage	 with	 organisations	 or	 societies.	 She	 conveyed	 the	sentiment	of	several	of	her	peers:		 In	 this	 century	 that	 ‘thing’	 of	white	 people	…	 [that]	 they’re	more	privileged	 than	 Black	 people,	 it’s	 getting,	 …	 I	 don’t	 wanna	 say																																																									42	Allocation	 and	 distribution	 of	 funds	 through	 NSFAS	 was	 one	 of	 the	 key	 challenges	 facing	students	 and	 a	 point	 of	 critique	 raised	 by	 Fallists	 and	 scholars.	 Attributed	 mainly	 to	administrative	deficiencies	and	corruption	within	NSFAS,	 students	experienced	anxieties	about	their	 financial	 status	and	ability	 to	study,	as	well	as	 real	everyday	struggles	 to	purchase	books	and	keep	up	with	course	work	or	to	pay	for	housing	and	food.	
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overrated,	but	I	feel	like	it’s	time	for	us	to	just	move	on	in	terms	of	who’s	more	 privileged	 because	 of	 their	 skin	 colour	 and	 stuff	 like	that.	Can’t	we	really	recognise,	if	there	is	hard	work	or	something?		Thobile’s	views	show	a	sense	of	frustration	with	the	pervasiveness	of	racial	and	class	 discourses	 in	 South	 Africa.	 Rather	 than	 denying	 that	 these	 differences	mattered	and	continued	to	be	relevant,	it	was	more	of	an	expression	of	a	desire	for	meritocracy	and	achievement,	which	she	viewed	as	a	just	and	fair	measure	of	deserving	 benefits,	 opportunities	 and	 ultimately	 success	 and	 wellbeing.	 Many	Black	African	students	saw	affirmative	action	as	a	tool	to	off-set	existing	power	inequalities	 and	 privilege	 rather	 than	 a	 promotion	 of	 unfair	 counter-privilege.	Hence,	 quotas	 were	 seen	 both	 as	 a	 tool	 undermining	 and	 strengthening	 one’s	deservedness.			Many	non-Black	African	students	argued	 that	 they	also	wanted	equality	 for	all;	however,	they	believed	that	affirmative	action	and	quotas	were	the	wrong	way	to	achieve	 it.	They	perceived	 these	policies	as	bringing	 them	(non-Black	Africans)	down,	rather	than	lifting	others	up.	For	example,	Daniela	was	a	white	student	in	her	 second	 year	 of	 Biokinetics	 studies	 at	 the	 DFC	 campus.	 She	 lived	 with	 her	parents	and	commuted	to	school	by	car,	although	she	preferred	to	park	at	APK	and	take	the	university-funded	bus	to	DFC	as	a	safety	precaution.	As	many	other	students,	she	was	worried	about	driving	in	the	CBD.	Her	mother	paid	her	fees	in	her	first	year,	and	she	was	able	to	get	a	bursary	for	her	second	year,	but	she	was	also	working	while	not	being	a	member	of	clubs	or	societies.	She	had	originally	applied	to	Wits	to	study	medicine,	but	she	was	told	that	she	did	not	get	into	the	country’s	leading	programme	because	of	racial	quotas.	Many	white	students	such	as	Daniela	failed	to	recognise	the	structural	nature	of	racial	privilege	because	in	their	daily	lives,	they	did	not	feel	that	whiteness	gave	them	undeserved	benefits.	This	meant	 that	 they	believed	 instead	 that	 the	same	way	 their	parents	worked	hard	 to	earn	 their	 living	and	 their	 status,	 they	 too	were	working	hard	on	 their	education	and	thus	deserved	the	corresponding	benefits	and	positive	outcomes.	Therefore,	many	non-Black	African	students	used	the	same	ideals	about	how	one	becomes	 deserving	 as	 their	 Black	 African	 counterparts.	 They	 sought	 the	 same	idea	of	justice	and	equality,	while	arguing	for	the	opposing	political	objectives.		
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	As	I	have	shown	so	far,	the	students	applied	the	expectations	of	being	deserving	through	 hard	 work	 to	 other	 students	 and	 themselves;	 yet,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	generational	 element	 to	 the	 discourses	 connected	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 hardship	 and	struggle,	which	I	discuss	in	the	next	section,	which	makes	the	older	generations	deserving	of	power	and	privilege,	while	portraying	the	youth	as	underserving	in	the	 absence	 of	 struggle.	 Consequently,	 the	 discourses	 are	 further	 used	 to	discipline	 the	youth	and	 they	 contribute	 to	preserving	 the	differences	between	elites	in	positions	of	power,	who	are	supposed	to	be	revered	as	role	models,	and	young	people	in	university.		
Struggle	and	Hard	Work:	The	Undeserving	BF	Generation	The	 narratives	 of	 struggle	 are	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 the	 South	 African	 political	 and	social	landscape.	The	two	most	widespread	and	inter-related	versions	of	struggle	in	 the	 context	 of	my	 research	were	 associated	with	 the	 fight	 against	 apartheid	and	 the	 experiences	 of	 marginalised	 Black	 Africans.	 The	 former	 struggle	encompasses	 experiences	 of	 anti-apartheid	 activism,	 ranging	 from	 political	campaigns	and	organising	in	exile,	through	advocacy	and	imprisonment	in	South	Africa,	 to	 widespread	 acts	 of	 everyday	 resistance,	 which	 were	 met	 with	 the	brutal	force	of	the	regime.	The	second	iteration	of	struggle	refers	to	the	lives	of	the	 impoverished,	 of	 the	 un-	 or	 under-employed	 and	 of	 the	 precariat	 in	 South	Africa.	The	symbolic	personification	of	this	struggle,	which	is	an	extension	of	the	anti-apartheid	one,	is	a	Black	African	woman	in	a	rural	village	or	a	township,	who	continues	 to	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 put	 food	 on	 the	 table,	 secure	 housing,	 water,	electricity	 and	 sanitation	 for	her	 family,	 despite	 the	ANC	promises	 to	deliver	 a	better	life	for	all.	For	some	people,	this	idea	of	struggle,	sometimes	subsumed	or	replaced	by	the	notion	of	Black	pain,	may	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	victimhood.	However,	 such	 an	 approach	 robs	 those	 who	 struggle	 of	 their	 political	 and	personal	 agency	 and	 for	 the	 students	 in	my	 research,	women’s	 struggles	were	actually	 an	 expression	of	 agency	because	 they	were	 a	 site	of	 strength,	 grit	 and	perseverance.	 Journalist	 Thandeka	 Gqubule	 captures	 the	 sentiments	 about	struggle	well	in	her	writing	about	Thuli	Madonsela’s	experiences	fighting	for	the	Public	Protector’s	report	on	Nkandla	to	be	accepted	and	implemented.	Gqubule	
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writes,	“Africans,	and	others,	have	fallen	in	 love	with	the	strength	of	those	who	bear	 difficult	 loads	 with	 grace	 and	 dignity”	 (2017,	 117).	 Thus,	 referring	 to	struggle	becomes	a	tool	of	self-empowerment	and	an	avenue	to	demand	redress	for	 those,	 who	 by	 the	 virtue	 of	 their	 marginalisation	 have	 been	 deprived	 of	 a	voice	and	who	are	considered	to	deserve	justice	and	admiration.43			The	 students’	 view	 that	 one	 becomes	 deserving	 through	 hard	 work	 and	perseverance	 in	 hardship	 and	 struggle,	 was	 shown	 in	 many	 students’	appreciation	 of	 their	mothers44,	who	were	 some	of	 their	most	 frequently	 cited	role	 models.	 The	 students	 had	 access	 to	 the	 life-journey	 narratives	 of	 their	mothers,	 and	 thus	were	able	 to	 appreciate	 their	 various	 struggles	 and/or	hard	work.	For	example,	some	mothers	were	portrayed	as	working	hard	in	their	jobs,	taking	care	of	the	family,	volunteering	and	giving	back	to	the	community,	while	others	were	struggling	to	make	ends	meet	as	single	unemployed	carers	with	no	or	little	income,	who	managed	to	provide	for	their	families	against	the	odds.	One	of	these	students	was	Sharon.	Living	with	her	mother	in	a	township	in	Gauteng,	it	seemed	to	me	that	she	was	downplaying	what	I	perceived	as	serious	problems,	such	 as	 debt-collectors	 knocking	 on	 their	 door,	 asking	 for	money	 to	 settle	 her	outstanding	bill	 for	 a	 semester	 that	 she	 took	 at	UNISA.	That	 semester	was	her	first	attempt	to	start	university	studies,	which,	however,	fell	through	because	the	money	she	had	been	promised	by	allegedly	politically	connected	individuals	did	not	materialise.	 She	 saw	her	mother	 as	 a	 superwoman	 –	with	 no	 education	 or	jobs,	her	mother	pulled	Sharon	and	her	brother	through,	after	her	father	passed	away	 when	 she	 was	 seven.	 These	 findings	 echo	 Michelle	 McLean’s	 (2004)	research	on	role	models	amongst	medical	students	at	Nelson	Mandela	School	of	Medicine	 in	 Durban.	 She	 found	 that	 majority	 of	 the	 role	 models	 were	 from	students’	 family	 circles,	 and	had	qualities	 such	 as	being	 “successful,	 intelligent,																																																									43	It	 is	 not	 the	 intention	 here	 to	 perpetuate	 a	 narrative	 that	 all	 Black	 African	 women	 are	automatically	 supposed	 to	be	powerful	 and	hard-working	 leaders	 and	 thus	 assign	 to	 them	 the	responsibility	to	build	and	maintain	their	families	and	communities,	as	many	NGOs	working	on	the	continent	tend	to	assume	through	their	economic	empowerment	programming.	However,	it	is	meant	to	show	that	many	women	do	undertake	such	responsibilities.		44	The	students	also	mentioned	their	fathers,	parents	collectively,	and	other	primary	caretakers	and	familial	individuals	such	as	cousins,	aunts	and	grandmothers	that	were	present	in	their	life.	Hence,	 the	 stories	mentioned	 here	 about	 the	 students’	mothers	 represent	 a	 broader	 group	 of	caretakers.	
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moral	 and	 someone	who	 tackles	the	hardships	that	they	face	and	comes	through	
victorious”	 and	 because	 mothers	 were	 seen	 as	 “hard-working,	 for	 persevering	through	crises	or	disadvantage	or	for	providing	for	and	educating	a	family	(often	single-handedly)	under	difficult	circumstances”	[my	emphases]	(2004,	137).			Although	the	post-1994	struggle	discourses	are	 inherently	tied	to	the	pre-1994	hardships	of	many	Black	Africans	and	women	in	particular,	there	is	an	important	distinction	 caused	 by	 the	 94	 political	 transition.	 While	 the	 anti-apartheid	struggle	was	seen	as	much	of	a	political	and	ideological	fight	as	well	as	economic	and	social,	the	democratic	era	saw	the	de-politicisation	of	Black	African	women’s	struggle,	 together	 with	 the	 struggles	 of	 other	 disadvantaged	 groups	 (Gibson,	2016;	Bond,	2014;	Staeheli	and	Hammett,	2013;	Gouws,	2005a;	Manicom,	2005;).	After	1994	 the	ANC	propagated	a	very	particular	 ideal	of	a	 responsible	 citizen,	who	 patiently	 works	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 ANC	 to	 deliver	 economic	development.	 In	 such	 narratives,	 “poor	 black	 people’s	 freedom	 and	 equality	 is	always	to	be	attained	in	the	future”	(Selmeczi,	2015,	68).	Selmeczi’s	assessment	hints	at	how	patience	and	perseverance	are	the	basis	of	the	political	order,	built	on	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 better	 life	 is	 in	 the	 making	 and	 will	 be	 achieved	 once	 the	democratic	 revolution	 is	 complete.	 This	 approach	 is	 a	 mixture	 of	 communist-inspired	 rhetoric	 and	 Christian	 ideas	 of	 suffering	 in	 mortal	 life,	 which	complements	 the	 neoliberal,	 puritan	 work-ethics	 described	 earlier.	 Suffering,	sacrifice,	and	struggle	as	a	life	experience	thus	become	tolerated.	They	become	a	redeeming	 quality,	 and	 thus	 this	 discourse	 sustains	 the	 systems	 of	 power,	 in	which	 the	 majority	 continues	 to	 experience	 poverty	 and	 marginalisation.	Moreover,	 those	who	experience	struggle	can	claim	moral	superiority,	which	 is	complemented	by	devaluation	of	 those	who	have	 it	easy	 in	 life.	Hence,	struggle	narratives	 create	 an	 identity-based	 difference	 between	 the	 students	 as	 the	generation	 free	 of	 apartheid	 racism,	 and	 their	 predecessors.	 Thus,	 the	 struggle	narratives,	 both	 past	 and	 present,	 seek	 to	 stabilise	 the	 systems	 of	 power	inequality,	in	which	the	younger,	BF	generation	is	disempowered.		
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When	 I	 spoke	with	Miriam,	 an	 anti-apartheid	 activist,	 she	portrayed	herself	 as	someone	 committed	 to	 building	 new	 South	 Africa	 and	 developing	 the	 youth.	Speaking	about	generational	differences	and	the	post-1994	changes,	she	said:		 I	 don’t	 know	 if	 there	 is	 understanding	 [between	 generations].	 I	think,	 sometimes	because	we	don’t	 understand	 their	 struggle,	we	feel	 that	 they	have	 an	 entitlement	 attitude.	 I	 feel	 that	 even	 about	my	children	[laugh].	I	feel	that	I	struggled	to	be	where	I	am,	and	I	find	 that	 they	 make	 sometimes,	 what	 I	 think,	 is	 unreasonable	demands.	But	from	their	perspective,	they’re	not	unreasonable.	But	I	understand	though,	because	 I	had	 the	same	at	 that	age	 too	with	my	parents	–	 there	was	this	 inter-generational	misunderstanding.	For	example,	when	we	would	stay	and	not	go	to	school	and	would	demand	 that	 they	 don’t	 go	 to	 work.	 They	 would	 not	 understand	why	we	would	make	even	those	demands.			Miriam	was	clearly	self-critical	and	tried	to	be	self-reflective	in	her	assessment	of	generational	differences,	 but	her	 immediate	 reaction	demonstrates	 the	 societal	anxieties	and	tensions	around	the	youth	as	undeserving	of	the	benefits	that	were	ushered	 in	 the	 post-apartheid	 era.	 She	 perceived	 herself,	 and	 arguably	 other	members	 of	 her	 generation,	 to	 have	 deserved	 and	 achieved	 the	 life	 they	 had,	because	they	gave	up	their	youth	to	apartheid	struggle	and	because	they	worked	hard	for	what	they	had.	Consequently,	the	BF	generation	becomes	pre-disposed	to	be	 judged	 critically	 as	underserving,	 because	 they	have	not	 experienced	 the	apartheid	 struggle	 or	 in	 the	 case	of	particular	 economic	 classes,	 other	 types	of	hardship.			Beresford	 (2015)	 finds	 parallel	 generational	 tensions	 in	 his	 research	 amongst	leading	ANC	members.	Feeling	a	sense	of	nostalgia,	many	ANC	struggle	veterans	believe	that	new	ANC	members,	who	joined	the	party	after	the	end	of	apartheid,	did	not	do	so	from	ideological	reasons	or	for	the	cause,	but	they	did	so	based	on	their	 desire	 to	make	 careers	 and	drive	 luxury	 cars	 and	 thus	 to	 profit	 from	 the	ANC	 patronage	 network.	 Deborah	 Posel	 (2010)	 similarly	 captures	 this	 tension	within	 the	 ANC,	 albeit	 not	 in	 generational	 terms.	 In	 her	 analysis	 of	 race	 and	consumption,	Posel	suggests	that	understanding	one’s	 freedom	as	consumption	might	 be	 a	 logical	 outcome	 of	 the	 long	 history	 of	 the	 colonial	 and	 apartheid	regimes,	which	controlled	the	consumption	and	access	of	Black	populations	as	a	
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means	 of	 setting	 racial	 boundaries.	 As	 she	 notes,	 while	 some	 ANC	 liberation	stalwarts	find	the	idea	offensive,	the	ability	of	Black	Africans	to	consume	might	be	seen	as	emancipative	 for	others.	However,	 in	 the	ANC	context,	as	within	the	wider	 society,	 those	consuming	do	not	possess	 the	 same	moral	high	ground	as	the	older	generations.	This	distinction	around	being	deserving	based	on	struggle	thus	mirrors	the	distinctions	about	the	ideas	of	eliteness	and	political	leadership,	which	I	discuss	in	Chapter	Six.			The	moral	superiority	of	struggle	has	been	a	crucial	building	block	of	the	ANC’s	policy	of	cadre	deployment,	as	 it	 justifies	the	provision	of	political	rewards	and	other	 benefits	 to	 those	 who	 were	 part	 of	 the	 anti-apartheid	 movement.	 It	 is	therefore	not	surprising	that	most	students	were	convinced	that	many	women	in	politics	got	into	their	positions	because	of	their	involvement	in	the	struggle.	One	of	 these	struggle	 figures	 is	Lindiwe	Sisulu,	an	experienced	minister	and	a	 long-term	career	politician.	Sisulu	had	also	been	known	as	the	daughter	of	Albertina	and	Walter	Sisulu,	two	of	the	anti-apartheid’s	well-known	stalwarts.	When	Sisulu	entered	 the	 ANC	 presidential	 race	 in	mid-2017,	 she	was	 heralded	 as	 the	 dark	horse	 and	 the	 potential	 deputy-president	 candidate	 for	 Cyril	 Ramaphosa.	However,	during	 the	 campaign	 she	was	attacked	 for	being	 ‘royalty’,	 due	 to	her	familial	connections,	which	she	countered	with	her	own	struggle	credentials	and	political	 track	 record	 (Madia,	 2017).	 As	 I	 have	 argued	 before,	 similar	 critiques	were	 raised	 against	 Winnie	 Madikizela-Mandela	 and	 NDZ	 and	 it	 has	 been	 a	widespread	 and	 well-documented	 practice	 in	 many	 post-colonial	 and	 post-revolutionary	 contexts,	 where	 politicians’	wives,	 partners	 and	 female	 relatives	have	 been	 used	 as	 pawns	 to	 extend	 the	 power	 of	 their	 male	 relations;	alternatively,	where	women	with	their	own	credentials	were	being	discredited	in	this	way	 (Bauer,	 2011;	Bauer	 and	Britton,	 2006;	 Tripp,	 2006;	 2001).	Based	on	this	 stereotypical	 sexist	 view	 of	 women’s	 undeserved	 access	 to	 power,	 the	emphasis	was	placed	on	 targeting	Sisulu’s	deserving	her	 role	 through	her	own	abilities	and	competencies.			My	 exchange	 with	 Lesego	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	deserved	position	and	underserved	privilege	of	women	in	politics	rather	clearly.	
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When	I	asked	her,	whether	she	would	point	out	women	in	politics	as	role	models	to	her	daughter	had	she	one,	she	responded:		 Lesego:	 I	 think	 so,	 yes,	 because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 [women	 in	politics]	made	 it,	 into	 the	 positions	 they	 are	 occupying.	 It	means	that	they	are	capable	of	something,	like	they	worked	hard,	I	believe	so.		Ján:	 …	 	 You	 just	 said	 that	 she	 [NDZ]	 would	 do	 the	 same	 as	 her	husband.	Lesego:	Yah,	so,	no	I	wouldn’t	vote	for	her	as	president.	Ján:	But	you	would	still	show	her	as	an	example	to	your	daughter?	Lesego:	No,	OK,	 let	me	specify.	…	I	would	make	my	daughter	 look	up	 to	 those,	 like	 different	 departmental	 ministers	 and	 the	chairperson,	but	not	Zuma.		Lesego’s	statements	highlight	the	importance	of	being	deserving	of	one’s	success	through	one’s	own	hard	work,	as	was	the	case	of	female	departmental	ministers,	who	she	believed	were	capable	and	thus	having	shown	that	they	deserved	their	positions.	The	students’	sentiments,	as	demonstrated	in	Lesego’s	exchange	with	me,	also	underline	that	the	struggle	experience	and	credentials	were	not	enough	to	 make	 elites	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 deserving	 of	 their	 political	 power.	 The	credentials	must	be	accompanied	by	hard	work.	While	the	students	did	recognise	the	importance	of	the	struggle,	they	acknowledged	the	atrocities	of	the	previous	era	 and	 at	 least	 intellectually	 and	 emotionally	 they	 appreciated	 the	 sacrifices	made,	they	expected	more.	Correspondingly,	the	students	who	participated	in	my	study	and	who	said	that	they	vote	for	the	ANC,	did	so	because	they	believed	the	ANC	deserved	their	support	based	on	their	post-1994	achievements,	such	as	the	provision	of	housing,	social	grants	and	other	pro-poor	measures.	These	findings	align	 with	 what	 other	 researchers,	 for	 example	 Gordon,	 Struwig	 and	 Roberts	(2017)	 and	 Anyangwe	 (2012),	 have	 suggested	 about	 the	 diminishing	 youth	support	 of	 the	 ANC,	 based	 on	 ANC’s	 inability	 to	 deliver	 services	 and	 other	tangible	outcomes	 in	citizens’	daily	 lives.	Moreover,	 these	students’	support	 for	the	 ANC	 was	 also	 amplified	 by	 the	 argument	 that	 other	 parties	 have	 not	demonstrated	 that	 they	 deserve	 their	 vote	 instead.	 For	 example,	 the	 lack	 of	governance	 track	 record	 of	 the	 EFF	 at	 the	 time	 of	 our	 interviews,	 or	 to	 some	Black	 Africans	 the	 questionable	 track	 record	 of	 the	 DA	 in	 the	 Western	 Cape,	meant	that	the	students	were	unconvinced	about	the	opposition	deserving	their	
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switch	of	allegiance	from	the	ANC.	Hence,	the	perceptions	of	one	being	deserving	through	hard	work	also	 facilitated	 the	students’	political	views	both	 in	support	and	against	the	ANC.			The	centrality	of	hard	work	and	struggle	in	the	students’	understanding	of	who	is	deserving,	fostered	a	belief	and	hope	that	if	the	students	worked	hard	in	varsity,	they	 deserved	 to	 get	 good	 grades,	 their	 degrees	 and/or	 jobs	 in	 the	 future.	 Put	differently,	they	felt	that	because	they	were	people	who	met	the	criteria	of	being	deserving,	 they	 should	 be	 positively	 rewarded	 for	 their	 hard	 work,	 without	necessarily	questioning	whether	this	hard	work	was	also	of	appropriate	quality.	Being	 a	 hard	 worker	 can	 therefore	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 important	 ideal	characteristic	for	the	students,	which	is	then	projected	in	their	FPE	construction,	especially	as	many	women	in	politics	were	not	seen	to	be	deserving	on	all	fronts.	It	shows	that	students	may	become	empowered	by	their	constructed	ideal	of	the	FPE	and	use	the	norms	and	discourses	that	try	to	discipline	them	to	subvert	the	elites	in	power.	Concurrently,	it	also	means	that	many	students	were	critical	and	dismissive	of	their	Black	African	peers,	who	as	a	post-apartheid	generation,	can	already	 have	 undeserved	 privilege	 passed	 onto	 them	 from	 their	 middle	class/elite	 parents.	 This	 would	 be	 in	 particular	 with	 regards	 to	 jobs	 and	employment.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 non-Black	 African	 students	 felt	 that	because	of	the	political	power	being	with	the	Black	African	majority,	the	system	was	 skewed	against	 them	and	was	not	 rewarding	 them	 for	 their	hard	work	 as	they	deserved.			The	expectation	for	ideal	FPEs	to	work	hard	in	order	to	be	seen	as	deserving	of	their	 powerful	 positions,	 affects	 whether	 students	 believe	 young	 women	 and	men	 deserve	 to	 be	 labelled	 as	 ‘political	 elites’.	 While	 most	 students	 used	examples	 of	 women	 from	 older	 generations,	 when	 talking	 about	 FPEs,	 the	students	had	mixed	reactions	to	my	proposition	that	student	leaders	or	the	key	figures	of	the	FMF	could	be	considered	FPEs.	Some	rejected	the	notion	because	of	what	they	perceived	as	the	Fallists’	lack	of	achievement	–	these	students	believed	that	 Fallists	 have	 not	 yet	 demonstrated	 that	 they	 have	 achieved	 enough	 with	their	 activism	 to	 deserve	 the	 designation.	 Consequently,	 they	 would	 be	
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considered	 as	 FPEs	 ‘in	 the	 making’	 –	 with	 their	 education,	 passion	 and	commitment	 for	 the	 cause,	 an	 FMF	 leader	 could	 become	 an	 FPE	 after	 she	will	have	 achieved	 her	 political	 objectives.	 Others	 believed	 that	 FMF	 leaders	 have	already	 accomplished	 some	 of	 their	 goals,	 as	 seen	 with	 the	 president’s	 no-fee	increase	policy	in	2015.	For	both	of	these	groups	of	students,	an	FPE	would	not	necessarily	 be	 an	 older	 person,	 but	 someone	who	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 they	can	be	 successful	 agents	of	 change,	which	however,	 tended	 to	be	older	people.	Students	 who	 saw	 eliteness	 as	 a	 positive	 and	 desirable	 label	 would	 therefore	argue	that	it	was	a	status	they	were	striving	towards,	rather	than	something	that	they	 have	 already	 achieved.	 Exceptionalism	 of	 FPEs	was	 thus	 in	 a	way	 future-orientated.	 This	 underscores	 the	 construction	 of	 FPEs	 as	 ideal	 versions	 of	 the	students	themselves.			The	necessity	to	be	hard-working	and	struggling	as	an	FPE	meant	that	women	in	politics	 were	 expected	 to	 continue	 manifesting	 their	 deservedness	 in	 their	positions	of	power.	As	Sinqobile	put	it	during	her	group	discussion:		 At	first,	these	women,	they	made	it	to	the	political	elitism	stage,	but	you	 still	 need	 to	 continue…	 Baleka	 Mbete,	 she	 is	 in	 the	 comfort	zone	 now,	 she	 is	 no	 longer	 breaking	 the	 norm,	 unlike	 Tuli	Madonsela.	 She	 [Madonsela]	 is	 still	 breaking	 boundaries,	 she	 is	there,	she	 is	still	moving	forward.	So,	 I	 think	 it’s	about	continuing	breaking	the	norm,	challenging	the	system.		Sinqobile’s	 critique	 of	 Baleka	 Mbete,	 shared	 by	 the	 students	 across	 socio-economic	and	racial	backgrounds,	shows	that	women	in	positions	of	power	are	expected	 to	 continue	 to	work	 hard,	which	 is	 important	 especially	 vis-à-vis	 the	distrust	 that	many	 students	 have	 of	 the	 political	 establishment.	 Students	 often	recalled	watching	Parliament	on	TV	and	seeing	male	and	female	MPs	sleeping	in	the	 chambers.	 Symbols	 of	 laziness	 and	 inactivity,	 the	 images	 of	 sleeping	 MPs	reinforce	 the	students’	views	that	political	elites	are	old,	 tired	and	out	of	 touch	with	reality	and	hence	inadequate.	Similarly	to	the	aforementioned	issue	of	ANC	WL’s	patriarchal	bargain,	some	students	gave	these	women	in	politics	the	benefit	of	 the	 doubt	 that	 in	 their	 youth	 they	 had	 been	 trailblazers,	 because	 of	 their	
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apartheid	struggle	and/or	because	of	their	achievement	of	high	positions	against	a	patriarchal	push-back.			The	 students’	 critique	 of	 inactivity	 and	 laziness	 can	 also	 help	 explain	why	 the	passion	 and	 engagement	 of	 the	 EFF	 and	 some	 members	 of	 other	 opposition	parties	were	appealing	to	many	young	people.	Many	commentators	attribute	the	attractiveness	of	the	EFF	to	the	radicalism	of	 its	 ideas	and	the	Black	nationalist	populism,	 while	 some	 even	 undervalue	 the	 EFF	 appeal	 by	 linking	 it	 to	 the	naiveté,	idealism	and	inexperience	of	youth.	However,	as	I	have	shown,	many	of	my	 interviewees	 expressed	 an	 appreciation	 for	 cooperative,	 collaborative	 and	solution-orientated	politics,	which	suggests	that	the	appeal	of	the	EFF	is	rooted	more	 in	 their	 shift	 away	 from	 the	 perceived	 ANC	 inactivity,	 stagnation	 and	 a	sense	of	being	stuck.	As	the	students	perceive	themselves	as	change-makers	and	as	 they	desire	 change,	 the	perception	of	 activity,	whether	 it	 leads	 to	 results	 or	not,	is	very	appealing.	Hence,	even	without	witnessing	many	women	in	politics	as	hard	working,	struggling	and	thus	deserving	of	their	power,	privilege	and	other	rewards,	the	students	still	constructed	the	ideal	of	deserving,	hard-working	FPE,	based	on	other	spheres	of	life	and	other	aspects	of	the	political	landscape	in	the	country.	It	was	these	ideal	norms	that	challenge	those	anti-heroes	in	power	and	provide	normative	resources	to	challenge	the	existing	elites.		
The	Implications	of	Being	a	Deserving	Hard	Worker:	Entrepreneurs	as	Role	
Models	The	 importance	 of	 hard	 work	 and	 its	 neoliberal	 underpinning	 in	 students’	normative	 expectations	 is	 shown	 in	 the	 widespread	 validation	 and	 praise	 of	entrepreneurs.	 Entrepreneurs	 are	 usually	 portrayed	 as	 people	 who	 do	 not	depend	on	others	to	make	their	success	happen	or	who	would	wait	for	others	to	give	them	employment	opportunities.	One	such	young	female	entrepreneur	was	a	 participant	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 research	 by	 UJ	 Centre	 for	 Social	Development	in	Africa,	who	spoke	at	their	report	launch	event	in	2016.	She	was	a	young	woman	projecting	an	imagine	of	a	hip	urbanite,	who	took	advantage	of	a	skills-development	course	offered	by	an	employability-focused	NGO.	Afterwards,	she	decided	 to	start	her	own	business.	She	was	driven,	optimistic	and	with	 the	
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right	 attitude,	 because	 she	was	not	waiting	 for	 others	 to	 help	 her,	 but	 actively	sought	mentors	and	business	partners	for	her	own	initiative.	Entrepreneurs	like	this	young	woman	are	the	only	ones,	according	to	most	of	my	participants,	who	have	the	chance	of	becoming	successful	 in	South	Africa	even	without	HE	–	who	can	 ‘make	 it’	 up	 the	 ladder	 without	 degrees.	 In	 the	 midst	 of	 high	 youth	unemployment,	 emphasising	 entrepreneurship	 becomes	 the	 government’s	preferred	solution	because	it	absolves	it	of	the	need	to	deliver	structural	reform	and	 create	 opportunities.	 Moreover,	 entrepreneurship	 reinforces	 and	 is	reinforced	 by	 the	 broader	 narratives	 of	 the	 responsible	 citizen,	 who	 does	 not	wait	 for	 handouts	 and	 social	 grants,	 who	 pays	 taxes,	 does	 not	 protest,	 waits	patiently,	and	votes	for	the	ANC.			Despite	 the	 overwhelming	 praise	 of	 entrepreneurship,	 as	 Akinkugbe	 and	Wohlmuth	(2016)	point	out,	many	entrepreneurs	fail	despite	their	potential.	This	is	 partially	 caused	 by	 the	 insufficient	 appreciation	 of	 the	 precarious,	 unstable	nature	of	the	middle	class	positionality,	as	BMC	are	most	frequently	targeted	as	potential	 entrepreneurs.	 Due	 to	 their	 circumstances,	 aspiring	 entrepreneurs	 in	the	BMC	often	lack	saving	skills	and	other	abilities	to	succeed	in	an	economy	that	is	dominated	by	big	corporations.	This	neglect	to	recognise	the	high	numbers	of	failed	 businesswomen	 and	 men	 is	 reinforced	 by	 the	 public	 praise	 of	 the	successful	self-made	entrepreneurs	such	as	Cyril	Ramaphosa,	or	celebrities	such	as	 Trevor	 Noah,	 Bonang	 Matheba	 or	 Oprah	 Winfrey.	 The	 latter	 two	 women	embody	the	‘rags	to	riches’	pathways	of	social	mobility	for	Black	African	women	and	were,	 therefore,	understandably	 seen	as	 life-journey	 role	models	 for	many	young	women	in	my	research.			Bonang	 and	 Oprah	 are	 Black	 African	 businesswomen	 and	media	 personalities,	who	were	hailed	for	their	perseverance	and	the	ability	to	reach	success,	despite	the	odds	that	were	stacked	against	them,	namely	their	gender,	race,	poverty	and	their	difficult	 family	background	growing	up.	The	students	who	mentioned	one	of	the	two	businesswomen	would	usually	not	pick	both	of	them	together	as	role	models,	 and	 some	 would	 probably	 take	 offence	 at	 the	 idea	 that	 I	 group	 them	together.	The	main	tension	between	Oprah	and	Bonang	seemed	to	stem	from	the	
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moral	 judgement	 and	 critique	 that	 some	 of	 the	 students	 expressed	 against	Bonang.	 She	was	described	by	one	 student	 as	 “a	 television	personality	…	 she’s	made	 a	 name	 for	 herself,	 she’s	 hustling	 for	 herself,	 …	 	 though	 there	 are	 some	scandals	about	her	[having	an	affair	with	a	married	man],	but	she	really	did	it	for	herself.”	Oprah	on	the	other	hand	was	known	in	South	Africa	for	her	charitable	work	with	girl’s	empowerment	initiatives	and	running	a	girls’	school	in	Gauteng	(eNCA,	2016b)	 in	addition	 to	her	business	and	media	success.	Nonetheless,	 the	appeal	 of	 both	 their	 respective	 journeys	 to	 fame	 and	 success	 underscores	 the	importance	of	having	knowledge	of	life	histories,	which	I	argue	in	Chapter	Five	is	missing	in	the	case	of	many	women	in	politics.			It	is	not	only	the	exceptional	grand	cases	like	Oprah	Winfrey	and	Bonang,	but	the	everyday	‘hustlers’	who	also	reinforce	this	neoliberal	value	system	embedded	in	entrepreneurship.	 Capturing	 the	 essence	 of	 hustling,	 one	 student	 blogger	described	young	people	in	Braamfontein,	a	hipster	part	of	Johannesburg’s	CBD	as	follows:		 People	 have	 steady	 jobs	 but	 they	 always	 seem	 to	 be	 doing	something	on	 the	 side.	A	 guy	 could	own	a	 coffee	 shop,	but	he’s	 a	fashion	designer	on	the	side,	or	a	girl	could	be	a	retail	cashier,	but	she’s	 doing	 photography	 part-time.	 Young	 people	 here	 are	 such	hustlers.	 It’s	 inspiring	working	in	a	place	where	young	people	are	not	just	waiting	for	something	to	happen	but	they’re	actively	doing	stuff	(Rehman,	2016).		Hustlers,	 however,	 are	 not	 only	 hip	 individuals.	 They	 are	 also	 poor,	 informal	jacks	 of	 all	 trades,	 who	 make	 ends	 meet	 by	 being	 creative	 and	 finding	 ways	through	 life’s	 challenges	 and	 struggles.	 Many	 students	 wanted	 to	 run	 their	businesses	 on	 top	 of	 having	 full	 times	 jobs,	 and	 even	 if	 they	 did	 not	 see	 their	future	through	the	prism	of	hustling,	many	admired	those	who	were	hustlers.	For	example,	 Laury	 admired	 how	 her	mother	was	 a	 hustler.	 Laury	was	 an	 African	student	 whose	 well-educated	 father	 lived	 and	 worked	 in	 another	 country,	because	 he	 was	 unable	 to	 get	 employed	 in	 South	 Africa	 as	 a	 non-citizen.	 She	could	see	herself	 in	Parliament	and	although	she	was	not	a	member	of	a	party,	she	engaged	in	campus	societies.	Laury	struggled	with	university	fees	as	a	result	of	her	 family’s	situation,	and	nearly	did	not	return	 to	UJ	 for	her	second	year	 in	
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2017.	Nonetheless,	she	admired	her	mother	because	she	was	hustling	to	provide	for	 the	 family.	Without	a	matric	and	 in	charge	of	 three	children,	 she	had	 to	get	additional	income	for	the	household	to	ensure	they	get	by	and	cooked	traditional	foods	that	she	sold	and	had	an	informal	tailoring	business	as	well.	Praise-worthy	hustlers	therefore	reinforce	the	students’	ideals	of	being	deserving	through	hard	work	 and	 through	 overcoming	 obstacles	 on	 their	 own	 or	with	 limited	 support	from	the	government.	Together	with	the	examples	of	successful	businesswomen	who	also	serve	some	role	model	function,	the	female	entrepreneurs	underscore	that	women	 in	 politics	 as	 potential	 life-journey	 role	models	 and	 as	 symbols	 of	special	achievement	or	exceptionalism	do	not	serve	a	unique	function.	They	co-contribute	to	the	articulation	of	the	student’s	ideal	self	in	the	notion	of	a	female	political	elite.			In	the	following,	last	section	of	the	chapter,	the	projection	of	the	students’	lived	reality	 and	 social	 context	 onto	 the	 FPE	 ideal	 is	 further	 seen	 in	 the	 role	 of	education	as	an	ideal	trait	connected	to	the	notion	of	being	deserving.	Education	plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 students’	 self-identification,	 including	 as	 a	 means	 to	demonstrate	their	hard	work.	In	other	words,	getting	educated	was	not	only	an	end	status	for	them	–	a	goal	towards	employment	and	economic	wellbeing	or	a	trait	to	be	achieved	–	but	it	was	also	a	process,	through	which	they	demonstrated	being	 individuals	 deserving	 of	 wellbeing,	 success	 and	 support.	 Recalling	 the	graduation	season	at	UJ	in	early	2017,	one	of	the	key	characteristics	of	this	time	of	academic	year	is	displaying	student	success	stories	on	the	university	website.	Many	 of	 the	 stories	 presented	 were	 of	 Black	 African	 female	 students,	 who	managed	 to	 successfully	 complete	 their	 studies	 despite	 their	 unfavourable	circumstances	 (University	 of	 Johannesburg,	 2017b).	 These	 life	 stories	 offered	motivation	to	their	target	readership,	be	it	a	prospective	high	school	student	who	was	 unsure	 whether	 UJ	 was	 the	 place	 for	 her,	 or	 a	 current	 student,	 who	 was	riddled	with	doubt	about	whether	she	could	make	 it	all	 the	way	 to	her	degree.	They	were	presumably	 selected	because	 they	were	 just	 like	many	other	young	women	and	men	at	UJ,	and	hence	because	of	their	similarity,	they	were	potential	role	models.	 Their	 feature	 stories	 showed	 the	 high	 value	 and	 recognition	 that	
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students,	 the	 university	 and	 the	 society	 at	 large,	 placed	 on	 working	 hard	 and	struggling	towards	achieving	university	degrees.		
Educated,	Competent	and	Aware	While	 the	 students	 in	 my	 research	 expected	 both	 men	 and	 women	 to	 be	educated,	 it	 was	 especially	 important	 for	 FPEs,	 as	 many	 students	 believed	women	 had	 to	 prove	 themselves	 and	 work	 twice	 as	 hard	 as	 their	 male	counterparts	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 elite	 status	 and	 power	 that	 came	with	 it.	While	most	students	saw	being	educated	through	the	prism	of	formal	schooling	and	 holding	 degrees,	 a	 few	 students	 thought	 about	 it	 in	 more	 encompassing	terminology	of	being	aware,	smart,	competent	or	skilled.	The	latter	group	of	my	participants	 tended	 to	 recall	 examples	 of	 individuals,	 such	 as	 their	 mothers,	parents	 or	 other	 relatives,	 whom	 they	 considered	 to	 be	 smart,	 intelligent	 or	skilled,	even	if	they	lacked	papers	to	prove	it.	The	underlying	rationale	for	these	qualities	was	the	desire	for	political	elites	to	offer	solutions	that	will	help	change	the	country	and	the	uneducated,	yet	competent	and	skilled	individuals	served	as	proof	 that	 change	 can	 be	 done.	 Street	 smarts	 or	 the	 ability	 to	 solve	 practical	problems	 of	 the	 day-to-day	 life	 was	 also	 seen	 by	 a	 handful	 of	 students	 as	 a	predominantly	 female	 type	of	 knowledge	 that	many	men	did	not	possess.	 This	appreciation	 for	 practicality	 also	 substantiates	 the	 students’	 understanding	 of	ideal	 eliteness	 as	 rooted	 in	 the	 everyday	 life.	 Concurrently,	 it	 shows	 that	 elite	status	should	be	achieved	from	the	bottom	up,	and	it	should	not	only	be	available	to	 the	 already	 powerful	 or	 privileged.	 It	 follows	 then	 that	 it	 offers	 a	 way	 to	challenge	those	in	power	and	hence	that	it	has	empowering	potential.			An	example	of	an	educated,	competent	politician	that	met	the	FPE	expectation	in	this	 regard	 was	 Naledi	 Pandor,	 who	 was	 mentioned	 by	 Laury	 and	 only	 a	 few	additional	 students,	which	 can	be	partially	 explained	by	 the	 limited	media	 and	public	 attention	 that	 she	 received	 at	 the	 time.	 Naledi	 Pandor	 was	 then	 the	Minister	 of	 Science	 and	 Technology	 and	 had	 served	 in	 a	 number	 of	 cabinet	positions	 in	previous	administrations.	She	was	praised	by	 the	media	as	well	as	the	opposition	(Democratic	Alliance,	2016)	as	one	of	the	best	performing	Cabinet	members.	 In	 the	 Mail	 and	 Guardian	 newspaper’s	 (2018b;	 2018a)	 annual	
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government	members’	scorecards	for	both	2016	and	2017,	she	was	described	as	a	 hard-working	 minister,	 who	 ran	 a	 tight	 ship,	 did	 well	 with	 financial	 audits,	represented	 the	 country	 well,	 and	 tirelessly	 advocated	 for	 resources	 for	 her	portfolio.	 However,	 most	 of	 the	 students	 spoke	 about	 her	 as	 educated,	 well-spoken	and	articulate.	Laury	said:		 I	 don’t	 like	 those	 female	 MPs,	 Bathabile	 [Dlamini],	 they	 can’t	communicate	 properly.	 It	 really	 makes	me	 angry.	 Coz	 I	 know	 so	many	Black	females	that	could	go	up	there	and	kill	it	right	now.	So,	it’s	just	a	misrepresentation	of	what	we	are.	If	you’re	going	to	be	in	parliament,	 you	 must	 be	 smart.	 Be	 like	 Naledi	 Pandor.	 Very	graceful…	I’ve	[got]	ton	of	respect	for	her	because	she	is	smart.	She	is	soft	 spoken,	but	when	she	speaks,	 she	says	stuff,	 then	you’d	be	like,	oh,	this	lady,	she’s	A-list.		Thuli	Madonsela	 and	 Lindiwe	Mazibuko	 also	 represented	what	many	 students	expected	of	FPEs	–	women	who	were	competent	and	educated,	which	was	shown	in	 the	 way	 that	 they	 came	 across	 in	 public	 engagements.	 Madonsela	 had	frequently	been	described	by	commentators	as	soft-spoken,	yet	direct.	It	was	her	ability	to	provide	facts	and	‘knowing	her	stuff’	amongst	other	characteristics,	that	attracted	 students	 to	 her.	 Mazibuko	 was	 also	 complimented	 for	 having	 well-reasoned	arguments	and	evidence	when	speaking	 in	Parliament.	Moreover,	she	was	 applauded	 for	 continuing	her	 studies	 at	Harvard	 after	 having	 finished	her	parliamentary	 role	 for	 the	 DA.	 The	 ability	 to	 communicate	 was	 therefore	 an	important	characteristic	of	a	political	leader	and	much	of	the	current	scholarship	on	 protest	 in	 South	 Africa	 (Gouws	 2018;	 Kihato,	 2014;	 Paller,	 2013;	 Bénit-Gbaffou,	 2008)	 substantiates	 this	 finding,	 as	 it	 shows	 people’s	 disenchantment	with	the	lack	of	communication	and	openness	from	political	elites.			As	the	students	believed	that	women	needed	to	grow	into	eliteness,	the	criticism	and	public	backlash	against	women	in	politics	based	on	their	competency,	skills	and	mistakes,	deterred	many	of	my	participants	from	wanting	to	try	to	become	an	 FPE	 and	 enter	 formal	 politics.	 The	 ANC	 WL	 frequently	 had	 to	 defend	 its	members	and	other	ANC	women	in	the	cabinet	against	the	critique	that	showed	them	as	incompetent.	These	women	included	for	example	Nomvula	Mokonyane,	then	 Minister	 of	 Water	 and	 Sanitation,	 the	 chairwoman	 of	 the	 South	 African	
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Airlines	at	the	time,	Dudu	Myeni	and	former	Police	Commissioner,	Riah	Phiyega	(Matuba,	2017a;	2017d;	2016a).	The	ANC	WL	explained	these	‘attacks’	as	smear	campaigns	 and	 blamed	 patriarchy,	 white	 capitalists,	 anti-revolutionaries	 and	other	generic	‘enemies’	of	the	Black	African	women,	who,	they	suggested,	wanted	to	suppress	their	empowerment.	Phiyega	for	example,	was	the	only	high-ranking	official,	 who	 faced	 professional	 and	 political	 consequences	 for	 the	 Marikana	tragedy.	During	the	2016-2017	period,	an	inquiry	led	by	Judge	Claassen	released	the	report	into	Phiyega’s	fitness	to	hold	office,	after	she	was	suspended	in	2015	based	on	the	inquiry	into	Marikana	events	(so-called	Farlam	Commission).	It	was	argued	by	some	critics	of	the	government	action	in	response	to	Marikana	that	as	a	woman,	she	was	the	easiest	scapegoat	which	allowed	the	government	to	show	that	it	had	taken	some	action	and	held	decision-makers	accountable,	while	many	others	who	were	involved,	such	as	Cyril	Ramaphosa,	were	found	innocent	in	the	eyes	of	the	justice	system.			The	pressure	on	women	not	to	make	any	mistakes	was	the	reason	why	Aria	said	she	would	not	go	into	politics.	During	an	FGD,	she	expressed	her	concerns	over	the	demands	that	came	with	having	positions	of	power:			 I	prefer	to	be	in	the	back,	because	being	in	the	front,	there	is	a	lot	of	pressure	on	you.	At	the	back,	I	can	slip	up	…	in	the	back	I	can	work	and	 juggle	and	do	everything	properly	and	then	have	people	 take	recognition…	With	politics,	 I	prefer	to	be	in	the	back,	but	if	 it	was	something	else,	probably	business	or	something,	 I’d	want	to	be	in	the	 front,	 because	 I	 know	 these	 are	 my	 ideas,	 and	 even	 if	 I	 feel	oppressed,	 I	can	actually	 fall	down	and	say,	no,	 I	accept,	 I	made	a	mistake,	and	I	can	work	through,	but	if	you	have	a	whole	country	in	your	hand,	that’s	another	story.		Similarly	 concerned	 were	 several	 students	 who	 felt	 that	 they	 were	 not	sufficiently	 aware	 of	 issues	 in	 the	 country	 or	 that	 they	 were	 not	 educated	 or	skilled	 enough	 to	 go	 into	 politics	 and/or	 to	 even	 discuss	 it.	 They	 had	 high	expectations	of	the	knowledge	and	abilities	that	one	should	have	to	be	political	and	 to	 be	 an	 FPE	 in	 particular.	 As	 FPEs	 serve	 as	 ideal	 versions	 of	 the	 student	herself,	expecting	exceptional	intellectual	capacities	of	political	elites	-	leaders	is	partially	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 desire	 of	many	 students	 to	 have	multiple	 degrees.	
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While	 to	 an	 extent	 this	 quest	 for	 degrees	 is	 a	 result	 of	 not	 being	 clearly	committed	 to	 a	 career	 or	 being	 worried	 about	 job	 prospects,	 as	 I	 suggest	 in	Chapter	Five,	the	students	also	wanted	to	have	more	formal	education,	in	order	to	 become	 exceedingly	 skilled	 and	 to	 have	 in-depth	 knowledge,	 which	 would	make	them	exceptional	in	what	they	do.			For	many	students,	President	Jacob	Zuma	stood	in	direct	contrast	to	the	ideal	of	a	political	 elite	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons,	 including	 his	 lack	 of	 education.	 He	 was	frequently	critiqued	as	unsuitable	 to	 lead	the	country	or	 to	be	a	role	model	 for	people,	 because	 he	 did	 not	 ‘even’	 complete	 high	 school.	 His	 lack	 of	exceptionalism,	 being	 an	 ordinary	 man,	 was	 very	 appealing	 to	 many	 of	 his	supporters	 at	 the	 time	 of	 his	 election.	 Chris	 Jones	 (2017),	 a	 scholar	 of	 moral	leadership,	 argues	 that	 Zuma	 and	many	 other	 leaders	 did	 not	 have	 knowledge	and	comprehension,	which	he	links	to	the	fact	that	education	was	not	currently	valued	 in	 South	Africa.	However,	 for	 the	 students	 in	my	 research,	 the	 contrary	was	true.	While	there	was	a	recognition	that	formal	education	was	not	the	be	all	and	end	all,	and	that	in	order	to	be	a	leader	or	to	be	successful	there	were	other	avenues	 or	 forms	 of	 education	 that	may	 be	 just	 as	 important,	 with	 regards	 to	political	 elites-leaders,	 and	 FPEs	 in	 particular,	 awareness,	 competency	 and	formal	education	were	the	expected	qualities	and	characteristics.			The	concern	about	the	devaluation	of	knowledge	and	education	in	South	Africa	is	directly	linked	to	the	aforementioned	discourses	that	render	young	people	more	concerned	with	 consumerism	 and	materialism	 than	 socio-political	 issues.	With	many	 UJ	 students	 telling	me	 that	 politics	was	 not	 interesting	 for	 them	 or	 that	they	did	not	think	politics	was	an	area	of	relevance	to	their	lives,	it	would	seem	that	the	pessimistic	conclusions	of	some	commentators	are	warranted.	However,	it	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 while	 many	 students	 found	 themselves	unable	or	unwilling	to	discuss	politics,	they	had	a	certain	level	of	admiration	for	those	who	could.	Hence,	the	problem	that	requires	a	political	and	social	response	is	 in	 the	 limited	 understanding	 of	 who	 is	 able	 to	 talk	 about	 politics	 or	 under	which	circumstances	one	has	the	authority	to	make	contributions	about	politics.		
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A	 recent	 graduate	 from	 Wits,	 whom	 I	 met	 in	 her	 capacity	 as	 a	 writer	 and	journalist	for	a	youth	culture	and	media	consultancy,	pointed	out	this	difference.	When	we	discussed	what	were	some	of	the	issues	and	debates	that	she	found	to	be	 resonating	 with	 young	 Black	 African	 people	 that	 she	 wrote	 for,	 she	 listed	issues	such	as	hair	and	body	image,	or	control	over	women’s	bodies,	as	well	as	spirituality	and	being	informed	about	latest	socio-political	issues.	She	said:		 I	 think	being	woke	is	somewhat	of	a	trend	now.	If	you’re	going	to	talk	about	what	was	in	the	news	yesterday	then,	you	know	what	is	happening,	 you	 can	 tell	 us	 about	 the	 current	 situation…	 so	 being	informed	is	cool…	like	knowing	things,	just	being	informed	is	really	cool.	 If	you	can	stand	up	and	speak	about	something,	 if	you	know	everything,	then	people	are	like,	wow,	this	person	is	pretty	cool.		The	 writer’s	 comments	 resonate	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 elite	 studies	scholarship,	 which	 finds	 that	 being	 educated	 serves	 as	 a	 class	 distinction	 and	which	delivers	prestige	and	thus	creates	a	desirable	identity	marker.	However,	in	the	 South	 African	 context	 being	 educated	 as	 an	 identity/identification	marker	has	 a	 generational	 racialised	dimension,	 and	 it	 is	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 youth	 elite-leader	wannabes	to	challenge	the	older	elite	in	power.	This	distinction	is	rooted	in	 the	 aforementioned	 limited	 opportunities	 afforded	 to	 Black	 populations	during	apartheid.			In	addition	to	the	already	discussed	case	of	Zille-Mazibuko	leadership	challenge,	an	 interesting	 example	 of	 this	 discourse	 came	 from	 Juliet,	who	was	 an	African	student	 from	 rural	 parts	 of	 Mpumalanga.	 She	 lived	 with	 her	 sister	 and	 her	grandmother,	whom	she	 spoke	very	 fondly	off,	 and	whom	she	 said	 she	missed	very	much	while	at	university.	She	lived	in	a	small	village,	with	no	shops	or	other	services.	She	believed	that	more	Black	Africans	were	becoming	educated,	which	meant	that	apartheid	could	not	possibly	be	repeated.	She	expressed	this	view	as	we	discussed	voting	for	the	DA,	which	is	often	discouraged	amongst	Black	South	Africans	under	 the	 threat	 that	 the	party	would	bring	back	apartheid.	However,	Juliet	 and	 others	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 not	 possible,	 because	 many	 more	 Black	Africans	 were	 aware	 and	 empowered	 unlike	 in	 the	 past	 and	 would	 not	 allow	apartheid	to	happen.	Education	thus	arises	as	an	exceptional	identity	marker	and	
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a	 sign	 of	 distinction	 of	 the	 new	 Black	 generation,	 who	 considered	 older	generations,	 and	 women	 with	 education	 such	 as	 the	 aforementioned	 Pandor,	Madonsela	or	NDZ,	as	exceptions	amongst	women	in	politics.	Consequently,	this	shows	that	students	project	their	own	ideals	onto	FPEs	and	hence	construct	an	empowering	ideal	for	themselves	based	on	the	role	models	and	anti-heroes	they	observe.		
Conclusion	The	first	set	of	norms	expected	of	FPEs	grouped	around	the	discourses	of	being	deserving,	which	I	have	discussed	in	this	chapter,	demonstrates	the	construction	process	of	an	FPE	as	an	ideal	version	of	the	student	herself	based	on	role	models	and	anti-heroes	they	perceive.	As	students	pursue	their	HE,	they	are	exposed	to	a	multiplicity	of	discourses,	which	 suggest	 to	 them	 that	 they	must	work	hard	on	their	 education	 and	 not	 be	 lazy	 in	 order	 to	 be	 deserving	 of	 employment	 and	other	rewards	and	benefits	of	social	mobility,	as	uncertain	as	they	may	be.	These	discourses	adjudicating	who	is	deserving	and	how	deservedness	is	demonstrated	are	 rooted	 in	 the	 students’	 everyday	 experiences	 with	 issues	 such	 as	 social	welfare,	 land	 ownership,	 affirmative	 action	 and	 free	 HE	 policies,	 which	 all	revolve	 around	 the	 praise	 for	 those	who	work	 hard	 and	who	demonstrate	 the	neoliberal	 values	 of	 pulling	 oneself	 by	 their	 bootstraps.	 These	 debates	 are	situated	within	 the	wider	culture	 that	praises	 struggle,	 especially	 the	historical	fight	against	apartheid,	which	 leads	to	generational	tensions	as	 it	puts	youth	as	Born-Frees	 at	 a	 moral	 disadvantage	 against	 those	 in	 power	 with	 struggle	credentials.			Values	and	characteristics	of	being	hard	working	and	educated	that	the	students	hold	for	themselves	consequently	form	the	normative	expectations	of	ideal	FPEs,	who	 the	students	expect	 to	have	achieved	and	 thus	deserved	 their	positions	of	power	 and	 influence.	 Although	many	women	 in	 politics	 are	 not	 believed	 to	 be	meeting	 these	 values,	 characteristics,	 and	 behaviours,	 and	 hence	 could	 be	understood	as	deterrent	models,	the	students	are	able	to	construct	the	ideal	of	an	FPE	by	comparing	these	women	with	other	women	and	men	in	their	lives,	such	as	their	mothers,	or	successful	entrepreneurs	and	hustlers,	which	enables	them	
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to	 envision	 a	 future	 for	 themselves	 in	which	 patriarchal,	 racial,	 class	 and	 age-based	power	inequalities	are	subverted.		 	
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8 Exceptional	 People:	 Those	 Who	 Remember	 Where	 They	
Come	from	
Introduction	The	second	set	of	values,	characteristics	and	behaviours	that	students	associate	with	 the	 ideal	 FPE	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 ‘remembering	where	you	come	
from’.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 narratives	 of	 remembering	 operate	 on	 a	sense	 of	 belonging	 and	 social	 ties.	 The	 threat	 of	 becoming	 detached	 from	 this	community	 is	 then	 portrayed	 as	 a	 loss	 of	 identity	 and	 support	 mechanisms,	which	 remain	 important	 due	 to	 the	 precarious	 situation	 of	 the	 South	 African	nouveaux	 rich,	 the	 middle	 classes	 as	 well	 as	 the	 poor.	 Thus,	 the	 students	 are	pushed	 to	 live	 within	 the	 established	 social	 order	 based	 on	 the	 intersecting	norms	of	age,	class,	gender	and	race.	By	the	disciplinary	power	of	the	discourse,	the	 students’	 aspirations	 are	 moulded	 towards	 those	 forms	 of	 exceptionalism	that	are	within	 the	boundaries	of	 the	existing	 imagined	community	and	do	not	challenge	 the	 powerful.	 Similarly	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 being	 deserving,	 the	remembering	 discourse	 is	 both	 accepted	 and	 subverted	 through	 various	performative	practices,	be	it	of	humility	or	speaking	a	specific	language	that	are	analysed	here.45			The	students	also	express	their	remembering	through	caring	for	members	of	the	community,	 be	 it	 their	 families	 or	more	 expansively	 defined	 along	 a	 particular	location,	 racial	 identification	 or	 otherwise.	 Consequently,	 the	 students	 expect	political	 elites	 to	 show	 care	 for	 others,	 but	 they	 expect	 it	 more	 of	 female	politicians	than	their	male	counterparts,	because	of	the	widely	held	assumption	that	 women	 are	 naturally	 more	 caring	 than	 men.	 Care	 for	 others	 is	 infused,	however,	with	seemingly	contradictory	ideas	of	independence	and	steadfastness,																																																									45	The	analysis	of	practices	of	belonging	and	remembering	in	this	chapter	focus	primarily	on	the	Black	 African	 students,	 but	 the	 chapter	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 attempt	 at	 defining	Blackness	or	whiteness.	It	is	not	the	intention	to	provide	an	analysis	of	what	Blackness	means	to	young	women,	 nor	 to	 suggest	 this	 is	 an	 exhaustive	 list	 of	 behaviours	 and	 characteristics	 that	students	understand	as	markers	of	Blackness.	The	chapter	seeks	to	highlight	instead	how	power	is	wielded	by	using	and	abusing	the	desire	for	community	belonging,	leading	to	the	rejection	of	eliteness	as	exceptionalism	amongst	students	across	racial	and	class	identifications.	Moreover,	it	seeks	to	show	how	the	attempts	to	discipline	and	police	the	students	through	the	discourses	are	challenged,	 including	 through	 competing	 articulations	 of	 Black	 excellence,	 and	women’s	 Black	excellence	in	particular.	
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resulting	 in	 the	students’	articulation	of	an	FPE	as	a	woman	who	does	not	give	into	 gender	 oppression,	 greed	 and	 selfishness,	 but	who	 is	 strong	 to	withstand	these	 normative	 pressures.	 Hence,	 FPEs	 represent	 a	 change	 from	 the	 male	dominated	 status	 quo	 which	 echoes	 the	 ideal	 of	 change	 that	 students	 have	 of	themselves.	As	a	result,	 the	discourses	of	remembering	and	being	deserving,	as	well	as	their	subversions,	are	morphed	in	the	normative	expectations	of	an	FPE.	These	norms	thus	show	the	students’	agency	in	creating	the	empowering	effect	of	women	in	politics	as	role	models.		
Community	and	Belonging:	Markers	of	Blackness	and	Whiteness	
Remembering	 is	 an	 important	 notion	 through	 which	 anticolonial	 scholars	conceptualise	the	impacts	of	colonisation	on	the	colonised	subject.	Through	the	idea	of	remembering	they	articulate	the	processes	through	which	the	colonised	people	can	deal	with	the	internalised	norms	and	ways	of	being	of	the	coloniser.	Franz	Fanon	(2008)	 in	Black	Skins,	White	Masks,	 for	example,	highlights	 the	use	of	 French	 as	 a	way	 through	which	 the	 colonised,	 in	 his	 case	 the	 people	 in	 the	Antilles,	 attempted	 to	 be	 like	 the	 French.	 He	 writes,	 “Historically,	 it	 must	 be	understood	that	the	Negro	wants	to	speak	French	because	it	is	the	key	that	can	open	doors	which	were	still	barred	to	him	fifty	year	ago”	(2008,	25).	According	to	 Fanon,	 the	 colonised	 reject	 their	 own	 language	 to	 become	 honorary	 French	and	 to	break	away	 from	Blackness,	 in	order	 to	become	 closer	 to	being	human.	Fanon	elaborates	further,	“In	every	country	of	the	world	there	are	climbers,	‘the	ones	who	forget	who	they	are,’	and,	in	contrast	to	them,	‘the	ones	who	remember	where	 they	 came	 from’”	 (2008,	 24).	 The	 consequence	 of	 these	 observations	 is,	according	to	Fanon,	the	need	for	the	colonised	to	remember	who	they	are.			Just	like	Fanon,	many	young	Black	Africans	I	spoke	to	were	both	subconsciously	and	 intentionally	 tackling	 the	 question	 of	 what	 Blackness	 meant	 to	 them	 and	what	it	meant	to	decolonise	and	get	rid	of	the	internalised	colonial	worldviews.	The	students	across	various	backgrounds	were	further	grappling	with	the	issue	of	how	South	African	society	should	deal	with	 the	psychological	 impacts	of	 the	colonial	and	apartheid	histories.	 In	 this	 context,	Sara	Ahmed’s	 insights	 into	 the	memory	of	pain	and	injury	also	bear	relevance.	She	shows	that	remembering	is	
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an	 important	 act	 because,	 “forgetting	would	 be	 a	 repetition	 of	 the	 violence	 or	injury.	…	Our	 task	might	 instead	be	 to	 remember	how	 the	 surfaces	of	 bodies	…	came	to	be	wounded	in	the	first	place”	[my	emphasis]	(2014,	33).	Remembering	in	various	contextual	interpretations	(see	also	wa	Thiong’o	[2017])	is	therefore	a	powerful	 and	 widely	 spread	 discourse	 that	 penetrated	 the	 lives	 of	 my	participants	and	shaped	their	perceptions	of	South	African	politics.			Probably	 the	 most	 illustrative	 example	 where	 remembering	 discourse	 can	 be	understood	 is	 in	 spatial	 segregation.	 Relocation	 from	 racially	 defined	 areas	established	by	the	apartheid	legislation,	be	it	from	a	rural	to	an	urban	settlement	or	within	various	urban	settings,	 visually	 represents	 the	 severance	of	 ties	with	the	 ‘original’	 Black	 community	 from	 which	 people	 came	 from	 and	 creates	 a	potential	 identity	 difference	 and	 a	 social	 barrier.	 For	 example,	 after	 the	 end	of	apartheid,	 some	Black	households	 and	 individuals	 relocated	 into	more	 affluent	white	neighbourhoods,	which	represented	a	change	of	the	racial	and	class-based	community.	 Others	 relocated	 within	 the	 racially-defined	 township	 spaces	 to	higher	quality	sections,	hence	leaving	their	class-based	community.	For	many	of	my	respondents	 from	township	settings,	 specifying	which	part	of	 the	 township	they	 came	 from	 was	 important,	 because	 they	 represented	 a	 different	 type	 of	everyday	lived	experiences,	be	it	with	regards	to	electricity	access	and	sanitation,	the	 type	 and	 size	 of	 house	 they	 lived	 in,	 the	 transport	 connection	 to	 the	university	campus	or	the	amount	of	crime	they	were	confronted	with.			Spatial	separation	as	a	symbol	of	rupture	of	community	relations	mattered	in	the	students’	 decision-making	 about	 their	 university	 studies.	 Many	 Black	 African	students	 chose	 to	 come	 to	UJ	because	 it	was	 reasonably	 close	 to	 their	 families.	Some	expressed	their	parents’	or	guardians’	desire	for	them	not	to	go	far	away.	Their	rationale	was	partially	based	in	direct	economic	considerations	of	costs	of	living	away	from	home;	however,	an	associated	rationale	was	the	parents’	belief	that	 should	 something	 happen	 to	 the	 students,	 the	 proximity	 of	 family	 or	extended	 networks	 meant	 the	 students	 could	 receive	 some	 assistance.	 Many	students	expressed	their	own	desire	 to	stay	connected	to	 their	kin,	rather	 than	thinking	it	was	something	that	was	imposed	upon	them.	Many	non-Black	African	
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students	also	said	that	they	chose	to	come	to	UJ	in	order	to	live	at	home,	cut	costs	and	 to	 enjoy	 the	 financial	 and	other	 support	 of	 their	 families.	While	 some	 saw	this	as	their	own	choice	within	their	financial	circumstances,	others	clearly	said	they	had	no	control	over	where	 they	were	going	 to	 live.	Hence,	 although	 there	was	 a	 clear	 and	 important	 difference	 in	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 these	 groups	 of	students	relied	on	the	financial	support	of	others	and	the	degree	of	precarity	of	their	 lives,	 the	 rationales	 behind	 the	 students’	 choices	 of	 UJ	 were	 paralleled	across	various	racial	and	socio-economic	backgrounds.			An	example	of	the	importance	that	the	remembering	discourse	carried	amongst	students	was	captured	in	my	exchange	with	a	student,	who	identified	as	Native	African,	and	who	knew	 that	 she	was	considered	an	elite	by	many	of	her	peers.	She	came	to	study	at	UJ	after	having	worked	for	a	few	years.	Unlike	many	other	students	in	my	study	and	in	the	country	more	broadly,	she	had	been	able	to	get	a	relatively	well-paid	 job	with	 only	 a	matric	 certificate,	 because	 she	 had	 studied	abroad	 in	 high	 school	 and	 had	 been	 to	 various	 countries	with	 her	 family.	 Her	father	was	a	medical	doctor	and	her	mother	was	a	diplomat.	The	student	lived	on	her	own	in	a	flat	because	her	parents	could	afford	to	pay	for	it,	and	she	drove	to	school	 in	 her	 own	 car.	 She	 went	 back	 and	 forth	 on	 deciding	 whether	 she	embraced	the	label	of	elite	or	not,	and	expressed	the	pressures	as	follows:		 Student:	I	think	there	is	a	sense	of	shame	[for	being	called	an	elite]	because	 it’s	 like,	 oh,	 you	 have	 forgotten	 your	 roots.	 You’ve	forgotten	where	you’ve	come	from.	You’ve	forgotten	your	people.		Ján:	Why	is	that	important?	Student:	 For	me	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 forget	where	 I	 come	 from	and	not	to	forget	my	people.		Ján:	As	in	Black	people?	Student:	 Yeah,	 because	…	 	 I	 am	where	 I	 am	at	 the	backs	of	 some	people’s	struggle,	right?	I	am	where	I	am	because	some	people	had	to	give	up	their	lives	for	me	to	be	where	I	am.	I	wouldn’t	be	having	this	 conversation	with	 you,	 if	 it	 wasn’t	 for	 the	 people	who	 came	before	me	and	fought	for	that.	So,	for	me	to	just	be	like,	whatever,	I’m	doing	my	thing,	it’s	up	to	you,	you	do	yours.	It	makes	no	sense,	I	have	 to	pay	 it	 forward.	They’ve	 taught	me	 to	pay	 it	 forward.	So,	 I	have	to	go	back,	get	someone	who	is	still	behind	and	pull	them	up	with	me.	That’s	how	it	is,	that’s	how	it	ought	to	be.		
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The	debates	about	remembering	the	Black	community,	its	history	and	the	role	of	older	generations,	as	captured	above,	became	central	to	HE	experiences	in	2016-2017	because	of	 the	Fallist	 call	 for	decolonised,	 free,	quality,	HE.	However,	 the	debate	 reverberated	 with	 Black	 African	 youth	 also	 in	 high	 schools,	 many	 of	which	also	failed	to	transform	post-apartheid.	Student	protests	at	Pretoria	Girls’	High	 in	 particular	 caught	 the	media	 spotlight	 in	August	 2016	 after	 some	of	 its	pupils	challenged	the	management	over	the	school’s	hair	and	language	policies,	which	 forbade	natural	Black	African	hair	 styles	 and	 the	use	 of	 vernacular.	 The	image	of	Zulaikha	Patel	in	her	school	uniform,	a	big	afro	and	a	raised	fist	standing	in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 white	 school	 official,	 iconised	 the	 pupils’	 resistance	 (Nicolson,	2016;	Wazar,	2016).	These	events,	which	left	a	considerable	impression	on	many	of	my	respondents,	suggest	on	one	hand	the	youth’s	efforts	to	claim	and	promote	‘Black	 pride,’	 ‘Black	 excellence’	 and	 to	 affirm	 ‘Black	 culture’	 against	 the	demeaning,	 dehumanising,	 oppressive	 treatment	 by	 white	 structures.	Concurrently	the	events	also	spoke	to	the	concern	of	the	older	generations	that	since	 1994	 insufficient	 effort	 has	 been	made	 to	 stop	 Black	 African	 youth	 from	losing	their	heritage,	culture	and	traditions	and	thus	forgetting	where	they	come	from.46			For	many	students	in	my	research,	their	relationship	with	culture	and	tradition	was	an	ideological	issue	of	political	consequence,	but	more	importantly,	it	was	a	matter	of	dealing	with	tensions	and	contestations	over	the	everyday	practices	of	modern	 urban	 lifestyle,	 consumption,	 technological	 use	 and	 holding	 so-called	progressive	 values	 on	 race	 and	 gender.	 The	 students’	 engagement	 with	 the	prevalent	debates	of	 culture	and	 community,	 and	 consequently	 construction	of	their	 identity	 as	 young,	 Black	 Africans	 in	 South	 Africa,	 are	 occurring	 in	 a	contentious	 cross-generational,	 cross-temporal	 context	 despite	 the	 falsely	presumed	dawn	of	a	new	era	that	came	with	the	end	of	apartheid.	Young	people																																																									46	Many	members	of	the	Afrikaner	community	and	some	Afrikaner	students	in	my	research	also	felt	 that	 their	 identity	and	culture	were	under	 threat.	Hence,	 in	a	perverse	way,	 the	Afrikaners	shared	the	discourses	that	were	prevalent	amongst	the	Black	African	community,	namely	that	the	youth	were	at	risk	of	losing	their	heritage	and	forgetting	where	they	come	from,	such	as	the	Boer	history.	The	voice	of	the	Coloured	community,	that	also	speaks	Afrikaans	as	a	mother	tongue	and	sees	it	as	part	of	its	identity,	was,	however,	neglected	or	ignored	in	the	public	discourse	(van	der	Merwe,	2017;	Wesi,	2015).	
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are	operating	within	 a	 context	 of	 competing	 sets	 of	 expectations	 and	norms	of	what	 it	 means	 to	 belong	 to	 an	 imagined	 community	 or	 communities,	 some	 of	which	 are	 passed	 on	 from	 previous	 generations,	 while	 others	 are	 articulated	anew.	 The	 alleged	 shared	 experiences	 of	 racialisation	 and	 colonisation	 which	mark	an	element	of	the	community	belonging,	are	interpreted	and	felt	differently	across	 and	 within	 generations	 and	 classes.	 For	 example,	 most	 students	 in	 my	research	 simplistically	 synonymised	 the	 older	 generations	with	being	 resistant	keepers	of	tradition	and	culture,	especially	Black	African	culture,	as	if	it	were	set	in	stone.	Some	Fallists	in	contrast	argued	that	the	older	generations	have	failed	to	 decolonise	 and	 to	 subvert	 whiteness,	 which	 meant	 that	 they	 were	 not	 the	supposed	protectors	of	authentic	African	culture	and	hence	not	role	models,	but	anti-heroes.	 Therefore,	 many	 young	 activists	 looked	 up	 to	 a	 select	 few	individuals	who	were	 attempting	 to	 celebrate	 Blackness	 and	 Pan-Africanism	 –	although	 these	 concepts	were	often	undefined	and	 contested,	 the	 same	way	as	Eurocentrism	or	decolonisation.			In	 the	 eyes	 of	 many	 students,	 the	 struggle	 against	 racism	 of	 apartheid,	colonisation	and	their	continued	legacies,	 is	an	inherent	marker	of	Blackness.	A	Black	 student,	 who	 lived	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 commuted	 to	 campus	 and	 was	 a	member	of	a	day	house	as	well	 as	other	organisations	on	campus,	 shared	with	me	 feeling	 blessed	 because	 unlike	 many	 other	 young	 people,	 she	 had	 both	parents	to	rely	on,	who	were	married	to	each	other	and	supported	her,	including	through	 the	 varsity	 decision	 making	 process.	 She	 readily	 acknowledged	 her	privilege	and	her	statement	that	I	cite	below	shows	the	norms	and	expectations	that	young	Black	Africans	face	with	regards	to	Blackness,	struggle	and	belonging:		 I	 do	 feel	 judged	 [for	 not	 having	 to	 struggle].	 The	 moment	 you	haven’t	gone	through	a	struggle,	you	haven’t	lived,	for	example,	and	you’re	whitewashed,	or	you’re	 just	basically	being	shunned	upon.	…			I	 had	 a	 birthday	 party	 last	 year,	 and	 invited	 some	 of	my	 friends,	like,	 ‘hey,	 come	 over,	 let’s	 hang’…	 the	moment	 after	 they	 see	my	house	…	they’d	be	 like,	why	do	you	have	to	worry,	 I	mean,	you’re	settled,	 look	 at	 your	 house,	 and	 stuff	 like	 that.	 And	 that	 actually	
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offends	me,	because,	just	because	I’m	privileged,	doesn’t	mean	that	it’s	getting	to	my	head	and	that	I	don’t	think	about	other	people.	…		The	 close	 connection	 of	 wealth	 and	whiteness,	 and	 struggle	 and	 Blackness,	 as	described	by	the	student,	creates	an	 inherent	complexity	of	articulating	what	 it	means	 to	 ‘remember	 where	 you	 come	 from’	 as	 a	 Black	 African	 and	 as	 an	aspirational	social	climber.		The	 contestations	 about	 these	 questions	 show	 that	 the	 discourse	 of	remembering	 has	 disciplinary	 power	 by	 setting	 identity-based	 norms	 and	 is	wielded	by	people	who	want	 to	maintain	power	 as	well	 as	 those	who	want	 to	gain	 it.	 It	 allows	 for	 a	 certain	 level	 and	 type	of	 social	mobility	 and	 change,	 but	only	 enough	 to	 make	 the	 suffering	 and	 struggle	 against	 apartheid	 worth	 the	sacrifice	and	to	believe	 in	a	better	 future.	However,	 the	change	 is	not	sufficient	enough	to	displace	elites	and	the	powerful	reaping	the	benefits	of	the	status	quo.	While	operating	with	some	notion	of	change,	the	discursive	power	is	embedded	in	a	static	view	of	culture	and	the	desire	to	enforce	an	iteration	of	culture	that	is	its	 ‘true’	and	 ‘authentic’	version,	which	gains	 in	salience	 in	a	context	of	distrust	and	abuse	of	power	as	I	argue	in	Chapter	Three	is	the	case	in	South	Africa.	Thus,	the	discourse	creates	a	contested	set	of	identities	and	lines	of	difference	that	all	students	have	to	navigate	and	which	while	disciplining	them,	also	offers	them	the	opportunity	to	challenge	and	resist	the	pressures	to	conform.		
Black	Culture	and	Traditional	Leadership		Most	of	my	 research	participants	of	 all	 racial	 and	 socio-economic	backgrounds	argued	that	two	key	aspects	that	represented	some	generalised	characteristics	of	Black	African	culture	were	age-based	hierarchies	and	patriarchal	discrimination	of	women.	For	example,	Laury	spoke	to	me	at	length	about	what	she	referred	to	as	‘Black	culture’	and	the	way	that	it	made	her	experiences	different	from	those	of	white	students.	She	highlighted	that	while	white	pupils	spoke	up	and	said	to	a	teacher	whatever	 they	wanted,	Black	African	kids	believed	 that	 they	had	 to	be	more	 reserved	 towards	 the	 teacher’s	 authority.	 Thobile	 shared	 a	 similar	sentiment	with	me	when	she	recalled	her	first	year	at	UJ	and	the	adjustments	she	
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had	 to	 go	 through.	 In	 addition	 to	dealing	with	academic	 challenges,	 she	had	 to	adjust	to	a	different	classroom	behaviour	to	what	she	had	been	used	to	in	school.	She	said	that	out	of	respect	for	elders	as	authority,	she	would	never	have	dared	to	eat	snacks	or	talk	in	a	classroom.	At	UJ,	however,	she	said	that	students	often	did	 just	 that	 and	 they	 even	 left	 lectures	 early.	 She	 admitted	 that	 the	 idea	 of	leaving	 class	 early	 made	 her	 uncomfortable	 because	 she	 thought	 it	 was	disrespectful	to	the	lecturer	as	an	older	person.			Despite	 the	 students’	 perceptions,	 age-based	 hierarchies	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 a	particular	 culture	 or	 identity	 group	 in	 South	 Africa,	 although	 its	 power	 and	prevalence	 varied	 for	 individual	 students.	 Whiteness	 also	 works	 with	 and	through	 gerontocratic	 power	 system	 to	 control	 ‘the	 Other’	 which	 is	 seen	 in	infantilising	 and	 patronising	 (Gqola,	 2015;	 Fanon,	 2008).	 An	 example	 that	resonated	 with	 me	 was	 the	 statement	 from	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Black	 Panthers,	Ericka	Huggins,	who	spoke	at	an	event	organised	by	UJ’s	Centre	for	Social	Change	in	March	2017.	She	said,	“My	father	died	still	being	called	a	boy.”	Her	statement,	referring	to	the	situation	in	the	USA,	demonstrates	how	age-based	power	works	with	gender,	race	and	other	forms	of	oppression.	Her	insights	resonated	strongly	with	 the	 students	 in	 the	 audience,	 showing	 the	 transnational	 applicability.	Similarly,	 seniority-based	 inequality	 is	 part	 of	 the	 Afrikaner	 traditional	 values.	According	to	my	participant	Emily,	respecting	elders	was	one	of	the	values	that	were	impressed	upon	young	people	and	hence,	talking	freely	or	talking	back	was	not	deemed	acceptable.	Emily	was	a	first-year	student	at	UJ	when	we	met	at	the	end	 of	 2016	 and	 she	 came	 from	 a	 mixed	 white	 background	 –	 her	 father	 was	Afrikaner	 and	 her	 mother	 British	 –	 and	 so	 she	 said	 she	 was	 brought	 up	 in	between	two	cultures.	When	university	courses	were	in	session,	Emily	lived	with	relatives	not	too	far	from	the	campus,	as	she	was	from	another	part	of	Gauteng	and	 did	 not	 want	 to	 commute	 the	 distance.	 She	 was	 able	 to	 afford	 her	 fees	because	 of	 her	 mother’s	 job,	 that	 she	 described	 as	 well	 paid.	 She	 was	contemplating	her	future	at	UJ	in	favour	of	another	university	and	was	thus	not	actively	engaged	member	of	on	campus	organisations.	She	said	that	both	of	her	cultural	backgrounds	were	conservative,	but	 she	believed	 that	Afrikaners	were	perceived	 to	 be	 more	 conservative	 than	 British	 in	 South	 Africa,	 especially	
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because	of	 the	 influence	of	 the	 traditional	Afrikaner	NG	Kerk	 (Dutch	Reformed	Church	 –	 NGK).	 Despite	 this	 clear	 gerontocratic	 similarity	 across	 cultural	traditions,	 albeit	 in	various	degrees	of	 importance,	 respect	and	submissiveness	towards	the	elders	was	racialised	as	a	predominantly	Black	African	matter.			Most	 students	 also	 associated	 Black	 culture	 and	 tradition	 with	 gender	 norms,	which	 expected	 women	 to	 be	 ‘submissive’	 to	 men,47	including	 in	 positions	 of	decision-making,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 basic	 household	 matters.	 Thus,	 the	majority	of	the	students	believed	that	being	modern	was	associated	with	holding	views	 in	 support	 of	 gender	 equality,	 while	 traditional	 views	 and	 norms	 led	 to	women’s	oppression.	These	students’	views	mirror	Jewkes	and	Morrell’s	(2012)	distinction	 of	 modern	 and	 conservative	 femininities,	 with	 latter	 being	 seen	 as	obedient,	 respectful	 and	 attached	 primarily	 to	 the	 older	 generations.	 Based	 on	this	dichotomy	of	culture	and	modernity	of	gender	norms,	unsurprisingly,	none	of	 the	 participants	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 one	 student	 mentioned	 so-called	traditional	leaders	as	examples	of	FPEs.	Traditional	leaders	were	constitutionally	recognised	 and	 vested	 with	 political	 power	 as	 an	 act	 of	 ANC’s	 concession	 in	exchange	for	political	support	in	the	South	African	democratic	settlement	and	the	subsequent	 elections.	 Thus,	 the	 considerable	 influence	 held	 by	 the	 traditional	leaders	was	politically	and	legally	substantiated.	 It	 is	argued	that	they	continue	to	 exercise	 this	 influence,	 creating	 tensions	 between	 people’s	 everyday	experiences	on	one	hand	and	legal	provisions	and	protections	afforded	to	them	on	the	other.	For	example,	while	gender	equality	provisions	are	constitutionally	protected	 and	 stand	 above	 traditional	 practices,	 women’s	 opportunities	 and	abilities	 to	 exercise	 their	 rights	 in	matters	 such	 as	 land	 ownership	 or	 political	representation	within	local	structures	continue	to	be	undermined	(Bauer,	2011;	Beall,	Mkhize	and	Vawda,	2005;	Bentley,	2005;	Walker,	1994).																																																										47	While	many	students	spoke	about	women’s	vulnerabilities	and	gender	oppressions	especially	with	 reference	 to	 Black	 African	 culture,	 young	 women	 from	 all	 racial,	 ethnic	 and	 religious	backgrounds	experience	patriarchal	oppression.	To	varying	degrees,	the	students	expressed	that	their	societal	context	–	be	it	defined	as	broadly	as	South	Africa,	or	as	a	particular	community	–	was	 patriarchal,	 even	 if	 they	 claimed	 that	 their	 upbringing	 was	 different	 from	 the	 norm.	 For	example,	 numerous	 Coloured	 students	 spoke	 about	 the	 society’s	 expectations	 that	 young	Coloured	women	 just	 fall	pregnant	and	do	not	 amount	 to	 anything,	 and	 Indian/Asian	 students	mentioned	 the	pressures	 to	 get	 some	education,	which	 should	be	 followed	by	marriage	 rather	than	 professional	 careers,	 meaning	 that	 their	 schooling	 did	 not	 need	 to	 be	 extensive	 or	particularly	exceptional.			
	224	
	Several	 Black	 African	 peoples	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	 wider	 region	 have	historically	 had	 female	 chiefs	 and	 queens,	 such	 as	 the	 mother	 of	 Shaka	 Zulu,	queen	Nandi	(Sesanti,	2016;	Shamase,	2014;	Weir,	2007).	However,	only	the	Rain	Queen,	 Majaji,	 and	 Queen	 Nzinga	 were	 mentioned	 by	 a	 few	 students	 in	 our	interviews	 as	 FPE	 examples.	 For	 instance,	 Sat-Ra	 Nthabi	 mentioned	 Queen	Nzinga	to	show	that	women	used	to	hold	important	leadership	roles	in	the	past,	and	therefore,	it	was	not	un-African	to	see	women	in	power,	as	some	men	tend	to	propose.	However,	it	was	only	in	her	response	to	my	prompting	that	she	thought	of	Nzinga,	rather	than	suggesting	some	of	the	female	chiefs	and	other	traditional	leaders	of	the	present	day	South	Africa.	The	students’	lack	of	association	between	FPEs	and	traditional	leadership	speaks	to	the	prevalence	of	patriarchal	nature	of	the	current	form	of	traditional	politics,	even	if	historically	that	had	not	been	the	case.			Tradition	 in	 the	eyes	of	my	 interviewees	was	also	 located	 in	 the	 rural	 villages,	and	 although	 several	 of	 my	 participants	 described	 their	 homes	 to	 be	 in	 these	areas,	they	did	not	think	that	the	traditional	leaders	mattered	to	their	life.	They	did	not	consider	them	to	be	of	sufficient	importance	to	personally	consult	them	in	their	decision-making,	although	they	knew	of	other	people	who	did.	Danie	was	one	of	my	research	participants,	whose	story	could	be	a	poster	representation	of	what	 the	 ANC	 envisioned	 for	 the	 Black	 African	 child	 in	 post-apartheid	 South	Africa,	because	she	was	a	Black	young	woman	who	came	from	rural	Mpumalanga	and	received	NSFAS	funding	to	study	at	UJ,	where	she	did	not	participate	in	any	organisations	 or	 societies.	 When	 she	 was	 younger,	 she	 had	 to	 walk	 eight	kilometres	 to	 school	 and	 after	 a	 whole	 day	 of	 classes	 she	 would	 have	 her	household	 chores	 waiting	 for	 her	 at	 home.	 Despite	 what	 she	 called	 her	conservative	upbringing,	she	described	herself	as	being	different	from	the	girls	in	her	village	and	acting	differently	 from	 the	norm.	She	did	not	 like	 to	wear	girly	clothes	 and	 she	 played	 football	 with	 the	 boys.	 When	 I	 asked	 her	 whether	traditional	 leaders	 played	 a	 role	 in	 her	 community	 and	whether	 they	 could	 be	seen	as	political	elites	she	said:		
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Danie:	 Chiefs	 want	 to	 rule	 on	 their	 own.	 So,	 they	 are,	 obviously,	against	politics.	…	 they	want	 to	 see	 themselves	 ruling	elite,	when	you	 have	 to	 do	 certain	 tradition,	 certain	 ceremony,	 you	 go	 ask	them,	because	they	are	the	leaders.	[You]	get	direction	from	them,	what	to	do	and	what	you’re	expected	to	do.	Ján:	 And	 are	 they	 all	men	 or	 are	 there	 some	women,	 or	 is	 it	 just	men?	Danie:	No,	 they’re	only	mens.	 Strictly	mens.	No	 females	would	be	given	 an	 opportunity	 to	 rule.	 Rule	 a	 man?	 No.	 Females	 are	 only	submissive.	They	have	to	submit	to	men.	…	I	don’t	believe	in	that.	Those	 [traditional	 leaders],	 actually,	 they	 want	 [to]	 control	
everything.	Everything	 that	we	do,	 they	wanna	control	 it.	Because	they	are	males,	and	you	know,	they	see	themselves	as	powerful.	…	We	[women]	just	lead	people	as	friends,	nah,	I	don’t	believe	that.	I	don’t.				Danie’s	 views	 were	 echoed	 by	 the	 majority	 of	 my	 research	 participants	 and	demonstrate	 that	 students	 associate	 politics	 with	 modernity,	 progress	 and	western	values,	which	are	in	contrast	to	the	notion	of	tradition	and	culture.	This	shows	how	students	 construct	FPEs	as	 symbols	of	 the	 students’	 ideal	 selves	as	modern	change	makers	and	hence	become	empowered	by	 the	 ideal	 role	model	that	 an	 FPE	 could	 be.	 Moreover,	 their	 rejection	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 traditional	authority	also	partially	works	as	a	challenge	to	the	remembering	discourse.		Considering	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 political	 eliteness,	 the	 generational	 divide	over	politics	and	patriarchy	had	many	important	consequences,	some	of	which	I	have	 already	 alluded	 to	 in	 previous	 chapters.	 Firstly,	 it	 led	 to	 the	 belief	 that	women	 in	 politics,	 as	 represented	 by	 the	 ANC	WL,	 were	 passive	 and	 failed	 to	actively	participate,	because	as	older	women	they	were	brought	up	in	patriarchal	culture.	The	frequent	reference	by	my	participants	to	ANC	women	as	‘submissive	grandmothers’	 and	 relegating	 their	 political	 relevance	 to	 leading	 processions	during	 funerals	 and	 not	much	 else,	 demonstrates	 this	 sentiment.	 Similarly,	 an	exchange	 between	 two	 students	 during	 one	 of	 my	 FGDs	 shows	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 Women’s	 League	 was	 perceived	 as	 failing	 to	 fight	 for	 women’s	empowerment	and	‘progressive,’	‘modern’	gender	norms:		 Philile:	There	was	a	time,	I	don’t	know,	a	few	years	back,	where	a	question	was	 posed	 to	 the	 ANC	Women’s	 League…	 on	whether	 they	 think	 that	 a	female	 could	 lead	 the	 country	 and	 they	 said	 no.	 If	 women	 say	 ‘no’	 to	
	226	
such…	older	women,	women	who	 I	 feel	 I	 look	up	 to,	 decide,	 ‘no,	 I	 don’t	think	 we’re	 ready	 for	 a	 female	 president’,	 how	 am	 I	 as	 youth,	 young	person	supposed	to	look	at	such	position…	Rose:	…	The	women	in	politics	have	grown	up	in	our	cultures	…	it	would	make	sense	when	they	say,	‘no	we’re	not	ready,’	because	their	culture	has	indoctrinated	them	into	thinking	that…	the	man	is	in	higher	position,	you	are	submissive	because	you’re	born	a	woman.		Philile:	I	get	what	you’re	saying,	but	I	feel	for	their	positions,	they	owe	it	to	their	position	[to	promote	women	for	leadership	roles].			In	her	commentary,	Philile	referred	 to	 the	2012	NEC	elections.	At	 the	 time,	 the	WL	 did	 not	 put	 forward	 a	 female	 candidate	 for	 the	 party	 presidency,	 but	supported	 the	 incumbent,	 President	 Jacob	 Zuma,	 which	 demonstrated	 the	League’s	 allegiance	 with	 the	 strongest	 and	 politically	 most	 beneficial	 party	faction,	 instead	 of	 pursuing	 a	 feminist	 political	 agenda	 (Gouws,	 2011).	 The	second	implication	of	the	generational	divides	was	the	view	that	older	women	of	the	WL	were	 inactive	because	 they	were	denied	opportunities	within	 the	ANC,	which	 was	 a	 patriarchal	 organisation,	 as	 it	 was	 led	 by	 traditionalist	 men	 like	President	Zuma.	And	thirdly,	it	meant	that	students	believed	it	would	be	difficult	for	a	woman	to	be	elected	president	of	South	Africa,	because	most	of	the	people	still	 lived	 in	 rural	 areas	 and/or	 had	 a	 traditional	mind-set.	 Therefore,	 the	ANC	would	not	nominate	a	woman	to	be	the	next	president.	Alternatively,	even	if	she	were	nominated,	 people	would	not	 vote	 for	 a	 female	 candidate,	 or	 they	would	vote	for	her	only	because	she	was	in	the	ANC	and	she	would	be	a	mere	pawn	for	the	men	of	the	party.		Based	on	the	view	that	women’s	presence	in	positions	of	power	is	an	exception	to	 the	 cultural	 norms,	 it	 follows	 that	 for	 the	 students	 women	 in	 positions	 of	power	represented	change	from	the	patriarchal	status	quo	and	offered	potential	role	models	that	are	empowering	vis-à-vis	the	existing	structures	of	power.	The	following	 exchange	 with	 Busisiwe	 captures	 this	 view.	 Busisiwe	 was	 a	 Black	student	from	a	small	town	in	Mpumalanga.	Like	many	other	students,	she	grew	up	with	her	grandparents	because	her	mother	had	 to	work	and	could	not	 take	care	 of	 her,	 and	 she	 received	what	 she	 described	 as	 Christian	 upbringing.	 She	was	from	a	township,	but	she	said	that	her	family	always	had	food	and	electricity.	Her	mother	 used	 to	work	 as	 a	 clerk,	 but	was	 currently	 unemployed;	 however,	
	227	
thanks	to	a	bursary	that	paid	 for	her	education,	as	well	as	accommodation,	her	studies	 were	 going	 well.	 We	 spoke	 about	 NDZ	 as	 the	 potential	 first	 female	president	of	South	Africa:		 Busisiwe:	 I	definitely	would	 [vote	 for	NDZ].	 I	wouldn’t	even	think	twice	about	it.	[laugh]	Ján:	But	then,	she	is	in	the	ANC.	So	that	means	you	would	be	voting	for	the	ANC	as	well.	Busisiwe:	Exactly,	but	I	guess,	what	choice	do	I	have?	[laugh]	ANC	rules.	But	yeah,	though	I	don’t	agree	with	some	of	their	strategies,	I	think	as	 a	 liberation	 struggle	movement,	 or	 as	 a	party,	 they	need	that	kind	of	a	dramatical	change,	you	know?	Ján:	But	would	she	be	a	dramatic	change?	Busisiwe:	 Yeah,	 I	 think	 so.	 She’s	 a	 revolutionary	 leader,	 but	 now,	you	have	these	thick-headed	men,	who	are	saying	this	is	how	this	party	 needs	 to	 be	 run,	 you	 understand?	 So,	 I	 think	 with	 proper	support	and	back	up,	she	can	do	it.			Many	 students	 believed	 just	 like	 Busisiwe	 that	 once	 in	 positions	 of	 power,	women	could	infuse	change	into	politics,	which	would	address	the	dire	situation	in	the	country,	because	of	the	different	qualities,	ideas	and	behaviours	that	they	should	possess	as	FPEs.	It	must	be	underscored,	however,	that	it	was	only	women	
who	would	meet	the	FPE	expectations	 that	would	be	bearers	 of	 change,	 because	women,	 such	as	many	members	of	 the	ANC	WL,	perpetuated	patriarchal	 status	quo	and	hence	represented	deterrent	models	instead.		It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 students	 who	 held	 views	 that	 challenged	 patriarchy	would	feel	that	they	were	either	rejecting	Blackness	and	their	community,	or	at	least	 that	 they	 were	 putting	 their	 belonging	 into	 the	 imaged	 community	 into	jeopardy.	 However,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 students	 did	 not	 seem	 to	 believe	 that	gender	equality	was	a	contradiction	to	Blackness	and	they	did	not	struggle	with	holding	 views	 in	 favour	 of	 gender	 equality.	 Thus,	 most	 students	 were	 not	intellectually	disciplined	by	the	discourse	of	remembering	in	the	realm	of	gender	relations,	 but	 conversely,	 they	 were	 subverting	 it	 through	 their	 constructed	expectations	of	FPE	values,	characteristics	and	behaviours.	It	is	their	disregard	or	conscious	 subversion	 of	 the	 normative	 power	 that	 suggests	 that	 FPEs	 as	 ideal	versions	of	exceptional	women	offer	an	empowerment	resource	to	the	students.		
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	Homogenous	 constructions	of	 community	 around	 racial	 identifications	 through	the	 discourses	 of	 remembering	 create	 a	 false	 sense	 of	 a	 unified	 Black	 African	community,	tied	to	the	ANC	and	others	in	positions	of	power	and	thus	help	those	in	power	to	maintain	the	oppressive	systems	in	place.	However,	these	narratives	disregard	 the	 marginalisation	 of	 many	 Black	 Africans	 who	 are	 oppressed	 or	disadvantaged	 based	 on	 ethnicity,	 nationality	 and	 colour.	 Expectedly,	 students	often	 spoke	about	 ‘their’	 people	 and	 ‘their’	 community	with	 reference	 to	being	Black	African	 in	all-encompassing	terms,	which	could	have	been	 in	response	to	my	 particular	 positionality.	 However,	 on	 several	 occasions	 they	 recognised	differences	 within	 the	 community	 and	 hierarchies	 based	 on	 perceived	stereotypes	associated	 for	 example	with	particular	nations,	peoples,	 ethnicities	or	 tribes.	 Their	 exclusionary	 othering	 was	 often	 subtle,	 unnoticed	 or	downplayed.	 For	 example,	 with	 regards	 to	 colourism	 –	 being	 seen	 as	 more	beautiful	 if	 one’s	 skin	 was	 of	 lighter	 shade	 –	 students	 would	 talk	 about	 a	particular	woman	in	politics	without	knowing	her	name,	which	 led	their	 fellow	discussants	to	ask,	“the	dark	one?”.	More	importantly,	however,	several	students	had	 personal	 experiences	 of	 being	 targets	 of	 such	 colour-based	 othering.	Similarly,	many	non-South	African	Black	Africans	spoke	about	xenophobia	in	the	country	 and	 the	 superiority	 that	 some	 Black	 South	 Africans	 felt	 vis-à-vis	 their	fellow	 Black	 Africans.	 These	 tensions	 within	 the	 imagined	 Black	 African	community	 periodically	 re-surface	 in	 the	 public	 discourses,	 especially	 as	xenophobic	attacks	and	protests	occur.	However,	 the	structural	causes	of	 these	incidents,	 such	 as	 economic	 disempowerment,	 continue	 to	 be	 systematically	unaddressed	 (Batisai,	 2016;	 Nyamnjoh,	 2016;	 Paret,	 2015;	 von	 Holdt,	 2013;	Alexander,	2010).			In	 the	 following	section	 I	now	turn	 to	 the	different	ways	 in	which	 the	students	choose	 to	 perform	 or	 subvert	 the	 particular	 norms	 presented	 as	 markers	 of	belonging	and	remembering.		 	
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Demonstrating	Belonging	and	Remembering:	Humility	and	Language	The	 disciplinary	 power	 of	 the	 remembering	 discourse	 is	 often	 operationalised	through	 the	 guilt-inducing	 accusation	 that	 students	 and	 other	 potential	 social	climbers	feel	they	are	better	than	others.	By	raising	this	criticism	people	want	to	bring	a	sense	of	shame,	as	one	of	 the	students	whom	I	quoted	earlier	had	said.	Deborah	James	writes	in	her	analysis	of	the	middle	class	and	inequality	in	South	Africa	about	jealousy	as	a	contributing	factor	behind	MC	pressures	to	consume.	She	argues:		
Jealous	is	the	word	commonly	used	to	characterize	both	those	who	promote	 competition	 by	 showing	 off	 and	 those	who	 feel	 slighted	by—and	desirous	to	imitate—such	status	display.	Unlike	its	use	in	common	 parlance	 elsewhere,	 jealous	 thus	 applies	 both	 to	 those	who	 fear	 being	 envied	 and	 to	 those	 do	 the	 envying	 [original	emphases]	(2014,	47).			While	the	word	‘jealousy’	did	not	feature	in	my	research	overtly	and	strongly	as	a	term,	it	emerged	as	a	hidden	emotion	behind	the	discourses.	Building	on	James’	argument,	 one	 can	 see	 how	 the	 fear	 of	 jealousy	 and	 the	 associated	 judgement	motivates	the	youth	away	from	seeing	themselves	as	a	particular	kind	of	change-makers	and	exceptions,	but	not	as	being	better	than	others.		A	 common	way	 to	 prevent	 the	 judgement	 based	 on	 the	 feeling	 yourself	 to	 be	better	 than	 others	 was	 through	 showing	 humility,	 and	 thus	 expressing	identification	and	belonging.	Grace	Khunou	(2015,	97)	portrays	this	sentiment	in	her	 interview	with	 a	PhD-holding	Black	 South	African	woman,	who	 recalls	 her	apartheid-era	childhood	as	having	been	 taught	not	 to	 think	of	herself	as	better	than	others	or	in	other	words,	being	instilled	humility	in	light	of	the	plight	of	the	Black	poor.	Preference	for	humility	amongst	my	participants	is	also	captured	in	their	praise	for	those	women	in	politics,	such	as	Thuli	Madonsela,	who	were	seen	as	humble	and	‘not	showing	off’.	However,	humility	was	shown	by	students	in	my	research	across	socio-economic	groups,	rather	than	just	Black	elites/MC	because	of	the	comparative	nature	of	one’s	social	positioning.	As	most	students	compared	themselves	with	both	people	above	and	below	their	perceived	economic	status,	
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they	always	had	someone	who	was	doing	worse	than	them	and	who	should	not	be	made	to	feel	inferior.			Language,	which	serves	as	a	marker	of	class	and	distinction,	was	one	of	the	most	frequently	 used	 examples	 of	 how	Black	African	 students	 chose	 to	demonstrate	their	belonging	and	humility.	As	Southall	(2016),	Babson	(2014)	and	others	find,	due	to	the	apartheid	education	policies,	studies	 in	English	are	for	many	(Black)	parents	 synonymous	with	 the	 idea	 of	 good	 education.	 Hence,	 they	 are	 against	their	 children	 studying	 in	 one	 of	 the	 languages	 spoken	 at	 home.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	many	students	recalled	experiences	when	they	were	criticised	for	the	way	they	talked	and	complained	that	they	had	to	withstand	negative	backlash	against	speaking	 English	 amongst	 other	 Black	 Africans.	 A	 symbol	 of	 whiteness	 and	wealth,	 English	 separated	 the	 students	 from	 those,	 who	 did	 not	 master	 the	language	 or	 did	 not	 feel	 confident	 in	 its	 use.	 Consequently,	 there	 were	contradictory	 pressures,	 which	 the	 students	 had	 to	 navigate.	 Many	 students’	language	strategy	was	therefore	a	careful	avoidance	of	speaking	English	at	home	or	in	taxis	when	commuting,	as	to	avoid	negative	comments	and	critiques,	such	as	being	called	a	coconut	or	another	similar	term	ascribing	whiteness.			Some	 students	 understood	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 language	 norms	 and	 the	discourse	 of	 remembering	 differently.	 They	 questioned	 why	 they	 would	 even	want	to	speak	English	at	home,	as	the	language	did	not	belong	to	that	sphere	of	their	 life	 and	 was	 limited	 to	 their	 professional,	 university	 setting.	 Hence,	 for	some	 students	 it	 was	 a	 natural,	 internalised	 and	 desired	 practice	 to	 stay	connected	 to	 their	 family,	 friends	 and	 broader	 community	 through	 the	 use	 of	their	home	languages.	However,	even	without	outward,	linguistic	expressions	of	difference,	 many	 students	 said	 that	 other	 people	 presumed	 that	 the	 students	considered	themselves	to	be	better	than	the	rest,	even	if	the	opposite	was	true,	just	 by	 the	 virtue	 of	 their	 HE	 and	 the	 presumed	 linguistic	 skills	 and	 potential	social	mobility.			Frequent	examples	of	political	elites,	both	male	and	female,	that	were	disciplined	on	their	Blackness	and	community	belonging	the	same	way	as	the	students,	were	
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Lindiwe	Mazibuko	and	Mmusi	Maimane	–	both	young	members	of	the	DA.	Many	students	believed	that	people	disliked	Mazibuko	and	attacked	her	in	Parliament	by	 calling	her	 a	 coconut	because	of	 her	 accent	 and	 the	way	 she	 spoke	English.	With	 Maimane,	 several	 students	 argued	 that	 he	 switched	 his	 accents	 when	speaking	English,	depending	on	his	audience,	sometimes	having	posh	or	proper,	‘white’	English	accent	when	speaking	to	whites	and	at	other	times,	using	a	more	stereotypical	‘Black’	South	African	English.	His	transition	between	accents	can	be	seen	 as	 what	 Rai	 (2015)	 describes	 as	 political	 performance,	 which,	 however,	decreased	rather	than	increased	his	legitimacy	and	authenticity	with	many	Black	Africans.			The	 remembering	 discourse	 is,	 however,	 also	 used	 reversely,	 namely	 by	politicians	 to	 discipline	 Black	 Africans.	 For	 example,	 President	 Zuma	made	 an	infamous	comment,	in	which	he	lambasted	“clever	blacks,”	for	having	outgrown	‘their’	 people.	 He	 criticised	 Black	 Africans	 for	 forgetting	 their	 traditions	 and	consequently	voting	for	the	DA	rather	than	the	ANC.	His	comments	thus	operated	precisely	with	this	discourse.	His	derogatory	remark	exemplifies	Zuma’s	populist	platform	and	his	image	of	a	traditionalist	Zulu	man,	which	brought	him	to	power.	Zuma	positioned	himself	as	the	man	of	the	people,	a	typical,	non-exceptional	man	embedded	 in	 (Zulu)	 culture,	 who	 understood	 the	 lives	 and	 experiences	 of	 the	poor	 South	 Africans,	 as	 he	 himself	 grew	 up	 in	 poverty	 and	 had	 an	 extensive	family	with	multiple	wives.	His	use	of	Zulu	in	his	speeches,	as	well	as	the	use	of	songs,	became	a	trade	mark	that	he	sustained	throughout	his	two	terms	in	office	(de	 Robillard,	 2016;	 Suttner,	 2016a;	 Gunner,	 2015).	 Louise	 Vincent	 (2011)	argues	 that	 Zuma’s	 approach	 brought	 to	 the	 fore	 populist	 politics	 that	 used	 to	maintain	people’s	 support	 for	 the	ANC	despite	 the	party’s	 failure	 to	deliver	 on	the	promise	of	post-apartheid	transformation.	She	highlights	that	the	racial	and	gender-based	 elements	 in	 Zuma’s	 rhetoric	 enabled	him	 to	 establish	 ‘the	Other’	amongst	 the	elites,	while	positioning	himself	 as	 the	 true	 representatives	of	 the	people.	 Addressing	 a	 similar	 issue	 in	 2017,	 the	 DA	 MP	 Phumzile	 van	 Damme	(2017)	 and	 ANC’s	 Yonela	 Diko	 (2017)	 exchanged	 newspaper	 blogs	 on	 the	question	 of	 who	 a	 Black	 African	 DA	 voter	 was.	 Diko	 argued	 that	 these	 voters	underplay	 racism	 in	 South	 Africa,	 because	 they	 profited	 from	 colonialism	 and	
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apartheid	and	have	assimilated	 into	whiteness.	Hence,	 they	 feel	better	than	the	rest	of	the	Black	people.	He	juxtaposed	them	with	the	educated	Black	elite	of	the	past	 that	 the	 ANC	 drew	 from,	 creating	 a	 standard	 of	 Black	 excellence,	 and	consequently,	strengthening	the	idea	that	‘true’	Black	people	voted	for	the	ANC.	Van	 Damme	 in	 response	 accused	 Diko	 of	 being	 patronising	 towards	 Black	Africans,	 suggesting	 that	 ANC	 felt	 it	 owned	 them	 and	 thus	 robbed	 them	 of	agency.			In	 addition	 to	 language,	 there	 are	 many	 other	 behaviours	 attached	 to	 Black	culture	 which	 the	 students	 identified	 as	 outward	 signs	 or	 performances	 of	distinction	from	whiteness	and	hence	their	markers	of	belonging	and	the	lack	of	difference.	For	example,	Keitumetse	revealed	the	judgement	she	faced	when	she	would	play	 indoors	and	not	outdoors	when	she	was	growing	up	and	when	–	to	other	people	in	her	community	–	she	was	behaving	as	if	she	were	white.	Mickey,	spoke	about	her	 inability	 to	cook	when	she	moved	to	varsity	and	 the	reactions	that	she	got	from	her	fellow	students,	who	she	said	had	questioned	how	that	was	possible,	because	she	was	a	Black	African	woman,	which	meant	that	she	had	to	cook.	She	said	that	although	her	family	was	Zulu,	she	did	not	speak	the	language	as	fluently	as	she	would	like.	Moreover,	she	described	her	parents’	relationship	as	 non-traditional,	 because	 they	 both	 helped	 each	 other,	 instead	 of	 her	 father	dominating.	Mickey’s	story	clearly	highlights	 the	 interconnection	between	race,	class,	gender	and	language	identities	and	the	way	they	are	often	used	together	to	articulate	Black	African	identity.			Students	such	as	Mickey	and	Keitumetse	contested	the	disciplinary	power	of	the	discourses	 in	several	ways.	Some	of	 these	challenges	were	seen	 in	the	realm	of	the	 everyday,	 small	 acts	 of	 rebellion	 or	 in	 the	 students’	 ideological	 stance	 and	personal	convictions.	Mbali,	for	example	said	that	she	did	not	mind	being	called	a	coconut	 and	 she	 disregarded	 those	 who	 might	 attack	 her	 with	 a	 simple,	 “so	what?”	 Other	 students,	 such	 as	 Sanele,	 cut	 ties	 with	 people	 who	 they	 thought	were	 trying	 to	stop	 them	 from	achieving	exceptionalism.	Sanele	did	not	have	a	bursary	or	a	 job	when	we	met	during	her	 first	year	at	UJ	 in	2016,	nor	was	she	participating	in	organisations	on	or	off	campus.	She	lived	in	a	township,	but	she	
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moved	 there	 after	 having	 lived	 for	 several	 years	 in	 one	 of	 the	 richest	neighbourhoods	in	Gauteng.	Her	parents	were	both	medical	professionals,	while	her	mother	had	already	retired,	her	father	still	worked	in	the	public	sector.	She	lived	with	her	parents	and	commuted	to	the	university,	but	as	she	explained,	she	was	happy	to	live	at	home	and	benefit	 from	the	care	and	support	of	her	family,	while	her	parents	were	 trying	 to	 “push	her	out”	 to	become	more	 independent.	Looking	 back	 at	 her	 move	 from	 suburbia,	 she	 was	 happy	 with	 the	 move	 to	 a	township.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	she	was	critical	of	many	people	who	lived	around	her	–	young	people	in	her	community	with	whom	she	was	not	friends:			 I	 don’t	 have	 friends	 around	 my	 house…	 it’s	 not	 people	 I	 would	associate	myself	with.	Not	that	 I	am	trying	to	 judge	or	something,	but,	 you	 can	 see	 situations,	 neh,	 you	 can	 see	people	 that	 you	 can	associate	 yourself	 with	 and	 you	 can	 see	 people,	 who	 you	 cannot	associate	yourself	…	 they’re	not	 influential,	 if	 I	must	say,	 they	are	not	 people	 you	 can	 chill	 with	 and	 talk	 about	 something	 that	 is	going	 to	 build	 you…	 they’re	 people	who	 always	 talk	 about	 other	people,	who	 always	 find	ways	 to	make	 sure	 that	 people	 feel	 bad	about	 themselves,	 it’s	 not	 people	 that	 I	 would	 associate	 myself	with.		Students	 also	waged	 a	 counter-critique	 centred	 around	 resisting	 change.	Many	believed	 that	 people,	 especially	 in	 the	 older	 generation,	 who	 critiqued	 their	desire	for	better	socio-economic	positions	or	who	were	against	women’s	equality	and	 greater	 representation	 in	 positions	 of	 power,	 were	 resisting	 change.	 The	students	 therefore	placed	 these	people	 into	 the	 realm	of	 tradition,	 rurality	and	simplicity,	 which	 worked	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 students’	 youth,	 modernity	 and	progress.	As	change	was	seen	by	the	students	as	a	positive	value,	it	is	logical	that	students	 would	 be	 asserting	 and	 empowering	 themselves	 by	 evoking	 and	praising	change.	While	some	political	theorists	and	analysts	may	disregard	these	acts	as	apolitical,	they	do	undermine	the	social	order	on	which	the	ANC-run	state	operates.	Moreover,	as	these	views	translate	into	the	construction	of	ideal	FPEs,	the	values,	characteristics	and	behaviours	which	they	expect	from	political	elites	challenge	the	status	quo.	They	relegate	existing	elites	into	the	realm	of	deterrent	models	who	are	different	from	and	non-representative	of	the	ideal	version	of	the	students	themselves	and	therefore	have	political	consequences.		
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The	 last	 form	of	demonstrating	remembering	and	belonging	that	emerges	 from	the	students’	experiences	and	plans	for	the	future,	 is	the	expectation	that	 those	who	 remember	 where	 they	 come	 from,	 care	 for	 other	 members	 of	 the	community	and	show	it	through	their	actions,	which	I	explore	in	the	remainder	of	the	chapter.	
Remembering	as	Care		While	 generally	 positively	 perceived	 as	 a	 support	 mechanism,	 remembering	familial	ties	and	community	networks	was	also	seen	as	a	burden	and	an	obstacle,	because	they	represented	financial	and	other	commitments.	Hence,	the	ties	were	potentially	limiting	the	students’	future	outlooks.	The	aforementioned	Black	tax	is	an	expression	of	this	social	commitment,	and	it	was	often	used	to	challenge	the	remembering	 discourse	 and	 show	 its	 dark	 side.	 Sinqobile	 captured	 its	 power	quite	well.	When	I	asked	whether	she	would	want	to	become	an	elite,	which	 in	her	 understanding	 meant	 someone	 successful	 and	 rich,	 she	 rejected	 the	proposition.	 She	 explained	herself	 by	pointing	out	 the	 expectations	 that	others	would	have	of	her.	 She	believed	 they	would	want	her	 to	provide	 jobs	 for	 their	cousins	and	to	do	them	other	favours,	and	she	just	did	not	want	to	deal	with	that	pressure.			Black	tax	also	featured	in	the	Fallist	critique	of	the	NSFAS	scheme,	which	at	the	time	 of	 my	 research	 operated	 as	 a	 loan	 scheme,	 rather	 than	 a	 grant	 or	 a	scholarship.	This	meant	that	the	recipients	were	expected	to	pay	back	the	state	once	 they	 got	 employed.	 However,	 according	 to	 some	 activists,	 once	 Black	African	students	got	 jobs,	 they	had	to	 take	care	of	 their	extended	 families,	who	counted	on	their	financial	support;	or	in	other	words,	they	had	to	pay	Black	tax.	It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	NSFAS	had	a	very	low	level	of	repayment	and	a	more	sustainable	funding	solutions	were	desperately	needed.	Aria	explained	the	issue	very	passionately	in	her	group	discussion,	which	took	place	at	the	heat	of	the	FMF	protests	in	October	2016.	She	said:		 With	 NSFAS,	 …	 if	 your	 parents	 work	 for	 the	 government,	 you’re	automatically	 rejected.	 …	 which	 is	 actually	 quite	 wrong,	 because	
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what	they	don’t	realise	is	that	in	South	Africa,	I	don’t	know	[about]	elsewhere,	but	in	South	Africa,	Black	people	suffer	from	Black	tax…	you	 need	 to	 pay	 for	 your	 other	 siblings,…	 and	 varsity	 is	 actually	quite	 expensive,	 coz	 it’s	 the	 fees,	 it’s	 the	 books	 as	 well,	 it’s	 the	accommodation,	it’s	money	to	actually	feed	you,	to	keep	you	going.			And	 another	 thing	 why	 I	 also	 feel	 that	 most	 university	 students	don’t	support	the	cause	of	#FeesMustFall	is	that	…	NSFAS	students	get	confused	thinking	that	NSFAS	is	free.	NSFAS	is	not	free…	it’s	a	loan…	which,	then	when	you	work,	it’s	not	like	you’re	working	for	yourself,	but	you’re	gonna	be	working	 for	NSFAS	with	your	Black	tax	 and	 everything	 else	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 you	 become	disadvantaged	even	though	you	earn	money	that	you	could	use.		Black	 tax	 was	 thus	 both	 a	 responsibility	 and	 an	 expectation,	 as	 well	 as	 a	disadvantage	 associated	 with	 being	 a	 member	 of	 the	 racial	 community	 in	 a	society	 that	 privileged	 whiteness.	 The	 concept	 thus	 worked	 as	 a	 critique	 of	structural	racism	perpetuated	in	South	Africa,	and	as	a	form	of	subversion	of	the	pressure	 to	 remember	where	you	 come	 from,	which	 circumscribed	aspirations	for	 exceptionalism.	 Hence,	 the	 critique	 of	 remembering	 co-existed	 with	 its	acceptance.			While	Black	Africans	expressed	the	narratives	of	remembering	most	 frequently,	similar	 discourses	 and	 associated	 tensions	 arose	 amongst	 Coloured	 and	white	students	as	well.	Due	to	the	stereotypes	about	Coloured	South	Africans,	held	by	other	 racial	 groups	 as	 much	 as	 by	 many	 Coloured	 South	 Africans	 themselves,	those	who	strove	for	exceptionalism	were	also	being	disciplined	by	accusations	of	 feeling	 better	 than	 the	 rest.	 While	 the	 racially-bound,	 community-based	disciplining	 was	 less	 prevalent	 amongst	 white	 students	 in	 my	 research,	 many	Afrikaner	students	in	particular	had	a	strong	sense	of	identity	tied	to	their	Boer	history,	Afrikaans	language	or	Christian	values	(most	frequently	associated	with	the	 NGK).	 The	 discourses	 thus	 had	 a	 similar	 mode	 of	 operation	 and	 effect	 on	them	 as	 their	 Black	 African	 peers,	 but	 most	 students	 did	 not	 convey	 such	narratives,	nor	did	they	suggest	that	they	were	worried	about	exclusion	and	non-belonging.			
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Many	white	 and	 Indian/Asian	 students	 said	 they	 felt	 the	pressure	not	 to	 show	their	 economic	 status	 in	 front	 of	 students	 from	 other	 racial	 and	 economic	backgrounds.	In	that	sense,	humility	and	remembering	where	their	Black	African	peers	came	 from	disciplined	 the	white	and	 Indian/Asian	students	 to	 limit	 their	sense	of	eliteness.	Some	of	them	rejected	this	pressure,	which	they	perceived	as	an	 attempt	 to	 make	 them	 feel	 guilty	 about	 apartheid	 and	 sins	 of	 the	 past.	 As	much	as	they	recognised	its	despicable	nature,	they	felt	they	had	not	contributed	to	apartheid’s	racism	and	they	should	not	be	held	responsible	for	it.	At	the	same	time,	the	sense	of	commitment	and	responsibility	towards	their	own	families	and	community	was	very	strong	for	both	white	and	Indian/Asian	students,	meaning	that	 the	 narratives	 of	 remembering	 their	 community	 were	 pertinent	 for	 the	students,	albeit	in	a	much	smaller	sense	of	familial	relations.	This	could	be	seen,	for	example,	in	their	desire	to	take	their	families	with	them	should	they	emigrate	from	South	Africa,	or	 in	 their	hesitation	to	emigrate	without	 their	 family	 in	 the	first	place.			Connected	to	the	 idea	of	remembering	one’s	community,	both	the	privileged	as	well	 as	 the	 economically	marginalised	 students	 believed	 in	 ‘giving	 back	 to	 the	communities,’	working	with	members	of	their	communities	or	at	least	going	into	various	 communities	 to	 do	 charity	 work.	 ‘Community’	 often	 served	 as	 a	discursive	 symbol	 of	 poverty,	 marginalisation,	 and	 disempowerment.	Consequently,	any	assistance	to	the	communities	is	vested	with	a	priori	positive	value,	and	activities	that	bring	political	and	other	elites	or	social	climbers	closer	to	 the	 community	 are	 praised	 and	perceived	 as	morally	worthy.	 Terry	Cannon	(2018)	captures	 this	process	of	virtue	signalling	 in	his	analysis	of	development	practice,	 whereby	 practitioners	 replace	 terms	 like	 places	 or	 people	 with	community	because	the	term	signals	moral	attributes	and	romanticised	versions	of	what	 interventions	 can	do	with	and	 for	people.	For	 instance,	 a	 student	used	the	following	defence	of	her	privilege	and	being	different	from	those	people	who	do	not	remember	others	because	of	their	economic	status.	She	said:		For	example,	my	mother	and	my	father	always	say,	give	back.	Give	back	 –	 it’s	 a	 very	 cliché	 thing	 to	 say,	 but	 give	 back,	 go	 to	orphanages,	go	 to	 townships,	…	one	 thing	 I	actually	want	 to	do	 is	
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live	a	day	in	the	person’s,	like	literally,	in	their	shoes.	Forget	about	your	phone,	for	example,	 forget	about	a	certain	type	of	brand	and	actually	 put	 yourself	 in	 someone	 else’s	 shoes	 and	 try	 to	 help	 out	and	see	that	not	everything	in	the	world	is	pretty	and	we	should	be	there	for	each	other.		Remembering	 the	community	 is	 thus	expressed	as	care	 for	 its	members,	which	stands	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 self-interest	 and	 greed	 that	 was	associated	 with	 eliteness.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 yet	 another	 method	 of	 downward	identification	 or	 subversion	 of	 the	 difference	 as	 seen	with	 pretend	modesty	 of	the	 elite	 or	 showing	 humility	 and	 thus	 overcoming	 power	 inequality	 and	difference.	 Moreover,	 these	 demonstrations	 of	 remembering	 also	 speak	 to	 the	notions	of	empathy,	mentioned	in	Chapter	Three.			Similarly,	 the	 students	 expected	 political	 elites,	 both	 male	 and	 female,	 not	 to	forget	 the	poor	and	 the	marginalised	Black	African	people,	whether	 it	be	 ‘their	community,’	 if	 the	 political	 elites	 were	 Black	 African	 themselves,	 or	 just	 ‘the	community’	 if	 they	were	 from	other	racial	groups.	While	 the	students	expected	all	 leaders	 to	 put	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 people	 before	 their	 own,	 the	 gender	stereotype	of	women’s	natural	tendency	to	nurture	and	care	led	the	students	to	have	higher	expectations	of	women	 in	politics	 to	be	caring.	As	a	student	put	 it,	the	same	way	a	mother	would	rather	have	torn	up	clothes	to	ensure	her	children	are	 fed,	 the	FPEs	need	to	 think	about	others	before	 themselves.	Therefore,	 it	 is	more	pertinent	to	speak	about	remembering	as	care,	rather	than	as	service	with	regards	 to	 female	 political	 elites,	 as	 I	 suggest	 in	 my	 previous	 discussion	 of	Ubuntu	leadership	in	Chapter	Six.			As	a	result	of	the	students’	conviction	that	women	were	naturally	inclined	to	be	caring,	 they	concluded	that	bringing	more	women	who	meet	 the	FPE	 ideal	 into	politics	 would	 mean	 positive	 changes	 for	 the	 poor	 and	 for	 the	 country.	 They	believed	 that	 moving	 away	 from	 male-controlled	 decision-making	 through	greater	 inclusion	 of	 FPEs	would	 ultimately	 contribute	 to	 a	more	 equal	 society,	not	just	in	gender-related	matters.	FPEs	were	thus	perceived	both	as	a	change	in	itself	 and	 as	 change	makers,	 because	 they	 were	 perceived	 as	 ‘nurturing’	 and	
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‘motherly’.	 As	 such,	 the	 constructed	 ideal	 FPE	 based	 on	 various	 role	 models,	represented	for	the	students	a	source	of	empowerment.			Although	the	ANC	WL	was	largely	perceived	to	be	an	institution	of	grandmothers,	most	 of	 the	 students	 believed	 that	 the	 League	 failed	 to	 meet	 their	 motherly	behaviour	 in	 their	 politics.	 Put	 differently,	 they	 were	 perceived	 as	 having	forgotten	where	they	came	from	and	thus	not	care	about	the	most	vulnerable	in	society	and	hence	were	deterrent	models,	whose	behaviour	was	 to	be	avoided.	The	 students	used	multiple	 examples	 to	prove	 this	 claim,	 including	 the	 case	of	then	Minister	of	 Social	Development,	Bathabile	Dlamini,	who	was	 in	 the	media	limelight	for	the	near	collapse	of	the	social	grants	system,	which	was	overseen	by	the	 South	 African	 Social	 Security	 Agency	 (SASSA),	 and	 which	 reported	 to	 her	Department.	 At	 the	 time	 of	my	 research,	 the	 South	African	 state’s	 provision	 of	grants	 had	 been	 outsourced	 to	 a	 private	 company,	 Cash	 Paymaster	 Services	(CPS),	which	was	 responsible	 for	 the	entire	provision	chain,	 including	 stocking	cashpoints	and	providing	people	with	biometric	ID	cards	to	access	their	welfare	grants.	 The	 contract	with	 CPS	 had	 been	 declared	 invalid	 by	 the	 Constitutional	Court	(ConCourt)	due	to	the	breach	of	the	procurement	legislature.	However,	in	March	 2017	 the	 contract	 had	 to	 be	 extended	 by	 ConCourt,	 as	 SASSA	 and	 the	Department	failed	to	find	a	new	provider	by	the	fast	approaching	April	deadline.	ConCourt	 made	 the	 decision	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 life-threatening	 impacts	 on	millions	of	people	who	depend	on	grants,	while	SASSA	and	the	Department	were	mandated	to	find	a	new	provider	under	the	Court’s	strict	supervision.			As	the	head	of	 the	Department,	Dlamini	was	 in	the	centre	of	 the	crisis	and	was	critiqued	 for	 allowing	 the	 situation	 to	 escalate	 to	 the	 brink	 and	 endangering	people’s	 lives.	Many	 politicians	 and	 civil	 society	 representatives	 called	 for	 her	resignation.	 She	 was	 especially	 criticised	 as	 being	 incompetent	 by	 ConCourt’s	Chief	 Justice	 Mogoeng	 Mogoeng,	 who	 enjoyed	 high	 respect	 in	 the	 country	(Chabalala	 and	 Raborife,	 2017).	 The	 situation	 surrounding	 the	 SASSA	 grants	manifested	 the	 students’	 widely	 held	 view	 that	 many	 female	 politicians	 were	pursuing	policies	 that	 did	not	 remember	 the	 community	 and	 that	 they	did	not	think	about	 the	needs	of	others.	Put	differently,	women	 in	politics	appeared	 to	
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have	 lost	 or	 given	 up	 on	 their	 inherent	 motherly	 trait	 to	 care	 for	 others,	 and	instead	pursued	self-interest	and	greed	as	elites.			The	 students’	 views	 of	 women	 as	 nurturing	 and	 caring	 had	 several	 iterations.	Some	argued	that	women	were	more	emotional	than	men,	which	enhanced	their	caring	qualities,	because	they	were	more	sensitive	and	aware	of	the	 issues	that	South	 African	 people	 faced.	 This	 interpretation	 made	 their	 emotions	 into	 a	strength	 and	 some	proponents	 of	 this	 view	 therefore	 criticised	 rationality	 as	 a	male-centred	standard	of	 leadership,	which	meant	 that	women	 in	politics	were	treated	 unfairly.	 Emotions	 were	 not	 necessarily	 seen	 as	 a	 driving	 force	 in	 the	behaviour	of	women	in	politics,	but	an	underlying	force	that	enabled	their	better	awareness,	understanding,	and	empathy	with	the	community.	On	the	other	hand,	there	were	several	students	who	concluded	that	as	a	result	of	women’s	emotions,	many	women	failed	to	be	good	leaders.	Accordingly,	only	women	who	portrayed	traits	 of	 rationality,	 objectivity	 and	 emotionless	 decision-making	 succeed	 in	becoming	good	leaders.	However,	rather	than	believing	that	women	could	not	be	good	 leaders,	 women	 had	 to	 be	 masculine	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 the	 leadership	expectations.			Zanele	held	this	view.	Her	perspective	seemed	to	contradict	her	self-portrayal	of	being	a	strong	young	female	leader.	She	had	decided	to	come	to	UJ	from	KZN	to	get	 away	 from	 her	 family,	 gain	 independence	 and	 to	 study	 a	 degree	 that	 her	mother	 disapproved	 of.	 She	 considered	 her	 mother	 to	 be	 an	 elite,	 having	managed	to	provide	a	good	life	for	Zanele	and	her	siblings	without	her	husband,	Zanele’s	 father,	who	had	passed	 away	when	 she	was	 a	 child.	While	 still	 in	 her	first	year	of	university,	Zanele	said	she	took	on	a	role	of	a	lay	preacher	in	her	res.	She	said	she	was	 in	 favour	of	women	taking	 leadership	positions,	but	not	 in	an	equal	measure	as	men,	because	of	their	emotions.	The	most	important	leadership	positions	should,	according	to	her,	be	taken	by	men.	An	example	she	and	other	students	 used	 to	 prove	 women’s	 emotional	 or	 overly	 sensitive	 character	 was	Baleka	Mbete.	Mbete	was	criticised	for	her	inability	to	control	the	parliamentary	chambers	 when	 she	 presided	 over	 the	 Assembly	 sessions.	 While	 to	 some	students	it	showed	more	the	patriarchal	nature	of	the	institution	and	sexism	of	
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the	 male	 MPs,	 as	 they	 believed	 men	 disregarded	 Mbete	 because	 she	 was	 a	woman,	others	saw	in	it	a	lack	of	control	over	her	emotions,	which	led	Mbete	to	having	patronizing	outbursts	and	scolding	her	fellow	MPs.	
Being	Steadfast	and	Independent		In	 light	 of	 the	 observed	 uncaring	 behaviour	 of	 ANC	 women	 and	 the	 negative	consequences	 that	 it	 brought	 to	 the	 country,	 the	 students	 believed	 that	 FPEs	must	 be	 strong	 and	 not	 easily	 swayed	 from	 their	 values.	 They	 should	 stay	steadfast	 and	 not	 crumble	 under	 pressure	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 being	 like	 those	women,	who	give	in	to	male	domination	or	to	their	elite	self-interest	and	greed.	An	 exceptional	woman	 in	 politics	 that	met	 this	 expectation	 for	many	 students,	was	 yet	 again,	 Thuli	Madonsela.	 Lutho	 participated	 in	 a	 group	 discussion	 as	 a	first	 year	 student	 who	 came	 to	 UJ	 on	 a	 bursary	 and	 who	 was	 not	 actively	involved	in	organisations	on	or	off	campus.	She	was	from	the	Eastern	Cape	and	identified	 as	 Black	 South	 African,	 and	 she	 described	 her	 sentiments	 about	Madonsela	as	follows:				 I’m	 just	 one	 of	 the	 hugest	 fans	 of	 Thuli	Madonsela.	 Honestly,	 I’m	not	even	gonna	lie.	The	reason	why	she	is	such	an	inspiration	and	such	a	female	political	elite,	is	because,	number	one,	someone	says	you’re	 not	 intimidated,	 she	 is	 not	 intimidated	 by	 anything.	 You	know,	 she	 does	 not,	 …	 shiver	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 you	 know,	somebody	as	big	as	you’d	 say	 for	example	 the	president,	because	she	 was	 able	 to	 actually	 stand	 firm	 you	 know,	 until	 the	 thing	[president’s	unduly	benefitting	 from	publicly	 funding	upgrades	 to	his	 homestead	 in	 Nkandla]	 was	 solved,	 …	 she	 is	 such	 a	 [sigh]	strength,	 a	 power	 that,	 you	 know,	 it	makes	 you	 yourself	want	 to	stand	 and	want,	 you	 know,	make	 yourself	 heard,	 because	 you’ve	seen	her.		In	 addition	 to	 the	 exceptionalism	 of	 Madonsela’s	 behaviour	 in	 the	 realm	 of	politics,	students	admired	many	other	women	who	found	their	voice	and	stood	up	to	power	and	hence	who	were	empowering	role	models	 for	 the	students	by	changing	 the	 status	 quo.	 For	 example,	 some	 non-Black	 African	 students	expressed	their	admiration	for	Malala	Yousafzai,	a	young	Pakistani	woman,	who	was	 revered	 for	 standing	 up	 for	 her	 desire	 to	 get	 education	 despite	 the	 grave	danger	 that	 she	 faced.	 For	 other	 students,	 young	 women	 involved	 in	 the	
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aforementioned	 protest	 at	 the	 Pretoria	 High	 School	 for	 Girls,	 who	 stood	 up	against	 racial	 discrimination,	 represented	 similar	 courage	 and	 bravery	 as	Madonsela.	The	experiences	of	the	Pretoria	Girls’	students,	 for	example,	echoed	the	experiences	of	my	research	participants,	many	of	whom	said	that	when	they	were	in	school,	they	had	not	understood	the	rules	on	hair	styling	as	institutional	racism.	 They	 saw	 them	 only	 as	 generic	 rules	 that	 they	 had	 to	 follow,	 and	therefore,	 they	did	not	 think	 to	challenge	 them.	Many	other	students,	however,	said	they	were	aware	of	the	racist	nature	of	the	policies,	but	chose	not	to	act	on	them,	 which	 made	 the	 Pretoria	 Girls’	 protest	 much	 more	 admirable. 48	Considering	students’	own	experiences	with	not	wanting	to	or	not	being	able	to	stand	 up	 and	 challenge	 power,	 helps	 to	 explain	 why	 they	 assigned	 such	importance	to	strength	and	steadfastness	as	a	trait	in	an	FPE.		Steadfastness	was	closely	associated	with	the	expectation	that	women	need	to	be	economically	 independent	 in	order	to	have	control	over	their	 lives,	which	most	students	 clearly	 desired	 for	 themselves.	 For	 example,	 many	 Black	 African	students	were	critical	of	rules	that	they	were	expected	to	follow	at	home.	Despite	being	 critical	 of	 these	norms,	many	 chose	not	 to	 speak	up	 against	 them	out	 of	strategic	 considerations,	 namely	 being	 dependent	 on	 the	 family’s	 financial	support.	When	 I	asked	 the	students	how	they	pictured	 themselves	 in	10	years’	time,	most	of	the	students	envisioned	themselves	as	economically	secure,	stable	or	independent	even	if	they	did	not	have	a	specific	career	in	mind	or	a	detailed	vision	how	to	achieve	that.	While	some	expressed	it	as	having	their	own	jobs	and	income,	 others	 spoke	 about	 not	 depending	 on	 their	 parents	 or	 others.	 For	example,	Sanele	said	this	about	her	future:		 OK,	how	old	am	I	now,	19,	right?	 [In]	10	years’	 time,	 I	will	be	29.	Right.	Just	living	off	my	own	money,	like	owning	my	own	house	and	stuff,	 not	 marriage,	 it’s	 too	 early,	 29	 is	 too	 early	 for	 marriage,	 I	think.	So,	and	it’s	too	early	for	a	baby	too.	So,	yah,	I’ll	just	keep	on	hustling	until	I	get	my	money,	when	I	am	29,	when	I	am	29	I	know	I	will	be	living	off	my	money	and	I	won’t	depend	on	anyone.	People	in	my	life	can	just	come	and	go	if	I	have	my	own	money.																																																									48	Yet	 again	 it	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 racial	 identifications	 are	 no	 predeterminations	 of	 students’	agency	 or	 victimhood,	 as	 students	 across	 racial	 and	 class	 backgrounds	 experienced	powerlessness	and	empowerment	in	various	situations	in	their	lives.	
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	Just	 like	 Sanele,	 many	 students	 iterated	 their	 desire	 to	 achieve	 independence	before	 getting	married	 or	 having	 children.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 surprise	 that	most	 of	my	participants	 drew	 this	 conclusion	 in	 light	 of	 the	 vulnerability	 discourses	 that	 I	outline	in	Chapter	Three.	Stories	of	young	women	such	as	Karabo	Mokoena	and	others,	 who	 depended	 on	 so-called	 sugardaddies	 or	 blessers	 –	 men	 who	 give	money,	material	gifts	or	other	forms	of	economic	security	for	women	in	exchange	for	their	companionship	or	other	sexual	relations	(eNCA,	2016a)	–	emphasise	the	need	 for	 financial	 independence.	 The	 FMF	 campaigns	 also	 contributed	 to	bringing	the	desperate	situations	of	many	female	students	to	the	public	domain,	highlighting	stories	of	young	women	and	men	squatting	in	university	bathrooms	overnight	or	not	being	able	to	afford	personal	hygiene	products.	Moreover,	many	of	 the	 students	 saw	 this	 vulnerability	 in	 the	 life	 experiences	 of	 their	 own	mothers,	who	they	thought	were	dependent	on	the	students’	fathers,	partners	or	other	relatives,	because	without	education	and	jobs,	they	needed	the	support	of	others	to	make	ends	meet.			Most	 importantly,	 however,	 for	 many	 women	 at	 UJ,	 such	 as	 aforementioned	Sharon,	Nonkululeko	or	Arya,	the	desire	for	economic	independence	came	from	their	 own	personal	 experiences.	When	Arya,	 a	 young	mother	 from	a	 township,	was	 pondering	what	 her	 life	would	 be	 like	 by	 the	 time	 she	was	 31,	 she	 spoke	about	 having	 saved	 money	 for	 the	 education	 of	 her	 child	 and	 her	 younger	brother.	She	also	wanted	to	 take	care	of	her	parents	before	starting	 to	care	 for	herself:			Arya:	 I	 would	 have	 loved	 to,	 you	 know,	 start	 at	 home	 [meaning	taking	 care	 of	 her	 parents	 and	 family]	 before	 I	 can	 do	 things	 for	myself,	coz	…,	having	a	child	before	marriage	[claps]	and	at	a	young	age,	 …	 	 it’s	 wrong	 and	 you	 know	 it’s	 a	 disappointment	 to	 your	parents.	…		Ján:	Did	you	feel	that	you	were	disappointing	your	parents?	Or	that	it	was	a	failure?	Arya:	 Because	 they	 knew	 the	 guy,	 they	 didn’t	 really	 feel	 that.	 …	They	had	hope	in	this	guy,	because	you	know,	he	paid	the	damages	for	 [child’s	 name],	 he	 did	 everything.	 You	 know,	 he	 paid	 your	[Arya’s]	school	fees,	even	my	mom	was	like,	I	take	this	as	a	lobola	…	so	 I,	 don’t	 think	 they	 were	 really	 disappointed,	 but,	 [a]	 bit	 of	
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disappointment	considering	the	fact	that	you	don’t	have	a	degree,	what	if	this	person	leaves	or	what	you’re	going	to	do,	you	know?			Arya’s	 concerns	 about	being	 left	 alone	with	 a	 child,	without	 a	 degree	 and	 thus	any	 means	 of	 getting	 a	 decent	 job	 shows	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 female	vulnerability	effects	 the	students.	Gqola	 (2015)	argues	 that	patriarchy	 in	South	Africa	operates	a	“fear	factory”	that	is	linked	to	violence,	which	polices	women’s	behaviour,	and	Arya’s	concern	could	be	seen	as	part	of	this	South	African	reality.			Arya’s	comments	also	highlight	that	independence	does	not	mean	individualism	or	selfishness,	but	it	is	part	and	parcel	of	caring	for	the	community	and	the	family	and	 hence	was	 not	 a	 sign	 of	 elite	 distinction	 and	 difference.	 Bucie’s	 desire	 for	independence	functioned	in	the	same	way.	Bucie	was	one	of	those	students	who	spoke	 about	 her	 desire	 for	 economic	 independence	 because	 she	 believed	 it	would	 give	 her	 a	 voice	 and	 an	 ability	 to	 withstand	 pressures	 from	 those	 in	power,	namely	her	family’s	elders.	For	her,	independence	did	not	mean	that	she	wanted	 to	 care	 only	 about	 herself	 and	her	 own	 success.	 She	 said	 that	 she	was	studying	 to	 get	 a	 good	 job	 that	 would	 allow	 her	 to	 pay	 for	 her	 nephew’s	education,	 once	 he	was	 ready	 to	 go	 to	 university.	 She	 also	wanted	 to	 give	 her	mother	a	beautiful	house,	 just	 like	 the	ones	she	saw	on	TV.	Being	 independent,	therefore,	did	not	mean	reneging	on	responsibilities	for	the	community.	It	meant	being	 financially	 stable	 and	 comfortable	 enough	 to	 help	 others	 too.	 The	expectation	 of	 FPEs	 to	 be	 caring	 and	 steadfast/independent	 is	 therefore	 very	much	a	construction	connected	to	the	students’	lives,	as	women	in	politics	were	seen	 to	 not	meet	 these	 expectations.	 The	 empowerment	 resource	 and	 the	 role	model	effect,	therefore	stemmed	from	the	FPE	ideal,	which	was	articulated	vis-à-vis	the	anti-heroes	amongst	most	women	in	politics.			It	could	be	argued	that	this	desire	for	independence	on	one	hand	and	care	on	the	other,	is	best	seen	as	interdependence,	and	thus	a	value	captured	by	the	Ubuntu	philosophy,	 and	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 communitarianism	 of	 the	 Black	 African	culture.	The	desire	for	independence,	however,	is	shared	by	students	from	other	socio-economic	 and	 racial	 groups	 as	well,	who	 equally	 seek	 to	 be	 independent	from	 their	parents	and	 future	partners,	 even	 if	many	of	 them	are	aware	of	 the	
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safety	net	that	their	parents	can	offer,	as	well	as	the	privileged	starting	position	they	have	on	the	 journey	towards	 independence.	They	also	wish	to	ensure	that	their	families	are	taken	care	of.	Therefore,	based	on	the	self-articulated	vision	of	the	 students’	 future,	most	 young	women	 across	 racial	 groups	 subscribe	 to	 the	gendered	 norms	 of	 care	 for	 others	 and	 hence	 conceive	 of	 themselves	 in	relationships	 to	 others.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 more	 revealing	 to	 think	 about	 the	students’	 desire	 for	 independence	 and	 steadfastness	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	intersections	 of	 neoliberal,	 racial,	 patriarchal	 market	 competition	 and	precariousness,	rather	than	as	a	consequence	of	Ubuntu.			Women’s	 economic	 independence	 was	 seen	 by	 several	 students	 to	 be	 in	contradiction	to	gender	norms,	which	arise	from	some	religious	teachings.	These	religious	 norms	 depict	 the	 man	 as	 the	 head	 of	 the	 household	 and	 the	breadwinner.	 While	 some	 students	 argued	 that	 because	 their	 particular	Christian,	 Hindu	 or	 Muslim	 beliefs	 were	 based	 on	 different	 interpretations	 of	these	 religions,	 their	 views	 about	 gender	 equality	were	not	 in	 contradiction	 to	their	 faith.	However,	 a	 few	 students	 felt	 they	would	 go	 against	 their	 religion	 if	they	 became	 an	 FPE,	 because	 that	 would	 mean	 they	 had	 to	 be	 economically	independent	and	challenge	the	man’s	roles	and	responsibilities.	One	student,	for	example,	 resolved	 the	 dilemma	 for	 herself	 by	 deferring	 marriage	 aspirations	until	she	has	achieved	what	she	wanted	in	her	professional	life.	Only	then	would	she	settle	down	and	adjust	her	 life	 into	 the	marriage	situation.	Similarly,	other	students	 were	 planning	 on	 giving	 up	 their	 professional	 life	 at	 their	 husbands’	requests	 or	 for	 family	 demands,	 although	 the	 majority	 would	 do	 so	 only	temporarily,	while	 their	children	were	of	a	certain,	younger	age,	or	 they	would	give	 up	 some	 of	 their	 jobs,	 while	 still	 continuing	 other	 activities	 on	 the	 side.	These	 ‘side	 activities’	 ranged	 from	 charity	 and	 volunteering	 to	 managing	 and	overseeing	 a	 business.	 Thus,	 many	 students	 did	 not	 find	 it	 problematic	 to	challenge	 patriarchal	 gender	 norms	 due	 to	 their	 association	 with	 culture,	 and	Black	 culture	 in	 particular,	 but	 those	who	 found	 it	 difficult	 did	 so	 due	 to	 their	religious	beliefs.		
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The	 last	 iteration	 of	 remembering	 as	 care	 that	many	 students	 associated	with	FPEs,	 was	 their	 expectation	 that	 women	 who	 succeed	 in	 gaining	 positions	 of	power	 should	 help	 other	 women	 achieve	 the	 same.	 Unlike	 discourses	surrounding	 gender-based	 quotas,	which	 appear	 to	 be	more	 visibly	 associated	with	undeserved	privilege	 and	unfairness,	women	helping	other	women	get	 to	the	top	was	not	explicitly	perceived	in	such	terms.	Most	of	the	students	with	this	view	 believed	 that	 the	 FPEs’	 assistance	 should	 take	 a	 form	 of	 mentoring	 –	showing	others	the	path	and	advising	them	on	how	to	reach	the	top	positions.	As	such,	it	did	not	compromise	the	value	of	deserving	or	achieving,	because	women	would	still	work	hard	towards	their	own	success.			According	 to	 the	 students,	 this	 form	 of	 collaboration	 and	 help	 was	 an	 ideal	approach,	 but	 it	was	 exceptional,	 because	women	 tended	 to	 be	 in	 competition	with	each	other	and	to	be	judgemental	of	one	another.	While	the	students	did	not	mention	incidents	involving	specific	women	in	politics	that	would	manifest	this	assumed	 competitive	 behaviour,	 besides	 the	 aforementioned	 fall-out	 between	Helen	 Zille	 and	 Lindiwe	 Mazibuko,	 the	 students’	 personal	 observations	 and	experiences	 from	 other	 contexts	made	 them	 believe	 that	 competition	 amongst	women	in	politics	had	to	exist,	because	the	opportunities	 for	women	were	few.	Thato	was	a	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng,	who	was	studying	in	order	to	get	a	job	as	a	community	worker.	She	was	a	member	of	a	volunteering	society	for	community	 engagement,	 and	 she	 even	 joined	 a	 student	 political	 organisation,	which	she	said	was	a	calculated,	practical	choice,	rather	than	a	reflection	of	her	deep	political	commitments	and	values.	She	was	the	first	one	in	her	family	to	go	to	university	and	she	had	to	take	a	gap	year	after	matriculating,	because	she	did	not	have	enough	money	to	pay	for	her	studies	at	the	time.	As	she	wanted	to	help	other	people,	it	was	important	for	her	to	see	women	in	politics	help	other	women	and	she	believed	that	FPEs	as	leaders	had	to	inspire	others	–	being	inspirational,	empowering	and	encouraging	were	qualities	that	she,	as	many	others,	expected	of	an	ideal	FPE.	Thato	observed:		 They	 [men]	 talk	 to	each	other…	we	as	women,	 sometimes	do	not	push	each	other	 to	get	wherever,	because	you’d	be	 like,	OK,	 she’s	pregnant,	she	didn’t	 finish	her	matric	and	we	 judge	her:	 ‘No,	eish,	
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she	 likes	 things,	 she	 likes	 partying’	 …	 so	 I	 feel	 if	 we	 have	 more	women	empowering	women,	 then	we’ll	have	a	number	of	women	sitting	in	political	things,	so	we	should	empower	each	other.		Thato’s	statement	also	draws	out	 the	aforementioned	gender	norms	associated	with	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 ‘good	 girl’.	 According	 to	 the	 students,	 it	 was	judgments	against	these	norms	that	created	barriers	to	women	working	together	and	helping	each	other.			In	 light	 of	 the	 students’	 perceptions	 of	 being	 judged	 by	 other	 women,	 many	students	expressed	appreciation	for	the	group	discussions	that	were	part	of	my	research.	Many	described	 the	FGDs	 as	 settings	where	 they	 could	 freely	 engage	with	one	 another	without	 feeling	 judged.	However,	 some	had	negative	 feelings	towards	their	fellow	discussants,	which	they	shared	with	me	during	our	follow-up	 interviews.	 For	 example,	 Arya	 was	 very	 critical	 of	 another	 member	 in	 her	group,	because	according	to	her,	she	was	flaunting	her	class,	her	experiences	and	networks.	 Put	 differently,	 Arya	 believed	 she	 lacked	 humility	 and	 portrayed	herself	 as	 better	 than	 others,	 which	 echoes	 the	 aforementioned	 discourse	disciplining	 students’	 exceptionalism,	 and	 the	 female-on-female	 normative	judgements.	 While	 such	 competition	 amongst	 women	 is	 a	 stereotype,	 it	 was	perceived	 by	 the	 students	 in	 gendered	 terms,	 and	 thus	 it	 impacts	 their	expectations	 of	 FPE	 behaviour.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 experiences	 where	 young	people,	 and	women	 in	 particular,	 continue	 to	 be	 subjected	 to	 various	 forms	 of	violence,	 it	 is	 understandable	 that	 an	 ideal	 version	 of	 an	 exceptional,	 elite	woman,	should	help	other	women.	In	many	students’	view,	helping	other	women	who	are	deserving	of	assistance	arises	as	a	 sign	of	 care	 in	a	 racialised,	 classed,	and	 sexist	 society.	 Therefore,	 an	 ideal	 FPE	 becomes	 an	 empowering	 resource	against	the	structures	of	domination.	
Conclusion	In	this	chapter	I	have	offered	a	set	of	values,	characteristics,	and	behaviours	that	students	 attached	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 an	 FPE,	 which	 stem	 from	 the	 discourse	 of	
remembering	 where	 you	 come	 from.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 this	 homogenising	discourse	seeks	to	discipline	the	students	in	their	desire	for	social	mobility	and	
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exceptionalism	 by	 the	 threat	 of	 exclusion	 from	 an	 imagined	 community	 of	belonging	 and	 thus	 perpetuates	 the	 status	 quo	 by	 enforcing	 ideas	 about	 elite	difference	and	by	further	painting	political	elites	 in	particular	as	greedy,	selfish	anti-heroes.	 In	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Black	 African	 students,	 the	 community	 was	organised	around	the	articulations	of	Blackness,	which	included	a	static	notion	of	culture	 or	 tradition.	 The	 students’	 adherence	 and/or	 subversion	 of	 the	 norms	and	 markers	 of	 belonging	 revolved	 for	 example	 around	 showing	 humility	 or	making	 particular	 linguistic	 choices,	which	were	 always	 classed	 and	 gendered.	The	disciplinary	power	of	this	discourse	was	applied	as	much	in	the	private	as	in	the	public	 realm,	 and	 it	 serves	 those	 in	 the	positions	of	power	 to	maintain	 the	existing	social	order,	while	permitting	unthreatening,	un-transformative	change.			As	a	result	of	this	discourse,	many	students	across	racial	and	class	backgrounds	expected	 ideal	 FPEs	 to	 show	 their	 remembering	by	being	 caring.	Based	on	 the	students’	 gendered	 perceptions	 of	 care,	 FPEs	 should	 care	 for	 the	 community	more	 than	 their	 male	 counterparts,	 and	 hence,	 their	 increased	 presence	 in	politics	ought	to	bring	change	into	the	selfish	and	greedy	elite	spaces.	In	order	to	demonstrate	and	deliver	caring	policies,	an	FPE	was	also	expected	to	be	steadfast	and	independent	in	order	to	withstand	the	pressures	in	the	male	dominated	and	corrupt	world	of	politics,	similarly	to	the	students	having	to	be	independent	from	their	 (future)	 families	 and	 partners	 to	 make	 it	 in	 life.	 Hence,	 the	 norms	 and	discourses	 that	 shaped	 the	 students’	 private	 lives	 had	 direct	 parallels	 in	 the	public	sphere,	which	underscores	the	fallacy	of	the	dichotomy.	It	also	shows	the	need	 for	 analysing	 students’	 lived	 realities	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 symbolic	representation,	 and	 for	 recognising	 students’	 agency	 in	 the	 empowering	mechanism	of	the	role	model	effect.		 	
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9 Conclusion:	Empowerment	through	Constructed	Ideals	Guided	by	 the	research	question,	To	what	extent	do	female	university	students	in	
present	 day	 South	 Africa	 consider	 values,	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	
represented	 by	 female	 political	 elites,	 when	 they	 make	 decisions	 they	 deem	
important	 to	 their	 lives?	 this	 thesis	 provided	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 mechanism	through	which	women	in	politics	serve	as	role	models.	As	such,	it	contributes	to	gender	 and	 politics	 literature,	 which	 examines	 how	 intersecting	 systems	 of	power	operate	in	relation	to	political	 institutions,	as	well	as	how	these	systems	become	 normalised	 and	 challenged.	 By	 concentrating	 on	 young	 women	 at	university	 I	 brought	 into	 focus	 of	 the	 RME	 analysis	 people’s	 lived	 experiences	and	the	disciplinary	power	of	norms,	which	underpin	the	social	order	 in	which	they	function.	This	shift	in	focus	of	feminist	political	scholarship,	as	seen	in	much	of	 the	global	South,	highlights	diverse	sources,	mechanisms	and	manifestations	of	 power	 as	 pertaining	 to	 politics,	 and	 thus	 brings	 women	 in	 politics	 to	 their	rightful	 proximity	 to	 other	 women	 and	 men,	 who	 serve	 as	 role	 models	 and	empowerment	 resources	 for	 young	 women.	 My	 expansion	 upon	 the	 RME	mechanism	also	provides	a	lens	through	which	to	understand	the	contemporary	South	 African	 social	 order	 and	 how	 it	 impacts	 female	 students’	 understanding	and	engagement	with	politics.	To	 the	best	of	my	knowledge,	 such	research	has	not	been	conducted	in	and	on	South	Africa	to	date,	and	hence	my	thesis	adds	to	the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 country,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 theories	 on	 gender	 and	 political	representation.		In	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	 question,	 I	 moved	 away	 from	methodologies	adopted	 in	much	of	 the	existing	scholarship	on	 the	RME	 in	political	 sciences	 in	North	 American	 and	 European	 academia,	 and	 conducted	 qualitative,	 FGD-	 and	interview-based	 data	 collection.	 These	methods	 enabled	 university	 students	 to	articulate	 the	 values,	 characteristics	 and	 behaviours	 that	 they	 associated	 with	female	political	 elites,	 and	 to	 identify	decisions	 that	 they	deemed	 important	 to	their	 lives	without	any	pre-conceived,	prescriptive	 limitations.	 I	 conceptualised	my	 analytical	 approach	 based	 on	 the	 insights	 from	 role	 model	 literature,	combined	 with	 elite	 studies	 and	 intersectionality	 theorising	 on	 difference,	identity	and	power.	Understanding	role	models	and	anti-heroes	as	construals	of	
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those	who	perceive	them	based	on	the	levels	of	similarity	and	difference,	brings	forward	the	potential	of	elites	 to	contribute	 to	 the	construction	of	empowering	normative	resources	within	intersecting	systems	of	power	that	operate	through	constructed	notions	of	 identity	and	difference.	Ultimately	 the	 thesis	shows	that	students	 create	 empowering	 resources	 in	 the	 values,	 characteristic	 and	behaviours	of	FPEs	that	they	construct	as	an	ideal	version	of	themselves.	These	emerge	based	on	their	exposure	to	and	experiences	with	a	wide	and	diverse	sets	of	role	models	and	deterrent	models,	who	are	embedded	in	the	context	of	‘glocal’	norms	 and	 discourses.	 Hence,	 women	 in	 politics	 play	 an	 important	 part	 in	shaping	the	set	of	expectations	for	ideal	FPEs	that	serve	as	role	models	and	that	provide	empowerment	resources	for	the	students.		
Key	Findings	on	Role	Models,	Empowerment	and	Political	Elites	Considering	firstly	the	research	sub-question,	What	are	the	key	decisions	that	the	
students	 have	 made	 so	 far?	 I	 show	 that	 most	 of	 the	 young	 women	 said	 that	coming	 to	 UJ	was	 their	most	 important	 decision	 and	 it	 was	 grounded	 in	 their	belief	that	the	economic	and	political	situation	in	South	Africa	required	a	flexible	approach	 to	 life	 planning.	 Against	 this	 understanding	 of	 their	 society	 as	 being	marked	by	 instability	 and	 flux,	 students	 found	 inspiration	 in	 people’s	 histories	and	experiences,	which	 showed	 them	how	 to	navigate	 through	 life	 rather	 than	how	 to	 get	 into	 a	particular	 career.	The	 students’	 role	models	 and	anti-heroes,	which	 demonstrated	 how	 one	 can	 achieve	 some	 iteration	 of	 wellbeing	 and	success,	therefore	stemmed	from	various	backgrounds	and	contexts,	rather	than	from	within	a	particular	educational	or	career	field.			In	this	decision-making	context,	I	find	that	most	women	in	politics	did	not	serve	as	 role	models	 that	would	draw	young	university	students	 into	politics	or	who	would	 be	 seen	 as	 directly	 relevant	 for	 the	 students’	 decision-making	 in	 other	career	 or	 educational	 matters.	 It	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 about	 leading	women	 politicians’	 personal	 and	 professional	 lives	 that	 represented	 a	 critical	hindrance	to	the	RME	in	the	iteration	most	commonly	explored	in	the	literature.	However,	the	lack	of	conscious	consideration	of	women	in	politics	as	role	models	ought	to	be	understood	within	the	broader	context	in	which	students	often	chose	
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courses	out	of	a	desire	to	obtain	any	higher	education	degree	which	they	hoped	would	give	 them	a	comparative	advantage	en	route	 towards	a	better	quality	of	life.	For	these	young	women,	university	education	continued	to	be	perceived	as	a	pre-requisite	 for	 a	 possibility	 to	 secure	 a	 decent	 life,	 even	 if	 many	 no	 longer	accepted	 it	 as	 a	 guarantee	 of	 such	 well-being	 and	 recognised	 that	entrepreneurship	was	an	alternative	not	requiring	a	degree.			The	rejection	of	women	in	politics	as	role	models	is	attributed	by	some	feminists	to	the	specific	kind	of	politics	and	femininities	that	these	women	tend	to	portray	and	 subscribe	 to.	 In	 South	 Africa,	 scholars	 apply	 this	 critique	 to	 the	 ANC	Women’s	League	and	female	members	of	the	ANC	in	particular,	as	they	represent	the	majority	 of	 female	political	 office	holders.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 sub-question,	
Who	 are	 female	 political	 elites	 according	 to	 the	 students?	 and	 how	 does	 the	students’	understanding	of	eliteness	change	based	on	gendered	expectations	and	the	 realm	 of	 politics,	 I	 show	 that	 the	 students	 considered	 primarily	women	 in	offices	which	provided	them	with	access	to	power,	including	the	members	of	the	ANC	WL.	 Being	 part	 of	 the	 corrupt	 political	 machinery	 of	 the	 state	 and	 being	considered	elites,	women	of	the	ANC	were	often	seen	as	greedy	and	selfish	and	hence	 would	 better	 be	 understood	 as	 deterrent	 models,	 whose	 values,	characteristics,	 and	behaviours	 should	be	 avoided.	Consequently,	 eliteness	was	not	a	desirable	status	or	something	to	aspire	towards.			When	eliteness	was	reinterpreted	as	leadership	and	if	it	was	disguised	as	middle	classness,	however,	students	were	able	to	use	the	idea	of	an	FPE	to	construct	an	ideal	version	of	themselves.	They	were	thus	able	to	attach	to	the	idea	of	an	FPE	norms	 that	 were	 inspiring	 and	 empowering,	 and	 which	 they	 were	 able	 to	construct	based	on	women	and	men	to	whom	they	were	exposed	to,	as	well	as	from	their	lived	experiences	that	shaped	their	daily	realities	and	which	were	the	product	of	the	South	African	social	order.	Because	of	the	elite-leader	connection,	the	 students	 as	 leaders	were	 ultimately	 able	 to	 aspire	 towards	 social	mobility	and	change	through	eliteness.		
	251	
The	rejection	of	many	specific	women	in	politics	as	ideal	FPEs	was	connected	to	the	students’	perception	of	these	politicians	as	subservient	because	of	their	race	and	 age	 and	 their	 socialisation	 in	 a	 different	 era.	 Being	 part	 of	 the	 older	generations	of	Black	African	women,	most	women	in	politics	were	perceived	to	have	 internalised	 the	 subservient	 femininity.	 Many	 students	 associated	 this	femininity	with	Black	African	culture	and	tradition,	which	according	to	the	them,	enables	men	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	women	 and	push	 them	 to	 the	 sidelines.	 Yet,	many	students	who	thought	critically	of	most	ANC	women	still	found	inspiration	in	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 Black	 African	 woman,	 such	 as	 Dr	 Nkosazana	 Dlamini-Zuma	(NDZ),	 had	made	 it	 to	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 continental	 politics	 and	 was	 in	 the	running	 to	 become	 the	 president	 of	 the	 country.	What	 transpired	 from	 such	 a	seeming	contradiction	was	that	students	became	driven	by	the	idea	of	what	they	thought	women	in	politics	should	do	in	order	to	deserve	the	FPE	label	and	what	they	would	 have	 done	 to	 achieve	 their	 elite	 status.	 In	 other	words,	 in	 light	 of	missing	 information	 that	 the	 students	 wanted	 to	 know	 in	 order	 to	 adjudicate	politicians’	meeting	of	 FPE	expectations,	 they	drew	on	 assumptions	of	 the	FPE	ideal	 instead.	 The	 students	 were	 thus	 inspired	 by	 generalised	 values,	characteristics,	and	behaviours,	which	they	vested	in	the	FPE	ideal.	This	process	signals	their	personal	agency	in	the	construction	of	FPE	norms	which	they	draw	on	as	an	empowerment	resource,	and	which	is	frequently	neglected	in	the	RME	theorising	and	research.		NDZ,	amongst	other	female	politicians,	was	rejected	by	some	students	as	meeting	the	 FPE	 expectations	 for	 her	 presumed	 ascendancy	 to	 power	 through	 the	connection	 to	 her	 ex-husband,	 which	 they	 argued	 meant	 that	 she	 had	 not	achieved	 and	 deserved	 her	 position	 of	 power	 and	 privilege.	 However,	 those	students,	 who	 believed	 that	 her	 success	 was	 due	 to	 her	 credentials	 as	 an	educated	 medical	 doctor	 and	 a	 former	 cabinet	 member,	 and	 due	 to	 her	perseverance	against	racism	and	patriarchy	as	a	Black	African	woman,	found	her	to	 be	 a	 role	 model	 and	 an	 FPE,	 despite	 her	 affiliation	 with	 corruption	 and	patronage	in	politics	and	in	the	Zuma-dominated	ANC	in	particular.	The	need	for	women	 in	 politics	 to	 deserve	 their	 positions,	 mirrors	 the	 students’	 own	expectations	 that	 rewards,	 whether	 it	 be	 power,	 privilege,	 welfare	 or	 another	
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form	 of	 success,	 need	 to	 be	 deserved	 and	 achieved.	 The	 discourses	 of	 ‘being	deserving’,	 and	 ‘remembering	 where	 you	 come	 from’	 seek	 to	 discipline	 the	students’	 social	 mobility	 aspirations	 towards	 eliteness	 and	 their	 desire	 to	become	 and	 to	 see	 themselves	 as	 elites.	 These	 disciplinary	 discourses	 thus	maintain	 the	existing	systems	and	structures	of	power.	Out	of	 these	discourses	arises	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 final	 sub-question,	What	are	the	values,	characteristics	
and	behaviours	that	they	expect	of	female	political	elites?	The	 students	 expected	FPEs	as	their	ideal	selves	to	be	educated,	hard-working,	active,	caring,	steadfast,	and	independent.	It	is	this	ideal	version	of	the	student	that	drives	them	to	aspire	towards	changing	their	own	lives	as	well	as	their	communities	and	society	more	broadly.	Hence,	 it	 is	 this	 ideal	 that	delivers	the	emancipative	potential	attached	to	women	 in	 positions	 of	 political	 power	 and	which	 offers	 a	way	 to	 challenge	elites	in	power.		Throughout	 the	 thesis	 I	 therefore	 argue	 that	 women	 in	 politics	 are	 an	empowerment	 resource	 for	 female	 university	 students	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	contribute	 together	 with	 other	 women	 and	 men	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 the	students’	 ideal	self,	which	 is	attached	to	the	notion	of	a	 ‘female	political	elite’.	 I	show	 that	 the	students	articulate	 their	 ideal	FPE	 in	 light	of	what	 they	perceive	amongst	 female	 politicians	 as	much	 as	 other	 women	 and	men	 in	 the	 country.	They	 assess	 whether	 women	 in	 politics	 meet	 these	 expectations	 or	 not	 and	individual	women	in	politics	often	failed	to	be	directly	understood	and	accepted	as	normative	resources.	Despite	many	women	 in	politics	and	other	elites	being	seen	as	deterrent	models	and	anti-heroes,	the	students	were	able	to	be	inspired	and	empowered	by	a	constructed	image	of	an	ideal	self	that	FPEs	represented	as	a	 culmination	 of	 diverse	 sets	 of	 role	 models	 and	 it	 is	 this	 diversity	 that	represents	the	cornerstone	of	the	desired	RME.		
Implications	for	the	RME	Theorising	While	gender	scholars	such	as	Lombardo	and	Meier	(2014)	and	Squires	(2008),	have	been	drawing	our	attention	to	 the	multiplicity	of	ways	that	gender	norms	are	constructed	 through	and	around	women	 in	politics,	 the	citizens’	active	role	and	 agency	 in	 the	 process	 have	 been	 undervalued	within	 the	 complex	web	 of	
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actors	who	co-construct	these	social	meanings.	Most	RME	literature	and	feminist	advocacy	surrounding	women	in	politics	innately	treat	women	outside	of	politics	as	 recipients	 and	 perceivers	 of	 norms.	 Their	 agency	 is	 only	 manifested	 in	political	 participation,	 by	 which	 they	 respond	 to	 what	 they	 perceive.	 As	Lombardo	and	Meier	(2017)	point	out,	contestation	around	symbols	is	amongst	various	meanings	that	are	constructed	and	attached	to	them,	and	it	 is	up	to	the	principal	to	recognise	them	and	either	accept	or	reject	them.	Consequently,	most	RME	 scholars	 in	 western	 political	 sciences	 have	 focused	 on	 analysing	 what	women	 should	 do	 (substantive	 representation)	 and	 who	 they	 should	 be	(descriptive	markers)	to	either	succeed	or	fail	in	becoming	role	models,	and	the	citizens	 have	 been	 reduced	 to	 variables	 of	 the	 predetermined	 identities	 and	political	preferences,	which	either	do	or	do	not	become	salient.	Having	made	the	citizen	 into	 the	 research	 focal	 point	 in	 this	 thesis	 has	 enabled	 their	 agency	 to	come	through	the	mesh	of	actors,	who	co-construct	the	meaning	of	the	symbol.			The	neglect	of	people’s	agency	in	the	construction	of	norms	arises	when	women	in	 politics	 are	 treated	 similarly	 to	 symbols	 that	 are	 inanimate	 objects	 or	concepts,	such	as	flags	or	currencies	as	symbols	of	nations.	However,	as	human	beings	 they	are	better	understood	as	symbolic	agents,	because	 they	are	able	 to	act	independently	of	the	constructed	meaning	that	they	evoke.	Hence,	there	is	a	crucial	difference	between	 the	normative	meaning(s)	evoked	by	 their	presence	and	 the	 norms	 enacted	 by	 individual	 women	 in	 politics.	 Carefully	 separating	these	 two	elements	of	 symbolic	 representation	 then	brings	 to	 the	 fore	 that	 the	emancipative	effect	of	women	in	politics	as	role	models	is	actually	delivered	by	the	normative	meaning	behind	the	symbol	that	the	citizens	construct	themselves,	rather	than	the	symbolic	agents.			Consequently,	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 role	 model	 function,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	analyse	people’s	 lives	–	the	norms	and	discourses	that	structure	their	everyday	experiences.	 As	 my	 research	 substantiates,	 students	 did	 not	 separate	 their	personal	 lives,	 their	 lived	 experiences	 and	 perceptions	 from	 the	 construction	process	 of	 FPEs,	 but	 articulated	 their	 expectations	 based	 on	 their	 exposure	 to	diverse	 women	 and	 men,	 ranging	 from	 their	 mothers	 to	 businesswomen	 like	
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Bonang	 and	 Oprah	 as	 well	 as	 political	 elites	 like	 Thuli	 Madonsela	 and	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela.	 Hence	 FPEs	 need	 to	 be	 analysed	 in	 the	 most	 expansive	context	 of	 the	 society,	 not	 just	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 politics	 as	 understood	 in	 the	theories	 from	 and	 for	 the	 global	 North.	 This	 is	 primarily	 because	 elites	 were	understood	 as	 leaders	 and	 as	 exceptional	 versions	 of	 the	 students	 themselves.	They	were	rooted	in	the	everyday,	social	and	private	spheres	of	the	students	and	were	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 falsely	 dichotomised	 political	 vs.	 private	 sphere.	Therefore,	the	normative	ideal	of	FPEs	is	intrinsically	conceptualised	to	be	a	role	model	and	thus	the	empowering	function	of	women	in	politics	–	the	mechanism	of	the	RME	–	is	actually	rooted	construction	process.		
De-homogenizing	Youth	in	Times	of	Fallism	By	mapping	 the	 norms	 that	 students	 attached	 to	women	 in	 politics	 and	 to	 an	ideal	FPE	the	study	contributes	to	the	understanding	of	the	social	order	in	South	Africa	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 young	 women	 pursuing	 HE.	 The	 students’	experiences	 captured	 in	 this	 research	 corroborate	 the	 extensive	 body	of	 South	African	scholarship,	which	highlights	 the	ruptures	 in	 the	country’s	 social	 fabric	as	 I	 discuss	 in	 Chapter	 Three.	 These	 ruptures	 are	 seen	 in	 the	 distrust	 of	 the	system,	as	well	as	of	people	perceived	to	be	privileged	by	the	systems	of	power,	leading	 to	 the	 students’	 desire	 for	 experience-based	 knowledge	 and	representation.	While	many	 commentators	 and	policy	makers	 have	 focused	on	analysing	the	role	of	race,	class,	gender	and	age	as	the	main	sources	of	difference	and	cleavages	in	South	Africa,	applying	them	in	their	intersections	as	well	as	in	a	non-prescribed	 delimitations	 to	 the	 university	 students	 vis-à-vis	 both	 other	generations	and	women	in	positions	of	power,	is	often	missing	or	marginalised.			Additionally,	my	research	shows	the	importance	of	de-homogenizing	youth	and	university	students,	which	tend	to	be	essentialised	by	the	narratives	of	the	Born-Free	 (BF)	 generation	 or	 by	 considering	 students	 as	 a	 subgroup	 of	 this	 specific	youth	generation.	The	BF	narratives	have	been	widely	critiqued	by	the	students	active	in	the	Fallist	protests,	highlighting	the	fallacy	and	naivety	of	the	rainbow	nation	promise	vested	 in	 the	post-1994	generation.	At	 the	 same	 time,	many	of	the	 young	 people,	 including	 my	 participants	 who	 were	 not	 politically	 active,	
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embraced	 their	 generational	 identity	 and	 the	 BF	 label,	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	marginalisation	 by	 the	 older	 generations	 in	 power.	 While	 challenging	gerontocratic	power,	many	students	did	not	subscribe	to	radical	activism	nor	did	they	 agree	with	 violence	 and	 contestation	 as	 forms	 of	 political	 engagement	 in	response	to	structural	violence	 in	HE	or	 in	South	African	society	more	broadly.	Instead,	 they	 preferred	 coalition	 and	 consensus	 building.	 These	 contradictions	become	 visible	 due	 to	 an	 intersectional	 examination	 of	 the	 students’	 lives	 and	thus	 challenge	 simplistic	 narratives	 articulated	 predominantly	 on	 male	experiences,	worldviews	 and	 desires,	which	 accompanied	 the	 student	 protests	and	campaigns	in	the	2016-2017	period.		
Implications	for	Future	Research	and	Feminist	Advocacy	The	understanding	of	the	RME	mechanism	articulated	in	this	thesis	suggests	that	feminist	advocacy	and	future	research	might	benefit	from	some	changes	in	their	focus	 and	 approaches.	 Firstly,	 feminist	 political	 science	 research	 in	 western	academia	 which	 has	 been	 driving	 the	 RME	 theorising	 would	 be	 enhanced	 by	stepping	 outside	 of	 its	 disciplinary	 silo	 and	 working	 much	 more	comprehensively	and	intersectionally	with	concepts	of	power,	as	has	been	done	by	many	scholars	 in	the	global	South,	and	South	African	feminists	 in	particular.	As	my	research	also	shows,	FPE	expectations	were	a	result	of	the	students’	own	experiences	 with	 caring,	 hard-working	 and	 sacrificing	 female	 guardians,49	together	 with	 their	 own	 ambitions	 to	 bring	 change	 to	 their	 families	 and	communities.	Therefore,	it	becomes	important	to	research	the	impact	of	women	in	 politics	 in	 conjunction	 with	 women	 in	 other	 sectors,	 such	 as	 business	 or	media,	 rather	 than	 in	 isolation,	 as	 well	 as	 men	 who	 influence	 people’s	understanding	 of	 their	 world.	 As	 such,	 this	 research	 also	 substantiates	 that	change	of	norms	is	a	complex,	holistic	process	in	which	political	power	works	in	combination	with	other	 forms	of	power,	which	cannot	be	artificially	 ignored	or	separated.	 In	 practice	 this	 would	 mean	 that	 future	 symbolic	 representation	scholarship	 would	 be	 strengthened	 by	 focusing	 on	 in-depth	 understanding	 of	women’s	lives	and	identifications,	as	much	as	the	socio-political	conditions	of	the	specific	 time	 and	 context.	 Otherwise,	 the	 research	 community	 that	 focuses	 on																																																									49	It	must	be	underscored	that	not	all	students	had	experiences	with	such	women	in	their	lives.		
	256	
gender	 and	 politics	 risks	misunderstanding	 the	 impact	 that	 women	 in	 politics	have	 on	 female	 citizens	 and	 vice-versa,	 as	 well	 as	 simplifying	 and	misrepresenting	people’s	political	behaviour.		Secondly,	 the	findings	and	theoretical	 implications	of	 this	research	suggest	that	the	empowering	and	emancipative	effect	of	women	in	politics	as	role	models	 is	less	dependent	on	the	prevalence	of	women	in	positions	of	power,	the	particular	positions	 and	 roles	 that	 they	 occupy,	 or	 the	 policies	 that	 they	 pursue,	 but	 on	women’s	exposure	to	a	variety	of	women	in	the	public	and	private	domains.	The	issue	of	variety	becomes	clear	due	to	the	highly	diverse,	unequal	and	polarised	nature	of	South	African	society,	 together	with	the	prevalence	of	corruption	and	patronage.	As	 I	 show,	while	Thuli	Madonsela	was	 for	many	 the	embodiment	of	the	FPE	expectations	and	an	icon	due	to	her	perceived	steadfast	fight	for	justice	and	for	the	people,	women	like	Helen	Zille,	Winnie	Madikizela-Mandela	or	NDZ,	despite	all	the	controversies	that	were	attached	to	them,	also	represented	some	ideal	 characteristics	 of	 a	 female	 political	 elite-leader.	 Their	 differences,	compared	and	 contrasted	against	other	women	and	men	 in	 the	 students’	 lives,	allowed	 the	 students	 to	pick	and	choose	characteristics,	 values	and	behaviours	that	were	of	 importance	 to	 them.	Hence,	 the	 variety	of	women	on	 the	political	scene	enabled	the	students	to	critically	consider	what	their	ideal	should	look	like	and	draw	empowerment	resources	from	these	ideals	to	seek	to	change	the	status	quo.			Future	research	into	the	relative	importance	of	variety	of	and	amongst	women	in	politics,	 could	 be	 usefully	 explored	 in	 other	 contexts.	 In	 this	 study,	 the	geographical	 focus	 on	 South	 Africa	 and	 its	 specific	 set	 of	 historical,	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 circumstances	 created	 the	 underlying	 conditions,	whereby	 women’s	 presence	 in	 political	 decision-making	 is	 well	 established,	albeit	contested	with	regards	to	the	(e)quality	of	their	power.	Many	post-colonial	countries,	which	are	also	gerontocratic,	patriarchal	and	divided	along	economic	inequality,	 have	 lower	 representation	 of	 women	 in	 these	 positions,	 while	 still	having	 some	women	who	 represent	 the	 ideal	 values	 attached	 to	 FPEs	 in	 other	sectors	 and	 in	 people’s	 private	 lives.	 Hence,	 a	 comparison	with	 these	 contexts	
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would	further	enhance	our	understanding	of	the	roles	that	FPEs	play	and	would	supply	 further	evidence	 for	 the	most	effective	 tools	 for	application	of	 the	RME.	Similarly,	 replicating	 the	 study	 in	 non-democratic	 contexts,	 where	 women’s	ability	 to	 be	 active	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 is	 affected	 by	 different	 political	mechanisms,	might	equally	 lead	to	 further	nuancing	of	 the	theory.	 In	 the	South	African	context,	the	ANC	party-state,	the	anti-apartheid	struggle,	and	democratic	constitutionalism,	 together	 with	 the	 powerful	 role	 of	 the	 courts,	 have	 created	specific	 circumstances,	 which	 shape	 the	 students’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 realm	 of	possibility	for	political	engagement.	Hence,	it	could	be	expected	that	FPE	norms	might	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 different	 political	 contexts,	 despite	 the	 students’	exposure	to	a	diverse	set	of	women	who	meet	the	FPE	ideal	in	other	sectors	and	which	might	potentially	allow	the	articulation	of	the	student’s	ideal	self.				Thirdly,	 the	 findings	 surrounding	 eliteness	 suggest	 the	need	 to	 further	 explore	whether	to	reclaim,	redefine	or	substitute	the	notion	of	‘female	political	elite’	in	order	to	enhance	the	RME	potential	of	women	in	politics.	While	the	concept	of	an	FPE	allowed	the	South	African	university	students	to	articulate	the	ideal	version	of	 themselves,	 it	was	a	highly	contested	 term	due	 to	 its	multiple,	 contradictory	interpretations.	The	difficulty	with	which	being	an	FPE	was	approached	by	 the	students	 highlights	 the	 need	 to	 investigate	 whether	 and	 how	 to	 reclaim	 and	redefine	the	idea	of	being	an	elite	from	its	frequently	abused	discursive,	populist	shorthand.	 The	 positive	 re-interpretation	 of	 the	 term	 that	 would	 highlight	leadership,	 achievement,	 hard	 work	 and	 struggle	 is	 one	 potential	 approach.	However,	 reclaiming	 female	 political	 eliteness	 might	 not	 be	 plausible	 in	 a	political	 climate	 defined	 by	 rampant	 racialised	 neoliberalism	 combined	 with	patronage	and	corruption	and	their	consequent	mistrust	and	suspicion.			The	difficulty	lies	with	the	close	interlink	of	neoliberal	values	with	the	notion	of	deservedness.	 As	 I	 show	 in	 the	 examples	 of	 students’	 discourses	 of	 HE,	 it	 is	through	 hard	work	 that	many	 students	 feel	 they	 deserve	 their	 entitlements	 or	privileges,	while	women	 in	positions	of	power	are	equally	expected	 to	deserve	their	 posts.	 Often	 perceived	 as	 either	 saints	 or	 sinners,	 madonnas	 or	 whores	(Smith	 2018),	 women’s	 deservedness	 is	 not	 detached	 from	 these	 gendered	
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binaries	 as	 the	 frequent	 attacks	 on	 the	 sexual	 relations	 of	 women	 in	 politics	substantiate.	Consequently,	future	research	on	the	RME	might	focus	on	exploring	the	 potential	 of	 eliteness	 as	 an	 empowering	 concept	 in	 other	 neo-liberal	patriarchal	 contexts.	 This	 could	 be	 or	 example	 in	 countries	which	 share	 South	African	discourses	of	working	class	 struggle	and	downward	class	 identification	within	 broader	 post-colonial	 setting.	 Alternatively,	 it	 could	 be	 explored	 in	countries	where	 upper-class	 identification	has	 the	 reversed	 connotation	 to	 the	one	observed	in	South	Africa,	and	where	the	discourses	of	‘remembering	where	you	come	from’	in	their	class	or	race/ethnicity-based	iterations	might	differ.		
	Future	 explorations	of	 the	RME	 through	 the	FPE	might	 also	 engage	with	other	populations	 in	 South	 Africa,	whose	 relationship	with	 neoliberalism	may	 differ.	Firstly,	 this	 could	 be	 different	 generations	 and	 age-cohorts	 of	 women,	 whose	experiences	 of	 apartheid	 and	 the	 transitional	 period	might	 have	 affected	 their	relationship	with	the	ideas	of	struggle,	hard	work	and	working-class	identity.	As	I	 show	 in	 the	 thesis,	 the	students’	 construction	of	 the	FPE	was	shaped	by	 their	observations	 of	 older	 women	 in	 positions	 of	 power,	 their	 youth	 identity	 as	 a	marker	 of	 distinction,	 as	well	 as	 their	 socialisation	 amongst	 older	 generations	and	 experiencing	 the	 legacy	 of	 apartheid,	 which,	 to	 paraphrase	 Sara	 Ahmed	(2014),	 keeps	 the	memory	 of	 the	 wound	 raw.	 Therefore,	 similar	 observations	and	life	experiences	might	have	different	interpretive	meanings	for	women	who	are	members	of	the	same	generation	as	the	current	political	elites.	Secondly,	the	research	 could	 be	 replicated	 at	 other	 South	 African	 universities	 in	 order	 to	observe	the	 impact	of	the	elite/working	class	 image	and	reputation	of	different	institutions.	UJ	 students	have	particular	perceptions	of	 themselves	due	 to	 their	university	 choices	and	experience.	Therefore,	 the	variations	 in	 setting	between	so-called	 elite,	 research	 universities	 in	 comparison	 to	 comprehensive	universities	 and	under-resourced	 formerly	Black	African	 institutions	 should	be	explored.	Lastly,	it	would	be	equally	insightful	to	focus	on	young	people	who	are	the	 so-called	 NEETS,	 and	 who	 have	 been	 the	 worst	 affected	 by	 the	 neoliberal	policies	 of	 the	 ANC	 governments.	 NEETS	 might	 have	 diminished	 ability	 and	desire	to	identify	with	ideas	of	being	change-makers	as	I	argued	is	the	case	with	university	 students	 and	which	makes	 them	 into	 exceptional	 individuals	 in	 the	
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South	African	context.	These	comparative	approaches	against	the	findings	of	this	thesis	would	further	enlighten	the	effects	of	eliteness	of	women	in	politics	in	the	RME	mechanism.		My	 research	 further	 suggests	 that	 there	 might	 be	 other	 terms	 and	 concepts	which	might	be	less	contested	and	more	appropriate	for	the	examination	of	the	RME.	 These	 concepts	 should	 be	 rooted	 in	 a	 particular	 spatial-temporal	 setting	and	 capture	 what	 the	 ideal	 of	 women	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 should	 be.	 The	popularity	and	importance	of	the	idea	of	Black	excellence	amongst	Black	African	youth	 and	 activists	 in	 South	 Africa	 suggests	 that	 this	 notion	 could	 offer	 an	alternative	signifier	or	provide	a	conceptual	anchor	for	debates	that	would	reveal	a	 concept,	 which	 would	 enable	 the	 RME	 based	 empowerment	 process.	Consequently,	 future	 feminist	 activism	 and	 research	 might	 analyse	 the	discourses	 and	 concepts	 that	 impact	 young	 women’s	 ability	 to	 perceive	themselves	as	exceptional,	without	being	deemed	deviant	and	that	would	enable	them	 to	 find	 the	 language	 that	 would	 challenge	 the	 norms	 underpinning	 the	patriarchal	 structures.	 Methodologically,	 this	 would	 best	 be	 explored	 in	languages	 that	 are	most	 relevant	 to	 the	 participants	 and	 consequently	 explore	whether	 there	 are	 similarities	 across	 ethno-linguistic	 groups,	 which	 would	enable	intersectional	solidarities	for	future	advocacy	and	empowering	of	women	across	various	backgrounds.		Lastly,	feminist	activists	and	researchers	may	consider	more	closely	the	issue	of	access	to	detailed	information	about	women’s	personal	and	professional	life.	To	date,	advocacy	and	research	on	the	issue	of	 information	and	women’s	presence	in	 politics	 has	 primarily	 been	 operationalised	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 politicians’	communication	 skills,	 strategies	 and	 citizen	 outreach	 (Piscopo,	 2018).	 My	research	suggests	that	it	would	be	beneficial	for	female	students	in	South	Africa	and	potentially	other	women	as	well,	if	women	in	politics	tried	more	deliberately	to	define	and	portray	themselves	as	leaders	and	used	the	discursive	link	of	elite-leadership	in	order	to	help	young	women	to	think	about	themselves	as	relevant,	adequate	 and	 capable	 political	 beings.	 Leadership	 can	 thus	 serve	 as	 a	 tool	 of	
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‘intersectional	 solidarity’	 (Emejulu,	 2018;	 Seppälä,	 2016)	 building	 that	 creates	bridges	across	inter-	and	intra-	generational	divides.			However,	 such	 activities	 are	 contingent	 on	 people’s	 analytical	 skills	 and	 their	abilities	 to	 interpret	 this	 information	 from	 political	 elite-leaders,	 in	 order	 to	compare	women	in	power	against	their	own	lived	realities.	Citizens	would	thus	profit	 from	 being	 better	 equipped	 to	 examine	 the	 systems	 and	 structures	 that	shape	their	everyday	experiences	in	order	to	understand	the	existing	solidarities	with	 women	 in	 power.	 Feminist	 activism	 and	 research	 in	 politics	 would	therefore	 benefit	 from	 seeing	 the	 education	 realm	 as	 its	 natural	 sphere	 of	engagement,	 rather	 than	 a	 different,	 siloed	 sphere.	 The	 potential	 for	 changing	social	 norms	 and	 politics	 is	 intrinsically	 tied	 to	 skills	 that	 educational	institutions,	 and	universities	 in	 particular,	 should	 seek	 to	 develop	 (Stromquist,	2003).	 These	 competencies	 could	 help	women	 to	 be	more	 effective	 in	 utilising	women	in	politics	as	an	empowerment	resource.	Hence,	this	study	substantiates	the	existing	calls	for	reforms	of	the	HE	sector	in	South	Africa,	in	order	to	achieve	its	 anticipated	mandate	 of	 strengthening	 the	 non-racial,	 non-sexist	 society	 and	preserving	 the	 democratic	 nature	 of	 the	 country.	 I	 concur	 with	 the	 words	 of	Roger	 Southall	 who,	 borrowing	 from	 Pierre	 Bourdieu,	 suggests	 that	 the	 South	African	education	system	“channels	students	towards	unquestioning	acceptance	of	 the	established	social	system,	as	part	of	 the	natural	order	of	 things.	 In	short,	…its	 hidden	 purpose	 is	 to	 reproduce	 the	 values	 of	 the	 dominant	 class”	 (2016,	123).			While	 this	 thesis	 enhances	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 normative	 power	underpinning	 the	 social	order	 in	South	Africa,	 it	 is	ultimately	motivated	by	 the	feminist	desire	to	contribute	to	women’s	empowerment,	which	I	understand	as	a	political	project	for	human	equality	and	social	justice.	The	imperative	to	continue	such	 feminist	 research	 is	 substantiated	by	 the	 reversal	 of	 some	of	 the	 gains	 in	equality	and	 justice	achieved	 in	 the	past,	as	well	as	 the	slow	pace	of	change	on	other	 fronts	 (Rai,	 2008).	 This	 backsliding	 and	 stagnation	 are	 in	 some	 ways	observable	 in	South	Africa,	 as	 I	 show	 throughout	 the	 thesis.	However,	 they	are	also	 accompanied	 by	 the	 austerity-induced	 squeeze	 on	 resources	 available	 to	
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feminist	 activists	 and	 academics	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world,	 hitting	 both	programming	 and	 research	 (Celis	 and	 Lovenduski,	 2018;	 Emejulu,	 2018;	Gutiérrez	 Rodríguez,	 Tuzcu	 and	 Winkel,	 2018;	 Grzebalska,	 Kovats	 and	 Peto,	2017).	They	are	supplemented	by	patriarchal	co-optation	of	some	of	the	tools	at	the	disposal	of	feminist	advocacy,	not	least	women’s	empowerment	itself,	and	by	misogynistic	attacks	emboldened	by	 left-	and	right-wing	populisms	(McFadden,	2018).	 Distilling	 theoretical	 and	 conceptual	 lessons,	 and	 considering	 how	 they	can	 travel	 across	 contexts,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 ways	 the	 thesis	 aligns	 with	 feminist	academic	 ambitions.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	 may	 support	 the	 ongoing,	 decades-long	efforts	of	 feminist	practitioners	on	 the	 continent	 (Tripp,	2017)	and	around	 the	world	to	change	the	social	order.		 	
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Appendix	
Short	Biographies	of	Select	Student	Participants		Several	students	are	featured	multiple	times	in	the	thesis.	As	their	biographical	information	 is	 only	 included	 at	 their	 first	 mention,	 the	 reader	 can	 find	 below	excerpts	from	the	main	text	that	provide	the	students’	background	stories.	These	biographies	 are	 therefore	 meant	 to	 help	 the	 reader	 be	 reminded	 who	 the	students	are	as	they	encounter	them	on	the	different	pages	of	the	thesis,	which	are	 included	 by	 their	 names.	 As	 is	 the	 case	 in	 the	 main	 text,	 the	 biographies	below	 use	 the	 terminology	 and	 identifications	 preferred	 by	 the	 students	themselves.	
Aria	(pages	53,	210	and	234)	Aria	portrayed	herself	as	someone	who	could	be	described	 in	South	Africa	as	a	‘non-racialist,’	 because	 although	 she	 thought	 race	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 people’s	lives,	especially	with	regards	 to	accessing	economic	resources,	 she	claimed	she	did	not	let	race	influence	her	interactions	and	views	of	other	people.	She	defined	herself	as	African	and	said	she	did	not	 like	 it	when	people	asked	her	about	her	ethnicity.	She	was	from	Mpumalanga,	but	she	had	moved	to	Gauteng	where	she	went	to	a	well-resourced	high	school,	although	it	did	not	assist	her	with	applying	to	university.	She	was	an	“aspiring	plus	size	model”,	who	felt	bullied	and	judged	in	school,	but	had	no	one	to	talk	to	because	her	parents,	who	both	worked	in	the	public	sector,	travelled	a	lot.	She	was	a	poet,	taking	part	in	poetry	groups	and	jam	sessions,	but	was	not	a	member	of	any	societies	or	organisations.	
Arya	(pages	151,	152,	173,	242,	243	and	246)	Arya	 was	 a	 Black	 NSFAS-	 funded	 student	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 a	mother	of	a	young	girl.	In	2017,	she	was	in	her	second	year	of	studies	and	lived	with	her	parents,	commuting	a	considerable	distance	to	campus.	She	was	a	few	years	older	 than	most	of	her	peers,	as	she	had	done	a	 learnership	after	matric,	then	started	a	different	course,	but	abandoned	 it	as	she	had	her	baby.	She	was	therefore	 re-starting	 her	 studies,	 this	 time	 at	 UJ’s	 APK,	 APK,	 where	 she	 also	joined	a	volunteering	community	engagement	society.	As	a	young	mother	from	a	township,	when	she	was	pondering	what	her	 life	would	be	 like	by	the	time	she	
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was	31,	she	spoke	about	having	saved	money	for	the	education	of	her	child	and	her	younger	brother.	She	also	wanted	to	take	care	of	her	parents	before	starting	to	care	for	herself.	
Bucie	(pages	93	and	243)	Bucie	was	a	Black	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng,	but	she	clarified	that	she	lived	in	its	“middle	class	section.”	She	was	a	member	and	a	team	leader	in	an	on-campus	 society	 and	 she	 came	 to	 UJ	 at	 the	 insistence	 of	 her	 family,	 as	 she	 had	originally	 wanted	 to	 pursue	 investigative	 journalism	 and	 study	 at	 a	 college.	However,	she	had	been	convinced	by	her	family	that	she	was	smart	enough	to	go	to	university,	but	that	she	should	study	a	degree	that	was	less	dangerous.	Bucie	was	 one	 of	 those	 students	 who	 spoke	 about	 her	 desire	 for	 economic	independence	 because	 she	 believed	 it	would	 give	 her	 a	 voice	 and	 an	 ability	 to	withstand	 pressures	 from	 those	 in	 power,	 namely	 her	 family’s	 elders.	 Bucie’s	desire	for	independence	did	not	mean	that	she	wanted	to	care	only	about	herself	and	her	own	success.	She	said	that	she	was	studying	to	get	a	good	job	that	would	allow	 her	 to	 pay	 for	 her	 nephew’s	 education,	 once	 he	 was	 ready	 to	 go	 to	university.	 She	 also	wanted	 to	 give	 her	mother	 a	 beautiful	 house,	 just	 like	 the	ones	she	saw	on	TV	
Busisiwe	(pages	226	and	227)	Busisiwe	 was	 a	 Black	 student	 from	 a	 small	 town	 in	 Mpumalanga.	 Like	 many	other	students,	 she	grew	up	with	her	grandparents	because	her	mother	had	 to	work	 and	 could	 not	 take	 care	 of	 her,	 and	 received	 what	 she	 described	 as	Christian	 upbringing.	 She	 was	 from	 a	 township,	 but	 she	 said	 that	 her	 family	always	 had	 food	 and	 electricity.	 Her	mother	 used	 to	work	 as	 a	 clerk,	 but	was	currently	unemployed;	however,	thanks	to	a	bursary	that	paid	for	her	education,	as	well	as	accommodation,	her	studies	were	going	well.	
Danie	(pages	224	and	225)	Danie’s	 story	 could	be	 a	poster	 representation	of	what	 the	ANC	envisioned	 for	the	Black	African	child	 in	post-apartheid	South	Africa,	because	she	was	a	Black	young	woman	who	came	from	rural	Mpumalanga	and	received	NSFAS	funding	to	
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study	at	UJ,	where	she	did	not	participate	in	any	organisations	or	societies.	When	she	was	younger,	 she	had	 to	walk	eight	kilometres	 to	school	and	after	a	whole	day	 of	 classes,	 she	would	 have	 her	 household	 chores	waiting	 for	 her	 at	 home.	Despite	 what	 she	 called	 her	 conservative	 upbringing,	 she	 described	 herself	 as	being	different	from	the	girls	in	her	village	and	acting	differently	from	the	norm.	She	did	not	like	to	wear	girly	clothes	and	she	played	football	with	the	boys.		
Daniela	(page	195)	Daniela	was	a	white	student	in	her	second	year	of	Biokinetics	studies	at	the	DFC	campus.	She	lived	with	her	parents	and	commuted	to	school	by	car,	although	she	preferred	to	park	at	APK	and	take	the	university-funded	bus	to	DFC	as	a	safety	precaution.	As	many	other	students,	she	was	worried	about	driving	in	the	CBD.	Her	mother	paid	her	fees	in	her	first	year,	and	she	was	able	to	get	a	bursary	for	her	second	year,	but	she	was	also	working	while	not	being	a	member	of	clubs	or	societies.	She	had	originally	applied	to	Wits	to	study	medicine,	but	she	was	told	that	 she	 did	 not	 get	 into	 the	 country’s	 leading	 programme	 because	 of	 racial	quotas.	
Emily	(page	222)	Emily	was	 a	 first-year	 student	 at	UJ	when	we	met	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2016	 and	 she	came	from	a	mixed	white	background	–	her	father	was	Afrikaner	and	her	mother	British	 –	 and	 so	 she	 said	 she	was	 brought	 up	 in	 between	 two	 cultures.	When	university	courses	were	in	session,	Emily	lived	with	relatives	not	too	far	from	the	campus,	as	she	was	from	another	part	of	Gauteng	and	did	not	want	to	commute	the	distance.	She	was	able	to	afford	her	fees	because	of	her	mother’s	job,	that	she	described	 as	 well	 paid.	 She	 was	 contemplating	 her	 future	 at	 UJ	 in	 favour	 of	another	 university	 and	 was	 thus	 not	 actively	 engaged	 member	 of	 on	 campus	organisations.	She	said	that	both	of	her	cultural	backgrounds	were	conservative,	but	 she	 believed	 that	 Afrikaners	were	 perceived	 to	 be	more	 conservative	 than	British	 in	 South	 Africa,	 especially	 because	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 traditional	Afrikaner	NG	Kerk	(Dutch	Reformed	Church	–	NGK).				
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Lady	T	(pages	117	and	118)	Lady	 T	 was	 a	 Black	 student	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 in	 2017	 in	 her	second	year,	and	she	was	not	a	member	of	any	organisations	on	campus,	nor	did	she	participate	in	the	protests,	as	she	thought	of	UJ	mostly	as	a	place	to	study	and	pass	her	 courses.	 She	 lived	with	her	 aunt,	 siblings	 and	 cousins,	 as	her	parents,	who	were	 teachers,	had	passed	away	a	 long	 time	ago.	Her	 family	depended	on	social	 grants	 and	 living	 in	 a	 township	 far	 from	 campus	 meant	 that	 she	 had	 a	stressful,	 long	 commute	 on	public	 transport	 each	day.	Not	many	 young	people	who	lived	around	her	went	to	varsity,	nor	did	other	members	in	her	immediate	family.	She	was	hoping	to	continue	studying	after	finishing	her	bachelor’s	degree,	getting	multiple	 doctorates	 and	 also	working	 and	 being	 a	mother	 at	 the	 same	time,	which	she	said	she	thought	was	doable,	but	would	make	her	life	very	busy.	
Laury	(pages	206,	208,	209	and	221)	Laury	was	 an	African	 student	whose	well-educated	 father	 lived	 and	worked	 in	another	 country,	 because	 he	was	 unable	 to	 get	 employed	 in	 South	 Africa	 as	 a	non-citizen.	 She	 could	 see	 herself	 in	 Parliament	 and	 although	 she	 was	 not	 a	member	 of	 a	 party,	 she	 engaged	 in	 campus	 societies.	 Laury	 struggled	 with	university	fees	as	a	result	of	her	family	situation,	and	nearly	did	not	return	to	UJ	for	her	second	year	 in	2017.	Nonetheless,	she	admired	her	mother	because	she	was	hustling	 to	provide	 for	 the	 family.	Without	a	matric	and	 in	charge	of	 three	children,	she	had	to	get	additional	 income	for	the	household	to	ensure	they	get	by	 and	 cooked	 traditional	 foods	 that	 she	 sold	 and	 had	 an	 informal	 tailoring	business	as	well.	
Joy	(pages	94,	130	and	131)	Joy	was	from	a	township	in	the	North-West	province,	and	whom	I	interviewed	in	March	2017.	She	was	born	in	a	township	in	Gauteng,	but	her	parents	moved	to	North	West,	where	they	lived	when	we	met.	She	was	an	NSFAS-funded	student,	and	despite	the	fact	that	neither	of	her	parents	were	formally	employed,	she	felt	their	 life	 struggles	 were	 easier	 than	 other	 people’s	 because	 her	 mother	 made	sure	 they	 did	 not	 go	 to	 bed	 hungry.	 She	 was	 engaged	 in	 student	 activism	 on	campus,	including	a	community	outreach	group,	and	she	volunteer	with	a	youth	
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organisation	off	 campus	as	well.	When	we	were	discussing	racial	 relations,	 she	mentioned	the	pain	and	hurt	she	felt	when	she	had	heard	the	stories	of	what	the	older	 generations	went	 through.	 However,	 she	 did	 not	wish	 to	 identify	with	 a	specific	race.	She	believed	that	although	race	still	mattered	in	the	country,	citing	examples	of	discrimination	that	she	had	experienced	and	witnessed,	she	believed	that	politics	was	supposed	to	be	about	ideologies.	
Juliet	(page	212)	Juliet	 an	 African	 student	 from	 rural	 parts	 of	 Mpumalanga.	 She	 lived	 with	 her	sister	and	her	grandmother,	whom	she	spoke	very	fondly	off,	and	whom	she	said	she	missed	very	much	while	 at	university.	 She	 lived	 in	 a	 small	 village,	with	no	shops	or	 other	 services.	 She	believed	 that	more	Black	Africans	were	becoming	educated,	which	meant	that	apartheid	could	not	possibly	be	repeated.	
Katleho	(pages	90	and	91)	came	across	 as	 a	 strong	 feminist.	 In	 the	debate,	 she	 called	 for	more	women	 in	politics	and	for	a	fight	against	patriarchy.	She	found	inspiration	in	many	strong	women,	 including	 Helen	 Zille.	 She	 was	 a	 DA	 supporter	 and	 believed	 Mmusi	Maimane,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 DA	 at	 the	 time,	 represented	 the	 interests	 of	 her	generation	 and	 worked	 towards	 an	 equal	 South	 Africa.	 She	 was	 living	 in	 the	suburbs,	 with	 parents,	 both	 of	 whom	 had	 some	 formal	 education	 and	 were	employed.	When	I	tried	to	reconnect	with	Katleho	in	January	2017,	she	told	me	that	she	was	not	coming	back	to	UJ	because	she	could	no	longer	afford	the	fees.	She	eventually	managed	to	resume	her	studies	and	when	we	met	several	weeks	later,	 she	 explained	 how	her	 family	 unexpectedly	 got	 into	 financial	 difficulties,	which	caused	her	concerns	over	studies.	Not	having	expected	such	situation	 to	arise,	 she	 had	 not	 applied	 for	 NSFAS	 or	 bursaries.	 In	 the	 end	 she	 came	 to	 an	arrangement	 with	 UJ	 administration	 that	 allowed	 her	 to	 continue	 and	 having	good	 marks	 qualified	 her	 for	 additional	 fee	 reduction.	 As	 she	 resumed	 her	studies,	she	was	making	the	best	out	of	her	UJ	experience,	becoming	chairperson	of	a	society	and	playing	on	a	team,	having	felt	that	in	her	first	year	she	had	too	much	free	time	and	that	she	could	use	it	to	enhance	her	career	prospects.		
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Keitumetse	(pages	139,	140	and	232)	Keitumetse	 was	 an	 African	 (black)	 law	 student	 from	 Gauteng,	 captured	 the	difference	between	the	kind	of	 information	a	student	would	like	to	know	about	women	 in	 politics	 and	 the	 information	 that	 was	 available.	 She	 grew	 up	 in	 a	township,	but	she	was	 from	a	 financially	secure	home.	Although	her	 father	and	mother	were	separated,	he	was	helping	to	pay	for	Keitumetse’s	studies.	She	grew	up	 with	 her	 mother,	 aunt	 and	 cousins,	 and	 women	 in	 her	 family	 were	 all	educated,	 be	 it	 through	 a	 college	 or	 university.	 While	 at	 UJ,	 she	 joined	 a	 day	house	 and	 was	 a	 community	 engagement	 volunteer,	 and	 she	 also	 worked	 off	campus,	especially	in	promotions.	She	said	she	did	not	believe	in	gender	norms	which	made	Black	African	women	be	submissive,	and	she	said	she	definitely	did	not	follow	the	stereotypes.	
Kiara	(pages	41,	174	and	175)	In	 February	 2017,	 Kiara	 was	 in	 her	 second	 year	 and	 joined	 a	 community	engagement	 group	 as	 a	 volunteer.	 She	 had	 her	 eyes	 set	 on	 becoming	 a	 brand	manager	 for	 a	 fashion	and	beauty	house,	 such	as	Coco	Chanel.	 She	was	 from	a	township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 was	 very	 proud	 of	 being	 from	 a	 hip	 and	 happening	location.	Kiara	 lived	with	her	mother,	grandmother	and	her	brother,	 and	while	her	 mother	 only	 had	 a	 matric,	 her	 sisters	 were	 advocates	 (higher-level	 legal	counsellors),	so	her	university	career	was	not	unprecedented	in	her	family.	She	started	her	studies	without	funding,	but	by	the	second	year	she	was	able	to	get	NSFAS	and	was	preparing	to	move	into	on-campus	residence.	
Lebo	(pages	87,	88	and	150)	Lebo	 became	 one	 of	 my	 closest	 interviewees,	 with	 whom	 I	 met	 on	 several	occasions	to	talk	about	her	efforts	to	run	a	youth	empowerment	NGO.	She	was	a	Black	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng	in	her	second	year	of	studies	in	2016.	She	worked	extremely	hard	to	set	up	an	organisation	that	sought	to	help	young	people	in	her	community	with	accessing	education	and	getting	skills	to	alleviate	poverty.	 She	was	able	 to	 live	 in	 a	 residence	on	 campus	because	of	 the	bursary	that	 she	 had	 received	 from	 the	 company,	 where	 her	 mother	 worked	 as	 an	administrative	 help.	 Growing	 up	 in	 a	 household	with	many	 single	women,	 she	
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was	shown	the	value	of	independence	and	non-reliance	on	others,	although	she	said	she	had	also	grown	up	in	a	culture	in	which	men	were	seen	as	the	leaders.	Taking	her	own	money,	 the	 little	 that	 she	had,	 she	got	 the	organisation	off	 the	ground	and	was	working	tirelessly	with	a	few	friends	to	organise	events	and	to	raise	 further	 funds	 for	 programmes.	 She	 was	 also	 a	 member	 of	 some	organisations	at	UJ,	 including	a	women’s	organisation,	which,	however,	did	not	have	much	visibility	on	campus.	
Lesego	(pages	95,	96,	200	and	201)	Lesego,	a	Black	(African)	student,	was	from	a	township	in	Gauteng,	but	she	lived	in	 a	 student	 commune	 not	 far	 from	 the	 university.	 She	 described	 her	 financial	situation	as	 ‘normal’	 and	said	 that	her	mother	was	a	hard	worker,	 and	so	 they	never	 went	 hungry	 and	 had	 a	 roof	 over	 their	 heads.	 Her	 parents	 were	 both	college-educated	and	public	 sector	 employees,	but	 she	was	 living	 just	with	her	mother,	and	as	Lesego	proudly	claimed,	she	was	both	a	 father	and	a	mother	 to	her.	Although	she	was	studying	a	degree	related	to	politics,	she	was	not	active	in	any	civic	or	political	organisations.	
Mbali	(pages	122	and	232)	Mbali	was	from	a	township	in	Gauteng	and	from	her	perspective,	she	was	from	an	average	home	as	far	as	their	economic	situation	was	concerned.	She	said	that	although	her	family	would	not	have	bread	every	once	in	a	while,	or	struggled	to	pay	for	electricity,	her	mother	was	able	to	provide	for	them.	Mbali	was	the	first	one	 in	 her	 family	 to	 go	 to	 university	 and	 she	 was	 100%	 set	 on	 becoming	 a	diplomat.	She	did	not	doubt	her	chances	 to	succeed.	She	portrayed	herself	as	a	diplomat	in	the	making	and	most	of	her	answers	and	views	were	shaped	by	this	prospect.	She	stressed	to	me	the	 importance	of	showing	South	Africa	 in	a	good	light	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	which	made	her	very	critical	of	the	behaviour	of	the	EFF	MPs	during	the	2017	SONA	debate	 in	Parliament,	when	they	disrupted	the	proceedings	 and	 badgered	 Jacob	 Zuma	 to	 show	 that	 they	 considered	 his	Presidency	 illegitimate.	Mbali	hoped	that	 in	10	years’	 time	she	would	not	be	 in	South	Africa,	but	that	she	would	be	an	ambassador	to	the	UN	and	travelling	the	world.		
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Mickey	(pages	96,	97	and	232)	Mickey,	who	did	not	personally	identify	with	a	particular	racial	category,	was	in	her	 second	 year	 in	 2017	 and	 came	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 from	financially	stable	home.	Mickey’s	mother	was	a	public	sector	employee	and	while	at	UJ	she	was	not	a	member	of	any	organisations,	but	was	studying	a	community-orientated	degree.	She	said	that	although	her	family	was	Zulu,	she	did	not	speak	the	language	as	fluently	as	she	would	like.	Moreover,	she	described	her	parents’	relationship	as	untraditional,	because	they	both	helped	each	other,	instead	of	her	father	 dominating.	 She	 spoke	 about	 her	 inability	 to	 cook	 when	 she	 moved	 to	varsity	and	the	reactions	that	she	got	from	her	fellow	students,	who	she	said	had	questioned	how	that	was	possible,	because	as	she	was	Black	woman.		
Nomthandanzo	(page	166)		Nomthandanzo	was	an	African	student	living	in	a	township	in	Gauteng.	At	19,	she	was	living	with	her	parents	and	brothers,	and	was	a	mother	to	a	baby	boy.	She	was	 studying	 to	 become	 a	 community	 worker,	 hoping	 to	 help	 others	 in	 the	future.	When	she	was	describing	her	living	situation,	she	said	she	felt	privileged	because	 unlike	 many	 other	 people	 living	 in	 townships,	 she	 had	 never	 gone	hungry,	 because	 her	mother	 had	 always	made	 sure	 that	 she	 and	 her	 brothers	were	fed,	and	that	they	even	had	cake	to	celebrate	big	achievements.	
Nonkululeko	(pages	179,	180	and	242)	Nonkululeko	was	 a	 Black	master’s	 student	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng	 and	 a	close	 friend,	 articulated	 the	 tensions	 around	 class	 identification	 of	 university	students	in	an	insightful	way.	She	and	I	would	get	into	frequent	arguments	about	what	was	important	in	life	and	what	made	someone	successful.	As	she	explained,	for	someone	like	her,	who	had	lost	her	mother	at	a	young	age	and	grew	up	with	a	father	who	did	not	put	food	on	the	table	nor	had	given	her	money	to	buy	bread,	emotional	satisfaction	came	secondary	to	financial	stability	when	thinking	about	her	future.	These	thoughts	would	even	lead	her	to	conclude	that	maybe	pursuing	a	master’s	degree	had	not	been	the	best	choice	for	her,	because	her	friends	in	the	townships	 who	 were	 no	 longer	 studying	 but	 working,	 were	 able	 to	 buy	 cars,	
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while	 she	 still	 struggled	 to	make	 ends	meet,	working	 several	 student	 jobs	 and	fighting	to	get	scholarships.		
Nos	(page	158)	Nos,	 an	 African	 student	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng,	 was	 in	 her	 second	 year	when	she	attended	one	of	the	group	discussions.	She	was	a	bursary	recipient	and	she	was	not	a	member	of	any	organisations	on	or	off	campus.	Nos	was	living	with	her	 cousin,	 as	 her	mother	 passed	 away	when	 she	was	 still	 a	 teenager	 and	 her	father	did	not	 live	with	 them.	 She	 liked	 living	 in	 a	 township	because	 it	was	 an	exciting	space,	yet	she	did	not	have	indoor	sanitation,	which	was	very	common	for	many	township	housing	units,	and	she	highlighted	how	people	living	in	other	parts	of	town	do	not	realise	how	different	life	in	a	township	was.	
Phillipine	(pages	131,	193	and	194)	Phillipine	believed	that	as	a	Black	African	woman	she	was	at	an	advantage	and	that	Black	African	women	were	being	valued	in	the	post-apartheid	era.	It	was	a	seemingly	contradictory	position	to	her	earlier	statements	during	our	interview,	when	 she	 had	 said	 that	 as	 a	 girl	 she	 had	 felt	 discriminated	 against	 at	 home.	Growing	up	 in	a	village	 in	Limpopo,	she	was	determined	to	come	to	university,	having	seen	the	situation	in	her	rural	area,	and	being	convinced	the	only	way	for	a	better	life	was	through	education.	At	UJ	she	was	not	active	in	organisations	or	political	parties,	and	she	was	able	to	study	at	UJ	only	because	she	received	NSFAS	funding,	 although	 it	 was	 not	 sufficient	 to	 ensure	 that	 she	 always	 had	 enough	money	for	food.	Growing	up,	she	said	she	had	been	expected	to	do	all	the	typical	girl	duties,	from	serving	food	to	the	men	to	doing	the	dishes,	which	made	her	feel	unequal.	 However,	 when	 I	 asked	 her	 whether	 she	 felt	 limited	 in	 her	 career	options	 as	 a	 Black	 African	 woman,	 she	 said	 that	 everyone	 was	 given	 equal	opportunities	now,	unlike	maybe	 ten	years	ago,	and	 if	 she	was	not	given	a	 job,	she	would	use	her	race	and	gender	to	fight	the	potential	discrimination.	
Sage	Marley	(pages	41,	92	and	93)	Sage	 Marley	 considered	 herself	 racially	 mixed	 (not	 Coloured),	 having	 a	 white	father	 and	 a	 Black	 African	mother,	 while	 often	 being	 racialised	 as	white.	 Sage	
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Marley	was	from	Gauteng,	and	her	journey	into	varsity	was	a	complicated	one.	It	included	armed	home	invasion,	which	affected	her	ability	to	write	final	exams	in	grade	12	and	to	obtain	matric	to	commence	her	university	studies.	Although	she	was	not	member	of	any	organisations,	she	has	always	shown	interest	in	art	that	she	wanted	to	incorporate	into	her	future	career.	She	went	to	a	high	school	that	she	 described	 as	 small,	 conservative	 Christian	 and	 racially	 mixed.	 She	 was	adamant	 about	 the	 impact	 that	 an	 early	 exposure	 to	 apartheid	 history	 had	 on	kids	in	schools.	She	thought	that	young	kids	find	friends	across	racial	groups,	but	they	 start	drawing	 lines	amongst	 themselves	 the	more	 they	get	exposed	 to	 the	narratives	 and	 histories	 of	 apartheid.	 This	 led	 her	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	apartheid	 history	 should	 not	 be	 such	 a	 dominating	 element	 in	 early	 schooling,	but	something	that	cannot	be	forgotten	nonetheless.		
Sanele	(pages	232,	241	and	242)	Sanele	did	not	have	a	bursary	or	a	job	when	we	met	during	her	first	year	at	UJ	in	2016,	nor	was	she	participating	in	organisations	on	or	off	campus.	She	lived	in	a	township,	but	she	moved	there	after	having	lived	for	several	years	in	one	of	the	richest	 neighbourhoods	 in	 Gauteng.	 Her	 parents	 were	 both	 medical	professionals,	while	her	mother	had	already	retired,	her	father	still	worked	in	the	public	sector.	She	lived	with	her	parents	and	commuted	to	the	university,	but	as	she	 explained,	 she	 was	 happy	 to	 live	 at	 home	 and	 benefit	 from	 the	 care	 and	support	of	her	family,	while	her	parents	were	trying	to	“push	her	out”	to	become	more	independent.	Looking	back	at	her	move	from	suburbia,	she	was	happy	with	the	move	 to	a	 township.	Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 she	was	 critical	of	many	people	who	lived	around	her	–	young	people	in	her	community	with	whom	she	was	not	friends.	
Sat-Ra	Nthabi	(pages	137,	141,	191,	192	and	224)	Sat-Ra	Nthabi	was	a	Black	 student	who	grew	up	 in	a	 township	 in	Gauteng	and	came	 to	 varsity	 after	 having	 worked	 for	 several	 years	 in	 administrative	 jobs,	which	she	had	realised	would	never	allow	her	to	progress	professionally.	Hence,	she	was	older	than	most	of	my	other	participants	and	one	of	a	few	students	who	were	mothers.	Despite	 the	 advice	 of	 her	 family	 that	 being	 a	 single	mother	 she	
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should	 not	 leave	 the	 safety	 and	 stability	 of	 her	 job,	 she	 had	 done	 just	 that	 in	order	to	pursue	a	degree.	She	was	very	active	and	engaged	in	student	activities,	including	holding	a	leadership	position	in	a	Black	students’	organisation	and	led	a	community-based	NGO	outside	of	the	university.	
Sinqobile	(pages	71,	203	and	234)	Sinqobile	was	 a	Black	 student	who	 lived	 at	 home	with	her	mother,	who	was	 a	cleaner.	 She	 was	 a	 pro-active	 go-getter	 from	 a	 township	 in	 Gauteng:	 she	 was	involved	in	various	on-campus	activities	and	as	she	explained,	although	she	did	not	 know	much	 about	 politics,	 she	hoped	 there	might	 be	 something	 that	 came	out	 of	 her	 participation	 in	 the	 research,	 because	 she	 believed	 that	 one	 never	knew	what	doors	such	engagement	could	open.	She	was	convinced	that	in	order	to	succeed	and	to	get	ahead	in	South	Africa,	she	had	to	be	active,	knock	on	doors	and	ask	for	things.	For	example,	she	had	gone	to	the	ANC	offices	to	ask	for	money	for	 her	 studies,	 which	 she	 never	 received	 despite	 having	 been	 promised	 by	 a	member	 of	 the	 local	 branch.	Moreover,	 she	 believed	 that	 the	ANC	 government	only	 pretended	 to	 push	 for	 women’s	 empowerment	 and	 paid	 lip	 service	 to	women’s	equality.		
Sharon	(pages	197	and	242)	Black	 African	 student,	 Sharon	 was	 living	 with	 her	 mother	 in	 a	 township	 in	Gauteng,	it	seemed	to	me	that	she	was	downplaying	what	I	perceived	as	serious	problems,	 such	 as	 debt-collectors	 knocking	 on	 their	 door,	 asking	 for	money	 to	settle	her	outstanding	bill	 for	a	 semester	 that	 she	 took	at	UNISA.	That	was	her	first	attempt	to	start	university	studies,	which,	however,	fell	through	because	the	money	she	had	been	promised	by	allegedly	politically	connected	individuals	did	not	materialise.	 She	 saw	her	mother	 as	 a	 superwoman	 –	with	 no	 education	 or	jobs,	her	mother	pulled	Sharon	and	her	brother	through,	after	her	father	passed	away	when	she	was	seven.	
Taneeka	(pages	121,	122	and	125)	Taneeka’s	mother	was	a	housewife	with	a	high	school	certificate,	and	her	father	was	the	sole	provider	in	the	household,	working	in	accounting	and	finance.	They	
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lived	 in	 an	 Indian/Asian	 township	 in	 Gauteng,	 and	 although	 she	 needed	 a	bursary	 to	 study,	 she	did	not	describe	 their	 circumstances	as	being	poor.	After	high	school,	she	did	not	know	what	she	wanted	to	do	so	she	spent	two	years	after	matric	working.	She	took	the	only	job	she	was	offered,	which	was	in	her	uncle’s	accounting	 company.	Having	 enjoyed	her	 experience	 and	 thinking	 that	 the	pay	was	 decent,	 she	 had	 saved	 some	 money	 and	 started	 her	 diploma	 course.	Taneeka’s	 future	goals	 included	having	her	own	accounting	 firm,	and	“being	an	awesome	boss,”	while	at	the	same	time	being	a	mother	and	running	a	household	–	time-demanding	responsibilities	that	she	believed	were	achievable.		
Thando	(pages	53,	54,	56	and	57)		Thando	was	an	African	young	woman	from	KZN,	whose	family	was	closely	tied	to	the	 ruling	ANC,	as	her	parents	worked	 in	 the	public	 sector.	Yet	Thando	herself	was	not	actively	involved	in	political	parties	or	student	organisations	at	UJ.	She	believed	 that	 African	 culture,	 especially	 customs	 and	 traditions	 such	 as	slaughtering	 or	 black	 magic,	 had	 been	 forgotten	 and	 devalued	 under	 the	influence	 of	 colonial	 Christian	 conversion.	 During	 our	 interview,	 some	 of	 her	answers	made	me	suspect	that	the	racial	difference	between	us	mattered	to	her,	so	at	 the	end	of	 the	 conversation	 I	directly	asked	her	whether	 she	would	have	said	 things	 differently	 had	 I	 been	 Black	 African.	 Her	 response	 caught	 me	 off	guard,	because	we	had	met	twice	before	–	once	in	her	FGD	and	another	time	for	an	 informal	hang-out	with	her	and	her	 friend	 just	before	Christmas	2016.	Back	then	we	 spoke	about	our	 families,	 holiday	 traditions	 and	 I	 thought	 it	was	very	clear	 that	 I	 was	 a	 foreigner,	 with	 very	 different	 customs,	 worldviews	 and	personal	 histories	 from	most	 white	 South	 Africans.	 Nonetheless,	 she	 admitted	that	she	censored	herself,	that	she	expressed	things	differently,	because	she	did	not	know	whether	I	would	get	offended	as	a	white	person,	and	a	white	Christian	more	specifically.		
Thato	(pages	245	and	246)	Thato	was	a	student	from	a	township	in	Gauteng,	who	was	studying	in	order	to	be	able	to	get	a	job	as	a	community	worker.	She	was	a	member	of	a	volunteering	society	 for	 community	 engagement,	 and	 she	 even	 joined	 a	 student	 political	
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organisation,	which	she	explained	however,	 as	a	practical	 choice,	 rather	 than	a	reflection	of	her	political	commitments	and	values.	She	was	the	first	one	 in	her	family	 to	 go	 to	 university	 and	 she	 had	 to	 take	 a	 gap	 year	 after	 matriculating,	because	she	did	not	have	enough	money	to	pay	for	her	studies	at	the	time.	As	she	wanted	to	help	other	people,	 it	was	 important	 for	her	 to	see	women	 in	politics	help	other	women	and	she	believed	that	FPEs	as	leaders	had	to	inspire	others	–	being	 inspirational,	 empowering	 and	 encouraging	 were	 qualities	 that	 she,	 as	many	others,	expected	of	an	ideal	FPE.	
Thobile	(pages	194,	195	and	221)	Thobile	was	an	African	student	from	Mpumalanga,	but	she	lived	not	too	far	from	the	university	 in	 a	 student	 commune.	 She	was	 able	 to	 finance	her	 first	 year	 of	studies	 through	 instalments	with	 the	 assistance	 of	 her	 father	who	 encouraged	her	to	get	educated	and	go	to	university,	when	she	had	been	hesitant	during	her	high	 school	 years.	 For	 her	 second	 year,	 she	was	waiting	 for	 NSFAS	 funding	 to	come	through	when	we	met,	as	 late	as	 in	March	2017,	nearly	month	and	a	half	into	the	first	semester.	During	her	time	at	UJ,	she	was	pursuing	a	degree	that	was	connected	 to	politics,	and	after	struggling	 to	adjust	 to	 the	workload	 in	 the	 first	year,	she	was	coping	well,	although	she	was	not	spending	time	in	organisations	or	societies.	
Tshiamo	(pages	123	–	124,	and	168)	Tshiamo	found	herself	studying	a	degree	in	Politics	after	a	few	years	of	trying	to	get	 into	 varsity	 for	 a	 Law	 degree.	 Unexpectedly,	 she	 ended	 up	 coming	 to	 UJ	despite	 getting	 into	 a	 law	 programme	 at	 another	 institution,	 because	 she	 had	fallen	in	love	with	the	university	which	she	said	became	more	important	to	her	than	her	love	for	law.	Yet,	she	did	not	give	up	on	law	completely,	because	she	was	still	 considering	pursuing	 it	after	 finishing	her	current	degree.	Tshiamo	was	an	African	student	from	the	Free	State,	who	described	her	neighbourhood	as	middle	class	 with	 pockets	 of	 poverty.	 Her	 father	worked	 for	 the	 government	 and	 her	mother	was	a	teacher,	which	allowed	her	to	go	to	a	well-funded	high	school	and	even	 take	 some	 college	 courses	 before	 enrolling	 in	 university.	While	 at	UJ,	 she	was	 not	 a	member	 of	 an	 organisation	 or	 a	 society.	 She	was	 not	 sure	what	 she	
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could	do	with	her	degree	in	Politics,	especially	because	she	was	uncertain	if	she	was	 passionate	 enough	 about	 it,	 although	 she	 enjoyed	 the	 modules	 she	 was	taking.	
Zanele	(page	239)	Zanele’s	had	decided	to	come	to	UJ	from	KZN	to	get	away	from	her	family,	gain	independence	 and	 to	 study	 a	 degree	 that	 her	 mother	 disapproved	 of.	 She	considered	her	mother	to	be	an	elite,	having	managed	to	provide	a	good	life	for	Zanele	 and	 her	 siblings	without	 her	 husband,	 Zanele’s	 father,	who	 had	 passed	away	when	she	was	a	child.	While	still	in	her	first	year	of	university,	Zanele	said	she	 took	 on	 a	 role	 of	 a	 lay	 preacher	 in	 her	 res.	 She	 said	 she	was	 in	 favour	 of	women	taking	leadership	positions,	but	not	in	an	equal	measure	as	men,	because	of	their	emotions.	The	most	important	leadership	positions	should,	according	to	her,	be	taken	by	men.		 	
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Focus	Group	Discussions	Schedule	and	Questions	
Introductions:			
• Introduce	myself	and	research	objectives:	Students’	perceptions	of	FPEs	and	the	current	political	situation	more	broadly	
o Explain	why	participants	were	selected	(age/gender/	first	–	second	year)	
o Explain	their	inputs	and	contributions	towards	the	project	overall	(interviews	next	year)	
o Give	opportunity	to	ask	questions	about	the	research		
Consent:		
• Circulate/	Give	each	participant	the	consent	form	(circulated	previously	via	email	to	all	as	they	signed	up)	and	go	through	the	document,	especially	explain:	
o Recording	–	data	storage	(Password	protected;	might	be	archived)	
o Confidentiality		
§ need	to	commit	to	confidentiality	amongst	the	group	members	in	order	to	create	a	safe	space	conducive	to	open	discussions;	
§ 	give	them	a	warning	about	what	they	say,	that	they	might	have	shared	friends	and	acquaintances	without	them	knowing	it	
§ Pseudonyms	(refer	to	info	sheet)	and	sharing	of	findings,		
§ Personal	details,	which	could	lead	to	their	identification,	will	be	carefully	considered	and	removed	as	necessary	because	the	research	findings	will	be	shared	with	all	the	participants	and	are	also	expected	to	be	published	for	academic	consumption	in	South	Africa	
o Voluntary	participation	-	don’t	have	to	answer,	can	leave	and	can	withdraw	until	Sept	2017	
• No	benefits	for	the	lectures/	classes;	no	reporting	to	teachers;	etc.	
• Give	opportunity	to	ask	questions		
• At	the	end:	ask	them	to	cross	out	in	form	and	sign	–	collect	the	forms;		
	
Other	Practicalities	
• Circulate	information	sheet:	fully	voluntary	and	will	not	impact	on	the	students’	participation	in	the	FGD.		
• Ground	rules:	Respect	
• Me	taking	notes	–	not	to	be	disturbed,	nothing	wrong	etc.	
	
Quick	Break	
	
Participants	introduce	themselves:	Share	name	and	interesting	fact	
	
Discussion		
• Icebreaker:	Spend	a	few	minutes	talking	about	Fees	Must	Fall	and	about	talking	politics	–	ask	them	to	share	past	experiences,	check	if	any	anxieties	about	talking	about	politics			
• Who	do	you	think	is	an	FPE?		
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o Examples/	names	–	why?		
o What	makes	an	FPE?		
o What	kind	of	characteristics	do	they	have?	
o How	do	they	act?	How	do	they	behave?	
o What	do	they	do	in	politics?	What	makes	them	political?		
• If	specific	people	are	not	being	mentioned,	ask	about	specific	individuals:	
o From	Political	parties:		
§ Bathabile	Dlamini;	Baleka	Mbete;	Dlamini	Zuma;	(ANC	WL);	Thoko	Didiza	
§ Hellen	Zille;	Lindiwe	Mazibuko;	Patricia	de	Lille;	Pumzila	van	Damme	(DA)	
§ Hlengiwe	Maxon,	Magdelene	Moonsamy	(EFF)	
o Other	public	officials:	Thuli	Madonsela	(PP);	Jiba	(NPA);	Phiyega	(Police)	
o Media:	Ranjeny	Munusamy	(DM);	Marianne	Thamm	(DM);	Khadija	Patel	(Daily	Vox);	Iman	Rapetti	(eNCA);	Nontobeko	Sibisi	(enca	doek);	Pontsho	Pilane	(M&G)	
o NGOs/	Civil	Society:	Koketso	Moeti	(Amandla	Mobi);		
o Economic	Figures:	Lynette	Ntuli	(CEO	Investment	Solutions);	Wendy	Ackerman	(Pick	n	Pay);	Irene	Charnley	(MTN);	Judy	Dlamini	(Pharmacare)	
o Traditional	Leaders	(Balobedu	Rain	Queen:	Modjadji)	Noluntu	Dalindyebo	(baThembu	king	Buyelekhaya’s	wife);	VaVhenda	(Masindi	fighting	to	be	first	queen)	
o Student	political	leaders:	Simamkele	Dlakavu	(EFF	–	Remember	Khwezi);	Shaeera	Kalla	(Wits	SRC	–	FMF);	Nompendulo	(Ulo)	Mkhatshwa	(Wits	SRC	–	FMF);	SA	Union	of	Students’	Fasiha	Hassan	(WITS	SRC	Secretary)	
o Apartheid	Figures:	Winnie	Mandela,	Helen	Joseph;	Mamphela	Ramphele;	Albertina	Sisulu,	Ruth	First,	Graca	Machel;	
o Other:	Dr	Phumzile	Mlambo-Ngcuka	(UN	Women/	former	ANC	Mbeki)		
• How	are	they	treated?		
o What	do	other	people	think	about	FPEs?	
o Are	they	different	from	male	politicians?	
o Do	they	pursue	specific	policies?	
o Do	FPEs	protest	or	do	they	only	act	in	official	politics?	
o Can	women	be	successful	in	politics?	
o What	do	other	politicians	say	about	women?	
o Are	women	treated	differently?	are	they	disempowered?	
o Use	an	example	of	a	recent	event	or	an	issue,	which	will	be	dominating	the	news	of	the	time	in	which	FPEs	feature	
§ Baleka	Mbete’s	wedding	and	Birthday	
§ Winnie	Mandela’s	Birthday	–	mother	of	the	nation		
• How	would	they	act	in	a	certain	situation	or	in	contrast,	how	would	the	participants	handle	a	situation	differently	from	the	political	elite	being	discussed	
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• Can	you	imagine	being	an	FPE?	
o Are	FPE	someone	like	you?		
§ Race,	class,	location/ethnicity,	religion,	et.	
§ Motherhood/	femininity	
§ Modernity	(connected	to	age)	
• University	students	as	the	new	elites	–	do	you	agree?		
• Would	like/	want	to	be	like	the	FPEs?		
o Achieve	their	success?	Take	their	paths?	Would	you	want	to	work	in	such	environment	(politics/patriarchy)?	
	
Conclusions:		
• Questions		
• Feedback	form,	as	they	fill	out:	
• Reiterate	the	future	processes,	including	the	further	selection	of	participants	for	the	second	stage	of	interviews	in	new	year	and	that	I	will	be	reconnecting	with	most	of	them	in	January	2017.		
• Encourage	them	to	get	in	touch	to	meet	with	me	separately	to	provide	comments	and	feedback	through	email.		
o All	my	contact	details	are	on	the	consent	form;	encourage	them	to	keep	the	copy	of	the	form	
o Encourage	them	to	stay	in	touch	for	any	other	concerns	they	might	want	to	discuss	(e.g.	doing	research,	future	studies,	etc.)		 	
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Interview	Schedule	and	Questions		
Introduction		
• Re-introduce	the	research	and	myself		
o Name,	SOAS-	Centre	for	Gender	studies;	Second	year	PhD	etc.	
o The	research	objectives:	Student	lives	and	perceptions	of	female	political	elites	
o The	reasons	for	the	selection	in	the	second	phase,	explain	their	inputs	and	contributions	towards	the	larger	research	objective,	Age	–	under	35	youth;	1st/2nd	year	–	continued	next	academic	year;	South	African		
	
Review	Consent	
• Recording	–	data	storage	(Password	protected;	might	be	archived)	
• Confidentiality	through	pseudonyms	and	sharing	of	findings,		
o Confirm	continued	use	of	pseudonym/name		
o Personal	details,	which	could	lead	to	their	identification,	will	be	carefully	considered	and	removed	as	necessary	because	the	research	findings	will	be	shared	with	all	the	participants	and	are	also	expected	to	be	published	for	academic	consumption	in	South	Africa	
• Voluntary-	don’t	have	to	answer,	can	leave	and	can	withdraw	until	Sept	2017	
• No	benefits	for	the	lectures/	classes;	no	reporting	to	teachers;	etc.	
• Questions:	Encourage	them	to	ask	throughout	the	interview	as	well!	
• Sign	the	form		
Interview:	
• Ice-Breakers		
o How	were	the	holidays?	Where/	what	did	you	do?	
o How	did	the	end	of	last	year	go	for	you?		
o What	did	you	think	about	the	group	discussion?	
• Tell	me	about	yourself	(check	data	from	personal	forms)	
o What	do	you	study?	Do	you	do	any	activities?	How	do	you	find	studies	at	UJ?	
o Home	information	–	where	are	you	from;	religion/	socio-economic/	race;	marital	status	and	children		
• Journey	of	getting	into	university	
o Was	it	difficult	getting	into	university?	
o How	was	the	decision	made?		
o Who	were	the	main	people	in	that	decision-making	process?	
o What	did	you	think	about	when	you	were	making	the	decision?	
• Other	decisions	/	situations	
o What	were	some	of	the	decisions	in	your	life?		
o How	do	you	feel	about	this	decision?	
§ Would	you	change	it?		
§ How?	What	is	stopping	you?	
• Other	women	in	decision	making	
o Do	you	draw	inspirations	from	other	women?		
o Would	these	women	make	the	decisions	differently?	
• FPEs	
o What	makes	an	FPE?		
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o What	kind	of	characteristics	do	they	have?	
o How	do	they	act?	How	do	they	behave?	
o What	do	they	do	in	politics?	What	makes	them	political?	
o How	are	they	treated?		
o What	do	other	people	think	about	FPEs?	
o Are	they	different	from	male	politicians?	
o Do	they	pursue	specific	policies?	
o Do	FPEs	protest	or	do	they	only	act	in	official	politics?	
o Can	women	be	successful	in	politics?	
o What	do	other	politicians	say	about	women?	
o Are	women	treated	differently?	Are	they	disempowered?	
o Use	an	example	of	a	recent	event	or	an	issue,	which	will	be	dominating	the	news	of	the	time	in	which	FPEs	feature		
§ Nkosazana	Zuma	as	new	ANC	successor	vs.	Baleka	Mbete	
§ Hillary	Clinton	not	getting	the	presidency	
§ Bathabile	Dlamini	–Social	Development	
§ Thuli	Madonsela	and	new	PP	–	track	record	since	FGD	
o Can	you	imagine	being	an	FPE	
§ Are	FPE	someone	like	you?	explore	issues	of	race,	class,	location/ethnicity,	religion,	et.	Motherhood/	femininity’	Modernity	(connected	to	age)	
o University	students	as	the	new	elites	–	do	you	agree?		
§ What	did	you	think	about	the	FMF	last	year?		
§ What	do	you	expect	this	year?	
o Would	like	or	want	to	be	like	the	FPEs?	Achieve	their	success?	Take	their	paths?	Would	want	to	work	in	such	environment	(politics/patriarchy)?	
o Are	there	any	FPEs	that	you	find	inspirational?		
o Representation	
§ Can	FPEs	who	are	not	like	you,	represent	you?	Religion/	Class/	Race/	Gender	
• Future:		
o What	would	you	like	to	do?	Achieve?		
o Where	do	you	see	yourself	in	5	years?	
o What	do	you	have	to	do	to	get	there?	
o What	decisions	are	you	expecting	to	make	to	get	there?	
o Planning	in	South	Africa	–	is	it	possible	to	have	a	plan/	vision	for	your	life?	
	
Conclusions:	
• Ask	if	there	are	any	questions	/	comments	
• Reiterate	the	future	processes,	
o Potential	another	interview,	but	in	general	this	is	it		
o Stay	in	touch	for	any	other	concerns	they	might	want	to	discuss	(e.g.	doing	research,	future	studies,	etc.)	
o Let	me	know	if	want	to	engage,	review	transcript,	etc.	
